Strategia

The 2025 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) is centered on the "America First" principle and demands greater strategic autonomy from its European allies, whom President Donald Trump is pressing to take charge of their own defense on their continent. Washington would thus have its hands free to focus first on its domestic situation and on the American continent, infiltrated by China and Russia, and then on the Pacific Basin. To this end, it needs to reduce its involvement in the Middle East and keep it sustainably stable. For this purpose, the definitive neutralization of the threat from Iran and Hezbollah is essential. A weakened Iran would pave the way for an unprecedented expansion of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. The Abraham Accords Initiated during President Trump's first term, the Abraham Accords mark a break from the traditional "Land for Peace" diplomacy (or "a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza for Peace"), in favor of a "Peace through Prosperity" approach, which means: prosperity instead of a State for the Palestinians. At the current stage, the Abraham Accords encompass Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and Kazakhstan. They aim to seal an Arab-Islamic-Israeli security bloc, or a "regional NATO", including Israel and the Arab countries, capable of self-regulating the Middle East and autonomously containing Iran. This would allow the United States to reduce its ground forces, save billions, while maintaining a moderating role in the region, to retreat to its "America First" priority, and to pivot toward Asia to counter China without leaving a security vacuum that Tehran or Moscow could fill. Still within the framework of this strategy, Turkey is an indispensable partner for Washington, serving as a vital counterweight against Iran and Russia, despite Ankara's ideological dimension and persistent tensions over the Kurdish issue. The blockade against Iran: a strategy of strangulation but with flaws Iran is in a situation of critical economic survival facing the American naval blockade established on April 13, 2026. This blockade does not stop at the Strait of Hormuz but extends to the Gulf of Oman, and prohibits oil tankers and other ships from anchoring at the ports of Jask and Chabahar, located outside the Persian Gulf. In principle, this paralyzes almost all of Iran's maritime imports and exports, especially oil. Faced with this naval blockade, Tehran can technically hold out for a few months thanks to revenues secured by the surge in oil barrel prices between February and mid-April 2026, which partially offset the drop in exported volumes. Iran's daily losses amount to approximately 435 million dollars. Tehran had anticipated this scenario by developing infrastructure to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but their capacity remains largely insufficient. This involves the Caspian Sea, which offers a route to Russia and Kazakhstan, but supplies through this route remain marginal compared to national needs. Then there are the railways and roads connecting Iran to Turkey, Iraq, and Turkmenistan to import consumer goods and export non-oil products. These alternative routes absolutely cannot compensate for the Persian Gulf, through which 90% of Iranian oil transited before the crisis. Another strategy pursued by Tehran to break the blockade and bypass international sanctions is the "ghost fleet" (or dark fleet), which is the pillar of the regime's economic survival and the financing of its regional allies, notably Hezbollah. This is a vast clandestine network of 320 oil tankers on which Iran depends to export its crude. To escape international and American surveillance, the tankers of this dark fleet deploy sophisticated camouflage tactics by disabling their signaling systems to become "invisible" or by resorting to the falsification of their GPS geographic coordinates. The oil is then transferred on the high seas, via transshipment, to other tankers aimed at masking the Iranian origin of the cargo. This system is reinforced by the recurrent use of flags of convenience (Panama, Liberia, Cook Islands) and shell companies based in Dubai or Hong Kong, allowing for frequent changes of identity and ownership. Despite the draconian American naval blockade, this fleet demonstrates persistent efficiency. According to Lloyd's, 29 to 35 tankers from the dark fleet have reportedly already managed to bypass the American naval deployment to deliver their crude to China. This shadow logistics thus allows Tehran to maintain vital emergency revenues, defying the total economic asphyxiation aimed for by the American administration. However, the US Navy has already seized six ships from this ghost fleet and turned away 29 other regular tankers that tried to bypass the blockade. Be that as it may, without a lifting of the blockade or a massive diplomatic intervention, the economic asphyxiation of Iran could become irreversible by the summer of 2026. Iran is therefore strangled but shows no apparent sign of weakening. However, the eyes of both Washington and Tehran are discreetly turned toward China. The role of China: a solution looms on the horizon Today, China stands out as Iran's main client and sole economic shield. At the same time, Beijing needs the United States market, the largest in the world, to balance its economy. Washington also needs China to provide American citizens with economic goods at affordable prices. This gives China the capacity to act as a pragmatic mediator in the current crisis. Sino-Iranian ties are a true lifeline for the Islamic Republic, and Sino-American ties are leaning toward appeasement. In 2025, China absorbed nearly 90% of Iranian oil exports via the ghost fleet, but this is only a fraction of Chinese imports. Furthermore, fearing the disruption of its global energy supplies and its exports, China has hinted that it promises to materialize the 400 billion dollars of investments in Iran initially planned in 2021, in exchange for flexibility on the part of the Iranians. President Trump has moreover credited Beijing with having facilitated the April 2026 ceasefire. Additionally, China avoids any direct military support to Tehran and has eased tensions around Taiwan. The US administration stays the course on the NSS For its part, Washington uses commercial interdependence with China as a silent pressure weapon, continuing to impose sanctions prohibiting China's access to American technologies and equipment, and limiting vital Chinese exports to the United States. Already in 2025, these exports had decreased by 37 billion dollars compared to 2024. Last October, in Seoul, Trump and Xi Jinping met and reduced sanctions on both sides. They were supposed to meet again in April 2026 to continue the detente in their trade war, but this summit was postponed following the Iran war. The lifting of American sanctions imposed on China is a strategic need for Xi Jinping, who finds himself forced to play the role of moderator and put pressure on Iran. From a geopolitical perspective, by thus stabilizing the Middle East through joint Sino-American pressure, America secures a balanced relationship with its Asian rival, as stipulated in the 2025 NSS.

