Decryption

While the United States has promised an 'economic D-Day' for Iran, this strategy can only become fully effective with the cooperation of China, Iran's top oil importer and leading supplier of military technology to the mullahs' regime. After six months of war in the Middle East, Washington has reason to worry about the quagmire this conflict—initially expected to last only a few weeks—has become. With no quick military solution in sight, the Trump administration has chosen to strangle the Iranian regime by introducing new sanctions targeting not Tehran directly, but its trading partners, in order to isolate the Iranian economy. Chinese entities are among those affected by this sweeping plan from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who has called on Beijing to fall in line. The Shanghai Summit The situation is so urgent that it has turned the summit marking the 25th anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) into a last-chance meeting for the Iranians. The Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Indian leaders are expected in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, on Monday and Tuesday, along with six other Central Asian nations. Among them: Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, as well as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. While China is clearly in the crosshairs of the new U.S. sanctions regime, Beijing has brushed aside these threats, insisting instead that it will firmly defend its interests and its partnership with Iran, a country it considers a major ally. This standoff risks further escalating tensions between Beijing and Washington, ahead of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's planned visit to the U.S. capital in September. Iran has been resisting sanctions targeting it for decades by mobilizing complex international financial networks to circumvent them. Beijing is a major buyer of Iranian oil. It often settles its bills in renminbi—China's currency—which falls outside the reach of U.S. sanctions. Moreover, even if maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz were to be cut off, China could continue receiving Iranian crude via Central Asian road and rail routes. Costs vs. Benefits As a result, Chinese purchases have indeed declined, but what remains is what Tehran needs to survive total economic suffocation. According to experts interviewed by AFP, the new sanctions announced on Monday target certain Chinese entities accused of helping Tehran acquire critical technologies. However, the United States has so far refrained from sanctioning the Asian country's major financial institutions. Beijing and Washington spent much of last year mired in an escalating trade war, until the fragile respite brought about by the meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in October 2025. For its campaign against Iran to have any real impact, Washington may need to 'offer incentives' to Beijing to encourage the Asian giant to come on side, says Lim Tai Wei, a professor specializing in East Asia at Japan's Soka University, as quoted by AFP. As such, China will only consider cooperating with the United States 'if the costs of supporting Iran were to become significantly higher than the strategic and economic benefits' of continuing to do business with the country. Trump Multiplies the Distractions Meanwhile, in Washington, President Donald Trump watches helplessly as a series of setbacks mount, casting a shadow over the upcoming midterm elections in November. A renamed lake, shocking social media posts, bare-minimum engagement with the press… Trump no longer wants to talk about Iran or inflation—the two issues that are dragging down his presidency. His approval ratings are at an all-time low, and the Republican Party fears a crushing defeat in November during elections that will determine control of Congress — which has been majority conservative until now. The 80-year-old Republican is once again employing a strategy he has often used: stirring up noise in an attempt to drown out an unfavorable backdrop — in this case, a string of polls, each more damaging than the last, on his record. This week, Donald Trump briefly captured the media spotlight by announcing he was renaming Lake Ontario, on the US-Canadian border, "Lake America" — a move that infuriated Canada. Far-right influencer Matt Walsh also called the idea "politically stupid," seeing it as a "gift" to the American left. It must be noted, however, that in this context, anti-immigration policy remains one of the few areas where the Republican president has stayed true to his stated course. The administration has been heavily promoting its mass deportation campaign, which the Democratic opposition has frequently condemned as cruel. The Department of Homeland Security, for instance, released a video on Thursday showing shackled Haitian nationals being boarded onto a plane, after Washington revoked a status that had allowed them to enter the country legally. The video, set to music, was condemned as degrading and racist by opponents of Donald Trump. Beyond that, the conflict in Iran has dragged on far longer than the few weeks the White House occupant promised, and above all, Americans are still waiting for the cost of living to drop, as he had guaranteed. "The greatest president" His administration is piling on emergency measures ahead of the elections across various areas: massive imports of foreign beef to drive down prices; buybacks of US Treasury bonds to reassure markets; and an express mission by the CIA director to try to dissuade Russia from targeting a NATO country, according to the American press. Donald Trump, who has always relished impromptu exchanges with groups of journalists, is doing so less frequently — or cutting them short when he does. At the start of his second term, he would easily hold hour-long unplanned press conferences, sometimes every day. He now prefers, as he did this week, to sit down for lengthy interviews with MAGA-friendly hosts, where he faces no pushback. The Republican continues, however, to post prolifically on his Truth Social platform in a "trolling" style — gratuitous provocations designed to generate a viral reaction. This week, he posted a "ranking" of several American presidents that outraged his opponents. Lincoln and Washington were rated "very good," Clinton "average," while Biden, Obama, and Carter were deemed "failures." He himself, unsurprisingly, appears at the very top — alone — as the "greatest" president.

