Strategia

In a previous article, we analyzed the military and industrial impact of the joint “Epic Fury” and “Lion’s Roar” operations on Iran’s conventional capabilities. In this second and final installment, we examine the possible combined effects of economic strangulation and grassroots mobilization that could lezd to the implosion of the Iranian regime. The naval blockade has taken over from the February and April 2026 strikes. The blockade is a necessary condition for weakening the Iranian regime, but not a sufficient one. Several factors help explain why the economic sanctions imposed over many years – compounded by the ongoing American naval blockade and its consequences, including supply chain disruptions and the halt of oil exports –struggle on their own to bring about the regime’s collapse. The Iranian regime has repeatedly proven its capacity for adaptation and restructured itself following the decapitation strike of last February. Military Restructuring and National Identity The eliminated Iranian command has been replaced by a new one, heavily militarized in character. It is clear that President Masoud Pezeshkian, considered a moderate, has been sidelined, and strategic executive power is now vested in a junta dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). At the top, coordination is centralized at the “Khatam al-Anbiya” Headquarters, which, under new leadership figures, is overseeing the rapid reconstitution of missile and drone capabilities. To limit the vulnerability of the decision-making center, the chain of command is no longer pyramidal but flattened: regional commands have been authorized to take the initiative and now enjoy greater tactical autonomy, particularily in conducting naval and aerial ambushes and harassment raids should contact with Tehran be severed. This decentralization aims to multiply decision-making nodes and complicate the targeting of the chain of command. At the same time, the regime is leveraging a sense of national belonging in the face of an external threat by stigmatizing the opposition as a foreign agents and consolidating the loyalty of its hard core. The Weakening of a Still-Resilient Embargo Economy For decades, the Islamic Republic developped parallel trade networks and channels to circumvent Western sanctions imposed since the 1980s. These included black markets, shell companies scattered across the globe, and geopolitical partners such as China, Russia, Turkey and Iraq – all willing to bypass embargoes. As a result, the economic impact of the sanctions was softened, despite their having reduced Iran’s GDP by roughly 23% and caused revenue losses estimated at between $10 and $12 trillion between 2010 and 2022. The current sanctions and blockade continue to target Iran's economy, heightening internal sociopolitical tensions, constraining its regional influence and its ability to fund allies like Hezbollah. As such, sanctions and the blockade act as catalysts rather than triggers of an internal implosion. What factors could accelerate the regime’s collapse? Four factors stemming from a convergence of the current acute economic crisis and internal fractures could constitute tipping points leading to the collapse of the Islamic Republic. The Fracturing of Economic Pillars Iran, despite its outward appearance of resilience and ideological solidity, is under an extremely heavy economic burden. The regime is contending with a sharp devaluation of the rial, runaway inflation, the cost of rebuilding infrastructure, the reconstitution of its military arsenal, and the erosion of Iranian citizens’ purchasing power. Merchants, entrepreneurs and salaried workers had converged in protest last January, signaling that the regime’s economic base was already weakened: falling tax revenues, an inability to subsidize essential goods and supply difficulties. Today, the situation is far more severe, and the regime would be hard-pressed, over time, to contain discontent through repression alone. Divergences Among Elites and Reformist Pressures The Islamic Republic rested on a political architecture centered on Khamenei senior and a network of interconnected elites. But today, it is the IRGC that holds the reins of power. Faced with economic catastrophe, how will it deal with reformist factions? How will it manage elites whose internal divisions are currently masked by a state of war? Will those divisions come to the surface? What will the country’s 8 million Kurds, 3 million Baluch and a fraction of its 18 million Azeris – who have been demanding autonomy for decades – do? This abrupt shift toward decentralized command structures is pushing the regime to over-militarize its peripheries and increase pressure on minorities, justifying this by the “risk of the country’s partition,” which in turn tightens the ranks of the Persian population around the regime. Yet the destruction of economic and industrial infrastructure severely limits the regime’s capacity to buy social peace in these historically neglected provinces. Defections Within the Security Forces The most decisive factor for the regime’s survival will remain the loyalty of its coercive instruments, notably the IRGC, the police and the Basij popular militias. These forces remain, for now, united and disciplined. They are therefore able to contain waves of protest through force and intimidation. Should units or officers refuse orders, defect, or side with protesters – driven, for instance, by interruption in salary payments – popular discontent could turn into insurrection, and possibly revolution. The early warning indicators of such a scenario have not yet been reported, but the moment they do appear, it would indicate a crisis in its terminal phase. In peripheral regions such as Kurdistan or Baluchistan, the combination of deep social discontent and weakened local command structure could facilitate this fragmentation dynamic. The Erosion of Collective Fear Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has drowned five major waves of protest, each of which challenged the foundations of the theocracy: the purges of the early years (1979-1988), marked by the elimination of opponents and minorities and culminating in the clandestine execution of between 3,000 and 5,000 prisoners; the 2009 Green Movement, sparked by the disputed re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and crushed by the Basij, leaving between 100 and 150 dead; the 2017-2018 social uprisings, triggered by inflation and corruption, suppressed with roughly 30 deads; the “Bloody November” of 2019, sparked by a fuel price increase and quashed by the killing of at least 1,500 people in ten days; and the Woman, Life, Freedom movement (2022-2023), ignited by the death of Mahsa Amini and crushed through live fire and public executions, leaving more than 550 dead. The bloodiest was the most recent uprising, in January of this year, which served as an indirect trigger for American military intervention. During this revolt, economic grievances quickly turned political, with protesters calling for the overthrow of the regime. The IRGC, police and Basij crushed the uprising, killing 5,000 people according to official authorities and over 40,000 according to the highest estimates. The complete internet blackout, imposed as of January 8, isolated the country and made independent verification of information about ongoing events difficult. Each of these crises illustrated the regime's systematic recourse to disproportionate state violence as an instrument of survival. But collective psychology is not immutable. Younger generations, confronted with recurring state violence and economic hardship, have shown signs of a waning fear. When public perception shifts – under the combined effect of the absence of freedoms, sociopolitical discontent and the inability to meet basic daily needs – mobilization can then reach a critical scale and break the threshold at which collective fear effectively disappears. In the absence of internet and social networks, this would spread rapidly through local solidarities, crystallizing into a sustained protest dynamic. In conclusion, the American blockade functions like a slow pressure cooker: it reduces the resources needed to subsidize the economy, pay public services, and maintain the loyalty of the armed forces. As these capabilities are depleted, the regime loses crucial material levers. But collapse could only occur if, in parallel, the Persian population and peripheral ethnic communities cross certain thresholds, and/or if significant fragments of the security forces break away. In other words, without an internal breaking point – economic collapse combined with mass mobilization, and/or military defections – the blockade will remain a factor of attrition rather than a final instrument of overthrow. Should that breaking point prove distant or unattainable, three alternatives to the outcome of the crisis remain: either Washington blinks, which would mean a weakening of Trump; or Tehran blinks, which would mean a weakening of the regime or its collapse; or a return to war – a contingency for which both the IRGC and the U.S. Navy are preparing. Read also: Dismantled, Yet Still Dangerous: Iran After Operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion”: (1/2)

