The New World

Hezbollah’s search for Christian political cover for its weapons and for its rejection of direct negotiations with Israel speaks volumes about the depth of the crisis facing a party that is, in essence, little more than a sectarian militia serving Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The Hezbollah we once knew, with all its power, its arsenal and its financial resources, is gone. In reality, a party that once believed it could project power far beyond Lebanon, in Syria, Yemen and, at one point, Bahrain, to name only a few examples, has gone bankrupt. Nothing illustrates that bankruptcy more clearly than its decision to reopen old account books, beginning with its relationship with the Aounist Current and Michel Aoun, whose overriding ambition was to reach the presidency of the Republic at any cost. Only a bankrupt merchant goes back through old ledgers in the belief that there are still debts to collect. Hezbollah seems not to realize that the Aounist Current, now led by MP Gebran Bassil, is every bit as bankrupt as it is. Bassil and others like him have little choice but to try to restore their standing by distancing themselves from Hezbollah’s weapons, both to placate what remains of their Christian constituency and to insist that the Lebanese Army alone should have a monopoly on arms. Since when has the Aounist Current shown such devotion to the Lebanese Army?! For ten years, beginning with the signing of the Mar Mikhaël agreement with Hassan Nasrallah in February 2006, Michel Aoun was put through a succession of tests by Hezbollah. He passed every one of them. That included justifying the killing by a Hezbollah member of Lebanese Air Force officer Samer Hanna simply because Hanna had flown a helicopter into an area of South Lebanon controlled by the party. Aoun went so far as to justify the killing of a Lebanese officer flying over Lebanese territory by asking: “What was he doing there?” One bankrupt force is now being asked to lend legitimacy to another. A meeting between a Hezbollah delegation and an Aounist delegation will achieve nothing. Nor will Hezbollah’s efforts to court other political forces in order to justify retaining an arsenal that serves Iran and its expansionist project in the region. That project collapsed in Syria before beginning to collapse in Iran itself, which is now fighting a war over the future of its own regime, the Islamic Republic. The Iranian regime has lost touch with the transformations that have reshaped both the region and the world since October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” against Israeli communities around Gaza. After October 7, Israel changed. The region changed. Iran refused to. What is remarkable is that Hezbollah is still looking for political cover for its weapons while South Lebanon is enduring a genuine tragedy. That tragedy has brought back an occupation that ended in 2000, with Israel destroying around seventy villages and displacing more than one million people. None of this appears to matter to Hezbollah. Its overriding concern is to manufacture a domestic justification for keeping its weapons. A party beholden to Iran considers preserving its arsenal more important than ending the occupation. It knows that its very existence depends on those weapons, which have never been anything more than an instrument for subjugating Lebanese citizens and the Lebanese state and placing both under Iranian tutelage. Who in Lebanon is still willing to legitimize sectarian militia weapons whose most immediate consequence is the continuation of Israeli occupation? The Aounist Current is clearly no longer a viable source of such cover. It has already extracted from Hezbollah and its arsenal what it wanted: Michel Aoun’s accession to Baabda Palace. That leaves Hezbollah with one remaining card: Speaker Nabih Berri. One might have expected him to mark the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in a rather different fashion, rather than deliver a speech wholly out of step with the political realities of Lebanon and the region. Berri spoke as though Lebanon were still living in the 1980s. In 1983, the Syrian regime under Hafez al-Assad played a decisive role in torpedoing the May 17 Agreement. Yet under today’s balance of power, Lebanon is unlikely to secure anything better. Even so, Berri’s position should not be dismissed. He appears to have his own reasons for refusing to confront Lebanon’s reality, ignoring what is actually happening on the ground in South Lebanon and accommodating Iran to the greatest possible extent. Does the leader of the Amal Movement, who provides Hezbollah with substantial political cover, understand the implications of what he is doing, when he could instead confront the realities of Lebanon and South Lebanon rather than evade them? Between an Aounist Current reduced to threadbare political cover and Nabih Berri’s attempt to project the image of a cohesive Shiite community in which no meaningful distinction exists between Amal and Hezbollah, one fundamental question remains: who will end the Israeli occupation, and at what price? One thing is certain: Hezbollah’s weapons now threaten South Lebanon itself, and perhaps Lebanon as a whole, whatever political cover the party may still secure from forces that are themselves in need of cover.

