Politics

Levant Time received the following statement from the family of the late former minister and MP Hassan Rifaï, who passed away on September 3, 2025. We reproduce it in full: On the first anniversary of Hassan Rifaï’s passing, a man who devoted most of his life to defending Greater Lebanon, and at a time when debate is intensifying over the need to amend Lebanon’s political system, it is important to recall some of his reflections and positions on the Taif Agreement and the constitutional amendments that stemmed from it. 1. The Taif Agreement is a Syrian-American agreement concluded under an Arab umbrella, in terms that were for the most part Lebanese. (1989) 2. If the Taif “reforms” are implemented, they will be a disaster; if they are not, a catastrophe. (1989) 3. The Taif Agreement transformed the exercise of power in Lebanon from a two-headed conflict into a multi-headed war that paralyses and nullifies the exercise of power, against a backdrop of confusion and overlapping prerogatives. This is why, even before its adoption, Hassan Rifaï had called for Taif to be reconsidered, so as not to bequeath to future generations the worst of political systems. (1989-1990) 4. The Taif Agreement was concluded in 1989 under the pressure of internal wars and Syrian bombardment. Any new revision of the Constitution must not take place under similar circumstances, under the pressure of internal conflict or an external war. 5. The provisions of the National Accord Document (“Taif”) that were not formally enshrined in constitutional provisions have no binding legal or constitutional force and remain mere recommendations. 6. It is incorrect to claim that executive power was vested in the President of the Republic and that the Taif Agreement stripped him of it. Since 1943, presidential practice had rested on a transgression of the conventions of the democratic parliamentary system. 7. “Where responsibility lies, there lies power” (Léon Duguit). Since the President of the Republic is not politically responsible (Article 60 of the Constitution), responsibility rests with the government, its president and its ministers, who fall if they lose the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies or under pressure from the street. 8. Before the Taif Agreement, Presidents of the Council sought to accommodate Presidents of the Republic who exercised prerogatives that were not theirs. The Presidents of the Republic gained nothing from this; Lebanon, however, lost. Those who surrendered some of their prerogatives also lost, and Lebanon with them. (1988) 9. There is no legal definition of the formula “Any authority that contradicts the pact of communal coexistence is illegitimate,” set forth in paragraph (j) of the Preamble to the Constitution, which now serves as a pretext for the heresy of a spurious and wholly fabricated “mithaqiyya.” 10. The monopoly on legitimate violence belongs to the State. It constitutes the very foundation of any State. There is no need to invoke the provisions of the Taif Agreement to justify this principle. 11. Neither today nor in the foreseeable future can there be any question of contemplating the abolition of political confessionalism. 12. The Senate was introduced into the Taif Agreement to satisfy the Druze community. Yet its creation would impede the legislative process and serve no useful purpose. (1989) 13. Administrative decentralisation cannot be contemplated before a strong central State has been established, failing which the country would fragment into antagonistic cantons. (1981) 14. For our republican, democratic and parliamentary system to function properly, it needs an electoral law reflecting the nature of the Lebanese people: small constituencies and a majoritarian voting system, given the absence of genuine political parties. 15. By virtue of his election to a fixed four-year term, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies has departed from the impartiality inherent in his office; likewise, the heresy of “mithaqiyya” has enabled him to interfere in the functioning of the executive branch. 16. The constitutional amendments made no mention of decentralisation. Paragraph (g) of the Preamble to the Constitution, however, provides that “the balanced development of the regions, culturally, socially and economically, is a fundamental pillar of the unity of the State and the stability of the system.” In other words, the failure to develop the regions threatens the stability of the country. (1968-1981) 17. The Taif Agreement does not require national unity cabinets bringing together all opposing parties. Nor does it impose a consensual democracy requiring agreement among them, at the risk of undermining the proper functioning of democratic life. 18. The authorship of the “blocking third” in the Constitution resulting from the Taif Agreement belongs to a Lebanese faction that sought to prevent the Council of Ministers from adopting decisions unacceptable to the President of the Republic. 19. Article 95 of the Constitution resulting from the Taif Agreement provides that the abolition of confessionalism in the civil service, for categories below the first category, must respect the “requirements of national accord.” This vague formula made it possible to paralyse the “transitional period” provided for in that same article. 20. The “blocking third” rests on four mechanisms: the quorum for meetings of the Council of Ministers, which requires the presence of two-thirds of the ministers; fundamental decisions, whose adoption requires two-thirds of the ministers; the government, which is deemed to have resigned when more than one-third of its members resign; the dismissal of a minister, which must be decided by two-thirds of the ministers rather than by the President of the Republic and the President of the Council who appointed him. 21. Even before 1943, most political leaders were beholden to foreign States and their diplomatic missions, thereby inviting foreign intervention in all our national affairs. This remains the case today. 22. After seventy-five years of public life, Hassan Rifaï reached this conclusion: the problem lies with politicians; the solution lies with statesmen, of whom the country is today bereft. (2018)