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous seven instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South and the eruption of the 33-Day War in July 2006, which was initiated by Ali Larijani.. The 2006 War in Gaza Hezbollah’s cross-border military operation, dubbed “True Promise,” along the Blue Line had a dual objective: to open a second front to relieve pressure on Gaza and, above all, to divert attention from Iran’s nuclear dossier. Israel’s military campaign in Gaza during June and July 2006 was codenamed “Summer Rains.” It was launched on June 28, exactly two weeks before the outbreak of war in Lebanon, following the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas on June 25. The operation marked Israel’s first large-scale ground incursion into the Palestinian enclave since its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 under a plan known as the “Disengagement.” The two conflicts – in Gaza and Lebanon – therefore unfolded simultaneously during the summer of 2006. Operation Summer Rains reached its peak on July 12, when Israeli forces advanced into central Gaza – the very day Hezbollah launched its attack on Israel, triggering a devastating war. In this kind of geopolitical context, coincidences are rarely just that. The simultaneous opening of the two fronts was widely interpreted by observers as a coordinated strategic maneuver involving Iran and Hamas on one side, and Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on the other, aimed at advancing Tehran’s regional interests. General Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force (killed on the orders of Donald Trump on January 3, 2020, shortly after leaving Baghdad airport), confirmed years later that he himself had entered Lebanon through Syria at the outset of the conflict to oversee operations alongside Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, who was killed by Israel in September 2024, and Imad Mughniyeh, the group’s military chief and a close personal friend. Mughniyeh had been trained by Iranian officers from the early 1980s. Over the years, he became Hezbollah’s principal liaison with Iran for “special operations” abroad. Experts have noted that he had “one foot in Hezbollah and the other in Iran.” He often bypassed his own chain of command, reporting directly to and receiving instructions from the Quds Force. Fluent in Persian, he frequently travelled using Iranian diplomatic documents. Many of the major operations attributed to him – including the Buenos Aires bombings of 1992 and 1994 and support for Shiite militias in Iraq during the 2000s – were reportedly carried out at Tehran’s direct request. “Operation True Promise” On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol consisting of two armored Humvee vehicles travelling along the road that runs parallel to the border fence on the Israeli side of the frontier. The group used explosive devices and anti-tank missiles to disable the vehicles. At the same time, it unleashed a barrage of rockets and mortar rounds on several communities in northern Israel, as well as Israeli military positions across the border, in an effort to overwhelm communications and divert the attention of the Israeli command. A Hezbollah commando unit then crossed the border fence, attacked the Humvees, and initially killed three Israeli soldiers, capturing two others, who were later confirmed dead. Three more Israeli soldiers inside the armored vehicles were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. Immediately after the kidnapping of the two servicemen, a Merkava tank crossed the border in pursuit of the abductors, and drove straight into a powerful mine laid by Hezbollah, which destroyed the vehicle and killed all four crew members instantly. Another Israeli soldier was killed by mortar fire while trying to recover the tank crew’s bodies. The operation, carried out with professional precision, prompted the Israeli government to declare war without delay. It marked the beginning of what became known as the 33-Day War. The ambush had been months in the planning, executed by Hezbollah’s elite unit with the assistance of officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC officers advised the leadership of the pro-Iranian militia on infiltration tactics, carefully concealed and covered by diversionary attacks along multiple sectors of the Lebanese-Israeli border. The commandos involved were members of the unit then known as the “Intervention Forces,” the future Radwan Unit. They had been trained by instructors from the IRGC’s Quds Force in ambush techniques and the use of anti-tank missiles. The operation was directed by Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated by Mossad three years later in Syria. “Operation Steel Web” Israel’s response took the form of a military campaign codenamed “Operation Steel Web,” launched in reference, among other things, to a speech delivered by Hassan Nasrallah, six years earlier, at the football stadium in Bint Jbeil, just 24 hours after the Israeli withdrawal on May 26, 2000. On that occasion, he had described Israel as being “weaker than a spider’s web.” The Israeli army carried out a massive multi-day air campaign targeting the entirety of Lebanese territory before launching a ground offensive in southern Lebanon against several towns and villages. The most significant objective was Bint Jbeil, a town of deep symbolic importance precisely because of Nasrallah’s famous speech. It was there, in particular, that the fiercest fighting took place. The Battle of Bint Jbeil The Israeli army encircled the town on July 24, twelve days into the fighting and the taking of Maroun el-Ras, a village located just southeast of Bint Jbeil. On July 25, an Israeli general declared total control of the town, even as resistance continued at the town center. On July 26, a unit from the Golani Brigade walked into the deadliest ambush of the conflict on the town’s outskirts. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded. Unable to secure the town center, Israel fell back on heavy airstrikes and artillery fire, reducing much of the built-up area to rubble. Bint Jbeil was defended by 150 fighters, including units of the Radwan Force (1) . Entrenched in bunkers and tunnels, they repelled multiple ground incursions attempts with anti-tank missiles and mortar fire. Hezbollah fighters deployed along the Bint Jbeil-Wadi al-Hujeir axis were, to the surprise of many observers, heavily equipped with precision anti-tank missiles, including Kornet systems in both Russian and Iranian variants, as well as Russian-made Metis missiles supplied by Syria and Iran. The toll from the Battle of Bint Jbeil was steep on the Israeli side: 17 soldiers killed, including at least two senior officers, and several Merkava tanks damaged by missile strikes. Hezbollah’s losses were even heavier: 60 fighters killed, including the sectors operations commander, along with the wholesale destruction of infrastructure and ammunition depots. Another battle that would define thiswar was that of Wadi al-Houjeyr (to be continued) . (1) Hezbollah’s elite offensive unit, specialized in commando operations and cross-border incursions into Israeli territory, the Radwan Fore is divided into two groups: one tasked with breaching the Lebanese-Israeli border, and the other with seizing strategic positions in northern Israel. In one of his speeches, Hassan Nasrallah had threatened to capture the Galilee, relying on this Radwan unit. Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (7) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (6) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In this first instalment, we examine the military and industrial impact of Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion on Iran’s conventional capabilities. It will be followed next week by a second and final part exploring the conditions that could lead to Iran’s implosion over the medium to long term. The Iranian regime suffered heavy losses during the US-Israeli war fought between February and April 2026. Yet despite the scale of the damage, the collapse of the Islamic Republic did not materialize, and Tehran showed no sign of flexibility in response to U.S. sanctions and the American naval blockade. Historical experience and the assessments of many analysts suggest that an authoritarian system as deeply entrenched as Iran’s is far more likely to yield under the pressure of an internal implosion. Such a scenario would be triggered by the convergence of prolonged economic strangulation and a critical threshold of popular mobilization. International sanctions and the US naval blockade have undoubtedly weakened the Iranian state’s resources, but they remain only catalysts. The decisive rupture occurs when internal fractures – previously contained through repression – begin to spread and converge. More than 30,000 people were killed last January, while over 50,000 punitive and preventive arrests were carried out in February. Returning to the 40-day US-Israeli war against Iran, two key questions emerge: what is the true extent of the Islamic Republic’s military and economic losses, and what prospects lie ahead as it confronts the American blockade and protracted negotiations? What Remains of Iran’s Navy? The two joint military operations – America’s Epic Fury and Israel’s Roaring Lion – conducted between February and April 2026, involved a total of 20,000 airstrikes. Over a period of just 40 days, that figure amounted to 60% of all coalition strikes carried out against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq over five years. The US-Israeli campaign dealt a decisive blow to Iran’s regular navy. Strikes on the country’s main naval bases at Bandar Abbas and Konarak destroyed most of its major surface combatants. Destroyers, frigates and support vessels were either sunk or damaged beyond repair, depriving Iran of its conventional blue-water naval capability. This strategic setback has forced Tehran to rely on residual, asymmetric and highly mobile assets to defend its coastline and, above all, to maintain a threat to maritime traffic in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Although partially degraded, Iran’s submarine force retains the ability to disrupt operations in shallow waters through its remaining midget submarines. The three Russian-built Kilo-class attack submarines were damaged or sunk while docked. Half of the 23 domestically produced Ghadir-class midget submarines were also destroyed at their berths. The surviving fleet of these midget submarines – estimated at between 10 and 12 vessels and equipped with torpedoes and missiles – has been deployed on the front line in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. These mini-submarines provide maritime guerrilla capabilities, including mine-laying operations, torpedo attacks and covert missions launched from the region’s rugged coastline. At the same time, most of the surface fleet operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has survived, largely because of its dispersed structure. It consists of hundreds of armed fast attack craft, as well as light missile patrol boats such as the Peykaap II and Houdong classes. These small warships are designed to conduct coordinated swarm attacks in overwhelming numbers before rapidly withdrawing into coastal inlets and sheltered coves. Iranian Tactics in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz Iran’s strategy for targeting civilian and military shipping now relies primarily on midget submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles, each crewed by no more than seven sailors. It also draws on missile-equipped fast attack craft, typically operated by crews of four to five, as well as shore-to-sea anti-ship missiles, naval mines and attack drones. Roughly 70% of Iran’s anti-ship missile inventory – estimated at several hundred projectiles – remains intact and can be launched from around 30 coastal sites. These include the Iranian-made Ra’ad, Noor, Qader and Khalij