The holding of Morocco’s legislative elections on September 23, as scheduled, reflects the regularity of political life in a kingdom more than twelve centuries old. At every stage of its long history, Morocco has managed to overcome difficulties, obstacles and challenges of various kinds, leading up to the reign of Mohammed VI, who ascended the throne a little over twenty-seven years ago, succeeding his father Hassan II. The development of political life has been one of the defining features of Mohammed VI’s reign. It has gone hand in hand with the construction of modern infrastructure of such a standard that someone arriving in Morocco from Spain or Portugal hardly feels they have left two European countries for a different world… Holding the Moroccan elections on schedule consolidates new concepts of governance based on strict respect for the Constitution approved by citizens in the 2011 popular referendum. Among its provisions is the requirement that the person tasked with forming the government come from the party that wins the largest number of seats in Parliament. The elections will therefore open the door wide to bargaining among the parties, especially since the party that wins the largest number of seats will not be able to secure a majority allowing it to form a government without entering into alliances with other parties. This is what happened four years ago following the last elections, when the National Rally of Independents, then headed by Aziz Akhannouch, won the largest number of seats without securing an absolute majority. The 2011 Constitution marked a new departure for political life in a kingdom that chose to develop itself without ignoring the difficulties it faces, given its lack of natural resources on the one hand and the war of attrition to which it has been subjected since 1975 on the other. It is no secret that Morocco has been facing a war of attrition waged against it by the Algerian regime since it recovered its Saharan provinces from Spanish colonial rule through the “Green March,” a peaceful march in which some 350,000 Moroccan citizens took part in response to a call by the late King Hassan II. This war of attrition, in which the Polisario Front has been used for more than half a century, has come at a high cost. Yet it has not prevented Morocco from pursuing its development plans and diplomatic activity, which culminated in October 2025 with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2797, recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara and that the only viable solution lies in the proposal for broad autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. The elections and the phase that will follow them can be regarded as part of the challenges Morocco faces, including the fight against poverty that Mohammed VI called for from the moment he ascended the throne. Such a campaign, beginning with the elimination of slums and the provision of decent housing for the citizens who live in them, remains the best means of combating terrorism and all forms of extremism. Holding the elections on schedule will confirm that change for the better cannot take place without comprehensive political awareness at the national level. Such change takes place through the ballot box, not through the street, even when the protesters’ demands are legitimate. Aziz Akhannouch’s government did not fall in September and October last year when young members of Generation Z took to the streets to protest the standard of medical services and education, as well as rising tuition fees in private schools. The street did not bring down the government. But there is now an urgent need for a new government headed by a figure closer to ordinary citizens and more attuned to their concerns. There is a need for someone who has demonstrated in the recent past an ability to succeed when entrusted with a specific mission. More plainly, there is now a need for a government that understands the real reasons why mere false reports and rumors spread on social media drove thousands of young people, in the final days of last July, toward Ceuta, which is occupied by Spain in northern Morocco. These young Moroccans, whose number reached fifty thousand, believed that Ceuta, situated on Moroccan land, was a treasure trove from which they could scoop up gold and then return to their towns and villages to live in material comfort. From this standpoint, it is important for the elections to play their required role in bringing about political change. At the same time, however, they place all political parties and their leaders before challenges imposed by Moroccan realities. This naturally includes rising to the level of the momentum of development the kingdom is experiencing, with hospitals, medical centers, ports and service facilities being built in different parts of the country. There is also a genuine awareness on the part of Mohammed VI himself of the importance of raising educational standards. The Moroccan monarch spoke openly about this issue a few years ago in a Throne Day address, explicitly discussing the level of education and the importance of mastering foreign languages, alongside Arabic, of course. With around three weeks remaining before Morocco’s elections, the political class should absorb what the scene in Ceuta revealed about young people, unemployment, disparities and the wait for the benefits of major projects to materialize. The king himself addressed this a year ago when he stressed the need for all of Morocco to move forward at the same speed. Most importantly, the crisis surrounding Ceuta did not turn into an internal political divide, an open confrontation with Spain, or a diplomatic rupture that would reorder Morocco’s relations with Europe. This success confirms the Moroccan state’s ability to absorb the shock, prevent its known adversaries from imposing their own interpretation of it, and then put the event back into perspective without denying its seriousness. These are among the key issues of the post-election phase, first and foremost for Morocco’s political class.

