The New Middle East

It is impossible to discuss the future of the Middle East without considering Egypt. Not simply because it is the most populous Arab country, nor merely because of its geographical location, military strength or history, but above all because, for much of the modern era, Egypt has been one of the key centers around which the Arab regional order has been shaped. The question of Egypt’s future, therefore, goes far beyond its national borders. Ultimately, it is about the future of the Arab world’s role in the emerging Middle East. Since the 1952 revolution, and particularly under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt evolved from a major country into a regional power with an ambitious political project. Cairo became the epicenter of Arab nationalism and a major hub of cultural, media and political influence. Egypt also led the Arab confrontation with Israel. At the time, its power rested not only on its military and economic capabilities, but also on its ability to articulate a political vision that transcended its borders and resonated with broad segments of the Arab population.

Far from the wars ravaging the region, Arabs must grapple with a fundamental question: What future lies ahead for Arab nationalism, incumbent regimes, and the Arab nation-state itself? Throughout their modern history, Arabs have failed not only to build a unified Arab nationalist state, but also to establish a common political system capable of turning their shared national identity into a genuine political, economic, and strategic force. More seriously still, the failure of the project of Arab unity has prevented the nation-state from emerging as a viable alternative. Rather than investing in development, education, the economy, human development, and institutions, Arab countries have devoted considerable resources to wars, conflicts, arms, and the preservation of incumbent regimes.

It is impossible to consider the future of political Islam in the Middle East without examining the Shiite experience, particularly the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The revolution did more than transform Iran’s political system. It marked a historic turning point in the place of Shiites within the Muslim world. It also gave rise to a political and intellectual project that extended beyond Iran’s borders, reshaping the balance of power and changing how Islamic history itself is understood. The Rise of the Shiites and the Reinterpretation of History For centuries, much of the Muslim world lived under the authority of states and political and cultural institutions dominated by Sunnis. As this dominance became more firmly entrenched, the Sunni interpretation of Islamic history became the most widespread and the most prominent in the public sphere.

For more than a century, political Islam has been one of the major intellectual and political currents in the Arab and Muslim world. It has taken many forms, encompassing a wide range of organizations, movements and approaches, from those that have opted for elections and peaceful political action to revolutionary movements and, ultimately, extremist jihadist organizations. Despite their profound differences, a central idea has remained common to a significant number of these movements: the belief that the crisis facing Arab and Muslim societies can be overcome by returning to an Islamic political model capable of restoring the nation’s unity, strength and standing.

Over the past decades, and even more clearly in recent years, Israel has demonstrated the extent of its formidable military power. It has managed to strike its adversaries on multiple fronts, use its intelligence, technological and military superiority to impose new realities, and establish itself as one of the region’s strongest military powers. But this is where the great paradox emerges: what has Israel gained, strategically, from all these victories? A military victory becomes a historic victory only when it produces a reality that is safer and more stable than the one that preceded it. The problem is that the project of “Fortress Israel,” or “Israel as a military empire,” may achieve successive victories on the battlefield while simultaneously accumulating ever greater levels of rejection, hostility and isolation around Israel.

If the Middle East is now the scene of a confrontation between Israeli, Turkish and Iranian projects, the Mecca agreement on joint defense between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan could signal the emergence of something different: not necessarily a fourth hegemonic project, but a new project for regional balance. The significance of the agreement lies in the fact that the three countries bring together remarkably complementary sources of power. Turkey has a powerful military, is a member of NATO, and has a rapidly expanding military and technology industry, as well as advanced capabilities in drones and electronic warfare.

In 1998, my students asked me a question that, at the time, seemed too broad to have a clear answer: What is the future of the Middle East? I told them that I believed the Middle East would evolve into something resembling a large corporation, with the United States as its board of directors, and that the fundamental conflict of the future would no longer be limited to the one between the Arabs and Israel, but would also revolve around the question of who would take over the executive leadership of this regional enterprise. I added that the main contenders in this struggle would essentially be Israel, Iran, and Turkey.