Fars systems, all derived from China’s C-802 missile. With ranges of between 130 and 360 kilometers, they are deployed on mobile launch platforms concealed deep inland. Mine-laying remains a relatively simple capability for Tehran. However, US underwater countermeasures have succeeded in clearing several maritime corridors through the Strait of Hormuz. Between 10 and 20 commercial vessels, including giant oil tankers, currently transit these routes every day. Ships navigating these narrow passages switch off their radars and tracking systems, coordinate with the US Navy – which monitors them by radar – and receive remote escort protection. A similar pattern prevails on the Iranian side of the strait. Shahed-type suicide drones serve as an aerial extension of Iran’s maritime assets, helping to saturate American and Arab air-defense systems. Dozens of commercial vessels have been struck by these weapons. Yet Iran’s more sophisticated attacks, combining anti-ship missiles and drones, have failed to hit US naval vessels. While these remaining capabilities do not challenge American naval supremacy, they are sufficient to sustain chronic insecurity across key shipping lanes and to exert pressure on the global economy. What about Iran’s air defenses? In parallel, the massive US-Israeli coalition strikes have severely degraded Iran’s air defense capabilities, effectively opening Iranian airspace to American and Israeli aircraft. Before the conflict, Iran operated an integrated air defense system built around layered “bubbles” of access denial designed to restrict hostile aircraft and missiles across large parts of the Middle East. By early 2026, this system consisted of three complementary layers. The long-range layer relied on fixed batteries such as Russia’s S-300PMU-2 systems and their Iranian equivalents, the Bavar-373. This tier was tasked with protecting nuclear facilities and urban centers over distances of several hundred kilometers. A second, medium-range and highly mobile layer included domestically developed systems such as the Khordad-15, Raad and Talash, capable of engaging fighter jets and drones. A third, close-range defensive layer continued to operate through short-range systems such as Russia’s Tor-M1 and Pantsir-S1, supported by thousands of anti-aircraft guns and man-portable air-defense systems. The entire network was coordinated by an integrated command structure within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ “Khatam al-Anbiya” headquarters, fed by an extensive network of ground-based and coastal radar systems. The combined US-Israeli strikes – using anti-radiation missiles, B-2 stealth bombers and bunker-busting munitions – neutralized much of the fixed infrastructure and early-warning radar network. They eliminated both the long-range and medium-range layers, drastically reducing Iran’s ability to detect incoming aircraft and conduct long-range air denial operations. In response, Tehran has adopted a survival doctrine, relying in particular on intermittent radar shutdowns to evade enemy electronic warfare, increased use of optical sensors, and the dispersal of mobile batteries across coastal and mountainous terrain. Its units now conduct what analysts describe as “air ambushes.” They fire missiles from temporary positions before immediately relocating. This tactic has allowed them to shoot down several Israeli and American MQ-9 drones, the most recent in May 2026. The loss of heavy systems prevents Iran from denying its airspace to coalition stealth aircraft. Its new posture nonetheless remains dangerous: it retains an effective harassment capability against drones and low – to medium – altitude aircraft, the ability to mount saturation threats against enemy defenses, and sporadic ambushes that have, for example, forced coalition aircraft to avoid flying below 7 kilometers. Iran’s coastal air defenses have also been heavily degraded: most fixed long-range sites protecting Bandar Abbas, Jask and Kharg have been neutralized. Nuclear Sites and Military-Industrial Complexes The US-Israeli offensive also caused severe damage to a wide range of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, Parchin and Isfahan, which had already been bombed in June 2025. Similarly, drone production sites and a majority of ballistic missile infrastructure were either fully or partially destroyed. Critical energy and civilian infrastructure was also targeted, triggering fuel shortages in major cities. In conclusion, the heavy military, nuclear, industrial and economic losses – estimated at $14 trillion – have not eliminated Iran’s remaining asymmetric capabilities, which still allow it to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. However, today’s Iran is significantly degraded compared with its pre–June 2025 posture. Its nuclear, ballistic and drone capabilities, as well as its capacity to support regional allies such as Hezbollah, have been severely eroded.

Three months to the day after it began, the war in Iran appears to be in suspension, and in the calculations of Washington and Tehran, the opposing side will eventually give in with the factor of 'time'. Although all signs suggest that Iran should capitulate after its military disaster and integrated economic losses estimated between 1,000 and 1,450 billion US dollars, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not backing down. It has no accountability to its people, prevents them from expressing themselves, has massacred at least thirty thousand of them, and imprisoned fifty thousand more as of last January. The IRGC has thus secured its internal framework, firmly preserves its positions within it, and continues to coordinate closely with Hezbollah. Facing this force, Israel is launching targeted strikes and conducting a limited offensive in South Lebanon and parts of western Bekaa. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed to international navigation by Tehran, and Washington maintains its blockade on Iranian ports. Despite ongoing negotiations to break the deadlock, the situation in the Gulf is described as a strategic impasse. What about the demands presented by the belligerents, where do negotiations stand, and—a question asked and asked again many times—how could this war possibly end? Washington's position The Trump Administration maintains its demands, particularly the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the refusal to allow it to remain under Iranian control. It is demanding firm guarantees for international freedom of navigation. On the nuclear issue, the United States is demanding the complete halt of uranium enrichment for military use and the sequestration, for sixty days, of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile with a trustworthy third country, pending negotiations for permanent dismantling. Frozen Iranian assets would remain blocked as long as Tehran has not conceded on all American demands. The Abraham Accords should be expanded to all Gulf countries and Iranian support for Hezbollah must cease. Finally, CENTCOM reserves the right to conduct immediate defensive strikes against any mine-laying or direct threat, as was recently the case at Bandar Abbas, as long as no final agreement has been signed. Tehran's position Tehran is demanding the complete and immediate lifting of economic sanctions, is calling for the return of the tens of billions of dollars frozen abroad, and wishes to entrust Qatar with the role of financial guarantor for unblocking funds. All restrictions on its oil exports should be abolished. The Iranian regime reaffirms its sovereign right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes and would be willing to temporarily transfer its highly enriched stockpile to China, provided this is not part of permanent dismantling. It demands full recognition of its maritime sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and wishes the security of the Persian Gulf to be ensured exclusively by littoral states, excluding any Western military presence. Tehran is demanding an immediate halt to CENTCOM strikes and refuses to ratify an agreement as long as these strikes continue. Finally, Iran's top diplomat Abbas Araghchi refuses to tie a ceasefire to normalization between Arab countries and Israel and is seeking to convince Gulf monarchies to loosen their security ties with Washington. Positions of Pakistan and Qatar Negotiations are ongoing thanks to Pakistan, Qatar, and China, but they are facing profound mistrust between Iran and the United States whose contradictory statements are not facilitating a resolution. Since 1979, Pakistan has hosted Iran's interests section in Washington and thus serves as the de facto communication relay between the belligerents. Its top officials closely coordinate military and civilian exchanges between Washington, Tehran, and Beijing to preserve the ceasefire. Qatar, for its part, focuses on financial mechanisms, particularly proposals aimed at unfreezing Iranian funds in exchange for maritime security guarantees. China's Position China does not assume the role of front-line mediator, which is left to Pakistan and Qatar, but acts behind the scenes as a strategic guarantor for both parties and as a financial guarantor for Iran. It proposes a major technical solution: the nuclear stockpile. Iran would transfer its highly enriched uranium to China, offering Tehran an honorable exit and Washington tangible proof of short-term nuclear de-escalation, although the American administration shows reluctance to entrust this control to Beijing. Economically, China is Iran's financial lifeline, purchasing nearly 90% of its oil under sanctions. It has leveraged this role as an indispensable economic partner to pressure Tehran into accepting the ceasefire of April 8. To protect itself from the maritime traffic halt in the Gulf that it saw coming, China had accumulated massive reserves of 1.4 billion barrels of oil (enough for 6 months). This allowed it to negotiate without the absolute urgency that grips Western markets. Beijing also insists on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, vital for its imports, while respecting Iran's pro-sovereignty discourse. Finally, China seeks to strengthen its regional influence and obtain American concessions on Taiwan in exchange for its stabilizing role. The Art of the Geopolitical Deal: Trump's Negotiation Strategy In these negotiations, President Trump applies a personalized and aggressive style, a geopolitical version of his "Art of the Deal," combining soothing public rhetoric with concrete pressure on the ground. On one hand, the displayed optimism, asserting repeatedly an "imminent