One does not have to look far to see that several wars are being waged, with Iran’s blessing, across the Arab world and beyond. In Yemen, the Houthis are trying to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait by seeking to retake the Yemeni port of Mokha, from which they were driven in 2014 by local Yemeni forces backed by the United Arab Emirates. Will Iran manage to control both the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, through the Houthis in Yemen? Iran has made no secret of its decision to pursue an offensive policy on several fronts. But for the Revolutionary Guards, the priority today remains maintaining Iran’s grip on Iraq. A genuine struggle is underway there, centered on the weapons held by sectarian militias affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. These militias were brought together under the banner of the “Popular Mobilization Forces,” which receive funding from the Iraqi state budget and seek to exercise over the state the same dominant role played by the Revolutionary Guards in Iran. The Revolutionary Guards’ attachment to the Popular Mobilization Forces and their arsenal explains the importance Iran places on Iraq, which has now been put at the service of multiple Iranian interests benefiting the regime in Tehran. Among those uses is financing part of Iran’s budget. A few days ago, the governor of Iran’s central bank traveled to Baghdad to demand payment of $12 billion for Iranian gas used in Iraq to generate electricity. The Iranians have forgotten that closing the Strait of Hormuz prevents Iraq from exporting a large share of its oil and therefore costs Iraq billions of dollars. Iran is demanding billions from Iraq while at the same time seeking, for reasons of its own, to prevent it from exporting most of its oil. Those reasons stem from the fact that the Strait of Hormuz has become Iran’s most powerful weapon in its confrontation with the United States, with Iraq now among the victims of that confrontation. Regardless of what the “Islamic Republic” derives from Iraq’s resources, particularly its oil, Iraq remains the grand prize handed to Iran by the United States. That happened under the administration of George W. Bush, which insisted in 2003 on overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime and handing Iraq to the “Islamic Republic” on a silver platter. The US administration is now seeking to wrest Iraq away from Iran. Yet it appears to ignore a fundamental reality: since 2003, Iraq has effectively been ruled by sectarian militias linked to the Revolutionary Guards, the very militias that fought the Iraqi army during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. These are Iraqi militias that returned from Tehran, riding American tanks into Baghdad. They took control of the key institutions of the Iraqi state and prevented any genuine reform capable of turning Iraq into a normal state, one able to balance its relations with Iran and its Arab neighbors. This is an Iraqi reality that Donald Trump’s administration neglects because of its failure to understand the depth of Iranian penetration into Iraq… The George W. Bush administration rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist, family-run regime. It was necessary to get rid of that regime, both brutal and foolish, but only if one knew who would replace it. The Trump administration is now trying to address the consequences of a disaster that befell Iraq, which is now being asked to become a dagger in the side of Arab security. Attacks against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are launched from Iraq. Iraq is also used as a launchpad for attacks on specific targets in the Kurdistan Region. It is no coincidence that Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, speaker of Iran’s parliament, made a point of beginning his latest visit to Iraq with a stop at the memorial to Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, who was killed in a US strike alongside Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, shortly after they left Baghdad airport in early 2020. Qalibaf, one of the most prominent figures in the Iranian regime, came to Baghdad to confirm Tehran’s opposition to the disarmament of Iraqi militias, in direct opposition to the efforts of Ali al-Zaidi’s government, which finds itself in an unenviable position. Qalibaf did not say so explicitly. But his visit to the Qassem Soleimani memorial, where he delivered a speech glorifying the “resistance,” carries a clear message. Above all, it means that