Ankara at the Heart of NATO 3.0’s Southern Focus: What About Lebanon?

In the NATO 3.0 framework that emerged from the Ankara summit (July 7-8), the Alliance has strengthened its ability to simultaneously address a continental threat in the East (Russia) and hybrid instability (terrorism, migration crises, military conflicts) on its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern flanks. For this second dimension, NATO is now relying on Ankara, which has not only become a major arms supplier to member states but has also established itself as a mediator between the West and the Moscow-Tehran axis. Turkey has refused to sever ties with Russia and Iran while containing the former in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and the latter in Syria and Lebanon.

The Riyadh Pact

After several years of tensions with Riyadh, particularly following the Khashoggi affair, Turkey joined Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in establishing a Strategic Mutual Defense Pact, now described by some observers as a “Sunni NATO.” This bloc is emerging to counter both Iran’s remaining influence in Syria and Lebanon and Israeli power. The powerful symbol of this rapprochement is the Hejaz railway project. The railway line, which was first built in 1908 under Sultan Abdülhamid II, was a symbol of Ottoman power, linking Istanbul to Mecca until it was destroyed by the forces of the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, with the support and guidance of British officers.

From 1918 onward, these fighters systematically blew up tracks and bridges in order to disrupt the supply routes of Ottoman troops. The new railway project, approved last June, will link Istanbul to the Arabian Peninsula through Syria and Jordan, with a planned extension to Oman, creating a trade corridor connecting India and Southeast Asia to Istanbul. It represents a major economic strategy aimed, first, at bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and limiting the impact of Iranian pressure, and second, at reducing reliance on the port of Haifa, with the objective of marginalizing Israel’s commercial role in the region as Ankara’s relations with Tel Aviv reach their lowest point.

The New Syria: The Heart of Turkish Influence

The most important factor in this context is the consolidation of Turkish influence in Syria. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Ankara has actively supported the new administration led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. By becoming Syria’s main Sunni patron, Turkey has severed the former pro-Iranian land corridors to Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank.

On the military front, Ankara has refused to withdraw its troops from northern Syria, using counterterrorism efforts as a justification. Its actual objective, however, is the elimination of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led force accused of being an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara and Washington classify as a terrorist organization.

In addition, Syria participated for the first time in Turkey’s joint military exercises, known as EFES 2026, the latest edition of one of the largest multinational live-fire military drills organized every two years by the Turkish armed forces. The exercise took place between April and May 2026, primarily in the Izmir and Istanbul regions of Turkey. It involved more than 10,000 troops from fifty countries. Beyond its traditional NATO allies, such as the United States and France, Ankara invited the Syrian army to take part for the first time, marking a significant geopolitical development, as this represented Syria’s first official participation in an overseas military exercise since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Lebanon and the Strategic Awakening of the Turkish Sphinx

Turkey, which has reasserted itself as NATO 3.0’s southern pivot, as a key player in the Middle East, and as a member of the Islamabad-Ankara-Riyadh defense pact, now wields considerable influence in Syria. In this regard, it shares certain affinities with some Lebanese Islamist movements, such as Jama’a Islamya.

If Lebanon is to survive the regional chaos, it must learn to deal with this “Turkish pivot” on a state-to-state basis, not as a vassal, but as a strategic partner aware that the Middle East’s center of gravity has shifted northward.

Between 2025 and 2026, Turkey intensified its hostile rhetoric toward Israel, calling for its destruction. In this context, Erdoğan indicated that Lebanon falls within Turkey’s security sphere of interest. “Turkey’s security does not begin at its borders, but in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut,” he said, after making clear that he intended to counter Israeli expansionism in Lebanon.

These statements carry considerable weight given the current geopolitical situation, even if they remain, for the most part and for the time being, verbal. Following the NATO summit, however, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that no open war with Israel was being sought, suggesting the influence of an American push for de-escalation.

Lebanon’s official authorities have begun opening channels toward Ankara through several prime ministerial visits, the latest being that of Nawaf Salam a few days ago. President Joseph Aoun was also expected to travel to Ankara to consolidate this policy of engagement. However, strategic ties between the two countries remain below the required level and still need to be expanded. General Rodolphe Haykal’s visit to the SAHA defense exhibition in Istanbul (May 5-7, 2026) was intended to explore Turkish logistical support for the Lebanese army. Concrete cooperation between the two armed forces will nonetheless depend on US approval and on the Lebanese army’s ability to secure the Syrian border. Turkey can help contain instability emanating from Syria and a potential resurgence of ISIS, an enemy that Ankara closely monitors.

Lebanese-Syrian Ties in Turkey’s Shadow

Beirut stands to gain, in absolute terms, from consolidating its ties with Damascus by using the new Syrian regime as an opportunity to build mutual trust – while recognizing that tensions remain over former Assad regime officials currently in Lebanon, as well as over the Hezbollah issue in Syria. Lebanon also has an interest in contributing to a shared Ankara-Damascus-Beirut security framework, one that would provide reciprocal guarantees while preserving Lebanese political autonomy.

In this context, diplomatic sources say that Lebanon was a top priority during the meeting between President Donald Trump and Ahmad al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara. The two presidents are concerned about Hezbollah’s clandestine supply networks running through Turkey and Syria into Lebanon and agreed on the need to intensify coordination on this issue along the Lebanese-Syrian border.

The Multiplication of Regional and International Axes

Lebanon’s security is now being negotiated as much in Ankara as in Washington, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Paris, Damascus, and Tehran. Lebanon will therefore have to navigate this environment with pragmatism. This requires a coherent Lebanese strategy covering security, defense, the economy, and foreign policy – a strategy that has not yet taken shape.

Is this strategy being developed within the Council of Ministers? Within the Higher Defense Council? Behind the scenes at the presidential palace? Is it being entrusted to experts (real ones)? Or does it remain nonexistent? Should such a strategy emerge, it will need to:

1 – preserve sovereignty, preventing Lebanon from becoming a mere pawn in the rivalry between Tehran and Tel Aviv, and between Ankara and Tel Aviv;

2 – maintain a minimum level of credibility to avoid being abandoned by Washington;

3 – take into account Europe’s growing role in the Middle East; and

4 – avoid falling back into Iran’s orbit.