The image of Israeli flags fluttering over Beaufort Castle is painfully striking. It is as painful as those of villages completely or partially destroyed, or families decimated. It is as violent as videos of desperate Southerners trying to salvage what they can before the next merciless volley of missiles, who risk death to feed herds and pets abandoned by their owners, who cry out their anger, frustration, and despair at a war that nothing could justify. The banners on Beaufort and the unbearable Israeli triumphalism that followed the seizure of this strategic archaeological site hit like a punch. Because they recalled the machinery of pointless wars in which Lebanon has been trapped for decades, caught in a time loop of a bad movie. Many of the actors remain the same. While some may change faces and others are added, the script itself stays the same and repeats endlessly. This vicious cycle, set in motion particularly by the infamous Cairo agreement, has invariably served the interests of regional actors: from Palestinians to Iranians, passing through the sad Assad regime in Syria. The flags planted on Sunday on Beaufort cruelly recalled June 1982, when Lebanese endured the same spectacle: Israeli colors on this majestic site, the direct consequence of others' war on their soil. They acted as an irritating reminder: in 44 years, Lebanon has missed every opportunity to escape foreign influences and build a true state. Even today, despite promises and declarations of good intentions, the state continues the same policy of hesitation while the population desperately yearns to see it bang its fist on the table, say "enough is enough," and adopt a range of concrete political, administrative, and judicial actions that would allow it to reclaim its decision-making power and the monopoly on legitimate violence. Three years after Hezbollah opened a first front in support of the axis to which it belongs, people are still dreaming. Three wasted years searching for a hypothetical adequate formula to impose the monopoly of arms. In the end, this sad picture only reinforces the contradictory feelings that arose facing the horror imposed daily since Hezbollah decided to avenge the death of Iranian Ali Khamenei, when it knew full well what Israeli retaliation to expect. It knew well, after the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, that Israel would turn the south into scorched earth in case of another attack on its territory and would "bring Lebanon back to the stone age." The Lebanese state was not unaware of these intentions. Even journalists had been briefed on the matter to echo Tel Aviv's recurring warnings, transmitted through diplomatic channels to Lebanese authorities and to the leaders of this formation. Lebanese are therefore torn between two contradictory feelings: their hearts bleed for villages that exist now only in the memory of those who built their lives there. But at the same time, they fear the current war will end in anticlimax. That a new ceasefire will plunge Lebanon back into a state of permanent war on hold, of deadly stalemate, and bring it back under Hezbollah's control… That a regional agreement will be reached at the country's expense… That the Hydra that is the mullah regime will survive the agreement being negotiated… Far from geopolitical analyses of the stakes linked to the current regional conflict, they focus on their own future in a country now in tatters. All just to break this time loop. And this is what fuels the dilemma, sometimes guilt-ridden, that they face: their desire to see this horror end as soon as possible clashes with their wish to see Hezbollah completely neutralized, at any cost. Since October 8, 2023, with the opening of the southern front in support of Hamas in its war against Israel, the masks have fallen. The subsequent course of events has shown that the only viable equation for Lebanon's survival is for Hezbollah to cease to exist in its current form. This group's sustained efforts to attribute bellicose and expansionist ambitions to Tel Aviv, in order to justify the nightmare into which it has plunged Lebanon twice in the span of three years, fall far short of concealing its true nature as an executive vassal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its disregard for the country's interests. As for the intimidation it exercises against its detractors, through threats and accusations of treason, it only further turns the Lebanese against it, while the authorities practice ostrich politics, whose effects only fuel what they claim to want to prevent, by evoking potential internal unrest. For this erasure only deepens internal polarization and widens the gap between a Lebanese minority that wants to keep Lebanon within Iran's sphere and a majority that seeks to break free from it under the leadership of a central authority unfortunately held captive by its fears. Hezbollah's unacceptable threats against authorities who see direct negotiations with Israel as the only lifeline for the country do indeed intensify this group's isolation on the local scene, but they simultaneously confirm the urgency for the State to fully assume its role as regulator of public order and sole holder of decision-making power. This urgency imposed itself because of the policy of procrastination and erasure pursued for a year by those in power. Yet they had committed to the population and the international community to reclaim the monopoly on violence to spare the country further devastating adventures—first with the election of a new president, then again with the formation of Nawaf Salam's government, and a third time following the November 2024 ceasefire. The urgency became inescapable because without it, the Lebanese will remain, against their will, actors in a bad film whose course they cannot change, because of a ruling body that demonstrates daily it lacks both the means and, above all, the courage of its convictions. Nothing that could still happen can be worse than the horror being endured today by thousands of families.

After more than five weeks of war, Washington and Tehran have agreed on a two-week ceasefire in exchange for a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, just over an hour before the expiration of Donald Trump's ultimatum threatening to destroy the Islamic Republic. Tehran indicated at dawn on Wednesday that talks would take place starting Friday with Washington. These discussions will be held in Pakistan, a key mediator in the Middle East war. Israel has accepted the ceasefire with Iran, according to a White House official speaking on condition of anonymity. "Following discussions with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan, during which they asked me to suspend the military intervention planned for tonight against Iran, and provided that the Islamic Republic of Iran accepts the TOTAL, IMMEDIATE and SECURE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz, I agree to suspend bombings and attacks against Iran for a period of two weeks," the American president wrote on his Truth Social platform. The latest in a series of ultimatums issued by Donald Trump to Iran and repeatedly pushed back, gave Tehran until 8:00 PM Washington time (midnight GMT) to reopen the strategic maritime passage, through which 20% of the world's crude oil passed before the war. "This will be a reciprocal CEASEFIRE!" added Mr. Trump, according to whom the United States "has already achieved and surpassed all our military objectives" since the launch of American-Israeli strikes on February 28. He also reported "very advanced" discussions towards a "long-term" peace agreement with Iran. Tehran submitted "a 10-point proposal" which "constitutes a viable basis for negotiation." The White House spokesperson stated the United States is considering "in-person discussions" with Iran, "but nothing is final until the President or the White House announces