the “Islamic Republic” still regards Iraq as an “arena” within its orbit, and indeed as an essential asset in its confrontation with the Trump administration, a confrontation that is sometimes quiet and at other times overt, punctuated from time to time by public or secret negotiations. Iraq can now be regarded as an integral part of the wars unfolding across the region, from Yemen to the Strait of Hormuz, from the Arab Gulf states subjected to Iranian attacks to South Lebanon. Who will have the final say in Iraq? How far can Iran continue to exert pressure? To what extent can Ali al-Zaidi’s government withstand the armed militias? Will the visit to Saudi Arabia by Faiq Zidan, president of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, help secure Arab support for Ali al-Zaidi’s government? It should be noted that Faiq Zidan has recently emerged as a major player in Iraq’s domestic politics, including in the choice of prime minister. These are the questions that will define the next phase, with Iraq itself at the heart of them. It is in Iraq that Iran is defending its regime and seeking to assert that there will be no turning back, no return to the situation that existed before 2003. That year, the George W. Bush administration decided to make the “Islamic Republic” the custodian of Iraq under the pretext of Iraq’s “Shiite majority.” Can Donald Trump’s administration correct a historic mistake that upended the balance of power across the Middle East, the Near East and the Gulf?

The question could hardly be simpler. Does Lebanon have one government headed by Nawaf Salam, or several governments, each with its own agenda and controlled by one minister or another? It was only natural for Nawaf Salam to settle the matter and prevent Defense Minister Michel Menassa from speaking during the parliamentary session that saw the passage of the amnesty law, with all its merits and flaws, a law that reflects better than anything else the state of Lebanon, with all its decay and tensions. Nothing illustrates this Lebanese decay more clearly than the alliance between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, led by Gebran Bassil, the son-in-law of former president Michel Aoun. This alliance opposed the amnesty law and sided with the defense minister, who intended to express before Parliament the Lebanese army’s position on the law. This would have meant undermining the existing system at its very foundations by portraying the army as an entity autonomous from the Council of Ministers. In other words, the army would have a position of its own, alongside that of the Council of Ministers, which represents the executive authority… or so it is supposed to. Had the defense minister spoken before Parliament, Lebanon would effectively have acquired four authorities: the executive, the legislative, the judiciary… and a fourth, the Lebanese army as an authority in its own right, instead of the army being under the authority of the executive branch, represented by the Council of Ministers acting collectively and by the presidency of the Republic. Does the country need yet another authority at a moment that can, at the very least, be described as decisive, since it will determine whether Lebanon remains a viable country or not? The alliance between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, in other words the Aounist movement, is no coincidence. Michel Aoun’s presidential term, from 2016 to 2022, was essentially a Hezbollah presidency. Together with his son-in-law Gebran Bassil, Aoun placed the Lebanese state under Hezbollah’s orders, which means under Iran’s orders. This came at a time when Hezbollah had always opposed any Lebanese army activity on Lebanese soil. Its first objection was to the very presence of the army in southern Lebanon. Who remembers the helicopter flown by officer Samer Hanna, which was shot down in southern Lebanon by a Hezbollah fighter who was later released? Who remembers Michel Aoun justifying the killing of the pilot by asking: “What was Samer Hanna doing in southern Lebanon?” Michel Aoun said this before becoming president of the Republic. It was the period when he was presenting his credentials to Hezbollah, a phase that lasted ten years, beginning in 2006. It preceded his arrival at Baabda Palace as Hezbollah’s presidential candidate, a candidate who opposed none of Hezbollah’s decisions. The alliance between the Aounists and Hezbollah is opportunism at its most blatant. It also reflects a strategy of undermining Nawaf Salam’s government from within, with