On Tuesday, President Donald Trump rightly drew attention to an aspect of the war in Iran that some Western political leaders and media outlets have conspicuously overlooked: the humanitarian dimension of the Iranian crisis, and, more specifically, the murderous and appalling conduct of certain power centers within the ruling establishment in Tehran. As part of their campaign of repression and coercion, they have resorted to the near-daily execution and public hanging from cranes of schoolchildren, teenagers under 18 and young university students, seeking to terrorize the population and create an atmosphere of fear designed to suppress any attempt at a popular uprising. “The failing Islamic Republic of Iran is not paying large segments of their military, while at the same time killing protesters, even when they are not protesting, at levels not seen before. It is a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions,” President Trump said bluntly. It is precisely these executions of teenagers and young people “on a scale never seen before” that certain supposedly “right-thinking” Western political leaders and media outlets refuse to acknowledge. In doing so, they normalize this abhorrent practice of hanging people from cranes, as well as abducting teenagers – several cases of child abductions and disappearances have been reported in recent days – in an attempt to create a coercive climate of terror before the situation spills into the streets under the mounting pressure of an increasingly severe socioeconomic collapse. No Reaction Yet to the Economic D-Day On the practical front, political and economic circles around the world are closely watching to gauge the real impact of the economic war – dubbed the “economic D-Day” – officially and dramatically launched on Monday by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Reactions from European and Arab countries are still awaited, particularly when it comes to implementing the measures announced by Secretary Bessent. As we wait for the repercussions of this economic D-Day to become clearer and settle into focus, the ever-present issue of the Strait of Hormuz is once again coming to the fore, further underscoring the deep divide that continues to separate Washington and Tehran. President Trump said Tuesday that the U.S. Navy had informed him that all the mines threatening traffic through the Strait of Hormuz had been destroyed or removed. U.S. officials cited by Axios said that, over the past several months, underwater drones had inspected the strait and detected around 100 mines, which were subsequently destroyed or removed by private companies. The officials said that clearing the mines would facilitate the movement of ships through the strait, “allowing oil exports to international markets to increase.” Against this backdrop, President Trump said that the Islamic Republic had been warned that any vessel attempting to lay new mines would be destroyed without delay. He also pointed to close and meticulous satellite surveillance of the entire length of the strait, but also – and this is the crucial point – of the three nuclear sites destroyed by U.S. aircraft in June 2025 and, above all, of the underground nuclear facility at Pickaxe Mountain, built deep inside a hard granite mountain near the Natanz nuclear complex. The Pickaxe Mountain facility is difficult for U.S. aircraft to reach, and according to various Western sources, Iran is secretly carrying out uranium-enrichment work and assembling long-range ballistic missiles there. The Iranian Regime Resumes Its Stalling Tactics Faced with the U.S. escalation against the Islamic Republic, the mullahs’ regime responded Tuesday by reviving its traditional stalling tactics, clearly aimed at buying time, as it has done for more than two decades, ever since Tehran’s clandestine uranium-enrichment activities came to light in the early 2000s. Apparently at the behest of the mullahs’ regime, the Iranian and Omani foreign ministers met in Tehran on Tuesday for talks that the Iranian regime described as “constructive.” A joint statement issued after the talks stressed the need to resume shipping through the Strait of Hormuz “while preserving the sovereignty and rights of both countries.” In this regard, the statement revived the Iranian proposal, repeatedly put forward by Tehran, to create “a temporary joint corridor through the strait, alongside a joint mine-clearing operation.” This is a way for the mullahs’ regime to maintain the perception that it controls the strait and is solely in charge of managing it… In Syria, Kurdish Forces and Institutions Join the State On an entirely different front, Tuesday, August 25, was marked by a major development of great historical and symbolic significance. Late in the day, Kurdish forces commander Mazloum Abdi announced the dissolution of the Kurdish militia known as the SDF, which had been backed and supported by the United States in the fight against the Islamic State. At the same time, Abdi announced the dissolution of the autonomous administration and all Kurdish bodies attached to it, which will be integrated into Syrian state institutions. The integration of Kurdish forces and structures into the state was formally sealed at a meeting between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi. The chapter on the latent conflict between the former Assad regime and the Kurdish minority, which was largely ostracized by Presidents Assad, father and son, thus appears to have been closed… What remains is to turn this qualitative leap into reality and firmly consolidate it.

Two major developments mark the start of the week: Washington’s extraordinary economic and financial offensive against Iran – dubbed the “economic D-Day” – and, in Lebanon, the resurgence of the case of Mohammad Reza Chibani, Iran’s designated but unaccredited ambassador to Beirut. The significance of the barrage of sanctions announced by Washington on Monday lies in its direct consequences across multiple fronts, both in the short and medium term, for Iran’s economy, the survival of the mullahs’ regime, the regional balance of power and even international relations, particularly with China. The Mohammad Chibani affair, of course, is in no way comparable to the economic D-Day. Above all, however, it puts the Lebanese authorities’ ability to maintain consistency between their words and their actions to the test. It matters because it represents yet another test for a Lebanese state that has long struggled to assert its authority. On Monday, August 24, official Lebanon failed the test once again. The measures announced as part of the economic D-Day are unprecedented in every respect – both in form and in substance – insofar as they shake the global economy as a whole while simultaneously strangling the Iranian regime economically. The sanctions target every sector: gold, technology, digital assets, oil, the banking, aviation and shipping. The ultimatum issued by the U.S. Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, leaves no room for ambiguity: countries that do business with Iran must fall into line or risk being isolated themselves. Worse still, he warned, they risk being removed from the U.S. dollar system. “No one should test our resolve,” Bessent warned, adding that “gray spaces no longer exist.” “It is now time for world leaders to make a decision between peace and terror, America and Iran,” he declared. No exceptions – least of all for China, Tehran’s strategic partner, with which Donald Trump had nevertheless opened a new chapter, and which now finds itself back in Washington’s crosshairs. Beijing had recently expressed its displeasure with Washington’s new strategy towards Iran. Bessent responded bluntly when asked about the matter: “If Beijing facilitates Iranian transactions, it will be targeted.” For the U.S. official, such transactions, whatever their nature, amount to “money laundering on behalf of Iran.” The Treasury Secretary said he “expected a major institution to be sanctioned this week,” without providing further detail, but indicated that, even as he spoke, “around 60 entities with ties to Tehran had just been sanctioned.” Bank Melli, along with other Iranian institutions, was ordered to “close all its branches around the world.” According to Bessent, Iran “faces a very clear choice, with only two possible paths: complete isolation and a subsistence economy, or a return to normalcy with the opportunity to rejoin the global economy,” he said, calling on Iranian soldiers to lay down their arms. “Remember that the Berlin Wall fell when ordinary soldiers decided not to shoot on their fellow citizens,” he told them. In an initial reaction, the Tasnim news agency, which is close to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sought to play down the significance of the unprecedented new round of sanctions, “as the Pakistani mediator is in Tehran.” It attributed the move to Donald Trump’s “repeated media and psychological operations,” citing an Iranian official source. According to that same source, “nothing will change on the ground.” A message essentially intended for domestic consumption, because the situation on the ground will, precisely, no longer be the same. Panic in Tehran Announced by President Donald Trump on Wednesday, the economic D-Day – a reference to the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944, which hastened the collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany during the Second World War – could deliver a decisive blow to Iran if it is fully implemented and maintained in the absence of a diplomatic breakthrough. The choice of name for the draconian measures Washington intends to impose on the Islamic Republic and its recalcitrant partners is no accident. The sanctions, which Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent describes as the “largest financial offensive ever undertaken,” would mark the final chapter of a war that has been raging in various forms since February 28. Iranians are well aware of this, as shown by the rial’s precipitous fall – it was trading at more than 2 million to the dollar on Monday – and, above all, by the palpable panic within the ranks of the regime. Since Sunday, official statements and commentary have been coming thick and fast, in an Iran that continues to send contradictory signals, ranging from direct threats against the United States and countries that might join the new sanctions regime, to clear signals in favor of a political solution to the conflict, interspersed with grandiose claims about Iranian resilience and military capabilities. So much so that President Massoud Pezeshkian felt compelled to call for “unity of positions in the face of American threats.” Conspicuously absent from this chorus of statements was Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. Can Iran withstand the American sledgehammer? Impossible, given the severity of the U.S. sanctions and the scale of the financial and inflation crisis that has gripped the country for months and has been compounded by the U.S. naval blockade. One need only look at Iranian oil exports to grasp the depth of the financial crisis gripping the mullahs’ regime. From nearly two million barrels a day before the February war, exports had fallen to around 400,000 by mid-August. In any event, faced with this economic D-Day, Iranian authorities said on Monday evening that they had drawn up a “two-year plan” – that is, one extending until the end of President Donald Trump’s term – to weather this economic war. What role for diplomacy? Despite the pressure it is under, Tehran still refuses to back down over what it calls its right to control the Strait of Hormuz – at least publicly, as Pakistan has stepped up its diplomatic efforts in the hope of a breakthrough that would bring Iran and the United States back to the negotiating table and ease tensions on the ground. Yemen’s Houthi militia, meanwhile, continued to target Saudi sites on Monday, including in the Red Sea. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is currently in Tehran for talks with Iranian officials. According to Reuters, he spoke by phone with Donald Trump last week. Oman’s foreign minister, Badr al-Busaidi, is due to follow him to the Iranian capital on Tuesday for talks on the Strait of Hormuz. The Unfortunate Chibani Affair In any event, if it continues without a diplomatic breakthrough, the economic D-Day will undoubtedly affect countries across the region where Tehran maintains influence through its armed proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed factions in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. Two significant developments stand out in this context: Baghdad has delayed the timetable for disarming pro-Iranian armed groups, without explaining the change or setting a new deadline. Launched in June, the process was supposed to be completed by September 30, when the mission of the U.S.-led international coalition against Islamic State in Iraq is due to end. Under pressure from Iran, however, some groups refused to lay down their arms, arguing that doing so would benefit the United States and Israel. Seeking to avoid armed confrontations and favoring dialogue, the Iraqi authorities adjusted their timetable without ever changing the original deadline. Iraq’s decision to abandon that deadline can only be explained by increased Iranian pressure, which has pushed Ali al-Zaidi’s government to slow the process already under way. The same is true in Lebanon, where Iran’s designated but unaccredited ambassador, Mohammad Reza Chibani, is holding on to his post, even though he was declared persona non grata and ordered by the Foreign Ministry to leave the country in March. In practical terms, Chibani has been in an irregular situation in Lebanon since March 24, since his visa ceased to be valid once he was declared persona non grata . Nevertheless, the authorities have done nothing to enforce the decision they themselves took, thus failing an initial test of their authority. On Monday, they squandered a second opportunity to prove their credibility, as Iran’s representative managed to obtain a six-month residence permit from General Security on the grounds that he was a former ambassador who had served in Lebanon from 2006 to 2009. This maneuver, however, does little to conceal the enormous gulf between officials’ statements about their determination to shield Lebanon from foreign influence and actions that run directly counter to those stated intentions. Only Foreign Minister Joe Raggi has remained true to his position, saying a few days ago in an interview with An-Nahar that there is no question of reversing the decisions taken last March. The renewal of Chibani’s residence permit is a humiliation for the authorities, showing that they lack the resolve to enforce their own decisions, whatever pretexts they may offer – all the more so given that Hezbollah, which answers directly to Iran, continues to defy them. This was demonstrated once again by one of the group’s MPs, Hassan Fadlallah, who, during a meeting in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, spoke as though he were representing Lebanon, going so far as to call for “concerted action” with the Islamic Republic to confront Israel’s ongoing military operations in Lebanon. Syria Removed from the Terrorism List Against this backdrop of mounting tensions, one development of major importance remains to be noted – a move whose symbolic significance and timing are hard to miss. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Monday evening the official removal of Syria from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism. At the same time, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the organization formerly led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa who was then known by the alias al-Jolani, was also removed from the list of international terrorist organizations. The strategic impact of the move will be to pave the way for private investment in Syria, thereby helping to revive the Syrian economy and allowing post-Assad Syria to rejoin the global economic system.

