Composed gaze

At a time when countries across the region are seeking mechanisms and alliances that would allow them to reduce their total security dependence on the United States, if not move entirely out from under its umbrella, with the Turkish-Saudi-Pakistani alliance offering a clear example of this trend, official Lebanon is moving in the opposite direction, toward ever greater reliance on Washington in most areas of its foreign policy. This is not limited to the issue of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, which began in Washington and are continuing in Rome, rather than Paris, for instance, and that is no coincidence. Naturally, Lebanon cannot compare its position, presence, or role with those of the three major regional powers, nor can it adopt approaches similar to theirs, given the political, economic, and military capabilities at their disposal. Nor can anyone say with certainty whether Lebanon is even capable of distancing itself from Washington, or whether it has other options that would allow it to do so. There is also nothing to suggest that such a move is required in the first place, given the major role the United States continues to play internationally and regionally. If some believe that it was, in practice, the direct political negotiations that brought the war to an end, and there is certainly some truth to that, Lebanon nonetheless needs to pursue a more active and effective foreign policy, one capable of mobilizing international support for its just cause and pressing consistently for a full Israeli military withdrawal to the internationally recognized borders. Those borders were acknowledged in the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel, yet they were entirely overlooked in the latest negotiations. It is true that Washington will not accept anyone competing with its restored role in Lebanon, and that it wants to retain a monopoly over this arena in order to use it as a gateway toward some political achievement at the regional level, particularly in light of the stalemate surrounding the Iranian file, caught between bombardment and negotiation, with neither track proving capable of producing a decisive outcome. But it is equally true that relying exclusively on a single international power, however strong, does not necessarily yield the desired results. Perhaps the clearest example is the marginalization of the French role to its bare minimum, something highly unusual in the context of the “historic” Lebanese-French relationship. While acknowledging that the American role is unavoidable under the prevailing circumstances and given the balance of power produced by the wars that have raged over the past two years, one can only hope that Washington will exert greater pressure on its favored ally in order to secure a withdrawal and curb Israel’s unabated appetite for territory in southern Lebanon, reflected in the publication of suspicious maps, the opening of roads, and the establishment of military positions in occupied areas. Unless the United States becomes convinced that building a functioning state in Lebanon serves the interests of stability both at home and across the region, and unless that conviction is translated into concrete positions producing practical results in southern Lebanon, the situation will remain trapped in the same vicious circle: weapons before withdrawal, or withdrawal before weapons? Incidentally, this choice, namely the establishment of the state in Lebanon, does not necessarily serve Israel’s interests and most likely does not, because the absence of a strong state gives Israel room to vent its historic hostility toward Lebanon’s pluralistic character, which stands in stark contrast to its increasingly radicalized, monolithic identity. Building the state in Lebanon, beginning with placing all weapons under the exclusive authority of the state rather than simply disarming them, is the right and only way out of the reality in which we find ourselves. It would allow the people of the South to trust that there is a state capable of protecting them, embracing them, and providing the conditions for a dignified life, away from narratives of marginalization and neglect that are reinforced by repugnant sectarian rhetoric, cloaked in unhealthy slogans and expressing a hatred that could lay the groundwork for civil conflicts that most Lebanese believed had been consigned to the past for good. In a pluralistic and diverse society such as Lebanon, the state cannot be built on the principle of rule by the sword, although excessive weakness can itself prove fatal to the state-building project. It must instead rest on the creation of spaces of shared interest embodied by the state, which no party, however powerful, can replace. This is precisely what developments in Lebanon have demonstrated over the years, as an excess of power has passed successively from one community to another. The Lebanese state must therefore take the necessary steps to build itself and must not rule out dialogue with anyone, at home or abroad, in pursuit of that objective, even if this requires opening channels with actors that support particular parties in Lebanon rather than the state itself. Why should the state not seek to forge regional understandings under international cover that would enable it to put its project into practice in Lebanon: the project of the state? Is this beyond the state’s capabilities? Perhaps. But the attempt should at least be made. Finally, if calling for dialogue abroad appears necessary to break out of the current impasse, the need for dialogue at home is no less urgent. Such dialogue must not assume a merely folkloric character, producing nothing more than verbal understandings that never find their way into implementation. Rather, it must seriously seek to establish the necessary domestic red lines: no retreat from the project of building the state, beginning with placing all weapons under the exclusive authority of the state, and no fueling of feelings of marginalization and neglect among any segment of the Lebanese population. Between these two imperatives, some common space must be created, however difficult the task may be.