one objective: to prevent any progress in the negotiations under way between Lebanon and Israel. The prime minister was therefore right to stop Michel Menassa, who is nothing more than a retired officer with good intentions who does not grasp how much damage can be done when those intentions are misused, particularly when they are exploited by Iran, which exercises total control over Hezbollah. Ultimately, Lebanon faces a far more serious challenge than the amnesty law, with all the flaws it contains. It is confronting a historic test: how to rid itself of the Israeli occupation. It is an occupation that Hezbollah wants to see continue in order to justify retaining its weapons, which are directed first and foremost against other Lebanese. What Nawaf Salam did was a profoundly national act at a time when Lebanon has no option other than direct negotiations with an Israeli monster that is doing everything in its power to alter the character of southern Lebanon by inflicting further destruction and carrying out more explosions in villages and towns across the region. From this perspective, Lebanon cannot afford to lose itself in the labyrinths of the amnesty law and similar issues. The country has no choice, at least for the time being, but to face the reality that Israel is the only party that benefits from Hezbollah keeping its weapons. Anyone who rushes today to Hezbollah’s rescue and seeks to dismantle Nawaf Salam’s government is placing himself at the service of Israel and the occupation. Everything else is mere detail, and all those details ultimately serve the project pursued by the “Islamic Republic,” one of whose objectives is to turn Lebanon into an Iranian hostage in the negotiations being conducted, directly or indirectly, between Washington and Tehran. It is shameful that the Aounists and their satellites should once again place themselves at the service of Hezbollah and Iran. In reality, such behavior is hardly surprising from a camp that has never stopped stabbing the Lebanese army in the back. Did Michel Aoun not flee in October 1990 to the French Embassy compound in Baabda while Lebanese army officers and soldiers were courageously confronting the Syrian army as it advanced toward the presidential palace and the Ministry of Defense in Yarzeh? For someone who brought the Syrian army into Baabda Palace and the Ministry of Defense in 1990, serving the Iranian project in Lebanon in 2026 comes naturally…

Six years after the catastrophic explosion at the Port of Beirut, at a time when it is more than likely that Hezbollah, with the complicity of others, shielded the stockpiling of ammonium nitrate, Lebanon is still struggling against its internal enemy. That enemy is embodied by Hezbollah’s weapons, which have been used both inside Lebanon and beyond its borders, particularly in Syria, long before the so-called “war in support of Gaza”, a war that ultimately brought disaster upon Lebanon’s Shiite community and, above all, a national calamity for the country itself. The latest remarks by Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem are further proof of this reality. He accused the Lebanese authorities of having “helped Israel instead of helping Lebanon,” adding that “President Joseph Aoun has become a party to the conflict and a source of division, which is incompatible with the role he is supposed to play.” These statements are merely another chapter in Iran’s ongoing war against the Lebanese State and all its institutions. Fortunately, arrogance cannot conceal defeat. What Lebanon is facing today is a defeat brought about by Hezbollah. Because of that defeat, for which Hezbollah, in other words Iran, bears responsibility, Lebanon now finds itself forced to fight on two fronts under exceptionally difficult circumstances. The first is Iran’s war against the Lebanese State. The second is the struggle to end the Israeli occupation so that displaced residents can finally return to their towns and villages. Difficult negotiations with Israel recently took place in Rome with the aim of bringing that occupation to an end. Everything Hezbollah, backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, is doing today serves only to reinforce Israel’s position. How can the Lebanese negotiator respond when the Israeli side points out that Hezbollah’s weapons were used to threaten Israeli communities in the Galilee? It was from this perspective that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam replied with remarkable clarity to Hezbollah’s Secretary General, without