The Iranian mullah regime, and more specifically the radical faction represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, continues to seek control over the Strait of Hormuz crisis by dictating its own terms and sidelining the United States from ongoing negotiations—indeed, outright denying Washington any role in the emerging solution. To achieve this goal, Tehran's decision-makers negotiated the proposed settlement exclusively with the Sultanate of Oman, taking care to insist that no dialogue is taking place with the US. Even more strikingly, pushing its arrogance and open contempt for the American president even further, the Iranian regime declared on Wednesday morning that 'the agreement with Oman has been postponed due to threats made by the United States.' Tehran is thus dealing with the US Administration as a 'victor'—not only seeking to impose its own rules of the game, but deliberately treating its 'enemy' in a humiliating manner, interpreting President Donald Trump's hesitations and wavering as a sign of weakness it intends to exploit. In this context, the local outlet al-Janoubiya , which reflects the Lebanese Shia opposition movement hostile to Hezbollah, is reporting information drawn from the Iranian press that once again confirms the existence of a rift within the Iranian regime—and, more notably, reveals that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been sidelined from the ongoing negotiations. Indeed, a senior source at Iran's Foreign Ministry stated on Wednesday that 'no visit by the Foreign Minister or the Speaker of Parliament (the principal Iranian negotiators) is planned to Pakistan or Qatar' (the main mediators between the US and Iran). At the same time, al-Janoubiya also reports that a senior figure within the regime's radical wing allegedly declared that if Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian submits his resignation once again, it will be accepted immediately. This atmosphere within Iran surrounding the negotiations over the management of the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran's stubborn insistence on keeping the US out of any solution, cast serious doubt on the solidity and credibility of the agreement the regime has negotiated with Oman. An authorized Iranian source stressed on Wednesday evening that the Iran-Oman agreement 'does not mean the Strait of Hormuz will become safe' and 'does not mean the strait will be fully reopened'! In practical terms, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi indicated that evening that the agreement negotiated with Oman involves 'a different management model from the one that has been in place for sixty years.' The spokesman further specified that, at Tehran's request, the Sultanate is prepared to change 'the entry and exit corridors for commercial vessels.' The question now is whether President Trump will accept the rules of the game as defined by the regime's radical wing—especially given that, at the same time, the Houthis, the Pasdaran's Yemeni allies, continue to escalate their campaign in the Red Sea against Saudi Arabia. The Houthi spokesman announced on Wednesday evening that the militia had targeted 'a Saudi oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden with a ballistic missile.' Earlier in the day, a British source had also reported an attack off the coast of Yemen against a commercial vessel. These attacks came after President Trump had declared in the afternoon that he would hold Iran responsible for any Houthi attack against Saudi ships. In any case, Minister Araghchi stressed, in the context of the talks with Oman, that any agreement with the sultanate regarding the Strait of Hormuz will need to be approved by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Yet the Iranian president declared late in the evening that "contact with the Supreme Leader is extremely difficult at this stage"… The Lebanese file It was against this particularly murky backdrop, fraught with unpredictable consequences, that the second day of the seventh round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel took place on Wednesday, in a more positive atmosphere than the day before. This was announced late in the day by sources close to Baabda, who indicated that the discussions had resulted in the formation of three committees tasked with political, military, and border demarcation issues between the two countries. It is on this last point that the most notable progress has been recorded. The Baabda sources noted that the Lebanese delegation presented a detailed and well-documented study on the subject, and the American representative paid tribute to the position put forward by the Lebanese side in this regard. The other subject discussed between the Lebanese and Israeli delegations was the identification of a third party that would be responsible for ensuring the absence of any Hezbollah militia presence in the pilot zones evacuated by the IDF and taken over by the Lebanese army. Israel is said to oppose a role for France in this regard. However, observers note that the Italian Foreign Minister held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, and separately, a senior Italian officer met in Beirut with the chief of staff of the Lebanese army — fueling speculation that Italy could be chosen as the third party tasked with ensuring strict compliance with the terms of the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel. In any case, Wednesday afternoon's session was adjourned ahead of schedule, at the request of the American delegation, "due to developments on the ground," a State Department official said early in the evening. Bkerké backs negotiations with Israel To close this diplomatic chapter, it should be noted that following its monthly meeting held at Bkerké — as customary, every first Wednesday of the month — the assembly of Maronite bishops issued a communiqué in which the prelates expressed their full support for the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, under American auspices, with the aim of achieving a "full withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon and the return of residents to their villages (…)". Significantly, the Bkerké communiqué explicitly stresses that the path of negotiations with Israel being pursued by the Lebanese authorities must continue "away from attempts to tie this process to foreign agendas" — a barely veiled allusion to the Iranian regime's desire to take control of the South Lebanon card. On the ground in South Lebanon, Wednesday, August 6, 2026 was a deadly day. It began with the explosion of an improvised device in the village of Majdel Zoun, in the Tyre district. The blast killed two and wounded seven in the ranks of the Israeli army, one of them critically. Following this explosion, the IDF issued a communiqué strongly accusing Hezbollah of having violated the ceasefire in Lebanon and announcing that retaliatory strikes would be carried out in the South. In fact, a drone attack was carried out against the town of Tebnine, killing one person and wounding 12 others. At the same time, the forces of the Hebrew State announced that they had destroyed an underground infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah in the village of Srebbine (Bint Jbeil district), where significant quantities of weapons and ammunition were seized.