There is a heavy legacy between Lebanon and Syria, but there are also many opportunities. The past between the two countries weighs enormously. From independence under the Mandate in 1920 to actual independence in 1943, and through the most recent phases, issues have piled up to the point where fraught relations between the two countries have become an almost permanent state of affairs. But the time has come for this to end and for a new chapter to be opened, one whose fundamental principle is mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. The bitter experience of Syrian tutelage, which the Lebanese endured from Syria’s entry into Lebanon in 1976 until the military withdrawal of April 26, 2005, remains deeply etched in their memory. That withdrawal came amid the international reactions that followed the assassination of President Rafic Hariri on February 14 of the same year. While analyzing the reasons behind Syria’s entry into Lebanon would require articles of its own, the period that marked the height of the tutelage began after Syria’s participation in the operation to liberate Kuwait in 1990, when its control over Lebanon was effectively granted as a kind of “reward.” The Lebanese naturally remember how Syria’s administration of Lebanon evolved into a form of direct rule, exercised through the Syrian intelligence headquarters in Anjar, the Beau Rivage and other sites, where figures from the former regime deliberately humiliated Lebanese officials and issued orders to them with great condescension and little regard for even the most basic requirements of national dignity. It also goes without saying that the Lebanese have not forgotten the political assassinations carried out in Lebanon against opinion leaders, intellectuals and politicians, from Kamal Jumblatt to Rafic Hariri, nor the intimidation, arrests and suppression of freedom of expression and other liberties. The tutelage nearly turned Lebanon into a regime modeled on the Syrian system, with sham elections of no real consequence, whose sole purpose was to complete the political façade. The important thing is that this chapter has now been closed. More important still, however, is to think seriously about how to build strong future relations based on trust, respect and shared interests, and how to prevent either country from once again being drawn into harming the other or seeking to take control of it, as happened in the previous period. Some Lebanese official and non-official circles must also move beyond hesitation or indifference toward developing these relations in the right direction, in a way that serves the interests of both countries. The abolition of the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council was a step in the right direction toward restoring relations to their natural framework: relations between two fully independent states linked by many shared interests, to be managed through normal diplomatic channels, namely through their embassies. These relations can also be elevated to the level of joint or ministerial committees dealing with specific sectoral issues. Yet, despite all that has been said above about the need to restore “normality” to Lebanese-Syrian relations, it is essential to overcome some of the obstacles that impede progress in many areas, without this implying a return to the old formulas, particularly in foreign policy. While a return to the formula of the “unity of tracks and destinies,” which dominated Lebanese foreign policy in the 1990s and in practice deprived Lebanon of the ability to formulate an independent policy outside the Syrian orbit, is entirely unacceptable, this does not mean that coordination should cease, especially on regional issues and in the context of the conflict with Israel. Lebanon and Syria are both suffering from Israeli military expansion. The former has endured its share of destruction and occupation over the course of two successive wars, while the latter has also seen new portions of its territory occupied. Both countries face daily violations of their national sovereignty. And while the idea of a direct military confrontation with Israel is on the table neither in Lebanon nor in Syria, coordination of political and diplomatic positions is highly beneficial to both countries. In the security sphere, coordination is more than necessary in order to dismantle what remains of drug-trafficking networks, Captagon trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling. This must be pursued firmly by both sides, as such activities cause serious harm to both countries. As for the possibilities of economic, electricity and trade cooperation, they are many, indeed very many, and require particular attention from the official authorities in both countries. Turning the page on the past is therefore not enough. What is needed is serious thought about the future, especially as the region is undergoing unprecedented changes on multiple levels and Israeli threats have also reached an advanced stage. This makes even a minimum degree of Lebanese-Syrian “harmony” an urgent necessity.

It is true that translating Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s visit to the White House into concrete political results will require time and sustained effort, for many reasons. It is equally true, however, that appearances matter in relations between states, particularly when dealing with a president as unpredictable as Donald Trump, who is known at times to place greater weight on personal chemistry than on institutional considerations in his dealings with heads of state and government around the world. The scene in the Oval Office where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was publicly dressed down before the world’s cameras remains vividly etched in people’s memories. For that reason, the symbolic dimension of presidential summits cannot be dismissed, especially for a small country such as Lebanon, whose greatest asset remains the reputation of its people, who have succeeded across the globe by integrating into the societies that welcomed them and rising to the highest political, economic, and social positions. It now appears that the old maxim, “Lebanon’s strength is its weakness,” has once again resurfaced in Lebanese political discourse, particularly after the collapse of every slogan built around the so called “balance of deterrence” and similar concepts that lost all meaning in the aftermath of the wars of 2024 and 2026. Whatever the case, it has always been a profoundly misguided notion, and returning to it would be a grave mistake. While it is true that Lebanon cannot realistically build the kind of military arsenal that would allow it to defend its territory and borders on the same scale as other states, relying exclusively on the country’s “friends,” as one politician has suggested, is no solution either. No state’s diplomacy or foreign policy can be built solely on friendships. In politics, there are no permanent friendships. What serves one country’s interests today may no longer do so tomorrow, without explanation or justification. No less important than the Lebanese-American summit were the political remarks President Aoun delivered during the reception hosted by the Lebanese Embassy in Washington. His speech reflected a profound understanding of the dilemmas confronting Lebanon today and of the means to overcome them by reconciling the supreme national interest, sovereignty, and the state’s monopoly over arms with the equally vital need to avoid igniting internal conflict or shifting regional confrontations onto the Lebanese arena, thereby jeopardizing stability and civil peace. The president’s assertion that Hezbollah is not a mercenary force was particularly significant. Its members are the sons of the South, however profound the disagreements many Lebanese may have with them, and however much their religious doctrine has become intertwined with a political project whose foundations extend beyond Lebanon’s borders and capacities. The answer lies not in confrontation but in integration, and integration can only succeed through a comprehensive national vision capable of rebuilding trust between the state and the different components of Lebanese society. The gap separating those different components of Lebanese society from the state continues to widen for many reasons. Some are rooted in deeply rooted convictions embraced by segments of the population, convictions that cannot easily be abandoned or challenged through competing political, social, or, even more so, religious narratives. Others stem from a long historical legacy of the state’s inability, and at times its unwillingness, to protect southern Lebanon and its people, leaving them exposed to Israeli attacks, even before Hezbollah came into existence. Still others are linked to the state’s chronic weakness, the concentration of economic activity in the capital and major cities, and the deliberate or unintended neglect of rural areas, agriculture, traditional crafts, and small local industries, all of which are essential to enabling communities to remain on their land. Against that backdrop, it is essential that the measures to be taken in the coming phase proceed in parallel, gradually narrowing this deep divide. The state must move swiftly to fill the vacuum on the political, security, and economic fronts, asserting its presence where it has long been absent. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s symbolic act of planting the Lebanese flag in Zawtar al-Gharbiya following the Israeli withdrawal fits squarely within that approach. It should now be followed by similar initiatives at every level. If this is one of the essential tasks on the domestic front, the corresponding priority abroad is to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces as the principal guarantor of civil peace, enabling them to fully discharge their responsibilities, both in safeguarding internal stability and in enforcing the state’s monopoly over arms. That objective must be pursued first and foremost in implementation of the Taif Agreement, before it is seen as a response to any external demand, and as a safeguard against further unrestrained wars that have repeatedly brought devastation and national collapse upon Lebanon. Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces, enhancing their capabilities, and further reinforcing them constitutes the cornerstone of the next phase, without undermining their military doctrine, at least not until the situation in southern Lebanon has become fully clear, Israel has completed its withdrawal, and the occupied territory has been fully recovered. The state alone remains the fundamental guarantor of all Lebanese, even if, under the current political circumstances, it does not yet possess the means to provide complete protection. Part of its ability to fulfill that responsibility also depends on its capacity to rally the Lebanese around its national project, for every parallel project has ultimately proved a resounding failure.

While the reservations surrounding the US-sponsored framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel are numerous, profound, legitimate, and entirely justified, given the text’s failure to secure any meaningful gains for Lebanon, this does not mean that Lebanon should embrace the Islamabad track or the Switzerland agreement between Washington and Tehran, whose collapse, far from being unexpected, resulted from a combination of political and non-political factors. This fragile Switzerland agreement clearly reflects the deep mistrust between the two opposing sides. Tel Aviv has consistently sought to fuel and deepen that mistrust in pursuit of its own immediate interests: resuming the war from where it left off, further degrading Iran’s military capabilities, even if doing so failed to bring about the regime’s collapse, contrary to the expectations or hopes entertained during the early stages of the conflict. At the same time, it serves Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by buying him additional time, improving his standing ahead of the parliamentary elections, while allowing him to continue delaying, slowing, and stalling the judicial proceedings against him. Supporters of the negotiating option in Lebanon, regardless of whether it is direct or indirect, a distinction that events have now overtaken, can today argue that this approach spares Lebanon from becoming directly entangled in any renewed war between Washington and Tehran. True, the war has not stopped in Lebanon, and Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty continue on a daily basis. Yet the situation has not, at least so far, deteriorated into the total collapse of the front as it did in previous months. This may well be linked to reports that the US administration informed Benjamin Netanyahu that the Lebanese track was not contingent upon the collapse of the Switzerland agreement. However, this fundamental observation, namely Lebanon’s exclusive right to negotiate on its own behalf and its equally legitimate right to reject any attempt by another state to negotiate in its place, in contradiction with the most basic principles of sovereignty, principles that should be protected against violation regardless of its source, does not diminish the right of Lebanon’s political forces to criticize the framework agreement and point out its shortcomings without immediately facing accusations of treason from every direction. It is true that the Lebanese people have reached an advanced stage of collective exhaustion after enduring an endless cycle of recurring wars. No party can any longer justify dragging the country into conflicts that exceed its capacity to endure. The scale of destruction across southern Lebanon now makes it imperative to move beyond traditional approaches based on igniting wars that produce no meaningful outcome. Yet it is equally true that the many flaws embedded in the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel are unacceptable and incompatible with Lebanon’s national interest. The Lebanese state must acknowledge them as such and treat them as shortcomings that warrant renewed negotiations. In practical terms, what will strengthen Lebanon’s official position is rebuilding a national consensus around the negotiating process through the adoption of a coherent negotiating plan founded on national principles and constants that cannot be compromised. Foremost among these are establishing a timetable for Israel’s withdrawal and preserving Lebanon’s right to seek legal redress against the aggressor before international bodies. Strengthening the state’s position certainly does not require denying Lebanon’s various political forces the right to criticize it. Still less should it mean accepting Israel’s involvement in implementing decisions that are, by definition, the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities, particularly the issue of establishing the state’s monopoly on arms. This is already a sensitive and complex decision, one from which there can be no retreat if Lebanon is finally to build a functioning state after a delay that has become both intolerable and unacceptable. Ultimately, however, Lebanon cannot rely on the notion that the Lebanese state should call upon Israel or seek its assistance in carrying out the task of establishing the state’s monopoly on arms, nor can it accept placing the Lebanese Armed Forces in a position where they are effectively placed under the scrutiny of the Israeli military in the performance of their national and military duties, under a security tutelage superior to their own. Even if this was never the Lebanese negotiator’s intention, and certainly not one of his objectives, it nevertheless constitutes one of the practical consequences of the framework agreement: the absence of a clear timetable for Israel’s withdrawal, rebranded instead as a “redeployment,” together with the novel concept of “experimental zones,” which, in practice, subject the Lebanese Army to a daily test. At a minimum, this risks placing it in the midst of an internal confrontation that Israel could exploit to shift the conflict into Lebanon itself and broaden the scope of the confrontation. At the same time, certain Lebanese actors have no choice but to align themselves with the broader national consensus that rejects war and refuses to see Lebanon once again