In a forthcoming series of articles, we intend to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of impassioned, ideological, or romanticized narratives that overlook the realities on the ground. Our aim is to give readers the tools to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously challenge the sterile rhetoric of “resistance” – not with counter-rhetoric, but through a deeper approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built on sovereignty. To understand the present, few things are as revealing as revisiting contemporary history, which continues to shape collective memory. The wars between Israel and Hezbollah deserve a closer look – beginning with the first conflict in 1993, along with the key events that preceded it, not to mention Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on 25 May 2000, and the preceding and subsequent events, including the wars of 1996, 2006, 2023–2024, and 2026. Thirty-three years of conflict may seem chaotic at first glance, but in reality, they follow a clear pattern, orchestrated behind the scenes by the Mullahs in Tehran. Events continue to unfold within a complex tableau, where local, regional, and international interests intersect. As an international actor, the United States – an unrivaled global power since 1990 – has long also played a regional role, for better or worse, exerting influence across nearly every country in the region except Iran, while maintaining military bases throughout the Arab world. The interests of Washington, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Riyadh, and Tehran intersect, converge, diverge, pull apart, and clash in constant flux, while Lebanon’s singular interest – its sovereignty, denied for more than 50 years, and the subsequent rebuilding of its state institutions – remains unfulfilled. Numerous non-state actors in Lebanon, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and other illegal armed groups, as well as Lebanese parties allied with Hezbollah, often supported or tolerated by one regional power or another, have played major roles over the past decades, obstructing Lebanon’s path to sovereignty. Opportunities to reclaim that sovereignty, which have emerged repeatedly over the years, have been consistently thwarted by local decision-makers – by incompetence, narrow self-interest, cowardice, greed, or divided loyalties. Hezbollah’s Three Agendas Hezbollah continues to pursue three parallel agendas. The first, regional, centers on meddling in Arab countries to destabilize them in Iran’s favor – particularly Iraq, along Iran’s western border – with the aim of preventing the rise of an any new leader in the mold of Saddam Hussein, a nightmare for Tehran’s Mullahs. The second, focused on Israel, relies on a rhetoric of resistance – used to support a local agenda that is ultimately Hezbollah’s hegemony over Lebanon. Its supporters, driven by a religious ideology beyond debate, are convinced they are carrying out a divine mission, modeled on Iran, where a state exists in name but key decisions are made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a state within a state with extensive social, economic, security, and military ramifications. The Lebanese model envisioned by the pro-Iranian party is a façade state, handling day-to-day and ceremonial affairs, while Hezbollah operates both within and outside the state, with its militia and political, cultural, and social institutions. In practice, it is Hezbollah that makes strategic decisions and projects them onto Parliament and the government. For its supporters, the party thus embodies sovereignty, provides social and security guarantees, and, above all, advances their ideological ambitions. This issue is at the heart of current events, yet the “divine” party’s four-decade trajectory, which has led to today’s situation, deserves careful scrutiny, especially for the generations of Lebanese born under its hegemony. For them, Hezbollah is part of everyday life, and for some, coexistence with the party’s arms in the name of a resistance that has dragged on for 44 years seems acceptable. In this context, certain figures are particularly instructive: The war that ended with the Treaty of Westphalia lasted 30 years (1618–1648); World War I, four years; World War II, six years; the First Indochina War (France vs. Viet Minh), nine years; the Vietnam War (United States vs. North Vietnam), ten years; and the Arab-Israeli conflict (excluding Palestine), 25 years. It is clear that for the past 44 years, Hezbollah has drawn its legitimacy only in the shadow of a state of belligerency. Accordingly, it has little incentive to end its conflicts with Israel. It is now evident that only the Lebanese themselves can resolve their issues, by ending the state of war with the Israeli state, without necessarily negotiating a formal peace treaty. Six Arab countries have already taken this path ahead of Beirut. Lebanon could achieve the same, with the support of these Arab states and other friend nations. The Taif Agreement To revisit recent history, the starting point must be the Taif Agreement, signed on 22 October 1989 in Saudi Arabia with American endorsement. Its aim was to end the fifteen years of successive wars in Lebanon. The two final conflicts that hastened the signing and forceful implementation of the agreement were among the most devastating: the Lebanese–Syrian “War of Liberation” and the intra-Lebanese “War of Elimination.” These wars threatened to divide the Arab states and undermine a complex regional stabilization process desired by Washington and Riyadh following the conclusion of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. Implementation of the agreement, stalled for months, became a priority for its sponsors after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. For all regional and international players, it was essential to halt the ongoing wars in Lebanon after the agreement’s signing. Consequently, the international and Arab community gave the green light to Baathist Syria to impose stability in Lebanon by military means, in exchange for its alignment with the Arab–international coalition against Iraq aimed at liberating Kuwait. On 13 October 1990, Damascus forces thus invaded Baabda Palace and the Ministry of National Defense, both controlled by the Lebanese military government headed by General Michel Aoun. A few months later, in early 1991, Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait, and parts of Iraq were occupied by the anti-Saddam coalition. The outcome was the weakening of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the subsequent rise of Iran and its ally Hezbollah. This period marked the beginning of the wars waged by Hezbollah against Israel – and vice versa – before and after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on 24 May 2000. This period witnessed a global upheaval, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the weakening of the USSR and its regional allies, including Iraq and Syria, followed by Syria’s rapprochement with the United States, which granted it greater freedom of action in Lebanon. In addition, the Gulf countries, allied with the United States – which had become unrivaled on the international stage – aligned themselves with Assad’s Syria and gave Iran room to maneuver its confrontation with Saddam’s Iraq. This fundamentally altered reality was misread by General Aoun’s military government at the time, culminating in the disaster of 13 October 1990. (to be continued)

In a series of articles, we aim to shed light on the current situation in light of the past, moving beyond impassioned, ideological, or romanticized rhetoric that misses the mark and leaves the reader to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously counter the sterile rhetoric of resistance, not with counter-rhetoric, but with an in-depth approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built upon sovereignty. The first two articles presented a reinterpretation of the events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through Operation "Settling of Accounts" and the "July Agreement" (1993), up to the eve of its second war with Israel. Stage 3: Hezbollah's Guerrilla War Against Oslo and Madrid For three years following Operation "Settling of Accounts" (July 1993), the implementation of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel progressed only sluggishly, catalyzed by Washington, which maintained its strategy at all costs to contain the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in order to prevent it from derailing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, while simultaneously seeking to advance rapprochement efforts between Tel Aviv and Damascus. Furthermore, Washington and Tel Aviv openly discussed the imminent possibility of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, in light of news from Lebanon indicating that the Syrian Ba'athist army had launched a campaign of repression against Hezbollah. Later, this news turned out to be disinformation orchestrated by the Iranians, with the complicity of Hafez al-Assad. To lend credibility to its deceptions, Tehran leaked information suggesting that Iran would now deliver military aid to Hezbollah through channels other than Syria, implying that Syria was willing to reduce tensions in southern Lebanon. To further convince observers of Syria's good intentions, the Iranians did indeed send a shipment of weapons, which was intercepted in Turkey, much to Ankara's dismay. In reality, the Syrians were playing two contradictory cards: on the one hand, the card of peace, which allowed them to manipulate Washington, and on the other hand, the card of the failure of the peace negotiations. The Americans, having believed that the Syrians had chosen peace, were convinced that their pressure on Tel Aviv and Damascus had borne fruit… when in fact, this was not the case. Hafez al-Assad was actually preparing for the failure of the Oslo and Madrid