Strategia

This series of articles aims to provide a clearer understanding of the current situation on the Lebanese scene in light of the past, setting aside passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the realities on the ground, leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The previous ten installments examined a reinterpretation of events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through the Israeli army's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, up to the 2006 war and its aftermath. The deployment of the Lebanese army — known internationally as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) — then under the command of General Michel Sleiman, to southern Lebanon was ordered by Fouad Siniora's government on August 16, 2006. This deployment, the first since 1968, was immediately launched at dawn on August 17 with the crossing of the Litani River via military Bailey bridges and improvised crossings, as the permanent bridges had been destroyed by Israeli bombardments.

This series of articles aims to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, setting aside passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the mark on reality, and leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The previous nine installments offered a reexamination of events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollah-controlled zone in the South, and the 2006 war. This article addresses the lessons of the 2006 war and its aftermath. In the operation "Truthful Promise" (el-Wa3ed el-Sadek, the name given to the July 2006 war), Hezbollah employed tactics rooted in hybrid asymmetric warfare, skillfully combining traditional guerrilla techniques, the heavy use of cutting-edge dual-purpose anti-tank missiles, and defense in depth across the entire area south of the Litani River and parts of its northern bank.

This series of articles aims to provide a clearer understanding of the current situation in light of the past, free from passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the realities on the ground, leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The previous eight installments offered a reexamination of events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power since the Taif Agreement, through the Israeli army's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollah-controlled zone in the South, and the 2006 war. This article picks up where that conflict left off. The Battle of Wadi Al Houjeyr, also known as the Battle of Wadi Slouqi, took place in the central sector of the Lebanese-Israeli border between August 11 and 13, 2006. It was one of the costliest engagements for the Israeli army. The Israeli forces' objective was to cross the Slouqi valley heading northward to reach the Litani River before the anticipated ceasefire came into effect.

In a previous article, we analyzed the military and industrial impact of the joint “Epic Fury” and “Lion’s Roar” operations on Iran’s conventional capabilities. In this second and final installment, we examine the possible combined effects of economic strangulation and grassroots mobilization that could lezd to the implosion of the Iranian regime. The naval blockade has taken over from the February and April 2026 strikes. The blockade is a necessary condition for weakening the Iranian regime, but not a sufficient one. Several factors help explain why the economic sanctions imposed over many years – compounded by the ongoing American naval blockade and its consequences, including supply chain disruptions and the halt of oil exports –struggle on their own to bring about the regime’s collapse. The Iranian regime has repeatedly proven its capacity for adaptation and restructured itself following the decapitation strike of last February.

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous seven instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South and the eruption of the 33-Day War in July 2006, which was initiated by Ali Larijani..

In this first instalment, we examine the military and industrial impact of Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion on Iran’s conventional capabilities. It will be followed next week by a second and final part exploring the conditions that could lead to Iran’s implosion over the medium to long term. The Iranian regime suffered heavy losses during the US-Israeli war fought between February and April 2026. Yet despite the scale of the damage, the collapse of the Islamic Republic did not materialize, and Tehran showed no sign of flexibility in response to U.S. sanctions and the American naval blockade.

Three months to the day after it began, the war in Iran appears to be in suspension, and in the calculations of Washington and Tehran, the opposing side will eventually give in with the factor of 'time'. Although all signs suggest that Iran should capitulate after its military disaster and integrated economic losses estimated between 1,000 and 1,450 billion US dollars, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not backing down. It has no accountability to its people, prevents them from expressing themselves, has massacred at least thirty thousand of them, and imprisoned fifty thousand more as of last January.

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous six instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, and the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South. Death of Hafez al-Assad and the Growing Iranian Influence in Syria and Lebanon

Amid a full-blown trade tariff war and commercial restrictions between Beijing and Washington, along with their confrontations over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Trump and Xi Jinping held their first meeting on October 30, 2025, at Busan airport in South Korea, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum summit. This meeting, made necessary by the urgent economic problems facing both countries, resulted in the conclusion of a one-year trade ceasefire between the two parties. The ceasefire involved an immediate reduction in US tariffs on Chinese goods, which had exceeded 100% in some cases. These tariffs were cut to an average of 47%. Additionally, President Trump suspended the blacklisting of subsidiaries in which 50% or more of shares belonged to sanctioned Chinese groups. He also pledged to lift restrictions on exports to China of microchips related to Artificial Intelligence.

With this sixth instalment in the “Israel-Hezbollah” series, we continue to examine the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of the impassioned, ideological or romantic narratives that often obscure realities on the ground. Readers may draw their own conclusions. Previous articles revisited Hezbollah’s rise since the Taif Agreement, its first two wars with Israel, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon in May 2000. Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000, and at the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the United Nations officially certified on June 16, 2000, that the pullout was complete and in full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, which was thereafter deemed implemented. UNIFIL subsequently delineated an Israeli withdrawal line known as the “Blue Line,” identifying 13 disputed points between the two countries covering an area of less than one square kilometer. The line is often mistaken for the Paulet-Newcombe line, drawn in 1923 as the border separating Lebanon and Palestine under the French and British mandates.