become either the fuel or the battlefield for settling regional conflicts, particularly at a time when those conflicts appear to be entering a new phase of escalation. They must place the higher national interest above all else, bridge the deep divide that has emerged between them and the rest of Lebanese society, and undertake a serious reassessment of the transformations that have unfolded over the past three years, transformations that require new approaches to the liberation of occupied territory and the opening of a new chapter. While Israel cannot be absolved of its aggressive designs against Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria, it must also be acknowledged that the decision to enter the support war was both hasty and devastating. It failed to achieve its intended objectives and resulted in enormous human and material losses, squandering the historic achievement of the liberation of 25 May 2000, when Israel withdrew, for the first time, from Arab territory unconditionally, without a peace agreement or even a security arrangements agreement, in what appeared at the time to be a humiliating flight and retreat. Israel sought to erase that image through the last two wars and continues to do so today. To be perfectly clear, Lebanon is in no position to provide support to Tehran, nor should it be expected to do so. Such an undertaking far exceeds the country’s capacity to bear. As for the statements declaring that Hezbollah will not leave Iran to face the United States alone, they reflect a profound denial of the new realities and a striking absence of even the most basic forward-looking vision of the phase now unfolding. More fundamentally, they strike at the very heart of Lebanon’s national interest. The worst possible outcome for Lebanon and the Lebanese people would be to find themselves subjected to a dual tutelage: an American-Israeli tutelage on one side and an Iranian tutelage on the other. Between the two, it is the Lebanese people, and they alone, who pay the price.

Regardless of the political and media debate surrounding the content of the US-Iran agreement, recent developments have made it increasingly clear that new dynamics are taking shape across the region. Their defining feature may well be turning the page on the long-standing and deep-rooted conflict between Washington and Tehran and replacing it with a framework for managing their differences according to parameters markedly different from those that prevailed in the past. It is in this context that Iran’s insistence on “bringing the state of war between the two countries to an end can best be understood”. The Iranian ruling establishment demonstrated remarkable pragmatism by agreeing to enter direct negotiations only weeks after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose moral, religious, political and military authority occupied a central place within the Islamic Republic. In doing so, it broke with the doctrine that had shaped Iranian policy for more than forty-five years, ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, the formulation of the regime’s governing principles at home and its policy of exporting the revolution, along with its enduring description of the United States as the “Great Satan.” Despite the heavy losses it suffered in the two successive wars, Iran appears to have capitalized on the distinctive temperament of US President Donald Trump, always in pursuit of major deals and eager to project the image of a leader capable of achieving unprecedented breakthroughs. His readiness to wage war against Iran, encouraged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led him to entertain lofty expectations that quickly proved unattainable. The sheer magnitude of American power does not automatically translate into immediate results. In practical terms, Tehran emerged from the war with gains that exceeded even its own expectations. Sanctions on Iranian oil are expected to be lifted after years of restrictions, part of the country’s frozen financial assets will be released at a time when they are urgently needed, and discussions are underway over the creation of a $300 billion reconstruction fund. As for the very issues for which the war was fought, namely the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program and the Iranian proxies, they have ultimately been deferred to the negotiating table. And who has mastered the art of patient, long-term negotiation better than those who weave carpets? Without underestimating the devastating impact of the country’s economic and social crisis, the Iranian regime has long grown accustomed to living under political and economic pressure, even if it now seeks to free itself from those constraints more than ever before. From Tehran’s perspective, simply weathering this storm without collapsing amounts to a victory in itself. Despite the elimination of senior leaders and the extensive destruction inflicted upon numerous strategic civilian and military facilities, the regime has remained intact. It also became clear that Washington’s expectation, even if it was probably never a serious one, that the Iranian people would rise up against their leadership as soon as the war began, was badly misplaced. Israel had promoted that assumption in Washington to strengthen the case for war, despite the absence of any solid evidence to support it. Whether the Iranian public’s retreat from protest reflected a surge of national solidarity in the face of foreign aggression, or whether it simply gave the regime an opportunity to regain its footing in the midst of the conflict, the outcome remains the same. The Iranian regime did not waver, while all those living abroad who had already straightened their ties in anticipation of returning home were left facing a profound and lasting disappointment. The regime’s prospects for survival have, in fact, become stronger than before, making any discussion of its collapse unlikely for the foreseeable future. Above all, Iran “discovered” a major, perhaps even decisive, card that it had long threatened to play: the Strait of Hormuz. Experience has shown that merely brandishing that card can work to its advantage, even without going so far as to impose a toll on ships passing through it, as it had hoped to do. Trump, like the West more broadly, attaches enormous importance to the uninterrupted flow of oil and the smooth passage of oil shipments, given their far-reaching impact on the global economy. The issue is no longer simply one of winners and losers. Rather, it points to the emergence of a new political trajectory whose defining feature may well be a regional status quo, in other words, a form of coexistence between Washington and Tehran, however far from friendly. The coming days will reveal what this means for the region’s other outstanding issues, including Lebanon and Hezbollah’s weapons. Those who assumed that the fall of Iran would automatically lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah will likely have to reassess that assumption and adopt a more realistic approach, centered on the search for a US-sponsored regional settlement capable of resolving this longstanding dilemma and ensuring that the monopoly over arms rests exclusively with the Lebanese state, which alone should hold the authority to decide questions of war and peace. Such an outcome, however, also requires Washington to rein in its unruly ally, Israel, whose actions routinely exceed political, moral and even geographical boundaries, occupying territory here, bombing there and carrying out targeted assassinations elsewhere. The expression “clip the claws” is not intended as a slight against Israel. Rather, it reflects the nature and depth of US-Israeli relations, as well as the difficulty, at least for now, of creating meaningful distance between the two allies. Should such a settlement fail to materialize, Lebanon will enter an even more delicate phase, marked by Israel’s refusal to withdraw militarily and Hezbollah’s refusal to surrender its weapons in light of what Tehran has achieved. The important thing is to ensure that this regional status quo does not evolve into an explosive and draining reality for Lebanon.