processes, drawing ever closer to Iran and meeting secretly with Saddam Hussein, who was under American sanctions. Taking advantage of the American strategy of appeasement and convinced of the limits of Washington's pressure, Assad and Tehran advanced their interests in Lebanon, especially by supporting, arming, and strengthening Hezbollah. Between 1993 and 1996, Hezbollah waged a war of attrition against the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the Israeli army, using rockets, missiles, and explosive roadside bombs. The SLA and the IDF, for their part, retaliated with artillery and air power. The belligerents tried to spare civilians in accordance with the "July 1993 Agreement," but to no avail. In each clash, the United States intervened swiftly and acted as mediator, preventing Israel from escalating its reprisals beyond a critical point. By early 1996, the Israeli death toll was rising. Since the end of Operation "Settling Accounts," and due to Hezbollah's advanced tactics, 210 Israeli soldiers and 110 SLA soldiers had been killed; in addition, between 60 and 80 Lebanese civilians had fallen inside and outside the "security zone," killed by random strikes or explosives. For its part, Hezbollah lost 200 fighters, including operatives assassinated, others captured, and still others who escaped capture attempts. Step 4: Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” Operation against Hezbollah The second Hezbollah-Israel war, dubbed Operation “Grapes of Wrath” (April 11–27, 1996), ended the “July Agreement” and represented a major escalation aimed at changing the rules of the game between the two sides. Israel’s objective was to pressure Lebanon and Syria to contain Hezbollah operations. During this operation, the Israeli Air Force carried out 1,800 sorties, targeted 500 objectives including both civilian and military infrastructure, and displaced 400,000 civilians—a figure that corresponds exactly to the current situation, in addition to the razing of villages in the south. The culmination of this war was the Israeli artillery bombardment of a UNIFIL center in the town of Qana, where hundreds of civilians were seeking refuge, resulting in the deaths of 106 people. Israel claimed it was a blunder, while Hezbollah called the incident deliberate. Nevertheless, the Qana massacre sparked enormous international pressure, leading to a ceasefire. Operation Grapes of Wrath failed to stop Katyusha rocket fire on Israel and ended after sixteen days of fighting with an unsigned written agreement, dubbed the "April Agreement," brokered by France and the United States. This agreement stipulated a fragile and ill-defined rule of engagement: "Hezbollah will not fire from populated areas, and Israel will not bomb populated areas." Furthermore, a committee comprising the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel was established to monitor violations and investigate complaints. It bears a striking resemblance to the "Mechanism" established by the November 2024 ceasefire, which followed the Gaza War and comprised the same members, with the exception of Syria, and the addition of UNIFIL. Separated by 33 years, these two committees proved ineffective in halting hostilities. The "April 1996 Agreement" affirmed Hezbollah's right to act against military targets within the "security zone" south of the Litani River, occupied by Israel and held by the SLA, while sparing civilians and residential areas on both sides of the river as well as in Israel. This agreement was considered a major turning point because it implicitly legitimized Hezbollah operations against the IDF and the SLA inside Lebanese territory and indirectly amplified Iran's growing influence in Lebanon. Indeed, Tehran was the big winner of this agreement and proved to its Syrian and Palestinian allies, as well as its American and Israeli enemies, that it could initiate wars through its proxies, and consequently torpedo the Oslo and Madrid peace processes. Curiously, the cessation of hostilities and the continuation of Hezbollah's activities perfectly aligned with American objectives of pressuring Israel to make concessions to Syria and encouraging Syria to reach a peace agreement with Israel (to be continued). Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In Lebanon, the ceasefire proclaimed by Donald Trump, which came into effect on Thursday night to Friday, and President Joseph Aoun's message to the nation on Friday, applauded by sovereignist leaders and many editorialists alike, have rekindled public hope. Hezbollah was quick to vehemently criticize the presidential speech, even resorting to threats, although its name was not explicitly mentioned once. This speech, commendable in itself, however, recalls the inauguration speech of January 9, 2025, which has still not been implemented. Donald Trump will invite President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the White House for direct negotiations. Talks between belligerents always begin with contradictory positions, generally followed by a compromise. This is usually in favor of the stronger party but provides guarantees to the weaker party, when a true will for a solution exists. Before engaging in the exercise of predicting the results of the planned Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, it is appropriate to recall previous regional peace talks. Egypt has been at peace with Israel for 48 years and Jordan for 32 years. At the time of signing the peace treaties, both states were accused of all evils by countries claiming to be part of the “front of refusal.” The Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords have been stalled for 33 years, due to a lack of Israeli will and Palestinian divisions. The Abraham Accords for normalization, signed by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco with Israel, are working very well despite the Gaza war triggered by the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7, 2023. Following this war, however, Saudi Arabia has frozen the opening of normalization talks with Israel. Bashar al-Assad's Syria had calculated that it was in its interest not to sign peace agreements with Israel, to maintain an extremist posture, and to ally with Iran. Assad had two priorities: first, to preserve his regime and ensure its succession for the benefit of his son; second, to maintain his grip on Lebanon. He had estimated that the only way to secure these objectives was not to engage in a peace that could threaten his regime, which, deprived of the state of belligerence with Israel, could no longer justify either its hold on Lebanon or its internal repressions. The will to reach a peace agreement on both sides is therefore the key to the success of future Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. This peace would deprive Hezbollah of its “resistance” rhetoric and the legitimization of its militia structure. The pro-Iranian group would have to change its discourse and perhaps abandon its raison d'être. Consequently, it should not be expected to make concessions. Moreover, it clearly states that it wants neither negotiations nor peace. So what will the Lebanese state do during the Washington talks? It is absolutely clear that there is a common point between Lebanon and Israel: the dismantling of the Hezbollah militia. In geopolitical terms, this means the end of Iranian hegemony exercised for 44 years over the Eastern Mediterranean. But this will not be easy. In this case, how will the Lebanese authorities solve this problem? Sheikh Naim Qassem has already shown his hand, stating bluntly that he will continue the resistance until his last breath, and will continue to refuse to hand over his weapons before Israeli withdrawal and the implementation of a national security strategy (to keep his weapons under a different label). Have the president and his advisors, and/or the Council of Ministers, put the Hezbollah problem on the discussion table with a multidirectional approach? Have they developed a military, security, diplomatic, economic, social strategy… a compact strategy as required by any action of this magnitude? Is there collective work in this regard? Or will they hide behind our army, as they have been doing since August 2025? It should be known that the war triggered by Hezbollah to support Iran, which has just been interrupted by the current ceasefire, is the fifth between this group and Israel since 1993. Hezbollah therefore has 33 years of experience in how to take advantage of truces to reorganize, rearm, and renege on its commitments to hand over its weapons, as it did for UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006 and the ceasefire of November 27, 2024. If the Lebanese-Israeli peace talks falter, we must unfortunately prepare for a sixth war of its kind, always as devastating, if not more so. President Elias Hraoui's mandate was unable to confront Hezbollah. Those of Emile Lahoud and Michel Aoun granted all favors to this group. Only President Michel Sleiman proposed a roadmap to restore state sovereignty, with the Baabda Declaration (June 2012) as a starting point, which was very quickly circumvented and paralyzed by Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement (Michel Aoun), and the Lebanese Democratic Party (Talal Arslane). President Sleiman was accused of all evils by his detractors, amidst a media and social media campaign. Hezbollah has always regarded the state as a shell, serving as a legally cosmetic cover, but remaining at its mercy. Lebanese negotiators in peace talks should propose credible solutions to this 44-year-old problem, which several current powerful figures have helped to maintain. Without this, solutions will come from abroad, as has been the case for 50 years. A minimum of seriousness and credibility should emerge, otherwise the presidential speech of April 17, which is promising and a source of hope, risks not being followed by actions and ending up like the inauguration speech.