What answer can be given to Israel Katz, Israel’s defense minister, when he taunts Lebanon by declaring that “soon, fire will consume its cedars?” What response is there to Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s finance minister, who mocks Lebanon by saying that his son asks him “to leave something for him to destroy?” Israeli officials should choose their words more carefully. Words carry consequences. Katz invokes the Book of Zechariah: “Open your doors, O Lebanon, that the fire may devour your cedars! … Wail, O cypress, for the cedar has fallen, for the glorious trees are ruined! Wail, oaks of Bashan, for the thick forest has been felled! The sound of the wail of the shepherds, for their glory is ruined! The sound of the roar of the lions, for the thicket of the Jordan is ruined” (Zechariah 11:1–3). In this passage, to threaten the cedars is symbolically to threaten an entire country – its cultural inheritance, its history, and its identity. That is no small thing to say of a nation whose legacy stretches back millennia, as Lebanon’s does. As has already been noted, such biblical references are meant to normalize war within Israeli public opinion – to legitimize it, to suggest that it has been foretold. That is precisely why it is crucial to answer Israel Katz on a different register. Experience has shown that bellicose rhetoric only deepens the cycle of violence; it builds neither justice nor lasting peace. On the contrary, it risks fueling further escalation and animosity between peoples at the very moment talks are beginning toward, at the very least, a permanent cessation of hostilities. A diplomatic response – one that reaffirms international law, national sovereignty, and the necessity of dialogue – therefore constitutes the course that is both the fairest and the most pragmatic in protecting future generations and regional stability, while avoiding the trap of reciprocal provocation. The Moral Stakes of Language From an ethical standpoint, it is equally important to recall that violence – or threats directed against others – must never become a legacy to be passed on. When a public figure says that his son asks him to leave him “something to destroy,” he casts himself as an educator in hatred and violence. The Israeli minister’s words are the last thing a father should repeat before his son, gravely wounded in Lebanon. On the contrary, Israeli political leaders have a duty to protect, educate, and transmit principles of justice, responsibility, and mutual respect to their people, rather than pouring oil on the fire. One Must Never Laugh at Another’s Misfortune It scarcely needs saying how immoral it is to laugh at another person’s suffering. In our childhood, our elders would reprimand us whenever we mocked someone else’s physical defect – a hunchback, some other deformity, or even a speech impediment. To teach us respect, we were told that God might afflict us with the very hump or flaw we had ridiculed. In this way, we learned that there exists an invisible justice, immanent within creation itself, that restores human balance whenever it is broken. Unexpectedly, this subtle law of justice – or of balance – can also be found in the Book of Proverbs, one of the most frequently cited books of the Bible: “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, and do not let your heart be glad when he stumbles,” the Book of Proverbs warns, “lest, seeing it (also translated as ‘your wickedness’), God change His mind” (Proverbs 21). The Book of Proverbs is perhaps one of the foundations of our shared sense of civility. In the civilization common to the Semitic peoples of the region, words are never without consequence. This idea is also present throughout the Psalms, where it is said that those who seek to harm others ultimately become trapped in their own schemes. In Psalm 7, it is written that “he makes a pit, digging it out, and falls into the hole that he has made.” The image conveys the idea that threats or violence ultimately rebound upon the aggressor. In Psalm 37, it is advised: “Fret not yourself because of evildoers; be not envious of wrongdoers … For the evildoers draw the sword and bend their bows to bring down the poor and needy … but their swords shall enter their own hearts, and their bows shall be broken.” This is a poetic and moral way of recalling that unjust violence does not ultimately prevail. The figurative language of these maxims of practical wisdom suggests that wickedness, violence, and destruction often turn back upon those who devise them. The Psalms frequently combine these two motifs: the reversal of threats against the aggressor, and the protection and/or reward of the righteous. The Memory of the Villages Beyond symbolism, Lebanon also carries within it the centuries-old memory of the villages of South Lebanon that Israeli bulldozers are destroying. South Lebanon is part of the land trodden by the feet of Christ and, in the eyes of Lebanese – particularly Christians – it is worth as much as all the other treasures of the country combined, including the Holy Valley and the Cedars, Baalbek, and Beiteddine. Every Lebanese person feels, in the face of vanished villages, an intimate pain, but also a call to resilience and a trust in the destiny of their country. To enter a Lebanese home as a guest is to be welcomed as if one were at home; to enter it as an enemy is to condemn oneself to misfortune. The country emerged as an independent state after centuries of migrations, invasions, dominations, and external and internal pressures. Today, it continues to defend a sovereignty and territorial integrity that were hard won. Threatening its people or its national symbols will not paralyze it. On the contrary, such rhetoric only strengthens its determination, as well as that of its friends and partners, to continue confidently privileging what makes it strong: dialogue, diplomacy, and collective responsibility. To borrow the imagery of the prophet Zechariah, the reckoning will come later for the bad shepherds who left the flock’s pen unguarded – that is, the country’s borders. Freedom and Pluralism Faced with threats and provocations, responses must therefore be rooted in our deeper cultural tradition. Diplomacy, caution, prudence, and a solid understanding of both our own files and those of the adversary of the moment – alongside a reaffirmation of ethical principles and sovereign rights – constitute the most effective answer to incendiary rhetoric directed our way. In this sense, Lebanon’s true strength lies in its ability to resist provocation, to uphold justice – including the right of the Palestinians to an independent state, in close coordination with all member states of the Arab League – and to transmit urbi et orbi the values of freedom, pluralism, and dialogue at the heart of Lebanon’s historical mission. The Synagogue of Beirut In a recent interview given to the daily La Croix (20 April), Avraham Burg, former Labor president of the Knesset, of the Jewish Agency, and of the World Zionist Organization, does not hesitate to speak of Israel’s “moral bankruptcy,” with its soldiers razing Lebanese villages, looting homes, and desecrating religious symbols. “Israel is currently completely corrupt on a moral level,” he says, expressing particular outrage at the law on the death penalty applied selectively to Palestinians found guilty of “terrorism.” “More broadly,” he continues, “the government has compromised Judaism, the universality of justice, and all the values according to which Israel claimed to operate.” “Somewhat surprisingly,” the former Labor leader adds, “the only voice in favor of a sensitive and responsible humanity is that of the Pope. Leo XIV has avoided politics as much as possible, but he can no longer do so. And that is why, in a very dialectical way, he represents my spirituality and my value system, and not the rabbis.” One is tempted to say the same of Lebanon, whose Constitution grants a place to the Jewish community on an equal footing with the country’s seventeen other confessional components, and where the synagogue destroyed during the war has been restored and now occupies a prominent place in the historic center of Beirut.