Many analysts have taken note of the unusually critical remarks made by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance toward Israel, viewing them as an unprecedented stance, despite the massive political, military, and economic support that Washington continues to provide to Tel Aviv. Indeed, Vance reminded Israeli critics of the diplomatic agreement with Tehran that two-thirds of the weapons that have "protected their homeland" are American-made and fully funded by U.S. taxpayers. He stressed that Israel relies too heavily on military force to resolve its crises, and that it should show greater deference to Washington as its one and only remaining strategic ally in the world. In an interview with the New York Times , Vance noted that Donald Trump is the only world leader currently showing sympathy toward Israel, before addressing Israelis directly: "You’re a country of nine million people. You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have." An unprecedented shift in tone There is no doubt that a shift has occurred in the tone and manner of addressing Israel. It is rare to hear serious criticism from official American voices toward a country often regarded as the "spoiled child" of successive U.S. administrations. Those administrations typically competed in their political favoritism toward Israel — a prerequisite for pursuing a smooth political career, given the considerable influence of American lobbying groups in the corridors of Washington. That said, this sudden change in tone does not in any way mean that the current U.S. administration has "broken free" from the Zionist influence wielded by these lobbies. Nor does it mean that it is now prepared to openly debate the fact that a distinction exists between American national interest and Israeli interest — and that assuming they are permanently aligned is a political, even strategic, error that has cost, and continues to cost, the United States dearly in moral, political, and material terms. The consequences of America's historical bias America's absolute and longstanding bias in favor of Israel — along with the protective umbrella extended to it at every level, from the repeated use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council over decades to shield it from accountability for the occupation and suppression of the Palestinian people, down to the lowest levels — has, over the course of past decades, fueled deep-seated hatred toward the United States, particularly across the Arab world, creating a vast gulf between the peoples of the region and Washington. Yet these feelings of hatred have never translated into any concrete opposition movement. This is due to several factors, including: The absence of democracy in Arab countries and the suppression of their peoples, which prevents them from expressing their true sentiments. Arab fragmentation and official divisions over how to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict. The signing of unilateral peace agreements with Israel — most notably by Egypt and Jordan — which broke ranks and weakened the Arab position. This process continued years later with the Abraham Accords, which sought an almost cost-free normalization. It is worth recalling that Donald Trump's first administration moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognized the city as Israel's capital, and acknowledged Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. These steps, which previous administrations had dangled without ever following through, were carried out by Trump without any expectation of significant Arab backlash — and indeed, none materialized. Today, a prevailing sentiment within part of Trump's team is that Israel has "bogged down" America in a war against Iran, even though the real threat posed by Tehran — whether directly or through its armed proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon — was aimed far more at Israel than at the United States, despite Iran's politically hostile rhetoric toward Washington (branding it the "Great Satan," among other things). Trump himself appears to share this view, which explains his persistent push to reach a deal with Tehran — even as he wrapped that desire in threatening language, going so far as to invoke the "obliteration of Persian civilization." This also explains why the agreement is fundamentally American-Iranian in nature, even though the war involved the United States, Israel, and Iran. Trump and his team are well aware that Israel will not easily accept a deal and that it prefers the continuation of a war sponsored and bankrolled by Washington — one that serves Israel's interests first and foremost. This is what gives meaning to the U.S. Vice President's remark to the Israelis: "You can't solve all your national security problems through killing alone." An opportunity for the Gulf states? It is certainly premature to bet on a rupture between America and Israel, or to count on a full divorce between the two countries. Nevertheless, the Arab Gulf states can leverage this shift to open a political dialogue with Washington. The key pillars of that conversation should be: A refusal to drag the region into new wars on Israel's behalf. A refusal to allow American bases to become targets rather than a source of stability. An assertion that continuing to sidestep the Palestinian cause leads only to more death and destruction, with no way out. Recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as an essential prerequisite for stability in the Middle East and the broader Arab region. The U.S. president understands the strategic importance of his relationship with the Arab Gulf states, given their oil wealth — a cornerstone of Trump's foreign policy (Venezuela being a striking example). As a result, Washington can no longer afford to keep dismissing Arab demands for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian cause — one that begins with the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state, and with halting Israel's policy of killing and colonial expansion in the West Bank, as well as its encroachment into Lebanon and southern Syria. Only the United States has the power to rein in and hold Israel accountable — provided the political will exists, and provided the conviction takes hold that American national interest is not necessarily served by blind alignment with Tel Aviv, its expansionist ambitions, and its endless wars.