This series of articles will allow for a better understanding of the current situation in light of the past, moving beyond impassioned, ideological, or romanticized rhetoric that misses the mark, leaving the reader to draw their own conclusions. Furthermore, it is high time to seriously counter the sterile rhetoric of resistance, not with counter-rhetoric, but with serious work by promoting the rule of law, which can only be established through sovereignty. The first part outlined the international and regional situation that led to the Taif Agreement and the beginning of Hezbollah's rise to power. This second part illustrates how the Hezbollah militia has continued to exist and strengthen itself under the dual sponsorship of Syria and Iran. Damascus's goal is to strengthen its position at the peace negotiation table with Israel, while Tehran's is to undermine any attempt at peace between Israel on the one hand, and Syria and Lebanon on the other. Part 2: The Implementation of the Taif Agreement The Taif Agreement, signed on October 22, 1989, was drafted by the Lebanese themselves, particularly its clauses concerning internal constitutional reforms. It was the result of several rounds of dialogue between the Lebanese parties, conducted in stages since 1976. This agreement shifted or readjusted the balance of power between the communities in the country and granted more prerogatives to the Council of Ministers at the expense of the President of the Republic. Furthermore, it was the only document aimed at ending the wars that were ravaging the country. Indeed, it clearly stipulated the dismantling of armed militias. However, constitutional law specialists have highlighted, and continue to highlight, numerous constitutional shortcomings that it created. These were not the only ones, as it included another, far more important one, now obsolete: the implicit recognition of the Syrian Ba'athist occupation of Lebanon, with the approval of Arab countries, the international community, and particularly the United States. Washington was concerned about stability in Lebanon, and in its view, this could only be guaranteed by the Damascus regime, even at the cost of suppressing freedoms. It was, in its eyes, necessary to pave the way for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria, and then to include Lebanon, itself under Syrian occupation. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's troops invaded Kuwait in August 1990, a few months after the signing of the Taif Agreement, which General Michel Aoun's government opposed, stability in Lebanon became a top priority not only for the agreement's Arab sponsors but even more so for the Americans, who no longer wanted to be distracted by Lebanon and wanted to focus on the Kuwait crisis. On October 13, 1990, Damascus obtained Arab and international approval to invade the part of Lebanon it did not control, in exchange for joining the anti-Saddam coalition tasked with liberating Kuwait. Leveraging his near-total control of Lebanon, Hafez al-Assad implemented the Taif Agreement only selectively, according to his needs to consolidate his occupation of the country. Thus, the Syrian regime appointed Elias Hraoui and then Emile Lahoud as presidents of the state, each for a nine-year term, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. During their respective terms, Hezbollah enjoyed unprecedented leeway. It intensified its arms buildup from Iran via Syria. The prime ministers and successive ministers under Hraoui and Lahoud had no power over any military and security matters. These were exclusively the responsibility of the Syrians, whose strategy consisted of exerting extreme pressure on Israel from Lebanon, through Hezbollah, which operated freely in the south of the country and in the Bekaa Valley. Step 1: Dismantling of Militias Except Hezbollah During 1991, after their invasion, the Syrians took care to dismantle the militias that were outside their control. Hezbollah was not only granted immunity from the Taif Agreement, but it was also encouraged and supported by Damascus to wage a guerrilla war against the Israeli forces occupying part of southern Lebanon. The goal was to pressure Tel Aviv to improve Hafez al-Assad's position in the peace negotiations with Israel, initiated following the Madrid Conference held that same year. Tehran, for its part, sponsored Hezbollah to establish itself on the Lebanese scene, infiltrate the Lebanese state, weaken it, and export the Khomeini revolution, in accordance with the Iranian Constitution. It should be noted that this dual sponsorship enjoyed by Hezbollah lasted until the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. Since then, Hezbollah's tutelage has become primarily Iranian. It has strengthened and continues to this day. Stage 2: The Seven-Day War Between Hezbollah and Israel The guerrilla war waged by Hezbollah against the Israeli occupation forces and their ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), intensified in 1992 and 1993, under the slogan of "the resistance." On July 25, 1993, Israel responded by launching its first major war against Hezbollah, dubbed "Operation Settling Accounts," also known as the "Seven-Day War." This war ended on July 31, 1993, under pressure from the United States, particularly Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Israeli objectives were to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure, cut off its supplies, eradicate it from the South Lebanon region, and pressure the Lebanese government by displacing civilians to Beirut. This seven-day war ended with an unwritten agreement between the two sides, known as the "July Agreement," stipulating that civilians on both sides would not be targeted, while military operations against military targets on both sides would continue. From the outset of hostilities, Washington quickly intervened to broker this agreement, seeking to keep Syria in the Madrid peace process. Excessive use of force by Israel was perceived by President George H.W. Bush's administration as a factor that could force Syria to withdraw from the negotiations. "Operation Settling Accounts" resulted in 120 Lebanese civilian deaths and 500 injuries, 300,000 displaced persons, and thousands of destroyed and damaged buildings. Hezbollah's losses amounted to an undetermined number of dead, and dozens of fighting positions were destroyed. Israel, for its part, lost two soldiers and one civilian. (to be continued) Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In this fifth week of the Iran war, President Trump's statements are equivocal. So are those of Iranian leaders. Only the Israeli position is clear: priority to military and security imperatives. Information from the theater of operations, and sociopolitical analyses in the three belligerent states, come mainly from the press. The sources cited are often biased, and highlight only a part of the facts that serve the theses of their authors. It