
As this is being written, Lebanon is at war again. Since March 2, 2026, large-scale exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah have resumed, extending a cycle of violence that began in October 2023 and never truly ended despite the November 2024 ceasefire. The war has cost more than 4,000 lives, displaced over a million Lebanese – more than a fifth of the population – and destroyed entire cities, villages and homes, some of them centuries old and irreplaceable. The International Monetary Fund now expects Lebanon’s GDP to contract by 12% to 16% in 2026, driven mainly by the collapse of tourism and the paralysis of economic activity in border regions. All that, for what? For whom? For what purpose? Against this backdrop, one question deserves to be asked head-on: what if, instead, Lebanon was living through its first decade of durable peace since the civil war? This is not an idle utopia. It rests on real figures, plans already drafted, and financing already pledged but never disbursed for lack of stability. Lebanon does not need to invent its reconstruction – it has already costed it, on paper, more than once. What it lacks is the calm, uninterrupted time required to execute it. The starting point: an economy on life support Before imagining the way out, the depth of the hole must be measured. The World Bank has ranked Lebanon’s post-2019 financial collapse among the three most severe economic crises any country has experienced since the mid-19th century. Public debt, on which service has been suspended since the 2020 default, stands at roughly 150% of GDP. The economy contracted by 0.7% in 2023 and 7.5% in 2024, before a fragile rebound of 3.5% to 4% in 2025, driven by early signs of macroeconomic stabilization and a partial return of tourists. The war that broke out in March 2026 halted that momentum in its tracks. But the most telling figure has nothing to do with the state – it concerns households. The 2019 banking crisis produced a phenomenon with virtually no equivalent in recent economic history for a country at peace: the near-total destruction of an entire middle class’s private savings. Between $86 billion and $93 billion in deposits, spread across roughly 1.26 million accounts, remain frozen in Lebanese banks today – some estimates put the figure above $100 billion. These are not the holdings of the ultra-wealthy: they are lifetime savings, accumulated by families who had spent decades trusting the Lebanese banking system rather than real estate or cash. Over the same period, the Lebanese pound lost more than 98% of its value against the dollar since 2019, effectively wiping out the purchasing power of anyone who had not converted their savings in time. The social consequence of this twin destruction – frozen deposits and a collapsed currency – is staggering. GDP per capita fell from roughly $8,000 in 2018 to under $3,000 by the end of 2021. The poverty rate, which stood at 30% to 35% in 2019, is estimated by some measures to have surged to 85%-90% of the population by the end of 2021 before partially receding; the World Bank, for its part, measured poverty nearly quadrupling over a decade in the areas it surveyed, from 12% in 2012 to 44% in 2022, with more than 70% of the population affected by some form of multidimensional poverty. Lebanon’s middle class, once one of the most developed in the region, is now estimated to make up less than 20% of the population. The World Bank itself did not hesitate to describe the episode as a “deliberate depression,” arguing that the absence of a policy response owed less to incompetence than to a conscious choice to protect a financial elite’s interests at the expense of ordinary depositors’ savings – a rare characterization for a multilateral institution, and one that speaks to just how unprecedented Lebanon’s collapse has been. A Lebanon at peace cannot undo this loss: deposits frozen since 2019 will not magically resurface with a military peace agreement. But peace is the precondition without which even the most ambitious bank resolution law will remain a dead letter, for lack of growth, confidence and external financing to cushion the shock. That is the whole stake of the banking chapter further down in this piece. The World Bank costed the conflict between October 2023 and December 2024 alone at $14 billion, including $6.8 billion in direct physical damage and $7.2 billion in economic losses from reduced productivity and forgone revenue. Recovery and reconstruction needs were estimated at $11 billion in a report published in March 2025, of which $3 to 5 billion would need to be publicly financed and $6 to 8 billion privately financed, primarily for housing, business, manufacturing and tourism. In a scenario of consolidated peace, that same envelope would stop being a war bill and start being an investment plan. Foreign investment, finally disbursed Lebanon has a rare peculiarity: much of its international financing already exists. The 2018 CEDRE conference in Paris raised more than $11 billion in loans and grants, including a $1 billion credit line renewed by Saudi Arabia, $1.35 billion from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and $500 million