If the state of dejection that Lebanese people are living through at this stage is understandable, given the successive defeats that have haunted them for years and reached their apex with the two wars of support launched by Hezbollah without consulting anyone — wars that led to the return of Israeli occupation, the displacement of more than a million Lebanese, and the wholesale destruction of southern villages — the excessive enthusiasm of some for peace with Israel, and the headlong rush of others toward normalization, whether media-driven or otherwise, carry no logical justification whatsoever, and the least one can say of them is that they are precipitate and irresponsible. The reason is not that those who harbour reservations about peace necessarily support the war or wish to see it prolonged, nor that those who call for restraint in the face of this artificial and premature media normalization — which the law, at least for the time being, should be prosecuting — are opposed to a ceasefire and the return of stability. The point is rather to make clear that peace with Israel is no leisurely stroll, and that rushing to dream of a beer in Tel Aviv amounts to nothing more than a puerile, premature fantasy. This fracture plays out on two entirely contradictory levels. On one side, there are those prepared not only to turn a blind eye to what Israel has done to the Lebanese — killing them, occupying their land — but to absolve it of those acts, laying the blame exclusively on those who dragged Lebanon into the confrontation, without even alluding to the grossly disproportionate response that Israel has inflicted and continues to inflict: the occupation and levelling of villages, the evacuation orders served on entire localities to empty the regions and create a new reality on the ground, the targeting of hospitals and heritage sites, and much else besides. On the other side, there are those who refuse to read the shifts taking place and persist in tying the Lebanese front to the region's wars — wars they themselves essentially ignited in service of those conflicts and in revenge for their symbols — brandishing threats of retribution at their conclusion, invoking a surplus of power that has partly been broken in the recent period, and rejecting the efforts of the Lebanese state to end the war and recover its long-confiscated sovereignty. Lebanon cannot face this level of danger with such a depth of division, to the point where Lebanese people seem to disagree on almost everything — and at the top of that list of disagreements is the question of who is friend and who is enemy, which is precisely where the greatest peril lies. At the very moment when Israel descends upon Lebanon and kills its sons — civilians, soldiers, journalists, paramedics, and doctors — some persist in absolving it and concentrating all accusation on those who embroiled the country in this war, the very same parties now seeking a ceasefire, as they have always done: igniting the fire, then turning to find ways of extinguishing it. In the period following the Taif Agreement, the Lebanese had already divided over how to confront Israel and repeatedly failed to reach a national defence plan, owing to the lack of cooperation from Hezbollah — and from its regional patrons behind it, naturally. Lebanon was seeking to extend the legitimate authority of the state across its entire territory, which is after all the vocation of any government on earth. Yet it must be said that despite the depth of that disagreement, no one at the time put themselves forward to defend Israel, no one advocated a rushed peace with it, and no one violated the laws that remain in force until further notice by engaging with Israelis or hosting televised or journalistic exchanges with them. If the repeated entanglement of Lebanon in wars from which it gains nothing is something unacceptable — and the overwhelming majority of Lebanese, exhausted by conflict, death, and displacement, reject it without ambiguity — the illusion that peace with Israel would be a pleasant stroll, in a complete vacuum of power, is a fatal error, one liable to deepen the fracture among Lebanese and to aggravate the country's internal fragmentation still further.

Rather than becoming an occasion to open a serious debate on the foundations of the judicial system, justice, and punishment in Lebanon, the political and legal discussion around the proposed general amnesty law has turned into a sectarian and confessional contest, entirely removed from the basic principles underpinning the anticipated legislation, namely achieving justice, redressing the wrongs suffered by detainees who have been denied for years their natural right to timely trials, and addressing, of course, the issue of prison overcrowding, which violates the bare minimum of human rights even in the case of a prisoner or a pre-trial detainee, thereby contradicting the very reformative idea of detention and converting prisons into spaces that entrench criminality and abuse. As at every political or legislative juncture, confessional and sectarian groups have rushed to fight over the demands on the table, each seeking to claim the largest share for its own community with the aim of entrenching confessional influence and ensuring its perpetuation, to the point where the mere idea of breaking free from it becomes a matter of extreme complexity and difficulty, thereby deepening sectarian divisions across the country and obstructing any reform process that, in any case, rarely succeeds. The moment the debate around a general amnesty law breaks down along confessional lines in its treatment of the various files (one community calling for the release of Islamist detainees, another seeking to address the drug cultivation that flourishes in the Bekaa mohafazat, and others demanding the return of those expelled to Israel in 2000), this reveals the profound pathological state of Lebanon’s political society and the absence of any genuine desire to bring about the slightest change capable of disrupting the existing structure. And yet, the very fact of contemplating the adoption of a general amnesty law, one that comes not in the wake of a civil war or bloody conflict as was the case in 1991, should prompt a multitude of questions relating fundamentally to the nature of the Lebanese judicial system and its multiple challenges, bound up with how it operates and with the mechanisms of oversight and accountability, given the chronic delays in adjudicating judicial files that in hundreds of cases exceed, as they often do, the maximum sentences the charges would carry, constituting a severe and unprecedented injustice against the detainees. Who will give back the lost years, squandered away for them? If the mechanisms of judicial work are near-paralyzed, whether in the handing down of verdicts, their cassation appeal, the resolution of pending claims, or the inspection and accountability of negligent, corrupt, and derelict judges, an urgent question then presents itself to the presidency and the government, namely how to set the wheels of judicial reform in motion, starting with how to make the judiciary a genuinely independent authority, free from political interventions and influences in its transfers, promotions, and appointments, which