must be noted that the majority of the Western print media and audiovisual media insist more on the costs of the war than on its strategic outcome, which cannot be purely political or purely military, but must constitute a unique strategic synthesis. The military implements its own strategy to serve national objectives. Decision-makers do the same at the political level. An assessment of this campaign should take all of this into account. Some analysts neglect that the course of the war depends closely on the military and economic resources of each belligerent. These constitute the major determinant of success or failure. Ideology, willingness to fight, motivation and internal solidarity of each side come next. The American citizen believes that the ongoing military conflict weighs on his wallet. Some American companies complain about losses. Others, on the contrary, are making or will make profits. It is certain that after the war, the American economy, which is increasingly focused on the American continent and on a resumption of trade with China, will recover easily, as Trump bets. It should be noted, in this context, that the upcoming meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping, postponed for a few months, would be followed by the signing of huge contracts. Beijing could notably buy 600 Boeing planes from Washington for an amount of 140 billion dollars, soybeans for 20 billion, not to mention American oil and gas, and the lifting of restrictions on Beijing's purchase of electronic chips from the American company Nvidia. In return, the United States could import 'Rare Earths' from China, essential for the manufacture of computer hardware and AI, on which Xi Jinping has imposed severe restrictions, not forgetting low-cost Chinese products intended for American consumers. Militarily, Washington carefully avoids and will avoid any entanglement or war of attrition, mentioned notably by Trump's opponents, like the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States had tried, without success, to change regimes. American human and military equipment losses are so far relatively minimal, and military and economic resources are far from exhausted. The Pentagon had also set itself four to six weeks to achieve its objectives, and this deadline is still within the initially announced limits. Iran, for its part, is in a disastrous socioeconomic situation. This worsened in 2025 when Washington increased the sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic, which further strangles the Iranian economy and considerably reduced the flow of dollars from Iraqi banks. This situation risks deteriorating further after the conflict. Furthermore, the evident hegemony of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over the mullahs and key figures of the regime exacerbates the discontent of the Artesh (the Iranian regular army), so far spared from Israeli-American bombings, of reformers like President Masoud Pezeshkian, and of Kurdish, Baluch, Arab and Azeri minorities, who are only asking to act militarily. These dissensions would lead to a radicalization of the IRGC inside the country. Iran would need at least two decades to recover. In short, the failure of the IRGC's regional strategy over the last two decades is evident: it has cost hundreds of billions of dollars for nothing. Iran is in ruins. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the Islamic Republic possessed the largest and most diversified missile and drone arsenal in the Middle East, characterized by a shift towards solid-fuel ballistic missiles, therefore rapidly deployable and highly accurate, and massive stocks of long-range loitering munitions. According to estimates, Iran had a stock of approximately 2000 to 3000 long-range (2000 km) and short-range (300 km) ballistic missiles, including hypersonic Fattah , capable of reaching speeds exceeding Mach 10, and long-range Khorramshahr with a payload of over one ton, capable of multiple warheads and which have demonstrated their effectiveness. It also had approximately 480 mobile missile launchers. Iran has also mass-produced tens of thousands of suicide drones, especially the famous Shahed-136, with an operational range of 1500 to 2500 kilometers. It had equipped this arsenal with Chinese precision capabilities, allowing it to strike American radar antennas, which enabled the destruction of about seven sophisticated American radars and opened a breach in anti-missile defenses. Finally, Iran has massively invested in underground production and storage facilities to secure its arsenal, making its total destruction from the air more difficult. The IRGC's strategy aimed at a target saturation capability, in order to overwhelm defense systems, which was very partially successful given that the success rate on target demonstrated a success of 5 to 10%. These capabilities have been reduced by two-thirds after a month of conflict, according to Americans and Israelis. They continue to decrease. The Pentagon is preparing in the coming days for a prolonged ground campaign, with the deployment of thousands of additional American soldiers, as reported by the Washington Post and CBS. American elite units are preparing, including Navy SEALs, Rangers, Marines, and the 83rd Airborne Division, and are providing Washington with flexible options for eventual operations inside Iran, aimed at annihilating what remains of Iranian missiles and drones, and also the nuclear program. The Tehran Times warned that the American plan would begin with targeted assassinations of high-ranking officials, as at the start of the military conflict, followed by strikes against strategic infrastructure. The ground phase would subsequently involve thousands of local fighters, Iranian and non-Iranian, coming from the northwest, probably Kurds, supported by 5000 American soldiers distributed between Bahrain and the maritime axes, with the deployment of the 3rd aircraft carrier. Still according to the same source, marines and paratroopers would storm airports in the port city of Bandar Abbas and other cities, to facilitate airlifts, while airborne teams will strike sites related to missiles and the nuclear program. These assertions by the Tehran Times mean that Iran is preparing to oppose this plan. Meanwhile, American and Israeli strikes continue thanks to air superiority, and continue to degrade the Iranian arsenal. In view of all this, the observation is as follows: the Iranians, despite their military setbacks and considerable losses, demonstrate no flexibility or willingness for strategic concessions. American victory would therefore be limited to the military plane, while neutralizing, in the long term, Iran's capacity for harm. In return, and despite Trump's assertions, the IRGC continues to hold out, which makes a breakthrough in negotiations highly unlikely. Conclusions therefore remain premature pending the implementation or non-implementation of the American ground option.