mentioning him by name: “Today, some accuse the political authorities of helping Israel instead of defending Lebanon’s sovereignty, then call for dialogue and unity as though the Lebanese had no memory. The greatest service ever rendered to Israel came from those who single handedly dragged Lebanon into the reckless adventures of the so called ‘support wars,’ providing Israel with every pretext to attack our country, trample its sovereignty, destroy its towns and villages, kill its people, and displace hundreds of thousands of them. Those who monopolized the decision of war, who still seek to confiscate the State’s authority and bind Lebanon to foreign agendas and regional axes while disregarding the interests of both their own community and the Lebanese people as a whole, have no standing to lecture anyone about patriotism, let alone sovereignty. Lebanon’s sovereignty can exist only through a single, independent national decision exercised by a State with one army that alone extends its authority across the entire national territory. As for dialogue and unity, they can be built only through the courage to acknowledge the facts, however painful they may be, and to assume responsibility for reckless choices whose heavy cost the Lebanese people continue to bear.” Naim Qassem’s accusations are thus fully answered. He urged the Lebanese authorities to “protect national sovereignty, strengthen the Lebanese Army, secure the withdrawal of the Israeli enemy, rebuild the country, and uncover the truth about the port.” He further claimed that “direct negotiations have brought Lebanon nothing but shame, humiliation, disappointment, and one concession after another.” He even went so far as to assert that “every attack against Lebanon was carried out under American supervision, American management, and with American approval,” while calling on the Lebanese authorities to “stop making free concessions, engage in dialogue with the Resistance, restore Lebanon’s domestic stability, and safeguard sovereignty.” Nor did he forget to praise Iran, claiming that it “ensured that Lebanon was placed at the top of the memorandum of understanding with the United States and insisted on ending the aggression and securing an Israeli withdrawal.” The Hezbollah Secretary General concluded by declaring that “it is the course set by the memorandum of understanding that will bring about Israel’s withdrawal, and without the Resistance’s resilience, nothing would have been achieved.” He added: “We are committed to national unity. The great unity between Hezbollah and Amal has formed an impregnable barrier against Israeli American aggression and against the minor players. Together, as people, Resistance, future, and life, we will continue on our path.” The least one can say about this address, which defies all logic, is that Naim Qassem appears convinced that the Lebanese people have no memory. That includes the memory of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, his companions, many of Lebanon’s finest figures, and ultimately Lokman Slim. He also seems to believe that the Lebanese do not know who opened the southern front without the slightest regard for Lebanon’s sovereignty, even in its most basic sense. It has become abundantly clear that Hezbollah’s Secretary General regards the Lebanese people as a flock incapable of subjecting his positions to the slightest critical scrutiny. He expects the Lebanese State to bear the consequences of the crimes committed by his party against the country, including the return of the Israeli occupation. Naim Qassem’s statements can be explained only by his contempt for the intelligence of the Lebanese people and by Iran’s total domination over Hezbollah. The question therefore remains: how can Lebanon emerge from this crisis? Must it wait for a profound change in Iran? The answer is simple. Lebanon is capable of doing so, provided it understands that true humiliation lies in invoking occupation to justify the continued existence of illegal weapons on its soil. It also lies in refusing to acknowledge that no occupation can be ended without direct negotiations with the occupying power. There is a price that must inevitably be paid. Those who refuse to pay it seek only to continue exploiting southern Lebanon and its people indefinitely, while waiting for the Day of Judgment in the Islamic Republic. In other words, they are waiting for the day when Iran once again becomes a normal State, nothing more, a State that no longer needs to resort to arrogance in order to justify its defeat.