transform it into an arena of struggle and power-sharing, to the detriment of the very essence of the judicial idea and its independence. Among the many important commitments the President of the Republic, General Joseph Aoun, has put forward in his inauguration speech and in his subsequent political positions, judicial reform figures prominently, and he has expressed his conviction in this regard on numerous occasions when addressing the judicial body. This position converges with similar, if not identical, views held by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who occupied one of the highest international judicial posts before assuming the Lebanese premiership, as an international judge whose writings on justice, politics, and reform are extensive. Certainly, the Israeli war has upended all balances and reconfigured priorities in a manner radically different from what was expected, and certainly Lebanon — its South in particular — has become a disaster zone in every sense of the word, with the priority remaining the cessation of hostilities, the Israeli military withdrawal, and reconstruction; and yet it is equally true that progress on many internal files is both possible and within reach, and it would be even more accurate to say that it will never again be as smooth and accessible as it is with these two presidents specifically in office. In this regard, it is imperative that the debate around the general amnesty law transform into a debate on the means of revitalizing judicial inspection and activating accountability mechanisms within the judiciary, as a prelude to the more fundamental question concerning the nature of the relationship between political power and the judiciary, and the paths toward a genuine “liberation” of the courts and the judges from the political stranglehold that domesticates the judiciary and drains it of its substance, its role, and its mission. In this incandescent regional moment, one bearing transformations that would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago, while Lebanon loses one by one the distinctive qualities that once set it apart, to the benefit of other rising nations, it is no longer possible to continue going in circles: wars, divisions, corruption, and decay.

To commemorate the Palestinian Nakba as an annual ritual in which the memory of that land's dispossession from its original inhabitants, and its colonisation by the Israeli entity, is revisited does not truly convey that the Nakba is still ongoing — when in fact it is. As though this people had not suffered enough from displacement, destruction and defeat, the facts themselves are now transmuted into questions that appear legitimate in the eyes of public opinion while being, at their core, far removed from reality. Among these questions, widely in circulation across Western media — and in which any guest daring to defend the Palestinian cause finds themselves ensnared — is the following: “Do you recognise Israel’s right to exist?” The UN Special Rapporteur on the Palestinian Territories, Francesca Albanese, was perhaps the one who addressed this matter most shrewdly, when she replied: “Nobody asks Italy or Spain, or any other state in the world, to justify its right to exist!” Naturally, the question conceals an entirely different purpose: to divert attention from Palestinian rights, to suggest that Israel is forever on the side of the oppressed, and, above all, to bury the history attached to the Nakba of 1948 and to the forced expulsions that preceded it, through which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were torn from their homes, their properties and their livelihoods, so that the Zionist movement might erect its project of a Jewish state on Palestinian land. The same question pursues an additional aim: to avert the gaze from what Israel accomplished in 1967 by expanding its occupation to new Arab territories, most notably East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Syrian Golan and the Egyptian Sinai. While Israel withdrew from Sinai under the Camp David Accords concluded with Egypt in the late 1970s, it has formally annexed the Golan and not only refuses any withdrawal from the West Bank — the core of what would remain of the long-promised Palestinian state — but continues to plant settlements across it, generating facts on the ground that render the state project impossible, in addition to the political, military and legal impossibilities already bearing down upon it. Some, particularly among the states sympathetic to Israel, pay little heed to the fact that there are no official borders for a state that, within minutes of proclaiming its “birth” in 1948, obtained international recognition from the world’s most powerful nations. Leaving the question of borders deliberately vague is obviously not a political oversight but a premeditated choice, intimately connected to Zionist expansionist projects that show no signs of halting at the boundaries of 1948, nor perhaps even at the additional territories annexed after the 1967 war. It is true that the “international community” has failed, over decades, to compel Israel to honour the two-state project, yet even this broad heading has by now largely disappeared from international political discourse — and most markedly from American discourse, given the weight and global standing of the United States and its strategically unbreakable relationship with Israel. This sweeping political retreat has enabled Israel to resume its belligerent enterprises and to persist, with full deliberation, in rejecting every settlement proposal, from Madrid (1991) to the Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the Beirut Summit (2002), which enshrined the land-for-peace principle. As for the Oslo Accords (1993), Israeli political conduct aims to empty them of all substance, so that no real gains whatsoever accrue to the Palestinian people. Israeli preponderance of power, backed by uninterrupted American support, has allowed Israel to escape all accountability in spite of decades of deliberate killing, displacement and extermination, whose apex has been reached in Gaza and Lebanon. The arrest warrant issued against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, significant as it is in legal and symbolic terms, has remained a dead letter: the man has traveled abroad on multiple occasions since its issuance, carefully skirting the limited number of countries that declared they would proceed with his arrest should he pass through their territory. On the 78th anniversary of the Nakba, Palestine appears to stand at a historical crossroads. Armed resistance to the occupation has been answered with genocide; political negotiation has been blocked by Israel’s deliberate intransigence and has reached an absolute dead end for lack of any Israeli willingness to make progress in this direction. The internal Palestinian division further compounds this already difficult situation — a division over strategic choices, not over secondary or tactical questions. Yet it is impossible not to acknowledge that all attempts to circumvent the Palestinian question through regional agreements — whether through successive waves of normalisation from which Israel is, first and last, the sole beneficiary, or through the effort to reduce this question to a mere matter of property or economics — have failed. It has become plain that regional stability can only be achieved through a just and lasting resolution of the Palestinian question. The Nakba, undeniably, continues…