In which direction is the war between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other, heading? This is a question that arises daily since the start of military operations, and to which many analysts and politicians, playing the soothsayers, have already hastily responded with certainty. However, it would be necessary to acquire a set of concrete data, difficult to obtain, in order to have precise answers to this question. It must be noted in this context that one often takes one's desires for realities, and analysts sometimes describe their own thoughts rather than analyzing tangible facts. Military intelligence, whether American, Israeli, Iranian, or even Russian and Chinese, are the only ones capable of defining the situation of each party on the ground, knowing that in the past they have sometimes made serious errors of judgment. The set of data that must be acquired to evaluate the state of each belligerent as precisely as possible is innumerable, including: its exact losses; its ammunition stock for each piece of equipment; its battle plan and its flexibility; the course of its military action; the performance of each of its units engaged on the ground; the availability of its reserve combat units; the state of mind of its decision-makers at the senior military and political level; its economic and financial situation sector by sector; its dependence in terms of supply lines, or conversely its independence in terms of resources (human, agricultural, energy, industrial, financial, military…); its resilience; its sociopolitical situation and internal pressures; its will to continue the fight; its state of fatigue and its ability to carry out military and political maneuvers. Dynamic data The collection of all this information will always remain incomplete and will require the skillful use of artificial intelligence to draw credible conclusions. The fact remains that prudence is essential in terms of judgment and recommendations presented to decision-makers, whether they are called Trump, Netanyahu, or Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf. Each of them is surrounded by experts, but each also exercises their leadership within limits that cannot always be foreseen. It should also be noted that these data are dynamic and subject to hour-by-hour changes. It is therefore difficult to draw a complete picture of the situation and to make precise forecasts. Gaps could be filled by the analyst's imagination, which itself depends on their experience, level of expertise, ideological tendency, and political affiliation. The analyst therefore risks having flaws in their estimations. Only those with enough experience and culture could issue a credible opinion, often characterized by prudence and modesty, neither overestimating nor underestimating the capabilities of one or the other belligerent. Furthermore, recourse to the lessons of history could be useful. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (March 1954) is an example, knowing full well that it took place in a totally different context. The Communist Vietnamese had taken the French military base of Dien Bien Phu, which was a humiliating defeat for France. It was well known that Dien Bien Phu would have been saved, and Ho Chi Minh's Vietnamese defeated, had the United States intervened with its air force for one or two days, but Eisenhower believed that such an action would have pushed China to intervene as it did in Korea four years earlier. Moreover, he knew that the communists ideologically controlled the Vietnamese populations and also controlled the countryside. As a result, the war would have dragged on despite his intervention. Fundamental questions Based on this example, the following facts could be noted concerning the present case: the American-Israeli military superiority is undeniable; neither the Russians nor the Chinese will intervene alongside Iran; the Americans are setting up an international coalition to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz to reduce pressure on the global economy, despite European discontent; moreover, the Tehran regime does not control all its populations, much less the northern and southern rural areas of the country. In return, the unpopularity of the war in the United States risks compromising the second part of Trump's mandate. The Iranian regime appears resilient, though unpopular, and press reports indicate that a sense of national belonging among Iranians maintains a minimum of cohesion under bombings. All this available data necessitates caution in evaluations. Furthermore, many questions remain without precise answers, except perhaps among military intelligence services, notably: what remains of the Iranians' asymmetric military capabilities? To what extent can these means still be harmful, however minimal they may be? Are the Russians and Chinese helping the Iranians or not? If so, what is the volume and quality of this aid, and its effectiveness in prolonging the conflict? Is time working against the Iranians, the Americans, or both? What is the true state of mind of the Pasdaran and the mullahs, and of the American command? Where does the will to fight stand in both camps? What about the weight of internal pressures on decision-makers in each of the two camps? … Uncertainties are numerous. However, the following can be stated: the minimum expectation is that the Iranian regime will certainly be deprived of the resources it had for its regional expansion, which would considerably diminish its capacity for harm, and for a long time. At best, Tehran would change its attitude, hand over radioactive uranium to the International Atomic Energy Agency, cease its support for its regional instruments, and agree to limit its drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles. The fall of the regime is not predictable at the current stage. Between these extreme expectations lie many eventualities, including the fragmentation of Iran into ethnic entities against a backdrop of instability and/or civil war, with spillover into neighboring countries. One could therefore write whole pages on this in the absence of complete and precise data, however, the Arab world and ourselves will certainly have better days.

For some time now, a significant portion of public opinion has been accusing the army – and/or its commander-in-chief – of failing in its duty, if not outright mutinying against the government that tasked it with dismantling Hezbollah’s military arsenal. The Lebanese Army has thus become a favorite target for certain journalists, bloggers, and social media activists, even as it is admired – and nearly deified – by their counterparts in the opposing camp. The absurdity – and the sheer inadmissibility – of the situation lies in the fact that today’s admirers were yesterday’s fiercest critics, blaming the army for every ill. They accused it of “collaboration” with American “imperialism” – a clichéd label casually affixed by just about anyone to whatever they happen to dislike – in reference to military cooperation between Lebanon and the United States, even though, without American assistance, our army would have been rendered inoperative, given the paltry defense budget. These neo-admirers of the military institution now join the ranks of its perennial devotees, who smother the troops in their embrace. Those who discredit the army under all circumstances – and they are many – claim it has never protected them, overlooking a century-long record of sacrifice, particularly since the 1960s. To be sure, they sometimes invoke valid arguments, pointing to the public conduct of certain service members, the televised appearances of some retirees, and other criticism. They focus on minutiae while deliberately overlooking the essential. All of this has turned the Lebanese army into a subject of media spectacle, which is harmful in every respect. Certainly, reform in security and defense is necessary, but such a task falls within the remit of the legislative authorities, who are competent in the matter. Our army should not meddle in politics. Yet, national deadlocks and the failures of the political authorities have placed it squarely at the center of public attention. Thus, since 1958 – and following the mini-civil war of that year – the military has been thrust onto the political stage, for which it was wholly unprepared. Few of its members ever truly adapt. Back to the army’s operational aspect, it receives – in addition to American military aid – further support from various European and Arab countries. Iran – so cherished by Hezbollah, its unconditional allies, and its seasonal supporters (elections oblige) – has never seriously offered assistance to our military institution, despite a doctrine that emphasizes defending the country against any aggression, including from Israel. Tehran has provided only superficial military aid to the army, reserving its substantial support for Hezbollah, notably next-generation of anti-tank missiles, drones, and other weaponry of all kinds, in addition to financial assistance. The military institution has not maintained an effective presence in southern Lebanon since 1975 – a vacuum that has led to the current situation. This absence was largely dictated by the Syrian occupation, particularly from 1990 onward. Since that year, the presidents installed at Baabda were under Damascus’s sway, which forbade them from asserting national sovereignty in the South. President Émile Lahoud, whose friendship with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez Assad, was close, carefully ensured through successive governments that the regular forces did not deploy southwards following