it," added Karoline Leavitt. Iranian ten-point plan For their part, Iranian leaders confirmed that they agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz "for a period of two weeks" "if attacks against Iran cease," Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X. "It has been decided at the highest level that Iran will engage, for a period of two weeks (...), in negotiations with the American side in Islamabad," the Supreme National Security Council added in a statement. "It is specified that this does not mean the end of the war, and that Iran will only accept the cessation of hostilities when" negotiations have concluded, he added, stressing that these two weeks could be extended "by agreement of both parties." According to Iranian media, the ten-point plan submitted to the United States provides for Washington to accept the continuation of Tehran's uranium enrichment program and the lifting of all sanctions. The plan, published by the Supreme National Security Council, includes "the principle of non-agression, continued Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, acceptance of enrichment, the lifting of all primary sanctions, and the lifting of all secondary sanctions," Iranian state television and Mehr agency reported. Iran also demands the cessation of resolutions against the Islamic Republic voted by the UN Security Council and by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the payment of compensation to Iran, the withdrawal of American military forces from the region, and the cessation of fighting on all fronts, including that of southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah has drawn the country into the war against Israel. Ceasefire applies to Lebanon Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif welcomed the results obtained following his country's mediation, which is on good terms with all parties: "I am pleased to announce that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, as well as their allies, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire everywhere, including in Lebanon and elsewhere, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT," Mr. Sharif wrote on X, using capital letters at the end of his message. The Pakistani capital, Islamabad, will host delegations from both countries on Friday for negotiations aimed at reaching a "definitive agreement," he added. Pakistan has emerged in recent weeks as a mediator between Tehran and Washington, seeking to prevent a further escalation of the conflict in the Middle East. Mr. Sharif is notably one of the members of the "Peace Council" established a few months ago by Donald Trump. Shortly before the announcement by the Pakistani Prime Minister, an Israeli strike killed eight and wounded 22 in a cafe on the waterfront in Sidon. (Mahmoud Zayyat/AFP) Shortly before the announcement by the Pakistani Prime Minister, an Israeli strike killed eight and wounded 22 in the Lebanese city of Sidon, the Lebanese Ministry of Health announced on Wednesday. For its part, the Israeli army reported three volleys of missiles fired by Iran towards its territory, moments after President Trump's announcement. Oil plunges, stock markets soar The announcement of the agreement was extremely well received in the markets: oil prices quickly dropped by more than 15%, falling below $100 per barrel, even approaching $90, and the Tokyo and Seoul stock exchanges soared by 4% and 6% respectively at the opening.

It all goes back to 1998 — May 30 to be precise, the date on which Pakistan conducted its last nuclear test in the sands of Kharan, in Balochistan. The program, from the bomb to its entire development chain, had been financed by Saudi Arabia, with American and Israeli approval. Both capitals had consented to Islamabad joining the nuclear club in order to establish a strategic counterweight in the India-China-Pakistan triangle, at a time when Beijing and New Delhi had already crossed the threshold of nuclear armament. It was then that speculation multiplied around Iran's intention to develop a military nuclear program under civilian cover — a prospect that Tel Aviv and Washington deemed unacceptable. The Pakistani bomb, Sunni, was meant to impose a balance in the Far East; an Iranian bomb, Shia, would create an unprecedented balance of power in the Middle East, a region where Israel considers itself the foremost strategic actor. The directive imposed itself: Iran could not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, never ceased to reaffirm the peaceful nature of its ambitions, with no military objectives in this domain. The question of a "Sunni NATO" resurfaces today with renewed insistence, in the wake of the Sharm el-Sheikh Peace Summit, where some one billion three hundred million Muslims gathered to proclaim the end of armed conflict with Israel, in exchange for the creation of a Palestinian state. This dynamic was part of the initiative launched by Donald Trump in the aftermath of the Gaza war — an initiative conceived in several phases, the first of which was to be the cessation of hostilities, before a civilian government could be established in Gaza. The process stalled there, unable to move beyond this first stage. A conviction then took hold, within the Saudi Kingdom in particular and the Sunni world in general: that Trump and the Israeli right do not genuinely desire the emergence of a Palestinian state, that the latter had convinced the American president not to go too far in his concessions to the Islamic states of the region, for fear that they would impose their conditions in the future — and that striking Iran remains the real priority. Internal tensions within the Republican administration are also visible on the question of the role the Gulf states might be entitled to play in the region. Trump and part of his inner circle were unsettled by the agreement Mohammed bin Salman reached with the Houthis in Yanbu without informing Washington; and then by his trip to Beijing, under the Biden presidency, which had resulted in an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement under Chinese auspices. Today, the crown prince and the Sunni actors of the region — joined by Egypt and Turkey — seek an end to the fighting and find in J. D. Vance, and in the Republicans who support him, allies committed to this cause. The idea of a Sunni NATO is therefore not without substance: it could pave the way for a degree of regional balance once the war is extinguished. If the Sunnis fare well in the region, the region as a whole will fare well. In the period preceding the Assad family, the Syrian Sunni bourgeoisie had brought Fares al-Khoury, a Lebanese from Kafr, to the presidency of the Damascus government; and Chawkat Choucair, father of Ayman Choucair, the Druze from Arsoun in Mount Lebanon, had been appointed chief of staff of the Syrian army. And of course, if the Christians — and with them the Shia of Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine's movement — fare well too, it is the entire region, and Lebanon with it, that will fare well also.

