Strategia

The Iran-U.S. confrontation recalls a quote by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu (4 th – 5 th century BC): "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting". President Donald Trump seems to adopt a strategy based on this quote, and he deliberately maintains ambiguity to keep his strategic objectives and military thinking secret. Strikes, large-scale war, sustained threats (from both sides) that risk escalating at any moment… Speculation is rife. The concentration of American war assets in the Middle East is enormous and leaves no doubt as to the vast damage these assets can inflict on Iran. In this regard, and speaking of his warships, President Trump told reporters last week: "They have to sail somewhere. They might as well sail near Iran". However, President Trump's strategy based on Sun Tzu's quote cannot apply to the case of Iran, where the mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards prioritize ideology over objective data. Moreover, the regime will do everything to survive, even if it means bringing the temple down on itself and its adversaries. Historically, Khomeinist Iran has only relented twice, and that was after painful strikes: the first, after the destruction of a large part of the Iranian navy by the US Navy, the very heavy losses suffered against the Iraqi army, and after strong economic pressures, Tehran finally accepted Resolution 598 of July 1988, adopted by the Security Council a year earlier and stipulating a cessation of the war with Iraq. The second time occurred in June 2025 after 12 days of Israeli strikes and a massive American bombardment against nuclear facilities; the mullahs then immediately accepted a ceasefire proposed by President Trump via Qatar. US aviation raids Iran's determination to enrich radioactive uranium and continue manufacturing ballistic missiles, as well as the presence of the American armada in the region, will most likely lead to an armed confrontation with severe consequences for Iran, but also with real risks of American losses. Indeed, on February 23rd, the Pentagon informed President Trump of its concerns about the risks of a prolonged military campaign against Iran, particularly concerning loss of life. This is not surprising, but is an American strike against Iran likely to be long? And what do we mean by "long"? Between March and May 2025, at the beginning of the first year of President Trump's second term, the United States conducted strikes against the Houthis that only ceased with the halt of their attacks on international shipping. In June 2025, US Air Force B2 bombers dropped a dozen 10-ton bombs each on Iran, causing massive damage to Iranian nuclear sites. Then in December 2025, American aviation retaliated against the Islamic State in Syria, targeting 70 objectives, and the same month American missiles targeted the Islamic State in Nigeria. In early 2026, Maduro was captured and handed over to New York justice, and since then dozens of US Navy strikes have been counted against the Islamic State and the Al-Shabab organization in Somalia. Outcome: zero American deaths and undeniable military and political successes for Washington. Gaining time President Trump has so far kept his electoral promises: no more endless wars where the United States gets bogged down. He is certain to continue keeping his promises for a multitude of reasons, including mid-term legislative elections, his personal reputation, and his desire to preserve U.S. supremacy not only on the American continent, as stipulated in his 2025 national strategy in accordance with the "Monroe" doctrine, but worldwide. Khomeinist Iran, for its part, has seen eight presidents succeed one another in Washington, three of whom clashed with Tehran: Carter, Reagan, and Trump. The others contented themselves with sanctions that did not prevent Iran from developing its formidable military force, supporting its allied militias, and expanding in the region, which indicates gaping loopholes in these sanctions, especially regarding oil exports. The mullahs have always adopted the strategy of gaining time, exploiting diplomacy to advance their nuclear and ballistic programs, and dragging out any negotiation. The eight American presidents were very busy at home and around the world to focus on Iran. The current crisis is different. Even if Washington wishes to conclude the conflict with an agreement on its own terms – which is unlikely – the concentration of military forces, Iran's intractable stance on the enrichment of fissile materials and the manufacture of missiles, alongside inflammatory speeches from both sides, are leading straight to a confrontation. Facing this risk, and according to Nate Swanson in Foreign Affairs of February 24th, "the White House shows widespread confidence in President Donald Trump's ability to manage the consequences of such a confrontation. This confidence is part of a trend that has shaped Trump's thinking for years". That said, the coming days and weeks will put an end to speculation, and several indicators suggest that a highly probable American strike will be "limited," a term that is very relative. It is certain that, given Iranian threats of retaliation against the dozen American military bases in the Gulf countries as well as against U.S. embassies, threats to mine the Strait of Hormuz, and the use of supersonic anti-ship missiles by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the American strike or war will, from the very first hours, target the Iranian navy to secure Hormuz, anti-aircraft batteries to ensure air superiority, land-to-sea anti-ship missile sites to secure naval maneuvers, and especially command posts, not to mention the deployment of cybernetic and electromagnetic means to blind Iranian surveillance radars. While this strike may seem enormous to some, it is relatively limited given that Iran has 90 million inhabitants and spans 1.6 million km². An Iranian retaliation/escalation? An American quagmire? Perhaps! But we are far from the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. No American ground troops in Iran, that is certain, except for very precise and lightning-fast operations, which avoids exposure to guerrilla warfare. Iran's asymmetrical means and those of its allies in the region will not hold their own in the current context, and they have shown their transience in the war against Israel. The fact remains that whatever the outcome, war or no war, regime change or not, Iran is no longer what it was over the past two decades.