Israel’s total withdrawal on 25 May 2000. The pretext was that the Shebaa Farms remained occupied, and that our army should not act as Israel’s border guard. In doing so, he facilitated Hezbollah’s deployment in the region, under the guise of liberating these farms – a move that cost us the devastating 2006 war and the now-famous words of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: “If only I had known.” A year later, the Fatah al-Islam organization – an Al-Qaeda offshoot – occupied the Nahr El-Bared Palestinian camp north of Tripoli, plotting to establish an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon loyal to Osama bin Laden. When the army confronted Fatah al-Islam – which had planted a bomb on a bus in Ain-Alak, in northern Metn, killing civilians, conducted bank heists, and killed 29 of our soldiers within a single hour, Hassan Nasrallah declared, verbatim: “The Palestinian camps are a red line.” At the time, however, the army defied this ultimatum and defeated the terrorist organization at the cost of 170 martyrs. Simultaneously, Hezbollah was besieging the Serail and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora through a sit-in that had dragged on for months – a clear attempt at a palace coup. Later, in 2008, the political deadlock propelled General Michel Sleiman to the presidency. He completed his term while being blamed for every ill by Hezbollah. Unlike his predecessor, Sleiman had refused to submit – and, most significantly, had developed a defense strategy aimed at restoring the state’s sovereignty, a deadly sin in the eyes of the militia, as it could have threatened its very existence. In 2016, after reaching an agreement with the sovereigntists, Hezbollah and its allies installed Michel Aoun at Baabda. From the very start of his mandate, Aoun ensured that the development of a defense strategy – one that his predecessor Michel Sleiman had put on the table – was blocked, claiming that strategies are fluid and that drafting one would be a futile exercise. He subsequently declared on several occasions that the army was incapable of defending the country. When, during the summer of 2017, the troops locked horns with the Islamic State (ISIS) in the Battle of Fajr al-Jurud – emerging victorious and preparing to launch the final assault against the group – total victory was aborted on President Aoun’s orders. ISIS fighters were evacuated by bus to Syria following an arrangement between Hezbollah and the Islamic State. A month later, in October 2017, Michel Aoun – a steadfast ally of Hezbollah, and almost certainly at its behest – told the press: “Lebanon’s economic situation does not allow for equipping the army, and there are reasons why weapons cannot be exclusively in its hands,” adding that “a solution in the Middle East will lead to a settlement of Hezbollah’s weapons issue.” At present, the government has taken commendable positions regarding the restoration of sovereignty. However, the troops are not executing them, as such a mission requires constant oversight by the executive – a factor that remains absent. The executive dithers or proposes obsolete initiatives. In conclusion, everyone wants the army’s mission to align with their own desires, using it as media fodder – positively or negatively – to boost their own notoriety. The true party to be held accountable remains the executive branch, encompassing both the Council of Ministers and the President, as well as Parliament – provided its Speaker, Nabih Berri, allows it, and respects the separation of powers. Montesquieu must be turning in his grave.

Analyses often miss the mark. We tend to drift into an excess of objectivity and a lack of imagination, or vice versa. At times, we even mistake our own desires for reality. It is a sobering fact that neither the most tragic events, nor their ultimate outcomes, were ever foreseen by even the most seasoned analysts. Only a few enlightened minds proved visionary, yet they were rarely heard within the high corridors of power, mired as they were in political, financial, and economic affairs. The Catalyst of the Two World Wars Few predicted the First World War. No belligerent truly desired it, especially following the various agreements and the carving up of global spheres of influence among the great powers of the era. Analysts, convinced that such a conflict could never be repeated and that Germany had been subdued for good, branded it the “War to End All Wars.” Twenty years later, Germany controlled Europe through a second, even more devastating conflict, and very nearly dominated the world were it not for American intervention. The key to the German renaissance and its military superiority lay in technology. The same was true on the eve of the First World War: the world was in the throes of an industrial and technological revolution. This shift birthed unprecedented weaponry–tanks, combat aircraft, all-metal naval fleets, oil-powered warships replacing coal, recoilless guns, and semi-automatic rifles. The arms race that followed acted, in turn, as the catalyst for both World Wars. The 21st Century: Weaponry Within Everyone’s Reach In terms of weaponry, the global landscape today is not so different from that of the early 20th century. The difference is that we have now entered the age of drones, smart missiles and shells of all kinds, high-precision radar, stealth aircraft and missiles, missile defense systems, nuclear weapons, combat robotics, electromagnetic tools, and cyber technologies. These capabilities are no longer the exclusive domain of the Great Powers; today, they are available to nations such as Ukraine, North Korea, and Iran. The accessibility of such technology encourages bellicose regimes to become more defiant, while providing relatively weaker nations, like Ukraine, with the resilience to resist far superior powers. No one foresaw the Hamas offensive from Gaza in October 2023. Bolstered by its locally-produced missiles and drones, its makeshift flying machines, and its technologically agile fighters, the movement was able to temporarily occupy southern Israel. On the eve of the current conflict, it seemed clear that Iran could no longer rely on its regional allies–notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Iraqi Hashed al-Shaabi–as these groups had been weakened by fifteen months of war with Israel. Furthermore, Tehran itself, having suffered significant damage to its military and nuclear potential during the “12-Day War” in June 2025, was considered neutralized–especially as it was then engaged in nuclear talks with the United States. These assumptions proved erroneous. While negotiating, Iran was simultaneously replenishing its own arsenal of drones–whose efficacy has been proven in Ukraine–alongside sophisticated ballistic missiles, high-precision cruise missiles, supersonic anti-ship missiles, hypersonic missiles, and multi-warhead missiles with a range exceeding 2,000 km. This buildup bolsters the regime’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and paralyze navigation in the Arabian Gulf. In the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran did not hesitate to sow naval mines in the Strait, leading to a devastating American strike on its navy to ensure free passage. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have demonstrated their expertise in deploying a complex combination of surveillance radar, drones, suicide boat-drones, surface-to-sea missiles, midget submarines–of which Iran possesses at least 18, all notoriously difficult to detect–and the naval mines cited in recent US reports. Two Conditions to End the War The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Tehran is becoming a reality, despite the significant loss of the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities. The Iranians retain sufficient, if limited, technological means–such as mines and drones–to block the passage. Yet, keeping the Strait open remains a vital strategic interest for the United States. At this stage of the conflict, President Donald Trump’s future depends on his ability to safeguard this interest: if he appears deterred by Iran, it will trigger a global geopolitical earthquake and a political crisis within the United States. Another technological consideration with grave geopolitical repercussions: Iran, according to its own officials, continues to hold 460 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, well-shielded from American surveillance. The country still possesses centrifuges capable of enriching this uranium to 90%–the threshold for weaponization. The danger is not necessarily the launch of a nuclear bomb via an Iranian missile. Rather, it lies in the fact that Tehran–having previously sponsored terrorist attacks, being allied with militias experienced in such acts, and reportedly sheltering Al-Qaeda operatives–could, in a gesture of desperation, transfer these fissile materials to organizations that would use them for a new 9/11, even more devastating than the first. These factors make a “whimper” of an ending to this conflict unlikely. Iran is fighting for its survival, waging a psychological war to project an image of defiance and victory, while President Trump demands nothing less than Tehran’s total surrender. This conflict can only end in one of two ways: a total “Clausewitzian” victory by the United States–a costly endeavor by any measure–or negotiations that force Iran to relinquish its highly enriched fissile materials and dismantle the capabilities that threaten the global economy via the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In the meantime, the war grinds on, and Iran grows increasingly weak.