On 28 February, thunder rolled across the world – an abrupt and violent movement. Brutal, certainly. Unexpected? Not quite. The event had long been anticipated – yet its timing, scale and objectives remained unknown. The date is now clear. The scale, however, is still uncertain. As for the objectives – what do they mean for Israel and for the United States? Given the stance of the mollah regime toward Israel – and the foundations of power it has built at great expense to pursuit the goal of eradicating the country and paralyzing Lebanon – Israel is fighting for its survival. So, too, does Benjamin Netanyahu. The objective that follows is stark: eradication. The United States has an entirely different agenda. Negotiations with Iran had stalled – a familiar Iranian tactic. President Trump, accustomed to swift deals and frustrated by his interlocutors’ delays, had one aim: to eliminate a religious power with which it was impossible to negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement, starting with the United States itself. Along the way, he sought to avenge the 1979 hostage crisis, a wound that remained raw. The ultimate goal: to resolve the Middle East issue quickly and clear the way to focus on the Indo-Pacific. Could Netanyahu have pushed Trump’s hand? It’s a plausible hypothesis. For the White House, the objective was a quick victory without committing ground troops. For the Israelis, the approach is long-term. That difference promises to be a major point of contention. Russia: silent. Its focus lies elsewhere. Its positions in Africa, including Libya, are secure; its footholds in Syria (Tartus, Hmeimim) and Sudan (Port Sudan) are established. Only victory in Ukraine remains in its sights – a victory that will be sealed once negotiations with the United States guarantee recognition of Russian control and ownership of Crimea and the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, which it has not fully conquered. Additional claims concern the broader future of Ukraine. President Putin’s stance makes it likely that Trump would support such negotiations. China: silent. Its main concern remains securing its supply of hydrocarbons, essential to maintaining its industrial power. The military successes in Venezuela by U.S. forces, and in Iran by American and Israeli armies – noting that both countries possess Chinese detection systems and air-defense equipment – do not prompt China to make a show of force, except – like the Russians – to insist on adherence to international decisions, which are otherwise ignored by both Iran and Venezuela. States that have sought protection from Russia or China after expelling other, perhaps imperfect but loyal countries, will find themselves at a loss if they become targets in the future, given the lack of a Russian or Chinese response to the offensive against Iran. The UAE Modernizes, Europe Absent What does the future hold for the BRICS+? Only time will tell. But those who claim to be protectors cannot afford to act solely as predators. Having freed themselves from Saudi tutelage – long burdensome and mired in conventional as well as economic stagnation – the Emirates have modernized, paving the way for a prosperous, globally connected future. They have secured strategic autonomy, and the contrast with Saudi geopolitics is evident on almost every front: Saudi Arabia is a strategic partner of Pakistan and backs Somalia’s federal government, while the UAE leans toward India and maintains a special relationship with the unrecognized Somaliland; in Sudan, Riyadh supports the regular army (SAF), whereas UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); in Yemen, Saudi Arabia supports the internationally recognized government, the UAE the southern separatists; at sea, in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, Saudi Arabia pursues a national security strategy, while the UAE has developed a network of ports and logistics hubs across the Indian Ocean. Finally, regarding Israel, Saudi Arabia has still not officially recognized the Jewish state, unlike the UAE, signatories of the Abraham Accords (2020). Saudi Arabia, aspiring to be a territorial and political power, seeks to establish a system of collective security. The Emirates, by contrast, aim for maritime and commercial partners. Two very different approaches to politics, international relations, and diplomacy. Two divergent global positions in terms of influence and action. Europe? Absent. Or at least inaudible. It had every reason and every opportunity to play a role – the capacity to do so was there. How could it, when part of Europe is focused on the East, hypnotized like a rabbit caught in a car’s headlights, while another, smaller portion looks toward the sea, the Mediterranean, and the Near and Middle East? A third part is incapable of action, viscerally attached to the United States, no matter the cost. And Iran in all this? Who is in command, who is leading, who has a strategy? For now, Iran attacks every country. In conclusion, the United States and Israel pursue different objectives at different tempos. There was a convergence of immediate interests. In the medium and long term, however, their paths appear to diverge sharply. Israel has no intention of negotiating. What, then, will become of Iran? Fragmented, fractured, Westernized? In any of these scenarios, the outcome would favor neither Russia nor China. As for the United States, fixated on its desire to see this reviled religious government disappear, it could not negotiate on its own terms. Now, the question remains: with whom will it negotiate?

Between the lessons of history and the pressures of war, the same question recurs: can an exhausted state defer its ultimate defeat through a difficult settlement, or does an agreement concluded under an imbalanced power dynamic end up weighing on sovereignty and stability for years to come? When states enter the hour of existential peril, the question is no longer how to win, but how to prevent total collapse. In this sense, the Lebanese debate currently unfolding around the initiative launched by President Joseph Aoun to open a path toward direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel under international sponsorship goes far beyond the boundaries of ordinary political controversy, and raises a deeper question concerning the limits of what realism can achieve when the state itself is threatened in its cohesion and its capacity to survive. The initiative has generated a visible rupture between those who see in it a realistic attempt to halt the collapse and prevent the expansion of the conflict, and those who believe that any negotiation conducted under the pressure of arms and in a context of unequal power relations risks becoming a harsh settlement imposed on Lebanon, with lasting effects on its sovereignty and political future. In such moments, history returns to offer its precedents: that of states or political regimes that found themselves before a choice of extreme difficulty — that of accepting a painful agreement in order to avert total collapse. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution’s triumph in 1917, the new Russian leadership found itself confronted with a brutal reality: an exhausted state, a disintegrating army, an economy on the verge of collapse after years of world war. At that moment, Vladimir Lenin understood that the continuation of the war against Germany risked precipitating the fall of the new power before it had managed to lay its foundations; he therefore charged Leon Trotsky with negotiating an end to the conflict. The decision, however, did not impose itself easily. The Bolshevik leadership was divided over the nature of the stance to adopt. Lenin argued for accepting peace, however harsh and humiliating, holding that the priority was to save the revolution and buy the time necessary to rebuild the state. Trotsky, for his part, attempted to chart a middle course, one that would halt the fighting without requiring the signing of a dishonorable treaty, while a faction within the party, led by Nikolai Bukharin, rejected any settlement with Germany and called for continuing what it termed the “revolutionary war.” Military realities settled the debate swiftly. The German army resumed its offensive and advanced into Russian territory without encountering any significant resistance, compelling the Bolshevik leadership to accept the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. The treaty was severe: it forced Russia to cede vast stretches of territory and to sustain significant economic losses, so much so that it was