Lebanese-Syrian relations have reached a new turning point following the important visit paid by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to Damascus, at the head of a ministerial delegation, with the aim of strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries and carrying them forward toward a new era, one capable of dissolving the sediment left by a bygone period in which mutual grievances accumulated and trust evaporated, as a result of the damaging role played by Syrian tutelage over Lebanon for more than thirty years. The transition from the hardships of fraternity to the open spaces of cooperation appears to have genuinely begun, though it demands perseverance, resolve, and steadiness from both leaderships. The journey toward rebuilding Lebanese-Syrian relations is long, but far from impossible, it remains achievable, provided it rests on the constants of both countries, steering clear of the two extremes of total rupture (the 1950 experience) and total tutelage (1976–2005). One thing is certain: both parties have a genuine stake in following this inevitable path. These relations cannot thrive if they drift toward complete severance, as occurred in 1950. While one of the causes of that rupture lay in the fundamental divergence between the two countries' strategic and economic choices, the closure of the borders inflicted considerable damage on the Lebanese economy, given that the Syrian land corridor is an obligatory transit point for Lebanese goods bound for the Arab hinterland, and it inevitably weighed on the Syrian economy as well. Today, as Syria enters a new political phase following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and as it begins to attract significant capital and investment in the wake of the lifting of American sanctions and the suspension of the Caesar Act, Lebanon is well positioned to be a beneficiary of this economic momentum, not on the basis of dependence, but of complementarity. The electricity interconnection projects, pursued also with Jordan, are among the most vivid illustrations of this. Beyond the economic dimension, however significant, there are files that must be addressed, all the more so given the sweeping changes that have occurred in the region, in Syria as in Lebanon, which at last allow for a serious and in-depth discussion — arguably the first of its kind — between the two countries, freed from the climate of dependency and tutelage that shaped their mutual relations for more than three decades. The following emerge as the priorities that must be examined with a cool head and complete calm, away from the political noise and media interference that seek, here and there, to turn back the clock. — Border control and demarcation: Territorial disputes between states are a common feature of international relations, and the files connected to borders tend to become more entangled whenever political relations deteriorate. There is an urgent need, serving the interests of both countries, to secure the border, combat smuggling on both sides, and take the necessary security and military measures to achieve this. More importantly, however, the terrestrial and maritime borders between the two countries must be delimited once and for all — a process that would include settling the debate over the identity of the Shebaa Farms, long used as a pretext to maintain Hezbollah's arsenal on the grounds that they are occupied by Israel, particularly given the persistent refusal of the deposed Bashar al-Assad regime to furnish the United Nations or the Lebanese government with documentation establishing their Lebanese character. — The displaced persons file: While a significant number of Syrian displaced persons returned to their country during the Israeli war on Lebanon, there is no escaping the need to continue addressing this important file in a way that ensures a dignified and decent return for these people to their homes. The question of Syrian labor in Lebanon also requires proper regulation — it remains a necessary component of Lebanese economic activity, but must always operate within the applicable legal rules and established procedures. — The detainees and prisoners file: While parliament examines the general amnesty law, which could lift the injustice weighing on hundreds of unconvicted prisoners and ease the overcrowding in already overburdened detention facilities, the file of Syrian detainees held in Lebanese prisons has recorded notable progress — a file with the potential to significantly thaw the atmosphere between the two countries, given the importance Syrian authorities attach to this matter. — Syrian deposits in Lebanese banks: Precise figures on the volume of Syrian deposits in Lebanese banks are unavailable; those deposits have met the same fate as the deposits of Lebanese nationals in commercial banks, a matter that has remained without any serious resolution for nearly six years, and which should be reactivated on the basis of protecting depositors' rights, regardless of their identity or nationality, as this is an acquired right belonging to any depositor, without exception. — The Lebanese missing persons in Syria: It is unacceptable that this file should continue to be shrouded in such obscurity. To ignore it would be a grave moral failure, since the families of these individuals have every right to know the fate of their loved ones after so many years of absence. If the former regime made a practice of concealing that fate, the new era in relations between the two countries must bring full clarity to all the circumstances of this file. — The economic file: This is perhaps the most important of all, deserving sustained attention from both countries given the mutual benefits that could be achieved, spanning agriculture, industry, and trade through to energy, electricity, and other significant areas. ` On the political front, while abolishing the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council — a relic of the tutelage era — and replacing it with normal diplomatic relations between states is a welcome step, it is nonetheless essential to build on the review of bilateral agreements conducted in 2010 and to update them in line with the new political circumstances and the emerging dynamic of relations between the two countries, grounded in mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. There is an enormous amount of work to be done between Lebanon and Syria at the political, economic, and security levels, particularly as Israel continues to encroach on additional Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime while occupying Lebanese land it has classified as lying within what it calls the "yellow line" in the current war. While there is no call to relink the two tracks as was done under the tutelage era, consultation and coordination can only benefit both countries; it prepares them to face the coming phase with all its difficulties and complexities, which is infinitely preferable to persisting in a state of silent estrangement.