For the past week, a new war – the fifth in 34 years – has pitted Israel against Hezbollah. It is yet another war that the Lebanese people never wanted. All the agreements that ended the previous four wars proved to be little more than temporary truces, exploited by Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and by Israel on the other to prepare for the next round of fighting. All of this unfolded under the watchful eye of the Assad regimes, father and son, and of Lebanese presidents and governments beholden to Damascus or Tehran, particularly during the tenures of Hraoui, Lahoud, and Michel Aoun. The costs of these wars have been paid dearly, willingly by Hezbollah’s unconditional supporters, under the numbing effect of ideology; reluctantly by other Lebanese; and by Arab countries that financed reconstruction for both humanitarian and geopolitical reasons. The same scenario has therefore repeated itself for four decades: war, ceasefire, rhetoric of victory, the deterioration of Lebanon’s political authority, Hezbollah’s preparations for endless wars, mutual deception, and then war again. A proverb drawn from popular wisdom says that “a donkey does not stumble twice on the same stone.” It is clear that President Joseph Aoun–who, under Article 49 of the Constitution, also serves as the supreme commander of the armed forces–and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and his government, who appoint not only the army commander but also all senior officers in the military and security institutions, constitute the first executive authority since 1990 to benefit from regional and international conditions conductive to reclaiming the sovereignty lost since 1968. They also enjoy unprecedented domestic support, as well as tangible Arab and international opportunities. In November 2024, after 13 months of war, Hezbollah was the party seeking a ceasefire with Israel, with Nabih Berri leading the negotiations. The Mikati government agreed to the ceasefire only after being “authorized” to do so by Hezbollah. Thus, the very party requesting the ceasefire subtly portrayed itself as having accepted it magnanimously–while proclaiming victory and orchestrating a staggering campaign of denial. For the past 15 months, the new president, the prime minister, and members of the government have been manipulated by Hezbollah–either knowingly or through a disarming display of incapacity. From the outset, Hezbollah has renounced its commitments to implement Resolution 1701, with the backing of Nabih Berri. The “divine party” used these fifteen months to reorganize itself with the help of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, under the watchful–or willfully blind–eye of the executive branch, without any mitigating circumstances. It exploited the blindness and short-sightedness of the sovereigntist parties, who were too preoccupied with legislative elections and competing over the division of parliamentary seats–seats that, in any case, made little difference in the face of strategic events, as demonstrated by the notably “brilliant” absence of the parliamentary Defense Committee. This reorganization of the “Party of God” is now on full display, as if time has stood still since November 27, 2024. Our army suffers the consequences of the government’s inaction–or, one might say, the complicity of a significant part of the executive branch with Hezbollah–putting its credibility squarely at risk. The forceful decisions aimed at disarming Hezbollah, taken in August 2025, eight months after President J. Aoun’s inauguration and following the Salam government’s vote of confidence, gradually unraveled in the face of Hezbollah’s favorite pastime: patient and cunning tergiversation. The army took time to present its plan for southern Litani, and its implementation dragged on. Today, all of this lies completely discredited, with the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Litani having returned to the status quo. In this context, a pressing question emerges: the president and the Council of Ministers had approved both the plan and its execution in southern Litani, raising no objections or comments on the timeline–despite clear warnings from international bodies regarding Hezbollah’s reorganization and Israel’s impatience. Yet willful deafness prevailed. Obviously, the plan for northern Litani has become a complete joke–unless a miracle occurs. In this situation, who is to blame? The president? The prime minister? The government? The executive branch as a whole? Our army? It must be emphasized that the executive holds full authority over the armed forces. Yet the unfortunate custom in Lebanon since 1968 has been to make the troops bear the consequences of the executive’s inaction and political deadlocks. In 1973, after clashes between our army and the PLO in Saida, the officers responsible for southern Lebanon were transferred. In 1975, the executive’s inaction and the slide toward internal war led to the replacement of the army’s chief of staff, General Iskandar Ghanem. In 1984, fighting between our army on one side and the militias of the Amal Movement, the PSP, the PLA (Palestine Liberation Army), and the Syrian occupation forces on the other led to the dismissal of the army’s chief of staff, General Ibrahim Tannous… Returning to our current situation, which bears no resemblance to previous ones, a vertical divide now separates Hezbollah and its supporters on one side, and all other Lebanese on the other, with Nabih Berri and his Amal Movement caught in evasive maneuvering. Two options present themselves: traditional inaction, or its opposite. In the case of inaction, the executive and legislative branches would become mere decoration, with nothing left to negotiate with Arab or international bodies–let alone with Israel. Conversely, if the executive chooses to act, unanimous Arab support is almost certain, regardless of the decision, especially given that Iran is currently attacking Arab countries strategically. European and American backing would also likely be assured–a rare occurrence, given that divisions between Washington and the EU are felt everywhere, except on Lebanon. When the executive acts unambiguously, and when the president fulfills his role as supreme commander of the armed forces–taking matters into its own hands through the Higher Defense Council and supervising the troops’ every action on a daily basis–the forces will perform, as they have consistently done since 2000. When the troops’ mission is politically secured, even without full consensus, the results will almost certainly be tangible. As for the parliamentary Defense Committee, it could at least, even without unanimity, hold both the executive and the military accountable, ensuring that those responsible are made to answer for their actions. Action, even with its uncertainties, is far less risky than inaction–especially when the region’s dinosaurs are at war. During World War II, Switzerland, although neutral and largely Germanophile, declared general mobilization, prevented Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy from using its territory or communicating through it, and established a military strategy to defend the mountain stronghold at the heart of the country. A similar strategy is certainly feasible in Lebanon, and without question, it is the executive–not the military–that must take responsibility for it. On this point, I quote Georges Clémenceau, physician and journalist, nicknamed “The Tiger,” Prime Minister and architect of France’s victory in World War I: “War is too important a matter to be entrusted to the military!”