described at the time as a shameful peace. Yet Lenin considered this step, constrained and provisional as it was, to be meant to protect the larger political enterprise: the survival of the revolution itself. And indeed, less than a year later, Germany was defeated and the treaty collapsed of its own accord, while the Bolshevik power succeeded in consolidating itself, waging the civil war, and emerging victorious. Since then, this episode has become a classic example in political history: that of accepting a hard agreement to save a project or a state threatened with collapse. This example is today frequently invoked in Lebanese political debates, particularly in the context of the open war with Israel and the catastrophic repercussions that have befallen the country. Lebanon is traversing a situation of extreme fragility: a ruined economy, a fractured social fabric, millions of citizens threatened with displacement or destitution since their cities, villages, and homes were destroyed — pressures of immense weight bearing down on the social fabric and threatening the unity and cohesion of the country. In such a context, some put forward the idea that political realism may sometimes require accepting difficult or unequal arrangements in order to end the war and prevent the collapse of the state and society. Others, conversely, reject this view and hold that any unbalanced agreement risks becoming a permanent diktat, entrenching the imbalance of power and durably undermining the sovereignty of the state. This debate is further sustained by a reading of Lebanon’s previous experiences with Israel, where successive stages of negotiation and understanding show that Lebanon’s margin of maneuver has narrowed progressively as the imbalance of power intensified and the state’s capacity to fully control the components of its strength deteriorated. From the May 17 Agreement, which carried broad political and security dimensions but collapsed before it could be implemented, to the April Understanding, which organized the rules of engagement without addressing the root of the conflict, through UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the series of understandings and security arrangements that followed it in an effort to contain hostilities — the realities of the field and the political landscape pushed gradually toward conditions ever more restrictive of Lebanese room for maneuver. From this vantage point, some observers hold that the question concerns not only the nature of any possible agreement today, but also whether current conditions — harsh as they are — might remain less costly than those that could be imposed tomorrow should the military and political deterioration continue and the imbalance of power deepen further still. The Lebanese dilemma is bound not only to the conditions of a possible settlement, but also to the persistence of a political discourse that continues to refuse to acknowledge the limits of power and to conflate realism with surrender — even as the perpetuation of this logic risks dragging both society and state toward a deepening of collapse, and rendering the cost of any subsequent arrangement more severe for Lebanon, politically, economically, and in terms of its sovereignty. The difference between the era of Brest-Litovsk and our own lies, however, also in the nature of the international system. In 1918, no global institutional framework existed capable of sponsoring agreements or guaranteeing their implementation. Today, despite all the flaws and dysfunctions that afflict the international order, the existence of the United Nations and a network of diplomatic and legal mechanisms can provide a minimum of guarantees. In Lebanon’s case, international sponsorship, combined with Arab stewardship, could constitute a safety net for any eventual agreement, contributing to ensuring the parties’ commitment and reducing the risk of such an agreement collapsing or degenerating into a mere temporary truce. Yet any serious discussion of a possible settlement in Lebanon runs directly into the question of arms outside the framework of the state — the knot bearing the heaviest consequences in defining Lebanon’s negotiating position and the limits of its capacity to honor any future agreement. The presence of Hezbollah as a military force holding an operational decision-making authority that exceeds the institutional framework of the state renders any negotiation inherently twofold: a negotiation between the Lebanese state and Israel on one hand, and an unresolved internal debate over who holds the final word on matters of war and peace on the other. Without this contradiction being addressed, any arrangement risks remaining precarious, for the success of an agreement depends not on texts alone, but on the existence of a single authority capable of monopolizing sovereign decision-making and fulfilling the commitments that flow from it. It is for this reason that the question before the Lebanese today is not only whether a settlement is necessary or possible, but how to frame it within an international architecture that guarantees its durability and shields Lebanon from once again becoming the theater of an open conflict. For in the end, the problem is not that an agreement be hard, but that its rejection today should open the way to still harder conditions tomorrow. States are measured not only by their capacity to endure, but also by their ability to recognize the moment when saving what can still be saved becomes the very condition of their survival.

Israel sets as a precondition the disarmament of Hezbollah before any negotiations — a demand it knows in advance to be beyond the reach of the Lebanese state, since the decision of war and peace remains, to a very large extent, outside the framework of that state's institutions. Israel has nonetheless taken a notable step by appointing Ron Dermer as head of its delegation to negotiations with Lebanon — a senior official close to decision-making circles, and particularly to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This appointment lends the Israeli move undeniable political substance and sends an unambiguous signal to the international community: Israel is ready to engage in a high-level negotiation process. By contrast, the Lebanese state is attempting to form a negotiating delegation that reflects the internal sectarian balances underpinning the political system. But this attempt quickly ran up against the complexities of Lebanese reality: Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri refused to name the Shia member of the delegation, conditioning his participation on a full ceasefire before any negotiating session. This comes at the very moment when Hezbollah has declared its rejection of any ceasefire before the end of the war against Iran, stating that it has committed all its capabilities to this conflict and will fight to the end or until victory is achieved. Such positions effectively close the door to any ceasefire in the near term and narrow the room for maneuver of any political initiative or negotiating process. They also lay bare the clear divergence between the logic of the Lebanese state — which seeks to contain the crisis through diplomatic channels — and that of the armed forces, which tie their decisions to a broader regional context that transcends Lebanon's borders. In light of these facts, Israel appears to have succeeded in scoring an additional point with international public opinion: it will come across as the party that demonstrated its willingness to negotiate by sending a high-level envoy, while Lebanon will appear as a state unable to unify its internal decision-making or meet the prerequisites for a transition to a political settlement. This perception, whether accurate or overstated, weakens Lebanon's negotiating position and makes it harder to defend its interests in international forums. In the final analysis, these developments reveal once again the depth of the predicament in which Lebanon finds itself, where a state of limited capacity collides with a military and political force that makes its decisions outside state institutions. In this context, any negotiating process or political settlement becomes hostage to regional balances over which Lebanon has no control. While the state strives to consolidate its place at the negotiating table, the real challenge lies in restoring the decision of war and peace to its constitutional institutions — for without that, Lebanon will remain a theater for the liquidation of regional conflicts rather than a state capable of defending its national interests.