agreement," aims to reassure markets and the electorate; on the other hand, targeted military operations and maximum economic measures serve to force the IRGC to yield to US demands. The White House chief favors bilateral channels with Pakistan and Qatar as well as direct dialogue with Xi Jinping, thereby imposing his unilateral narrative on the conflict's stakes. His "overheating" tactic consists of immediately demanding extreme positions (zero enrichment, adherence to the Abraham Accords) so he can then make concessions and sell compromises. Finally, he involves China, accepting to entrust it with Iranian uranium, using it simultaneously as both leverage and a fuse. If the deal succeeds, he takes the credit; if it fails, he can denounce its responsibility. Iran's Asymmetrical Negotiation Strategy Iran's negotiation strategy is slow, patient, and methodical, based on asymmetrical resistance aimed at wearing down Washington through attrition. Tehran practices "brinkmanship diplomacy" by provoking calculated tensions (mining the Strait of Hormuz, Hezbollah's involvement in a war with Israel, strikes against the United Arab Emirates, targeting ships in the Gulf) to demonstrate that the cost of inaction for the United States exceeds that of a compromise. The Iranian regime exploits its moderate diplomats and the IRGC to alternately present flexibility and threats. It seeks to fracture pro-American coalitions in the Gulf and strengthen its ties with China and Pakistan to demonstrate that it is not isolated. It uses time as leverage, prolonging technical discussions to exhaust Washington, which faces intense political and financial pressure. Finally, the sanctification of sovereignty makes any public capitulation unacceptable; technical solutions, such as uranium transfer to China, are therefore valued because they resolve the problem without Tehran appearing defeated. Outlook Negotiations are stalled, and as long as neither side has inflicted a sufficiently decisive shock to break the other's will, the conflict will persist in the shadow of measured but explosive tension (blockade, strait closure, intermittent strikes of varying intensity), which is bearable for President Trump but perhaps not for Tehran. From there, the conflict could evolve in two ways: either Iran yields over time, signaling the beginning of the regime's end; or Washington concedes to certain Iranian demands, saving face for the regime, which would mean a setback for Trump. Time will be the determining factor that will force one of the two parties to change course; otherwise, a third scenario would prevail: a devastating total war.

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous six instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, and the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South. Death of Hafez al-Assad and the Growing Iranian Influence in Syria and Lebanon On June 10, 2000, fifteen days after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hafez al-Assad died of a heart attack. In the aftermath of his death, his son Bashar took over the presidency. Under his rule, Baathist Syria drew steadily closer to Iran. The country became a satellite of Tehran and a platform through which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) projected its power and influence toward Lebanon, as well as toward the West Bank via the Syrian-Jordanian border. The extent of IRGC control in Syria was clearly described in January 2009 by former Syrian vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam (1984–2005), who stated: “Iran is involved at the very heart of the Syrian regime: in its security services, in its military forces, in its economic institutions and in its mosques.” Southern Lebanon: A Hezbollahland With Military, Political and Social Dimensions Following the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, President Émile Lahoud categorically refused to deploy the Lebanese army in the southern part of the country, up to the border with Israel. In doing so, he effectively relinquished the principle of national sovereignty and left the field open to Hezbollah, which quickly transformed South Lebanon into a multidimensional stronghold. The pro-Iranian militia reigned supreme there, under the complacent attitude of the Lebanese authorities and the Syrian occupation army. The latter was itself overseen by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers operating discreetly in the background. South Lebanon thus became a veritable Hezbollahland. At the military level, the Shiite organization expanded its rocket stockpile from a few thousand to around 15,000 units. In addition to the conventional Katyushas with a range of 20 km already in its possession, the pro-Iranian group was supplied by Iran with Fajr-3, Fajr-5, and Zelzal rockets, with ranges of 40, 72, and 250 km respectively. This arsenal was designed to give it the capacity to strike the entirety of Israeli territory. This large-scale rearmament was accompanied by the digging of an extensive network of tunnels and underground bunkers, intended to shield Hezbollah’s firing capabilities and protect its infrastructure from surveillance and Israeli airstrikes. This tactical preparation further reinforced expectation of an imminent war. The strengthening of Hezbollah’s military apparatus was also accompanied by growing political integration, marked by the movement’s entry into government for the first time in 2005, followed by its alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun through the Mar Mikhael Agreement, concluded in 2006. This pact enabled Hezbollah to break out of its sectarian isolation and consolidate its political influence in Lebanon. Through this unnatural alliance, the FPM primarily provided the armed extremist group with a rear base within the Christian community. For the first time in the country’s modern history, a predominantly Christian party carried out a U-turn that ran directly counter to its founding political line. After having shaped Lebanese national consciousness for more than a decade through its sovereigntist aspirations and its call for a rule-of-law state in Lebanon, it ultimately aligned itself with a faction beholden to a hegemonic regional power, which, quite clearly, would drag Lebanon into destructive wars. Hezbollah also established a quasi-parastatal social foothold in South Lebanon through near-free healthcare services and reconstruction efforts (notably via the engineering company “Jihad al-Bina’”) offering low-cost services under its own structure. These forms of support earned it the unwavering loyalty of the Shiite population. This multidimensional expansion enabled the group to maintain constant pressure along the Blue Line in South Lebanon, up until its cross-border military operation in July 2006, which triggered the third Israel-Hezbollah war, known as the 33-Day War. Prelude to the Third War With Israel A year after the Israeli withdrawal on May 24, 2000, it was clear that the presence of IRGC officers and long-range rockets in Lebanon was in no way intended to liberate the Shebaa Farms, but rather to turn the country into a missile-launching platform against Israel. This strategy served Iran’s geopolitical interests, notably by diverting attention from its nuclear program, which came under open international debate from 2002 onward, and by rallying the Arab world around Tehran on the Palestinian question. On the eve of the 2006 war, this situation did not reflect preparations for a direct Israel-Hezbollah confrontation but rather signaled an impending clash between Israel and Iran. The question was therefore not whether a war would break out, but when it would occur. A replay of the 1993 and 1996 conflicts was evident, but this time with heavier, longer-range rockets. Hezbollah officials made no secret of such intentions. In January 2002, Sheikh Nabil Kaouk, vice-president of the executive council of the pro-Iranian movement, declared in an impassioned tone: “More than 2.5 million Israelis are now within range of our missiles.” Ali Larijani Inspires the July 12 Cross-Border Attack and Pulls the Strings Under international pressure over its nuclear program, Iran is said to have encouraged Hezbollah to carry out a cross-border attack that its then secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, was likely reluctant to endorse. The pro-Iranian movement reportedly sought to maintain calm along the border, a position clearly reflected in Nasrallah’s remarks during meetings of the “national dialogue conference” held in parliament in the spring of 2006. These discussions focused on a “national defense strategy.” Nasrallah had stressed the need to prevent Israel from dragging the country into war, insisting at the time that the movement’s arsenal served as a deterrent against Israeli aggression, rather than as a tool to initiate conflict. On the day of the attack itself, Nasrallah held a press conference in which he stated that the cross-border operation – during which two Israeli soldiers were captured – was intended solely as a means to secure a prisoner exchange. He added that he did not wish to see escalation into a full-scale war. Was this a genuine appeal to Israel not to widen the conflict, or a calculated posture? Two days before the operation, Ali Larijani (1) , then secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, travelled to Damascus, where he met senior officials of the Assad regime as well as Hassan Nasrallah. He is reported to have informed his interlocutors that negotiations with Western powers over Iran’s nuclear program had reached an impasse. According to some reports, he indicated that “action” was necessary, suggesting the opening of a new front to divert international pressure on Tehran. The Gaza front had already been burning for around two weeks. Before Larijani’s visit to Damascus, and more specifically in the spring of 2006, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program between France, Britain, Germany and Iran had entered a deadlock phase following Tehran’s decision to resume uranium enrichment. The dialogue, initially conducted by the European trio, was then expanded to the P5+1 group, bringing in the United States, Russia and China, in an effort both to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic and to present it with a package of proposals. In June 2006, a major package of economic and technological incentives was presented to Tehran by Javier Solana, then High Representative of the European Union. In return, Western powers demanded a complete suspension of uranium enrichment as a precondition, a requirement Iran categorically rejected. This diplomatic impasse, perceived by Tehran as unbearable pressure, very likely contributed to the outbreak of hostilities by Hamas in Gaza, with the capture of an Israeli soldier on June 25, followed by the launch of Operation “Sincere Promise” in Lebanon. These two similar operations were aimed at prisoner exchanges between Israel on one side, and Hamas and Hezbollah on the other. Iran sought to position itself at the center of negotiations, as it had done during the Berlin talks in February 2000 and in other indirect negotiations conducted by Hezbollah with the Israeli state. Tehran had likely considered using the issue of prisoners held by Hamas and Hezbollah as leverage to ease the pressure it was facing over its nuclear file. This did not materialize, as the first UN Security Council sanctions against Iran were adopted in late July 2006, in the midst of the Gaza and Lebanon wars. (to be continued) (1) Ali Larijani was assassinated on March 17, 2026, in an Israeli strike in Tehran. Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (6) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