The recent meeting held at the United States Embassy in Madrid, centered on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2797 adopted last October 31 regarding the Moroccan Sahara, was no ordinary diplomatic encounter. Algeria’s presence, represented by its Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, was particularly significant, as it restored matters to their proper context: the dispute over the Sahara is, at its core, a Moroccan-Algerian conflict, while the Polisario Front serves merely as an instrument employed by the Algerian regime to justify a war of attrition waged against Morocco for nearly half a century, ever since Rabat recovered its Saharan provinces following Spain’s withdrawal in November 1975. Morocco was represented by Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita at the meeting, convened under the auspices of Massad Boulos, the U.S. Special Envoy for Africa. Also in attendance were Mauritania’s Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, a representative of the Polisario, and the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura. While Algeria has previously participated in discussions related to the Sahara, this was the first time it engaged in deliberations explicitly grounded in Resolution 2797, which identifies Morocco’s autonomy initiative as the sole proposal on the negotiating table. According to informed sources, Algeria attempted to reintroduce the notion of “self-determination,” overlooking the resolution’s explicit reference to autonomy “within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” It appears that Algeria, as a regime, would not have entered negotiations concerning autonomy absent American pressure. Those same pressures prompted Morocco to elaborate its autonomy vision in a forty-page document, whereas the original initiative announced by King Mohammed VI in Laayoune in 2007 spanned only three pages and rested upon two pillars: affirmation of Moroccan sovereignty and the establishment of broad decentralization. The political dimension of Algeria’s participation in Madrid is decisive. Algiers would not have attended had it not concluded that any improvement in relations with Washington required engagement in negotiations based on the Moroccan proposal. Persisting in its reservations regarding Resolution 2797 and continuing to rely on the Polisario would have jeopardized prospects for strengthening ties with the United States, particularly amid deteriorating relations with France and diverging strategic calculations with Russia over Mali. Furthermore, the United States’ recognition in 2020 of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, subsequently echoed by several European countries, underscored the absence of any viable future for a project aimed at turning the territory into a satellite within Algeria’s sphere of influence. Stability in the Sahel is increasingly understood to be linked to Morocco’s authority over its Saharan provinces, rather than to the latitude afforded to the Polisario within a region plagued by extremist networks and illicit trafficking. Algeria’s participation in the Madrid meeting thus marks a step toward realism — and perhaps toward liberation from longstanding historical resentments. It is far from a modest gesture. The central question is whether Algeria is prepared to free itself from the illusions of the past, including the aspiration to access the Atlantic without Morocco’s explicit consent. The Moroccan Sahara enjoys a vast Atlantic coastline, and the deep-water port of Dakhla has become integral to African aspirations for maritime connectivity. Algeria has a genuine opportunity to secure a land corridor to the ocean through Moroccan territory. Such an outcome would require cooperation with Rabat rather than the continuation of diplomatic rupture, border closures since 1994, and restrictions on overflight. Ultimately, recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara could pave the way for a strategic recalibration in Algiers, away from unproductive posturing and toward constructive engagement. When will Algeria formally acknowledge the Moroccan character of the Sahara, instead of seeing its foreign minister depart through a side exit to avoid being photographed alongside his Moroccan counterpart?