In contemporary geopolitics, there are few points on the map capable of altering the course of the world economy in a matter of moments. The Strait of Hormuz is among the most consequential of them. This narrow maritime passage, separating Iran from the Sultanate of Oman, forms the vital artery through which oil and gas are exported from the Gulf to the rest of the world. Any military tension in the region — particularly given the persistent escalation between Iran and Israel — places this strait at the very heart of the international equation. This is no longer merely a regional dispute or a limited military confrontation. What is at stake is the potential destabilization of one of the main pillars of the global economy. The Strait's Place in the Global Economic Order Roughly one-fifth of the world's oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz each day, along with a substantial share of liquefied natural gas. Major industrial powers in Asia — China, Japan, South Korea — depend primarily on energy flowing from the Gulf through this corridor. As a result, even the threat of closing the strait, or merely constraining navigation within it, is enough to send shockwaves through global markets. The international economy, for all its magnitude, remains extraordinarily vulnerable to any threat against energy supplies. The Strait as a Geopolitical Weapon Iran has long played the Hormuz card in its confrontations with the West. Each time political pressure or economic sanctions intensify, threats to close the strait or disrupt shipping resurface with predictable regularity. Yet this card has never been easy to play. A full closure of the strait would mean a direct confrontation with international powers, foremost among them the United States, which regards freedom of navigation there as an integral component of its strategic security. The real danger, however, lies not necessarily in a total blockade, but in an indirect constriction of maritime traffic: threatening commercial vessels, targeting oil tankers, laying naval mines, staging limited military escalations in the Gulf. Such measures would not formally close the strait but would suffice to throw shipping into confusion and drive up transport and insurance costs dramatically. The Iranian-Israeli Conflict and the Multiplication of Fronts In recent years, the conflict between Iran and Israel has evolved into a multi-front confrontation stretching from Syria to the Red Sea and Iraq. As military tensions mount, the Gulf itself has become part of the picture. A broad Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear or military installations could push Tehran to respond through a range of instruments, including pressure on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. In such a scenario, the aim would not necessarily be to bring global trade to a halt, but to send a strategic message: any war against Iran will extract its price from world markets. The World Economy Confronting an Energy Shock Should navigation in the strait be curtailed, the first shock would be felt in oil markets, which respond swiftly to geopolitical risk and could see prices spike sharply within days. Rising energy costs would in turn set off a chain of economic repercussions: higher transport and freight costs, soaring prices for essential goods, accelerating inflation across most countries, a slowdown in global economic growth. In a world that has not fully recovered from successive economic crises, a new energy shock could produce consequences both deep and long-lasting. Wider Regional Ramifications The tensions at Hormuz would not be contained within the bounds of global economics; they would spread to the political stability of the region itself. The Gulf states, whose livelihoods depend on energy exports through this passage, would find themselves in an acutely precarious position — caught between the imperative to protect their trade and the peril of being drawn into a wider regional conflict. A significant military escalation could also trigger a redrawing of the security map of the Middle East, with the possibility of the confrontation spreading to other fronts. Lebanon at the Eye of the Regional Storm For Lebanon, any major escalation between Iran and Israel would be felt on its own territory. Lebanon occupies one of the most sensitive positions in this conflict, given the role of Hezbollah, Iran's most prominent regional ally. When the confrontation flared across the region, Lebanon found itself facing one of two scenarios: either sliding into an open military front with Israel, or entering a prolonged period of intense political and security pressure stemming from regional tensions. In either case, the Lebanese economy — already exhausted — stands among the most exposed, whether through rising energy prices or through the disruption of regional trade. Between Deterrence and Detonation Despite all these risks, most parties are well aware that a full disruption of the Strait of Hormuz could unleash consequences that would be difficult to contain. This is why the threats have remained, for the most part, within the realm of political deterrence rather than practical execution. Yet history shows that major crises often begin with minor incidents or miscalculations between adversaries. And in a region as volatile as the Gulf, a single incident at sea can be enough to trigger a chain of reactions that no one can control. The Strait of Hormuz thus remains one of the most sensitive nodes in the international system. It is not merely a maritime corridor for oil transit — it is a geopolitical nexus where the interests of great powers intersect with the conflicts of the Middle East. As tensions between Iran and Israel continue to mount, the probability grows that this strait will become a card of strategic pressure in a confrontation that already transcends the region's boundaries. And in a world that depends so heavily on the flow of energy from the Gulf, any disruption of this vital artery could be enough to trigger a global economic earthquake. Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz reminds us of a simple truth: in the contemporary international order, a narrow passage on the map may hold the fate of the entire world's economy in its grasp.