Amid a full-blown trade tariff war and commercial restrictions between Beijing and Washington, along with their confrontations over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Trump and Xi Jinping held their first meeting on October 30, 2025, at Busan airport in South Korea, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum summit. This meeting, made necessary by the urgent economic problems facing both countries, resulted in the conclusion of a one-year trade ceasefire between the two parties. The ceasefire involved an immediate reduction in US tariffs on Chinese goods, which had exceeded 100% in some cases. These tariffs were cut to an average of 47%. Additionally, President Trump suspended the blacklisting of subsidiaries in which 50% or more of shares belonged to sanctioned Chinese groups. He also pledged to lift restrictions on exports to China of microchips related to Artificial Intelligence. In return, China committed to intensifying efforts to combat trafficking to America of raw materials used to manufacture narcotics. It also suspended its drastic restrictions on exports of rare earth metals essential to American technological and defense industries, with 90% of US supplies of these metals coming from China. Furthermore, Xi committed to resuming massive purchases of American soybeans at a rate of $11 billion per year and to buying Boeing aircraft without specifying the number. Finally, the two countries froze reciprocal port taxes on their merchant ships and promised to discuss heavier structural issues at a later date. This indicates a need for cooperation and the beginning of a new geopolitical era with global repercussions. Evidence of this is Putin's visit to Beijing, following Trump's. Trump-Xi Meeting of May 14-15, 2026 The historical significance of this meeting was downplayed by the media, which attempted to demonstrate that little progress was made and which especially highlighted Xi Jinping's insistence on reuniting Taiwan with China. In reality, this summit consolidated, expanded, and extended the fragile trade ceasefire signed in Busan seven months earlier, and it will be followed by other summits. In his speech, Xi affirmed his desire for a strategic understanding with the United States, based on "peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation." He noted that Sino-American relations concern the well-being of over 1.7 billion people in the two countries and have an impact on the interests of over 8 billion inhabitants of the planet. This is entirely new in Chinese political discourse. Consolidation of the Trade Ceasefire President Trump was accompanied to this summit by 17 American business leaders whose combined capital amounts to $15 trillion, equivalent to half of US GDP and three times France's GDP. This sum exceeds the combined GDPs of Japan, Germany, and India. Among the business leaders accompanying the White House chief were Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and Washington's unofficial ambassador responsible for serving as the natural bridge for trade between the United States and China, Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, and Kelly Ortberg, CEO of Boeing. Apple assembles 80-90% of its iPhones and iMacs in China. Following the summit, it succeeded in protecting this production by keeping bilateral tariffs lowered for a period of three years. Furthermore, Apple has annual revenues in China of $80 billion (20% of its global sales), which it seeks to increase. Tesla, Tesla et ambassadeur officieux de Washington, responsable de la passerelle naturelle pour le commerce entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine , Jensen Huang, patron de Nvidia, et Kelly Ortberg patronne de Boeing . Apple assemble en Chine près de 80 à 90% de ses iPhones et iMacs . Suite au sommet, elle a réussi à protéger cette production en gardant les droits de douane bilatéraux abaissés pour une période de trois ans. En outre, Apple a un chiffre d’affaires en Chine de 80 milliards de dollars (20% de ses ventes mondiales), qu’elle cherche à augmenter. Tesla, which manufactures electric vehicles and solar energy equipment in China, has successfully strengthened protection for its Shanghai plant against bilateral tariff barriers, given that it produces more than half of the world's {{name}} production. Tesla . One of the breakthroughs from this summit was the official authorization granted by Trump to {{name}} to sell its H200 artificial intelligence chip (the most sought-after on the market) to major Chinese technology companies. China represented up to 25% of {{name}}'s revenue; this figure has dropped to nearly 11% due to restrictions, which are now being lifted. Nvidia ; The big winner of the summit was {{name}}, which signed an agreement to deliver 200 commercial aircraft to Beijing, which is a complete success for its CEO Kelly Ortberg, and provides a financial lifeline to turn the company around. Boeing estimates that China will need more than 8,500 new commercial aircraft by 2043 and hopes, following this contract, to secure additional orders in the coming years, with the number of aircraft potentially reaching 750. The Taiwan Question The summit froze the status quo on the Taiwan issue. President Trump is clear in his refusal to accept the island's formal independence, which he considers dangerous in all respects. The mega-arms deal with Taipei worth 14 billion dollars is frozen and constitutes a powerful bargaining chip against Beijing. For its part, the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan's right-wing nationalist opposition party, advocates dialogue with Beijing and maintains its position in favor of a single China. In fact, its chairwoman, Cheng Li-wun, made a historic visit to Beijing from April 7-12. She met Xi Jinping to restore dialogue. Unlike the KMT, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) firmly defends Taiwan's national identity. However, it advocates maintaining the status quo in the face of mainland China's claims to avoid armed conflict. In summary, while Taiwan's political class seeks to preserve its democracy without triggering conflict, Donald Trump approached the issue from a strictly pragmatic angle. The Iran and Strait of Hormuz Crisis The Iranian nuclear crisis and the paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz remain unresolved, although these issues were certainly debated in the weeks preceding the Beijing meeting. President Trump stated that Xi had agreed to an absolute ban on Tehran possessing nuclear weapons, while committing to block any delivery of Chinese conventional arms to Iran. The White House chief also claimed that Beijing rejected the principle of maritime tolls imposed by the Islamic Republic in the strait. For its part, China's Foreign Ministry called for a global ceasefire, maintaining diplomatic ambiguity. In return, reports indicate that Beijing quietly pays Tehran transit fees for its oil tankers crossing the Strait, disguised as "environmental charges". China has every reason to seek the opening of the strait since it imports more than 50% of its oil not only from Iran but also from Gulf countries. Finally, the strategic partnership between Beijing and Tehran, signed in 2021, provided for 400 billion dollars in investments in Iran. Yet to date, these have not exceeded a few billion, suggesting that Xi Jinping has long chosen not to risk displeasing Washington and the Gulf states. A New Geopolitical Landscape La crise de l’Iran et du détroit d’Ormuz La crise du nucléaire iranien et la paralysie du détroit d’Ormuz demeurent sans solution, bien que ces dossiers aient été certainement débattus dans les semaines qui ont précédé la rencontre de Pékin. Le président Trump a affirmé que Xi avait souscrit à l'interdiction absolue pour Téhéran de posséder l'arme nucléaire, tout en s'engageant à bloquer toute livraison d'armes conventionnelles chinoises à l'Iran. Le chef de la Maison Blanche a également soutenu que Pékin refusait le principe du péage maritime imposé par la République islamique dans le détroit. De son côté, le ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères a appelé à un cessez-le-feu global, maintenant le flou diplomatique. En contrepartie, des rapports indiquent que Pékin paie discrètement à Téhéran des droits de transit pour ses pétroliers qui traversent Ormuz, sous couvert de «frais environnementaux». La Chine a tout intérêt à obtenir l’ouverture du détroit car elle importe plus de 50% de son pétrole non seulement d’Iran mais aussi des pays du Golfe. Enfin, le partenariat stratégique entre Pékin et Téhéran, signé en 2021, prévoyait des investissements de 400 milliards de dollars en Iran. Or jusqu’à cette date, ils ne dépassent pas quelques milliards, ce qui indique que Xi Jinping, depuis bien longtemps, ne veut pas risquer de mécontenter Washington et les pays du Golfe. Une nouvelle donne géopolitique The Beijing summit is part of a process leading toward a new world order that will replace the one that prevailed after World War II. Geopolitics demands it... It is clear that Xi Jinping, Trump, and Putin are prioritizing their domestic interests above all else, which requires normalizing economic and technological ties between their respective countries. Putin has indeed shown signs of openness across the board, particularly toward Trump and Xi Jinping, whom he made a point of visiting after the American president, as well as toward Europe. This does not bode well for Tehran, which risks bearing the brunt of this new geopolitical reality.