Success often breeds further success. Morocco has offered a striking example of this ever since Mohammed VI ascended the throne twenty-seven years ago. The foremost of these achievements has been the consolidation of Morocco’s claim to the Sahara, followed by a series of major projects that have now become reality. These include the transformation of the Port of Dakhla into one of Africa’s leading Atlantic gateways, the African gas pipeline linking Nigeria to Morocco, and the more than one-thousand-kilometre highway connecting Tiznit to Dakhla, which now bears Donald Trump’s name. The Moroccan monarch scarcely needed to dwell on these accomplishments in his annual Throne Day address, particularly after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797 on 31 October 2025. The resolution marked a turning point by explicitly acknowledging Morocco’s claim to the Sahara and reaffirming that the only realistic solution remains the one Rabat has advocated since 2007: broad autonomy for the Saharan provinces within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. Instead, Mohammed VI chose to let the numbers speak for themselves. Yet he also reminded all those willing to listen that Morocco’s progress rests on solid foundations because, in his words, the Kingdom is “an ancient nation-State.” As he put it: “Morocco is an ancient State that draws its strength from deeply rooted traditions as a nation-State. Its institutions fulfil their role within a framework of harmony and complementarity. This is what gives the State the effectiveness required to sustain its achievements and meet challenges despite difficulties and constraints. Morocco has demonstrated this through its exemplary organisation of continental and international events, earning admiration and respect around the world while, at times, arousing the envy of others.” It is only natural that Morocco should arouse “the envy of others.” The progress achieved has turned the Kingdom into a pillar of stability in a region that urgently needs a different climate to foster development and integration, far removed from empty slogans, hollow promises, illusions, and the exploitation of peoples and their future. On the twenty-seventh anniversary of his accession to the throne, Mohammed VI had every reason to look to the future with confidence. His address focused on Morocco’s promising future, one that is no longer founded on aspirations alone but on tangible achievements firmly anchored in reality. These accomplishments, he stressed, are the product of “security, stability, and effective institutions.” They are reflected in “the growing number of positive indicators across all sectors, reinforcing the country’s economic momentum and strengthening national sovereignty.” Returning to the language of numbers, in other words to verifiable facts, the Moroccan monarch noted that “economic growth reached approximately 4.9 percent in 2025 and is expected to remain at that level, or even exceed it, in 2026.” He also pointed out that, “in the agricultural sector, Morocco benefited from abundant rainfall and an excellent harvest, helping strengthen both water and food security.” At the same time, the Kingdom further consolidated its position as a hub for industrial, tourism, and financial investment, as reflected in the steady improvement of its economic indicators, particularly in industry. Today, the automotive, aerospace, renewable energy, and agri-food industries form the backbone of Morocco’s productive economy. They play a decisive role both in attracting foreign investment and in creating wealth and employment. Morocco has now become Africa’s leading automobile exporter, with an annual production capacity approaching one million vehicles. Exports from the automotive and aerospace sectors now account for more than 40 percent of the Kingdom’s total exports, surpassing even phosphate exports. As part of this same strategic vision, Mohammed VI recalled presiding earlier this year over the inauguration of new industrial facilities that have enabled Morocco to join the select group of countries hosting major manufacturing centres for aircraft engines and landing gear systems. The development of an integrated electric battery industry likewise reflects the Kingdom’s ability to anticipate technological change and integrate itself into the global production chains of strategic industries. Guided by the same spirit of innovation and modernisation, Morocco is pressing ahead with major projects designed to make renewable energy a cornerstone of its energy security and a powerful magnet for industries seeking competitive, low-carbon energy. As part of this ambitious strategy, the Kingdom has begun implementing its green hydrogen programme by approving a first wave of major projects. All this represents only a fraction of what Morocco has achieved, in a country that now welcomes twenty million tourists every year. This year’s Throne Day address by Mohammed VI was a message directed at everyone, both those willing to understand and those determined not to. Its central message is clear: Morocco has a vision and places its confidence in its people. It is betting on the ability of Moroccans to carry the country forward and establish it among the nations capable of playing a constructive role at both the regional and international levels, far removed from ideological confrontation, illusions, and sterile political grandstanding that offers no political, economic, or civilisational horizon. At its core, the message is a simple one: Morocco has fully recognised that the world has changed. It has changed even more profoundly than many imagined less than five years ago, first with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, then with the wave of violence unleashed by the attacks of 7 October 2023 and the war that engulfed the Middle East. The world has changed, and Morocco is determined to secure its place among the countries reshaping global supply chains, diversifying production, and connecting their national capabilities to the global economy. To achieve this, the Kingdom is relying on its infrastructure, its natural resources, the quality of its diplomacy and political leadership, and the preservation of a stability that has become one of its greatest assets, not only nationally but across the wider region.