from the Kuwait Fund for Development. Those commitments were conditioned on governance, procurement and electricity-sector reforms. They were almost never disbursed: neither the reforms nor the money followed through. In a Lebanon at peace, with a stable government, the return of the rule of law, and a fully validated IMF agreement, that logjam breaks. The World Bank has already laid the first stone with the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project (LEAP), a scalable $1 billion framework whose first $250 million tranche was approved in June 2025. Durable peace would turn that emergency mechanism into a genuine regional recovery plan, reactivating both the CEDRE pledges, the appetite of Gulf sovereign funds for discounted Lebanese assets, and the return of the diaspora, whose remittances have long been one of the most stable pillars of the Lebanese economy, even at the height of the crisis. Infrastructure: beyond the private generator Electricity remains the most visible symbol of Lebanese state failure. A seven-point reform plan championed by Energy and Water Minister Joe Saddi calls for building two 825-megawatt power plants at a cost of $2 billion, restructuring Électricité du Liban into a pure transmission operator, and opening generation and distribution to private players. An Electricity Regulatory Authority was appointed in September 2025, twenty-three years after the law creating it was passed. Lebanon is now actively courting Gulf capital to finance large-scale solar projects. In a peace scenario, this reform stops being a wish list funded in dribs and drabs and becomes bankable: international donors, the World Bank and Gulf private investors are waiting for nothing more than a signal of stability to commit the capital needed for round-the-clock power – a goal set years ago and repeatedly postponed. The same logic applies to the Port of Beirut, whose reconstruction after the 2020 explosion remains unfinished, as well as to the road network and water and sanitation infrastructure, all included in the World Bank’s reconstruction envelope. Real estate: the end of the cash economy Lebanon’s real estate market already offers a glimpse of what political stability can produce, even a partial and fragile one. Prices rose roughly 10% in the first quarter of 2025, lifted by the presidential election, the designation of a prime minister and the formation of a cabinet, before stabilizing. High-end apartments are now nearing pre-crisis levels in fresh-dollar terms, while mid-range units remain 20% to 30% below 2019 prices. Achrafieh and the Metn suburbs stand out as safe havens for capital preservation. This market today runs almost entirely on cash, in the absence of any reliable mortgage system – an anomaly that has paradoxically shielded it from the banking crisis but also caps its depth. A Lebanon at peace, with a restructured banking sector able to issue credit again, would see the return of mortgage lending, international developers, and a diaspora ready to invest in property rather than simply wiring subsistence transfers. Rebuilding the destroyed areas of the South, the Bekaa and Beirut’s southern suburbs would alone constitute a multi-billion-dollar market. Tourism: the sector most sensitive to peace No sector illustrates the direct correlation between peace and prosperity better than tourism. Lebanon recorded close to 3.46 million visitor arrivals in 2023, a figure that fell to 2.8 million in 2024. The 2025 rebound, fueled by hopes of stabilization, was itself held back by a weaker-than-expected season due to persistent tensions. According to the World Bank, it is precisely the anticipated collapse of tourism that explains most of the GDP contraction expected in 2026. Pre-war forecasts had projected 2.3 million arrivals and roughly $3.3 billion in tourism receipts by 2026 – figures that look optimistic today given the current context, but that would become plausible again, even beatable, in a stabilized Lebanon. The country retains intact structural assets: a diaspora of several million people that naturally forms its first tourism market, a coastline and mountains less than two hours’ flight from several Gulf capitals, and a food and nightlife scene that has outlasted every crisis. Its cultural and historical heritage is unique – few countries pack Phoenician, Roman, Crusader, Ottoman and modern layers into a territory the size of Lebanon. That depth alone could draw several million additional visitors a year from Europe, the United States and Asia, once Lebanon is seen again as a peaceful and reliable destination. Peace would not create a Lebanese tourism industry – it would unlock one that already exists but is running at a fraction of its capacity. Education and healthcare: stopping the brain drain Healthcare illustrates the harshest social cost of the twin economic and security crises. Public health spending fell 40% between 2018 and 2022. Since 2020, roughly 5,000 nurses and 3,000 doctors have left the country, and the recent conflict has forced the closure of more than a hundred clinics and primary care centers in border areas. Higher education has suffered comparable erosion, with universities