With this sixth instalment in the “Israel-Hezbollah” series, we continue to examine the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of the impassioned, ideological or romantic narratives that often obscure realities on the ground. Readers may draw their own conclusions. Previous articles revisited Hezbollah’s rise since the Taif Agreement, its first two wars with Israel, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon in May 2000. Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000, and at the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the United Nations officially certified on June 16, 2000, that the pullout was complete and in full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, which was thereafter deemed implemented. UNIFIL subsequently delineated an Israeli withdrawal line known as the “Blue Line,” identifying 13 disputed points between the two countries covering an area of less than one square kilometer. The line is often mistaken for the Paulet-Newcombe line, drawn in 1923 as the border separating Lebanon and Palestine under the French and British mandates. Instead of using Israel’s withdrawal on May 24, 2000, as an opportunity to restore state sovereignty – particularly in southern Lebanon – President Émile Lahoud and the Lebanese government, both aligned with Syria, chose to provide institutional and political backing to Hezbollah under the banner of the “resistance.” That narrative risked being seriously undermined by the United Nations’ official confirmation that Israel had fully withdrawn. Lahoud’s position perfectly suited both Syria and Iran, neither of which wanted Hezbollah stripped of its “armed struggle” slogan. Damascus was determined to preserve its leverage over Israel, whether for potential future peace negotiations or in the event of armed conflict with the Jewish state – an objective that aligned with Tehran’s efforts to strengthen the Shiite militia as its key instrument in Lebanon and across the region. Anticipating the problem, the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus of the time – a network of senior Lebanese and Syrian intelligence officers working in tandem – came up with the argument that would allow Hezbollah to retain control over southern Lebanon as a military pressure platform against Israel. That pretext was the Shebaa hamlets, better known as the Shebaa Farms. The Special Case of the Shebaa Hamlets In April 2000, just weeks before Israel’s withdrawal, General Jamil al-Sayed – then head of Lebanese General Security and a close ally of President Émile Lahoud – revived Lebanon’s claim to the Shebaa hamlets in a bid to justify the continuation of Hezbollah’s “resistance.” Lebanese land registry records had in fact established since 1949 that the 62-square-kilometer area belonged to Lebanon, although it appeared on maps as Syrian territory. Israel occupied the area in 1967, at the same time as it seized the Golan Heights. That strategic shift, coordinated with Damascus – notably through General Sayed’s ties to his Syrian counterpart, General Ali Mamlouk – provided the Lebanese state with a pretext to reject the United Nations’ certification of a full Israeli withdrawal. The Shebaa hamlets had been the subject of a border dispute between Lebanon and Syria since the French mandate period. The disagreement was never fundamentally resolved after the two countries gained independence. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the hamlets, where Syrian regular forces had been stationed since the early 1960s, and extended its military infrastructure on the Golan Heights to include the area. Lebanese police and customs officers had been stationed there from independence until the 1958 civil conflict, when Syrian militias and pro-Syrian Lebanese armed groups – involved in the uprising against President Camille Chamoun – forced Lebanese police and customs officers to withdraw and seized the area, using it as a military base to target the Lebanese army barracks in Marjayoun. At the end of the 1958 war, those militias pulled back into Syrian territory, but Lebanese police and customs officers never returned. The Syrian army later established positions there, and Syria continues to include the hamlets on its military maps. Lahoud, Architect of the “Complementarity” Between the Army and the “Resistance” Following the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and up until 2000, Lebanon never formally claimed the Shebaa Farms before the United Nations as occupied territory, effectively accepting international maps that placed the area within Syria. This claim only emerged officially in 2000, with the clear aim of challenging the completeness of Israel’s withdrawal and thereby legitimizing the ensuing discourse of “resistance.” That narrative was significantly amplified by President Émile Lahoud, the principal political guarantor of Hezbollah at the highest levels of the state. Even when he served as commander-in-chief of the army, he had already developed the concept of “complementarity” between the Shiite militia and the Lebanese regular army. In his view, the army’s role was to maintain internal order – which in practice entailed the repression of sovereigntist forces opposed to Syria and Hezbollah – while the “resistance,” namely Hezbollah, was tasked with defending the country against Israel. Lahoud had indeed facilitated, since he had commanded the army, the transfer of Iranian weapons via Syria to Hezbollah positions in the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Despite pressure from the United Nations, he systematically refused to deploy the Lebanese army in the area vacated by Israel, arguing that doing so would effectively turn the army into a “border guard” on behalf of the Jewish state. For his part, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri acted in tandem with Lahoud, serving as Hezbollah’s legislative and diplomatic linchpin. He ensured that the ministerial statements of successive governments after the Israeli withdrawal explicitly included Lebanon’s “right to resistance to liberate its territory,” thereby legitimizing Hezbollah’s arsenal. To reinforce the argument that the Shebaa hamlets constituted occupied territory that had to be liberated, and to impose new rules of military engagement, Hezbollah carried out a cross-border operation on October 7, 2000, just four months after the Israeli withdrawal. During the raid, it “captured” three Israeli soldiers, who were later found to have died at the time of the incident. The attack, which involved Hezbollah using UN-marked vehicles, triggered a diplomatic crisis between UNIFIL and Israel. In January 2004, a German-mediated agreement led to a prisoner exchange: Hezbollah returned the bodies of the three soldiers and released a civilian hostage, while Israel freed 435 detainees and returned the remains of 59 fighters from the Shiite militia. (to be continued) Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

This series of articles will allow for a better understanding of the current situation in light of the past, moving beyond impassioned, ideological, or romanticized rhetoric that misses the mark, leaving the reader to draw their own conclusions. Furthermore, it is high time to seriously counter the sterile rhetoric of resistance, not with counter-rhetoric, but with serious work by promoting the rule of law, which can only be established through sovereignty. In the previous four installments, we revisited the events that shaped Hezbollah’s rise following the Taif Agreement, its first two wars with Israel, and the grinding war of attrition it has waged for more than a decade. Stage 7: Hezbollah-Israel Talks in Berlin Following German mediation with Iran, at the request of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, Hezbollah and Israel entered into indirect talks in Berlin over a possible Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The first round took place on March 1 and 2, 2000, followed by a second on March 7. German mediators shuttled between the two delegations. The Israeli delegation was headed by Uri Lubrani, then Israel’s coordinator of operations in Lebanon. Acting on Barak’s instructions, Lubrani agreed during the second round of negotiations to meet all of Hezbollah’s demands: the Israeli army would carry out an unconditional withdrawal, and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) would be left to its fate. In return, Hezbollah would take control of the border area and ensure calm along it. Washington and Tehran – both represented at the talks by senior envoys – endorsed the arrangement, as did France, which was informed at a later stage. According to Yossef Bodansky (1) , the Iranian representative at the negotiations initially refused to believe the extent of the Israeli concessions until they were confirmed by the German mediators. Still according to Bodansky, who recounts the episode in his book The High Cost of Peace , Barak and Lubrani kept the agreement reached with Hezbollah secret for two months, informing the Israeli military only on the eve of the withdrawal. The SLA, likewise kept in the dark, was coordinating troop rotations with the Israeli army in the security zone, under the assumption that General Antoine Lahd’s (2) forces would eventually take over positions there. Lahd himself, having been told that the withdrawal would take place in July 2000, as publicly state by Barak, was making preparations accordingly. He had obtained assurances of financial and logistical support from Tel Aviv, as well as promises of air cover after the withdrawal. Until May 23, the day before Israeli troops pulled out, Barak continued to maneuver carefully to keep the SLA entirely unaware of the Berlin agreement. He was determined to fulfill his campaign promises and extricate Israel from the Lebanese quagmire without facing domestic pressure or appeals from Lahd, above all in order to negotiate a peace agreement with Syria