Defense

For Russia (in the Black Sea), Ukraine, Iran, China, and Japan, what role does the sea play in their overall strategy? Total or partial control, local or broad? Maritime power? Naval power? Jean-Patrick Dayras, Rear Admiral (ret.) Russia is unquestionably a maritime power. It has a substantial combat fleet, including frigates and corvettes, submarines, and anti-ship missiles. It also has a significant amphibious force. It controls the port of Sevastopol. In theory, it is also a naval power, given the number of its vessels and the diversity of their operational capabilities. But it has no drones. With a clear advantage in tonnage, the Russian navy enjoys overwhelming conventional naval dominance.

In the 19th century, two theorists—Mahan, an American, and Corbett, a Briton—who remain pillars of strategic naval thought, put forward theories on “command of the sea” and “sea power” (sometimes confused with maritime power). Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that a nation’s greatness, prosperity, and global dominance depend directly on its ability to control the seas: command of sea routes and the defeat of the enemy fleet take precedence over everything else. “Sea power” refers to a state’s ability to use the seas and oceans for military, economic, and political purposes in order to project its power and safeguard its global geopolitical interests.

Since the 19th century, maritime strategists—most notably the American Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Briton Julian Corbett—have theorized the concepts of “command of the sea” and “sea power.” These terms are too often treated as synonymous, even though they are quite distinct, addressing different political and military dimensions. Another concept has emerged in recent years: naval power. Unfortunately, some commentators—including prominent ones—conflate naval power with sea power, without understanding the increasingly important distinctions between them as new weapons and new methods of operation come into play, sometimes turning weakness into strength and vice versa. It is these new weapons, together with their associated methods and frameworks of use, that distinguish the terms forming this new terminology: naval or maritime.

The abandonment of the Future Combat Air System — known by its French acronym SCAF — announced this week by France and Germany after years of tensions, represents far more than the failure of an industrial program. It exposes the deep contradictions now shaping the construction of an autonomous European defense capability, at the very moment when the continent is seeking to free itself from its strategic dependence on the United States. At the heart of this wreck lies a question that has never found a consensual answer: is Europe capable of producing, through a common effort, the instruments of its military sovereignty, or does it remain a juxtaposition of competing national interests?