Disinformation and the distortion of historical facts clearly have no limits for certain circles. On the occasion of Catholic Easter, last April 5, a Hezbollah official, Hassan Dorr, published the following message on X (formerly Twitter): https://x.com/HasanDorr/status/2040735419952718037?s=20   « At the call of O Holy Mary: The « Resistance » sends its greetings to our Christian brothers on the occasion of #Easter by targeting the « Stella Maris » base, belonging to the murderers of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), in occupied #Palestine » . The Hezbollah activist accompanied his message with a video of the operation. According to the visual elements displayed on screen, the video appears to be a recording of a live broadcast from Al-Mayadeen, a pan-Arab satellite news channel aligned with Hezbollah, with a banner indicating: «Images of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon». The video of the operation also bears the logo of «Hezbollah's media war apparatus» . While Mr. Dorr linked the operation to Easter Sunday, Hezbollah's television channel, Al-Manar, had published the following on its English-language website on March 31, 2026, at 8:59 PM Beirut time: «The Islamic Resistance targeted the Stella Maris base (a strategic maritime surveillance and control base along Israel's northern coast) at 8:00 PM on Tuesday, March 31, 2026, with a volley of advanced rockets: Communiqué No. 22.» (Diplomatic translation) Furthermore, the full video of the operation to which DORR refers on X can be found at the following address, dated March 31, 2026: https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2040856427963494574?s=20 , and on the Al-Manar website: https://www.almanartv.com.lb/article/724772/ , still marked with the date of March 31, 2026. This shows that the operation had no connection to Easter, except in Dorr's staging, which instrumentalizes Christian celebrations to fuel religious tensions between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Decryption Dorr revives the ancient and discredited allegation of deicide attributed to the Jews. This thesis argues that the Jewish people bear collective responsibility for the death of Jesus, including through the generations that followed his crucifixion. However, the Catholic Church has rejected the accusation of deicide since the Council of Trent in the mid-16th century. In the catechism resulting from this council, the Catholic Church taught that sinful humanity as a whole bore responsibility for the death of Jesus, with Christians having a particular responsibility in this regard. During the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), Pope Paul VI promulgated the Nostra Aetate declaration, which rejected the idea of collective and transgenerational Jewish guilt in the crucifixion of Jesus. The declaration specified that «what was committed during his Passion cannot be imputed indiscriminately to all Jews then living, nor to Jews of our time.» Pope Benedict XVI also rejected the accusation of deicide against Jews in his book Jesus of Nazareth, published in 2011, emphasizing that it had no scriptural basis. In summary, the Council of Trent extended responsibility to sinful humanity as a whole, Vatican II explicitly rejected any collective Jewish guilt, and contemporary Catholic and Christian sources commonly present the accusation of deicide as an antisemitic or anti-Jewish trope based on collective guilt, while recently warning against its use during Holy Week. Manipulation Dorr's manipulative message has several dimensions Firstly, it is an unfounded allegation, dismissed liturgically by Christian authorities. Secondly, it instrumentalizes the Crucifixion, a fundamental commemoration of Christianity. His statement seeks to fuel religious tensions among some Christians, who would then be inclined to support Hezbollah's actions against Israel (understood here as Jews) in order to «avenge the death of Jesus,» even though «vengeance» goes against the most basic Christian teachings. This attempt to rally trans-confessional support for the Hezbollah camp allows propagandists to argue that Hezbollah's actions serve all of Lebanon, with a support base that extends beyond the Shiite community alone. A community that has, moreover, ended up joining other Lebanese denominations in publicly and loudly denouncing and rejecting Hezbollah's actions. Today, Shiite dissent has reached its highest level ever observed, due to the displacement of Shiite populations and the destruction of their homes caused by Hezbollah's military activities and Israeli retaliations. By presenting Hezbollah, a group defining itself as an Islamic resistance, as the muscle that strikes Jews to bring justice to Christians and Jesus himself, Dorr involves both Islam and Muslims in religious wars. Thirdly, and most importantly, Dorr misses the point: Easter is the passage from death to life; it is a celebration of resurrection, of eternal life. Dorr's inflammatory message arrives three days, five centuries, and two thousand years late, and it is erroneous.