without the burden of military pressure in South Lebanon. By that stage, Hezbollah’s military capabilities had been significantly strengthened through weapons shipments from Tehran via Syria. Israel, reassured by this arrangement, appeared prepared to leave the security zone in Hezbollah’s hands, convinced the group would maintain calm along the border. Syria, however, found itself deprived of a key instrument of pressure on Israel, while Lebanon remained the principal loser. The real beneficiary was, in fact, Iran, which had just secured a powerful lever in Lebanon and even in Syria. Washington and Tel Aviv seemed to have accepted the existence of the mullahs’ regime, judging that the risks, whatever they might be, would be reduced following Israel’s withdrawal. Washington failed to perceive that this regime, still reeling from its eight-year war of attrition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, remained capable of disseminating its ideology among the region’s minorities – not only to consolidate its influence there, but also to sustain internal tensions, divert these states’ attention from their domestic challenges, and, above all, prevent the re-emergence of a strong Iraq on Iran’s doorstep. Moreover, in order to further polarize an Arab world moving tentatively toward peace with Israel, the mullahs sought to derail that process by inflaming already existing anti-Israeli sentiment. Their ambition was to assume leadership of the fight against the Jewish state through Hezbollah, Hamas, and Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, to reinforce Iran’s role as an indispensable regional power, and to ensure the survival of their own regime. Israeli-Syrian peace talks ultimately collapsed on March 26, three weeks after the Berlin agreement, following the failure of the Geneva meeting between Hafez al-Assad and U.S. President Bill Clinton, who proved unable to bridge the gap between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Stage 8: May 24, 2000 – Israel’s Complete Withdrawal from South Lebanon The withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon took place in a rushed and almost chaotic manner, the order to pull out having been issued only the day before. On the night of May 23–24, 2000, Israeli forces unilaterally evacuated South Lebanon. Domestically in Israel, the end of the occupation brought an end to daily casualties, but in much of the world – and particularly in Lebanon – the departure was widely perceived as a victory for Hezbollah. From that point on, Iran found itself endowed with a direct line of confrontation with Israeli territory through Hezbollah, while also gaining near-direct influence over Lebanon’s internal affairs. Contrary to the initial fears sparked by a statement by former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who had threatened to “kill the members of the SLA in their beds,” the Israeli withdrawal was not followed by a campaign of violent reprisals by Hezbollah against civilians in the former security zone. However, some properties belonging to SLA members were looted or taken over, including General Lahd’s residence. In parallel, Hezbollah and Amal Movement officials met with Christian religious leaders in South Lebanon to reassure them that the “victory” belonged to all Lebanese, not to a single faction. This initiative formed part of a broader strategy of calculated restraint, adopted by Hezbollah to refine its public image and strengthen its national legitimacy. The Fate of the SLA’s Men When the Israeli army withdrew, around 7,000 members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families fled to Israel, fearing reprisals. Some later emigrated to Canada, the United States, and Europe. Others eventually returned to Lebanon, including roughly 2,700 who were tried on charges of collaboration, despite the fact that the SLA had originally emerged from the ranks of the legitimate Lebanese army. This force had originally been established under an official directive issued in 1976, with the mission of securing part of the border area against armed Palestinian organizations. Cut off from its command structure and later backed by Israel, it gradually evolved into an autonomous force, first adopting the name “Free Lebanon Army” before becoming the South Lebanon Army. The prison sentences handed down to those who returned ranged from several months to three years behind bars. These Lebanese believed they had been legitimately defending their land and their communities. Under Lebanese law, however, they were deemed collaborators, while for Hezbollah they were viewed as agents of Israel. An estimated 3,500 former SLA members still live in Israel. Officially registered as “Lebanese” in Israel, they were granted Israeli citizenship in 2004. All still have relatives in Lebanon, most of them in villages located only a few kilometers from the border. (to be continued) ( 1) American political scientist and author. He served as director of the United States House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare from 1988 to 2004 and authored several books on the Middle East. (2) Commander of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) at the time and former general in the Lebanese army. Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In a forthcoming series of articles, we intend to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of impassioned, ideological, or romanticized narratives that overlook the realities on the ground. Our aim is to give readers the tools to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously challenge the sterile rhetoric of “resistance” – not with counter-rhetoric, but through a deeper approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built on sovereignty. The first three articles presented a reinterpretation of the events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through Operation “Settling of Accounts” and the “July Agreement” (1993), up to the eve of its second war with Israel. Stage 5: From the “April Understanding” to a War of Attrition Following the “April Understanding” of 1996, Hezbollah – emboldened by Iran and Syria – relentlessly pursued the war of attrition it had launched in 1991 against the Israeli army and the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Its stated objective was the liberation of the Israeli-occupied “security zone,” yet the campaign also served another purpose: to derail peace negotiations from which Iran had been excluded. At the same time, Washington’s position remained unchanged since the Madrid and Oslo conferences, which aimed to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. To initiate and sustain this process, successive US administrations consistently sought to prevent any large-scale Israeli retaliation to Hezbollah attacks, wagering instead on the Syrian-Israeli peace track. The toll of this war of attrition proved heavy for all parties. Between 1996 and 2000, Israel lost 193 soldiers, the SLA 175, and Hezbollah 375. The deadliest single episode for Israeli forces came in February 1997, when two helicopters carrying troops from Sayeret Matkal, an elite Israeli army unit, collided en route to south Lebanon. The crash killed 73 soldiers – the heaviest toll in the army’s history. The shock it triggered led Israeli public opinion to question the human cost of maintaining the “security zone.” In September of the same year, 16 Israeli commandos from the elite Shayetet 13 unit were caught in a Hezbollah ambush at Ansariya, about 20 kilometers south of Saida; 12 were killed. The incident underscored Hezbollah’s tactical sophistication, bolstered and directly overseen by officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Combined with the helicopter disaster, it deepened in Israel a sense of a war without a clear horizon. One consequence was the emergence of the grassroots “Arba Imaot” (“Four Mothers”) movement, founded by mourning mothers of fallen soldiers. The issue thus shifted from the military sphere to a broader societal and moral debate, in which withdrawal from Lebanon became a political demand. The “Four Mothers” campaign forced Israeli leaders and electoral candidates to take a public stance on an unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon. Shimon Peres, followed by Benjamin Netanyahu and then Ehud Barak, before and after taking office as prime ministers, converged on a single message: withdrawal from Lebanon. In January 1998, Benjamin Netanyahu, then prime minister, declared that “Israel is prepared to accept UN Security Council Resolution 425 (1) , provided an agreement can be reached with Lebanon guaranteeing the security arrangements required by Tel Aviv.” A month later, he added: “What we must do is leave Lebanon. What the world must do is threaten the Syrians if they support attacks against us.” Within the ranks of the SLA, concern was mounting. The militia increasingly anticipated an Israeli withdrawal, particularly as Tel Aviv’s forces in the security zone had been significantly scaled back. The election of Ehud Barak in May 1999 – on a platform advocating the return of Israeli troops – marked an acceleration of the withdrawal process. Barak had pledged to bring his forces home by July 2000. Stage 6: For Damascus and Baabda, the Israeli withdrawal was a “Zionist conspiracy” In early January 2000, Bill Clinton brought together Ehud Barak and Farouk al-Sharaa, the Syrian foreign minister, in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. It marked the only direct Syrian-Israeli negotiations in history, and ended in failure. During the talks, Western and Israeli intelligence services learned that Damascus had authorized Tehran to rearm Hezbollah and expand its offensive capabilities through the immediate and sustained delivery of equipment and ammunition to Damascus airport. Syrian trucks then transported the materiel to Hezbollah depots in Lebanon, under the watchful – and acquiescent – eye