The global order is entering a transitional phase marked by remodeling rather than collapse. The post-WW2 order led so far- and more so since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 - by the United States is adjusting to new realities. China’s economic weight gives it strategic leverage that extends far beyond trade and finance, positioning it as a major competitor to the United States. Although China’s form of interventionism differs from that of Western powers, its growing influence across regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America is nothing but another version of neo-colonialism, hence not less damaging to America’s global interests. Despite the erosion of many of its strategic assets as a result of the war in Ukraine, Russia should neither be dismissed nor underestimated as a global power. It continues to wield influence across Africa, the Middle East, and other regions, maintaining a network of geopolitical reach. For the United States, Russia therefore remains a threat—diminished, but far from eliminated. More importantly, the inconsistent engagement and mounting internal challenges of traditional powers such as the United States, the European Union, and Russia have created a strategic vacuum that enabled a new set of regional actors across the Middle East and Asia to arise as the new “power brokers”. The emerging landscape is multipolar, but also interdependent. Competition is increasingly economic and technological. Control over supply chains, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, energy flows and critical minerals now shapes strategic influence more decisively than traditional territorial expansion. In this context, corporations and financial institutions exert unprecedented transnational impact, exposing new forms of state vulnerability. From a realist perspective, this represents a partial diffusion of power away from the state. While governments remain primary actors, their capacity to project power is increasingly undermined by private entities that control critical assets. States dependent on foreign-controlled supply chains, platforms, or capital markets face structural constraints on strategic autonomy, limiting their freedom of action even in matters traditionally associated with national security. Economic coercion, technological chokepoints, and financial leverage thus become substitutes for military force. This new reality may look like deepening a complex mutual dependence, in which corporations function as key intermediaries linking national economies. However, this interdependence is asymmetrical. States embedded in global markets but lacking domestic control over finance, technology, or energy are more exposed to external shocks and private decision-making beyond their regulatory reach. The scale and impact of non-state actors often rivals that of nation-states, raising important debates about governance, regulation and economic balance. For example, governance increasingly shifts from public institutions to transnational corporate networks that set standards, control data flows, and influence regulatory regimes. State authority is not eliminated, but fragmented and shared with non-state actors whose priorities are driven by profit, risk management, and shareholder interests rather than national strategy. For the Middle East, this transition presents both risk and opportunity. Strategic geography, energy transformation initiatives and infrastructure investments position the region as a central node in evolving global networks. The question is not whether the region will be affected — but how it will shape and leverage the shift. The capacity of Middle Eastern states to shape and leverage this shift is uneven and deeply conditioned by structural fragilities. Many of these vulnerabilities are rooted in the legacy of colonial state formation, which produced borders, institutions, and political economies poorly aligned with social realities. Post-independence governance models often relied on coercion, external rents, and patronage rather than inclusive political participation, resulting in weak or fractured social contracts. Over time, authoritarian consolidation, conflict, and economic mismanagement further eroded state legitimacy and institutional capacity. Nonetheless, the significant transformation is taking place at the societal level. The normalization of instability — from financial volatility to geopolitical shocks — has altered public expectations. What once triggered sustained public reaction now generates limited engagement. Information cycles accelerate, and crises overlap, compressing public attention spans. This shift does not necessarily imply manipulation, but it does reflect a structural change in how societies absorb disruption. Adaptability has become a defining feature of contemporary populations. The risk, however, is that adaptation without participation may gradually weaken long-term civic engagement. The emerging world order will be shaped not only by strategic competition among states, but also by how societies interpret and respond to continuous change. Ultimately, the most significant transformation may not be geopolitical, but cognitive. As power diffuses across states, corporations, and transnational networks, citizens increasingly confront governance systems that feel distant, opaque, and difficult to influence. The central question is whether societies respond to this complexity through renewed political engagement or retreat into permanent adjustment within structures they no longer meaningfully shape. In many contexts, prolonged exposure to instability, economic precarity, and external dependency has fostered a politics of accommodation rather than participation. Citizens recalibrate expectations downward, prioritizing survival and individual adaptation over collective agency. Governance, in turn, risks devolving into a technocratic exercise focused on managing volatility rather than articulating shared political projects. This cognitive shift—from ownership to endurance—gradually erodes the foundations of accountability and consent. The ultimate outcome of this transition will not be determined by states, corporations, or institutions alone. It will hinge on whether citizens remain active participants in shaping governance frameworks or settle into a condition of perpetual adjustment to forces they no longer contest. The world is being rewritten in real time. Whether public agency evolves alongside it—or erodes under the weight of complexity and fatigue—will define not only the legitimacy of future governance models, but the character of the next era itself.