The terms of the ceasefire agreement – set to last for a limited period of two weeks – remain, as presented unofficially, ambiguous. Iran is reported to have agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, described as a major concession in exchange for the ceasefire. The strait meets the criteria defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as an international strait. Section 2 of the Convention outlines the definition of an international strait and sets out the rules governing the passage of ships through its waters and the overflight of aircraft above it. Article 37 “This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.” Article 38 – Right of transit passage “1 – In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded (…).” “2 - Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.” The term “reopening” could have serious implications for the future of navigation and passage through the strait for all non-Iranian or non-Omani vessels. It implies that the strait was closed and will now be reopened by Iran. In other words, it suggests that the strait belongs to Iran, which can shut or open it at will – or manage it jointly with Oman. This would effectively mean that the Strait of Hormuz is no longer treated as an international strait, and its use could be subject to fees or obligations, including the requirement to pay a transit fee. Such a scenario would have significant repercussions for shipping costs across the Arabian-Persian Gulf. Such a situation could then be replicated elsewhere: the Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, Lombok, the Sunda Strait, Gibraltar, why not, as well as the Dardanelles, the English Channel, Russia’s northern coast – which is already being considered by that country – and even the Northwest Passage. All are international straits and passages vital for global trade and maritime traffic. Would it not have been wiser to use alternative wording, such as “lifting the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz” or “halting threats to block the Strait of Hormuz,” or any other formulation that clarifies that Iran had taken actions contrary to the Convention and the definition of an international strait? If the negotiators have indeed used the phrasing currently being reported – let us hope that is not the case – it is likely because the Iranians, perhaps more clear-sighted than their counterparts, have a medium to long-term plan in mind. One can only hope they do not. * Jean-Patrick Dayras: Rear Admiral in the French Navy; naval aviation pilot; specialist in air-sea operations and commando interventions; former expert for the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Americans are known for being "direct," especially in the questions they ask their interlocutors, expecting an automatic, Manichaean answer: yes/no, black/white. Kash Patel, FBI director, during his Senate hearing, was relentlessly pressed by Senator Eric Swalwell with the same question: "Did you inform the Attorney General about the mention of Donald Trump's name in the Epstein file, yes or no?", a question to which Patel did not give the expected categorical answer. While the answer to this question is simple, as it concerns a fact, the one posed by Senator Lindsey Graham, in Washington, to the army's commander-in-chief, General Rodolphe Haykal, is, however, much more complex, as it concerns an opinion, or even a political stance. "Do you consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization?" is the quintessential question to which the army commander certainly could not answer with a simple affirmation or negation. His reply "No, in the Lebanese context" is not skillful, but it is not false either. He could have said that, as long as the Lebanese government has not officially banned this organization, he is not in a position to comment on the matter, being himself a military officer executing instructions given to him by the political power. However, and at the risk that the following comments may shock, Hezbollah is not (yet) considered an outlaw organization in Lebanon, especially since it is represented within the government and Parliament itself. Unlike the IRA, which had the idea of separating its paramilitary wing from its political wing (Sinn Fein), which, thanks to leaders like Gerry Adams, managed to gain the upper hand over the militia, Hezbollah's military wing is the one that dominates the political wing, as well as the entire Lebanese system. Hezbollah MPs pose in militia attire, defend all positions as well as the instigation of wars and hostilities that have devastated the country. The most disheartening thing is that other political factions, out of opportunism or, worse still, conviction, defend Hezbollah, which, during its glorious thirty years (from 1994 to 2024), has managed to extend its influence throughout the entire Lebanese administration, including the army. It is undeniable that, since September 27, 2024, the militia's decline has begun. However, asking subordinates to change their ways (literally "change shoulder rifle" in this context) is utopian. The episode of the illumination of the Raouché grotto is the most flagrant example. One must give time to time, as Cervantes wrote, even if our political and/or military institutions show a certain quixotism by avoiding seeing "the elephant in the room" and tackling other problems that will never truly be resolved until Hezbollah has been definitively demilitarized. But, here's the thing: time is pressing, and we don't have the luxury of waiting. Therefore, Rodolphe Haykal's answer is not wrong: everything is relative, everything is a matter of perception. At the moment the question was asked, Hezbollah is not a terrorist organization in the eyes of the State. Otherwise, it would mean that Ministers Chéhadé, Issa el Khoury, Nassar, Raggi, and Saddi, as well as all sovereignist deputies, associate and discuss with criminals, and in a certain sense, are themselves criminals. One could always say in their defense that Judas had irreproachable friends, but that still remains a simplistic view of the situation. Consequently, and very objectively, the fact that General Haykal gave an answer that does not necessarily correspond to the aspirations of a majority of Lebanese is not particularly reprehensible. However, what is unfortunate is that Hezbollah's lobotomized camp, their cerberuses and other individuals suffering from Mar Mikhael syndrome, far more powerful than that of Stockholm, which celebrated its twentieth anniversary, have already used and abused, in an Epsteinian manner, General Haykal's remarks to resurrect the triptych "army, people and resistance," a true triolism that the country and its entire population have endured for decades. It remains to be hoped that the president will not bestow a new decoration upon Rodolphe Haykal's return, especially since the one he previously received (after Raouché) was the highest distinction. Unless a new category is envisioned: that of relative merit, a medal for services rendered to national confusion, awarded with honors by a State that prefers to decorate its contradictions rather than face its reality....