facing access and research-funding problems, even as institutions like the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University have weathered the storm better than most. Lebanon has long lived off exporting its locally trained human capital – doctors, engineers, academics – to the Gulf, Europe and North America. In a peace scenario, that dynamic could partially reverse: rebuilding the hospital system, financed through the infrastructure portion of the World Bank’s recovery plan, and stabilizing salaries in dollars would be enough to slow the emigration of healthcare workers and restore Lebanese universities to their historic role as a regional training hub – a sector that once generated significant revenue from foreign students, particularly from the Gulf and francophone Africa. Industry: relocating a narrow manufacturing base Lebanese manufacturing, already modest before 2019, was hit hard by the currency devaluation, the Beirut port explosion, and limited access to foreign-currency credit. It is explicitly among the sectors targeted for private financing under the World Bank’s reconstruction plan, alongside housing and tourism. A stabilized Lebanon, with a banking system once again able to open reliable letters of credit for import-export, would let Lebanese manufacturers – food processing, pharmaceuticals, textiles, building materials – regain normal access to imported inputs and regional export markets – particularly Syria, the Gulf and West Africa, three historic outlets for Lebanese industrial know-how. Agriculture: an underexploited sector that could double its exports Agriculture remains a blind spot in the Lebanese economy despite its social weight: it employs roughly 11% of the labor force, making it the country’s third-largest employer, while contributing an estimated 1.2% to 4.5% of GDP depending on the calculation method. Agricultural exports, dominated by fruit, vegetables and coffee and spices, plateaued around $193 million before the crisis, with modest annual growth. Since 2019, farmers have paid for most inputs – seeds, fertilizer, fuel – in cash and in hard currency, weakening the entire production chain. A Lebanon at peace would benefit from a double effect: the reopening of overland export routes to Syria and the Gulf, currently complicated by regional instability, and access to foreign-currency agricultural credit to modernize farms. Upgrading to international standards, particularly for olive oil, wine and processed products, offers export growth potential the sector has never been able to exploit for lack of stability and financing. The banking system: the precondition for everything else None of the above is possible without resolving the banking crisis, which remains the central knot of the Lebanese economy. Parliament passed a bank resolution law in July 2025, published in the Official Gazette in August 2025, meant to organize the restructuring or liquidation of non-viable banks. A complementary law on loss allocation – the “gap law” – is still being drafted, and depositor-advocacy groups criticize its failure to guarantee a clear repayment path. Banking secrecy was also significantly narrowed in April 2025 under IMF pressure. The current strategy envisions gradual repayment, prioritizing small depositors, of deposits under $100,000 – roughly $20 billion to be mobilized over several years, with no clearly identified funding source at this stage. In a peace scenario, a fully implemented IMF agreement would mechanically unlock the international financing needed to close that gap and restore confidence in Lebanese banks. This is the sine qua non for everything else: without a functioning banking sector able to finance mortgages, foreign trade and industrial investment, every sector described above will stay capped, however strong the political peace achieved. What this exercise really says This projection is not a forecast in the statistical sense – it does not claim to know exactly how many billions of dollars would flow in, or over how many quarters. It says something else, simpler and more unsettling: Lebanon is not waiting for plans, financing or reforms that still need to be invented. It is waiting for three things no donor conference can offer: peace, the rule of law, and time. Time for a banking law to take effect, for a power plant to get built, for a tourist season to run uninterrupted, for a generation of students and healthcare workers to stay rather than leave. With every cycle of violence since 2023, that time has been confiscated again. The question, then, is not whether Lebanon has an economic peace plan. It has several, costed and documented, already negotiated with its international partners. The only true variable still missing from the equation is peace itself. Can the Lebanese not, at last, weigh the dividend of peace against the price of war? Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Bank (Lebanon Economic Monitor, Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment 2025), Trading Economics, Credit Libanais Economic Research, IDAL (Investment Development Authority of Lebanon), Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Reform Initiative.