The Shiites knew "the death of God" more than a thousand years before the rest, when the lineage of Hassan ibn Ali al-Askari was cut off and he died by poison — the last of the great, infallible Imams. Shia political fiqh did not withdraw into some haven of consolation; it insisted, rather, that divine wilaya and the infallibility of the wali must endure. And so the son of Hassan came into being — most necessarily —, then disappeared in a Minor Occultation, followed by a Major Occultation, in the most prudent of all precautions… And thus Shia political fiqh deflected the idea of "the death of God" and fled from it toward the end of time… suspending time, leaving it hanging by a single hair: the awaiting of the Mahdi, who will return from his Occultation to fill the earth with justice and equity after it has been filled with oppression and iniquity… A Tour of the Shia Political Imaginary Before Khomeini Awaiting his noble return, political history remains for the Shiites a body of grievances and tragedies. They neither disavow them nor labor to avert them; quite to the contrary, this accumulation is a necessary sediment for the Mahdi's return. Furthermore, the Shiites long stood in a state of juridical release from the state, deeming it illegitimate, and harbored deep wariness toward the concepts of modernity and their outcomes — except within the latitude conceded by certain religious authorities, in isolated flashes, with wide variance between openness and closure. Awaiting the Mahdi, the Lord of Time, the Shia political imaginary finds itself before an epistemological deadlock and an existential predicament. The connection with God has been severed; and while awaiting the return of His Hujja , time becomes a commons, ownerless in the absence of the Lord of Time. This led a number of Shiites across the ages to withdraw from power and boycott it. Others engaged with existing authority on the grounds that it was necessary — for people must have governance, whether righteous or corrupt. The deadlock of Shia political fiqh very nearly drove it to embrace the project of the civil state and enter modernity through that door, having no alternative to offer beyond waiting or dealing with the existing reality by necessity. Hence, before Khomeini, the Shiites had on their own effectively killed God, on the roadside of the long wait for the return of His Hujja . And the Shiites' participation in nationalist, progressive, Marxist, leftist, socialist, liberal, secular, and atheist parties and organizations was entirely natural… These political and intellectual currents filled the place of a God who had turned His back and left His servants to await His return. The Window onto Western Modernity and Its Closure in Iran "God is dead, and we have killed him," in the words of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. It was thus that modern Western society moved to curtail religion's role as moral arbiter. As a result, epistemological, economic, and technological systems grew and flourished in conditions hospitable to every requirement of growth, prosperity, and well-being. Religion did not return to the public sphere except escorted by the epistemology of the sciences — as a theory of knowledge offering answers to humanity's great questions from outside the box of religion's ready-made answers — and by the philosophy of religions, which transformed the creeds of Western societies into relative truths. The plurality and renewal of gods, the relativity of truth and the measured appreciation of its necessity, the changing and accountability of leaders within the framework of the rotation of power, diversity as a source of wealth and difference within the management of plurality: these are all co-extensive paradigms of modernity. The result was the liberation of the human being and the reinforcement of his rights as an individual citizen, a state whose legislation and laws derive from a civil reference, the welfare of the individual and the supreme interest of society, and a rationalist impulse to consolidate these achievements, reevaluate them, and build upon them. That said, I will not engage here with modernity and the critique of modernity, nor will I revisit Foucault fleeing it for the embrace of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, only to return and revise his opinion — searching, like Lévi-Strauss and others, for his quarry for the critique of modernity, in the natural course of the development of societies. It had always been an exercise in plowing the waters to extract a political project for society from the folios of Shia political fiqh . Until Khomeini arrived and drew the theory of wilayat al-faqih from the cellars of the religious tradition, sealing the window onto Western modernity in Iran and the Arab world. He fashioned, in the eyes of the Shiites, an exact replica of the Lord of Time, and installed the Iranian wali al-faqih as his deputy. How the Occultist Mind of the Shiites Operates Under the Doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih The wali al-faqih has his Shiites in many Arab cities. They are the mustadaafun — the oppressed — by their governments and within their national states. For this reason, they must profess loyalty and obedience to the wali al-faqih at the expense of their belonging to their national identities and the causes of their communities; indeed, his claim upon them is the equivalent of the Prophet's claim and of God's own. Political borders are nothing but soft barriers before the expanding wilaya . While "the support of the mustadaafun " wherever they may be in the world is the foundational value of the Iranian Islamic Republic's constitution, "the export of the revolution" — toward this end — is the road to extending influence and expansion. In this way, the wali al-faqih shattered the Shiites' awaiting of the Mahdi, being himself his deputy and present among them at the same time. And he kept them in a state of perpetual waiting. Their minds thus came to rest on the occult, which displaces all realistic approaches. The will to obstruction consequently overwhelms every society in which the Shiites of the wali al-faqih are present — for what matters is his religious mandate, which he ratifies on behalf of millions of Shiites. And ruin, destruction, and gnawing from within ensue, for governance is permanent revolution and the export of revolution — not stability, peace, and the sovereignty of states within the obligations of each one's national security. Endless wars blaze and killing becomes habit, against the erasure of development and its requirements… Or woes proliferate and blood is shed and human values are violated and chaos and upheaval spread — for that is divine will and there is no way around it. Every fallen one becomes a martyr, every martyr is blessed, felicitous in his death — which occasions congratulation more than condolence, addressed to the Lord of Time, the Imam al-Mahdi, and to the Islamic Nation. The fall to earth is an ascent to heaven and an elevation, and the shroud of death a divine decoration. Until complete defeat and thunderous collapse arrive in culture, politics, security, and civilization — in Iran and beyond Iran. And here comes the role of the sanctification of ignorance and the denial of reality: defeat becomes victory, humiliation becomes honor, and self-respect becomes blind obedience… There is no room to hold the wali al-faqih , his agents, or his followers to account, for pledging allegiance to him is an absolution of all obligation. The Shiite operating under the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih functions within parallel systems in the society of his state and does not work for the welfare of society as a whole — for what concerns him is his religious duty, to which he remains faithful while betraying everything else. The Shiite of wilayat al-faqih does not weigh options rationally, does not shrink from chaos and destruction, does not find it objectionable to live in a society without a state, and does not hesitate whether death falls upon him or he falls upon death… The surrender of his affairs to his wali is the key to understanding his mind and behavior — not rationality as a methodological approach. Naturally and ordinarily rational questions — such as development, production, and stability — do not belong to the occultist mind of the Shiite who holds to wilayat al-faqih . The Death of Khamenei and All the Date-Palm Gods "Khamenei is dead, and we have killed him." Following this announcement, the American administration can extract the Shiites from the cave of their political fiqh and their occultist mind with a decisive blow and usher them into modernity. And if the son-Khamenei returns, as sons of gods do, the revolution of communication will expose the vulnerabilities of his alleged sanctity — from insufficient qualifications for the marjaïyya to the ease with which he can be targeted and struck, rendering him from every direction into a god of dates, easily eaten, as Muslims throughout history have generally made a habit of doing when hunger strikes: they eat their gods.