Nouri al-Maliki's return to power — or even to a key position within the Iraqi decision-making center — cannot be perceived as a mere political event, nor as the rehabilitation of a figure from the past. Due to what he embodies and the record of his actions, the man has become the symbol of an exhaustive governance model in its own right, associated with a pivotal phase in Iraq's post-2003 history, with its share of failures, divisions, and structural transformations of the state. Therefore, any eventual reappearance of Mr. al-Maliki effectively means the return of a global political orientation — on domestic, regional, and international levels — with all the repercussions this implies. Domestically – the return of the 'politicized state' 1. Increased centralization and erosion of balances During his two terms, between 2006 and 2014, Nouri al-Maliki was associated with the preeminence of executive power over other institutions, under the slogans of 'restoring state authority' and 'fighting terrorism'. In practice, this translated into a gradual politicization of state mechanisms, from justice to security apparatuses, and even public media. This approach emptied the principle of separation of powers of its substance, transforming the state into an instrument serving political authority rather than being a regulatory framework for political authority. Any prospect of al-Maliki's return is today perceived as the reproduction of this model: rigid centralization, restriction of opposition action, and systematic weakening of any counter-power capable of limiting the executive's grip. In a country with multiple identities like Iraq, this centralization does not produce stability, but accumulates latent tensions. 2. Worsening sectarian divisions Despite a nationalist discourse displayed at certain stages of his power, al-Maliki's experience was concretely marked by the deterioration of relations between Iraqi components, particularly with Sunnis and Kurds. Policies of exclusion, excessive use of security tools, arrests, and judicial prosecutions largely contributed to undermining trust between the state and large factions of society. These choices were not marginal: they constituted one of the structural factors that led to the explosion of the crisis with the expansion of the 'Islamic State' organization in 2014. In this context, a return of al-Maliki revives the memory of this stage and opens the way to a resurgence of divisions rather than their resolution, at a time when the national fabric remains fragile. 3. Weakening of the reform process and sabotaging calls for change The October 2019 protests marked a turning point in Iraqi political consciousness. They expressed a cross-community rejection of the existing governance system and called for a state based on citizenship, a serious fight against corruption, and an end to the logic of sectarian power-sharing and uncontrolled weapons. In this context, al-Maliki's return is perceived as a diametrically opposed message: the victory of the old system over aspirations for change, and the recycling of the same elite that the street holds responsible for political and economic collapse. Security-wise – the preponderance of the 'parallel state' 1. Strengthening the influence of armed factions Nouri al-Maliki is widely regarded as one of the main political covers for the Hashed al-Shaabi and their related factions. During his mandate, no real project was put forward to integrate these forces into state institutions, according to the principle of the monopoly of legitimate violence; on the contrary, the duality of security decision-making was consecrated. His return would de facto mean the entrenchment of this duality: an official state with limited capacities, facing a parallel armed force with political, security, and economic influence. Such a model does not produce a strong state, but a weakened state surrounded by forces more powerful than itself. 2. Tensions with the military institution Al-Maliki's past experience highlighted a direct political instrumentalization of the military institution, whether through appointments or the management of security operations. This approach weakened military professionalism and created cross-loyalties within the army. In any scenario of a return to power, the fear is to see this dynamic repeat itself, undermining the idea of a unifying national army, transforming it into a tool in a broader political conflict. Regionally – the return of the Iranian axis 1. A clear signal of allegiance to Tehran Al-Maliki is not a circumstantial ally of Iran, but one of the most consistent Iraqi political figures in this strategic choice. His return means, from a regional perspective, the reintegration of Iraq into an advanced position in the Iranian influence project, at a time when the region is trying to redefine its balances. This positioning is not limited to foreign policy: it is reflected internally by the strengthening of forces linked to the Tehran axis to the detriment of the logic of the national state. 2. Potential escalation with the Gulf Since 2021, Iraq has initiated a gradual opening towards its Arab environment, particularly the Gulf, in an attempt to rebalance its regional relations. Al-Maliki's return threatens this process, both through political discourse and through fait accompli policies, which could lead to a cooling, or even a setback, in Arab relations. 3. Lebanese repercussions The impact of al-Maliki's return extends beyond Iraq's borders. It offers a renewed model of the 'weak state facing the strong militia', a scheme that forces allied with Iran in Lebanon rely on to justify the retention of weapons outside the state framework. Thus, any consolidation of this model in Baghdad translates into a strengthening of similar rhetoric in Beirut. Internationally – isolation and pressure 1. Tensions with Washington and the West Western capitals, starting with Washington, have a negative memory of al-Maliki's experience, whether in terms of governance, security management, or relations with armed factions. His return is not perceived as a positive factor, but as a source of concern, even if it were to be approached pragmatically. 2. Investor concern and decline in confidence At a time of reconstruction and economic diversification, Iraq needs a stable environment and clear rules. However, the return of the governance model associated with al-Maliki weakens confidence in political and legal stability, which directly affects investments and keeps the economy captive to rent-seeking and corruption. Return to pre-2014 Ultimately, the return of Nouri al-Maliki — or even the strengthening of his role — is equivalent to Iraq returning to the pre-2014 situation: a less balanced state, a heavier regional influence, weapons outside state control, and a paralyzed reform process. It is not the return of a man, but of a governance model that has demonstrated, through experience, its inability to build an inclusive and effective state. Between fragile security stability and an accumulation of political tensions, the question remains open: can Iraq bear the cost of repeating the same experience, or does the momentum for change expressed by the protests remain latent, awaiting a new opportunity?