of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who was fully aligned with Hafez al-Assad’s regime. Despite this, Ehud Barak ordered his army not to target the depots supplied by the Syrians and, more importantly, not to strike Syrian assets themselves. He hoped that peace talks with Damascus would resume at a later stage. Shortly afterwards, after the Israeli army attempted to assassinate Hezbollah’s military leader in south Lebanon, it carried out heavy retaliatory strikes. The Israeli security cabinet authorised a series of air raids against Hezbollah, but issued a strict prohibition on targeting Syrian objectives. This approach earned Ehud Barak praise from Martin Indyk, then US ambassador to Israel and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Barak, moreover, missed no opportunity – in public and in private – to signal that he was pursuing a strategy for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. In response, senior figures within the Assad regime mounted an intensive campaign through their Lebanese allies, insisting that the Israeli withdrawal proposal was part of a “Zionist conspiracy” aimed at containing Syria in the same way Iraq was being contained by the United States. In the months that followed, Emile Lahoud stepped up his interventions, denouncing what he viewed as a dangerous Israeli tactical manoeuvre. He argued that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon without a parallel withdrawal from the Golan Heights amounted to a trap. On 9 March 2000, he declared: “Israel’s declared plans to withdraw from Lebanon are intended to sabotage the peace process.” He added that any Israeli withdrawal would be “the product of Lebanese support for the resistance (Hezbollah) and of the unity of the Lebanese-Syrian position,” rather than a genuine commitment to peace. The paradox of Emile Lahoud’s regime lay in its full backing of Hezbollah’s guerrilla campaign to “liberate the south,” while effectively ignoring the peace process. It did not, in fact, favour an Israeli withdrawal, as the continued occupation served three key objectives: legitimising Syria’s own presence in Lebanon, sustaining Hezbollah’s narrative of resistance, and keeping Israel mired in the “Lebanese quagmire” until the Golan Heights were returned to Syria. At that time, Hezbollah’s dominance over state institutions was still embryonic, even though the group already possessed significant military capabilities. It was Syria, however, that exercised full control over the Lebanese state. (to be continued) (1) UN Security Council Resolution 425 was adopted following Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon, which came in response to guerrilla operations launched against Israel by Palestinian armed groups operating from Lebanese territory. These attacks had been ongoing since 1969. Resolution 425 calls for Israel’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon, as well as the deployment of 3,000 troops of UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) at the time. Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

A growing number of Western analysts contend that the United States has failed to achieve its objectives in the war with Iran. This assessment is largely driven by the surge in global oil prices, which has rippled through the global economy and is being felt acutely in the rising cost of everyday goods in the United States – a recurring theme in the American press. For these same observers, Iran appears to hold the stronger hand in ongoing negotiations. But how accurate is that view? A Closer Look at the War’s Underlying Motives George Friedman, a geopolitical analyst, says he is not convinced that Benjamin Netanyahu was able to draw Donald Trump into the war. Not only, he argues, is the latter difficult to persuade, but Iran’s nuclear program is of far greater concern to the United States than to Israel. Moreover, the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS 2025) suggests that Washington’s priorities lie primarily at home and within the Western Hemisphere. Trump has sought to scale back the United States’ role in the Middle East, shifting greater responsibility to its regional allies among the signatories of the Abraham Accords. Iran, however, remains a significant obstacle, given its expanding arsenal and its interference across the region. U.S. Strategy: Weakening Iran Washington’s objective, then, is to weaken Iran and its allied militias. With the fall of the Baathist regime in Syria, the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the U.S.-British strikes against the Houthis between March and May 2025, the mullah regime has lost much of its hegemonic reach. The strikes carried out in June 2025 against Iran subsequently destroyed its air defenses, severely damaged its nuclear program, and inflicted significant losses on its missile production capacity. Once those strikes ceased, however, Iran moved quickly over the following eight months to repair part of the damage. The current war has nevertheless deprived the Islamic Republic of a large share of its arsenal and curtailed its ability to support its regional allies. With the Iranian economy in ruins, the mullah regime’s most serious challenges may still lie ahead – particularly if ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran conclude without any lifting of sanctions. The list of those dissatisfied within the country is long, particularly among marginalized minorities (Kurds, Azeris, Baluch, Turkmen, among others), the merchant class, students, women, pragmatists, and possibly even the Artesh – the Iranian army – given that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to be favored at its expense. However, the timeframe for any change in Iran’s behavior or regime remains uncertain. Airstrikes have not forced Tehran to back down, as it continues to possess sufficient asymmetric capabilities to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, destabilize the global economy, and carry out attacks across the region. Moreover, Hamas and Hezbollah retain both the capacity and the intent to rebuild over time. The Gaza peace process remains fragile, while efforts toward a settlement in Lebanon are still in their early stages. In short, the United States has moved forward in pursuing its objectives in the Middle East, though they remain unfulfilled. For Washington, however, other priorities are now more pressing. The Iranian Nuclear Program: A Real Threat Following the June 2025 strikes, Iran’s nuclear program was significantly damaged. However, Tehran retained the capacity to reactivate it, as it continued to possess 430 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which could be readily further enriched to 90 percent. The centrifuges required for this process remained intact at their production facilities; they had not been deployed to the bombed nuclear sites, while Iranian universities continued to transmit the relevant technical expertise. In short, within a few years, Iran could have been in a position to restore its nuclear capabilities and acquire a nuclear weapon. With the current war, the damage inflicted on this program is undoubtedly more significant, but no credible assessment is available at this stage. The United States is determined to prevent Iran from reactivating its nuclear program, not so much out of concern that the Islamic Republic might acquire nuclear-tipped missiles – a prospect that does not appear to be Washington’s primary fear – but because of the alleged connections between the mullah regime and al-Qaeda, the organization behind the September 11, 2001 attacks, some of whose leaders are said to have been hosted in Iran. US security officials fear a possible “second nuclear 9/11”: a scenario in which a small Iranian nuclear device could be transferred to al-Qaeda, concealed within a commercial shipment, and then transported to a major port such as New York, where its detonation could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths. This scenario is not imaginary, since al-Qaeda has already struck in the United States and in other countries. Similarly, Iran’s own “long arm” – already responsible for attacks in Argentina, Gulf states, and Bulgaria – is seen as potentially capable of carrying out comparable operations. How Might This War End? The Iranian regime remains firmly in place, and its behavior has not changed. Its nuclear potential, as well as its missile and drone capabilities, though significantly reduced, remain a reality. The Strait of Hormuz is still being blocked by the IRGC, while the US Navy is enforcing a naval blockade. Sanctions against the Islamic Republic continue to intensify, including from European countries. Iran’s economy lies in ruins, negotiations in Islamabad are dragging on, and the war is not yet over. The Islamic Republic cannot claim a Pyrrhic victory, except in the eyes of credulous, indoctrinated supporters. At the same time, a U.S. victory achieved through airstrikes alone remains unlikely. A ground operation by the United States is still possible, but Trump is reluctant to launch one, as it would be costly. Pressure is mounting on the US president because of the toll the war is taking on the global economy. Time is not on his side. Iran is indeed being strangled, and time works far less in its favor, although this does not prevent it from betting on this factor to sway American public opinion against Trump, as the communists did during the Vietnam War with Presidents Johnson and Nixon. The difference is that U.S. casualties in this war have so far been negligible compared with those of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. By contrast, the Pentagon’s military successes are significantly greater than in those other conflicts. If Iran continues to play the time factor, a swift, large-scale and short US ground operation against specific targets inside Iran cannot be ruled out, although it would likely come at a high cost.