The attacks launched from Iraqi territory against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan underscore the fragility of a country that remains unable to regain its balance. Saudi Arabia’s response, which targeted positions belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the umbrella organization for Iraqi sectarian militias aligned with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), confirms that the regional conflict has entered a new phase. Riyadh has made it clear that it is no longer willing to submit indefinitely to Iranian blackmail. The Islamic Republic is now playing every card at its disposal in an effort to escalate its confrontation with the United States. It is incapable of acknowledging that it is not a superpower and that it must reach an understanding with Donald Trump’s administration that would allow it to become a normal state rather than a hegemonic power imposing its will on others through Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. The Islamic Republic finds it equally difficult to admit that further escalation will serve no useful purpose. More importantly, the current escalation exposes the reality of Iraq’s predicament: the country remains unable to free itself from Iran’s grip, while Ali al-Zaidi’s government is, in essence, little more than a continuation of Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s administration. This remains true despite the efforts it claims to be making, including setting a timetable to eliminate weapons that remain outside the authority of the state. Al-Zaidi recently visited Washington, where Donald Trump lavished him with praise during their meeting in the Oval Office. It took only a few days, however, for it to become clear that the White House’s wager on the Iraqi prime minister was misplaced and that al-Zaidi is simply not in a position to rid Iraq of Iran’s direct influence. Ultimately, it is true that Ali al-Zaidi has waged a largely successful campaign against corruption in Iraq. It is equally true, however, that this campaign has stopped short of the real power brokers, those who protect a corrupt system that emerged in 2003, when George W. Bush’s administration handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter. There is a clear connection between corruption in Iraq and the role Iran plays in the country. Corruption not only finances the Iraqi sectarian militias affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but also fills the coffers of the Islamic Republic and bankrolls its proxies across the region. It is not enough for Donald Trump to declare that “we will teach Iran a harsh lesson and are considering strikes against its proxies.” Such statements remain little more than rhetoric in the absence of a clear American position on Iraq’s place in the regional equation. That position should begin with an unambiguous acknowledgment that Iraq remains under Iranian domination and, at the same time, poses a threat to its neighbors. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains bases along Iraq’s borders with Jordan and even Syria. Moreover, most of the drones Iran launched toward Kuwait originated from Iraqi territory. Most alarming of all, the Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia, carried out through Iraq, exposed far more than the shortcomings of Ali al-Zaidi’s government. They also demonstrated that the Islamic Republic has no respect for the agreements it signs with other states. This includes the agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in Beijing in 2023. Iran has not only violated that agreement through the Houthis in Yemen, but has also made it unmistakably clear that Iraq remains firmly in its pocket. More than that, the Islamic Republic appears prepared to use Iraq as a platform in its campaign against the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan. Donald Trump’s claim that the strikes against the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, carried out jointly by Saudi Arabia and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), “were coordinated with the Iraqi government” does little to alter the underlying reality. Such statements amount to turning a blind eye to a fact that cannot be ignored. The issue can be distilled into a simple question: where does Iraq stand in the regional equation, and can it truly become anything more than a satellite orbiting within Iran’s sphere of influence? What is most regrettable is that Ali al-Zaidi’s attempt to strike a balance between his government’s relationship with Iran and its ties with the Arab world has proved fruitless. The Iraqi prime minister has been forced to postpone his planned visit to Riyadh, at least for the time being. The postponement is entirely logical while Iraq’s place in the regional order remains unresolved and while it is still unclear whether the country has any realistic prospect of breaking free from Iranian domination. The Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella organization that brings together a number of militias, have become the clearest symbol of the Iranian dominance that has persisted in Iraq since 2003. Their fighters are paid from the Iraqi state budget. Donald Trump’s assertions about “coordination” with Ali al-Zaidi’s government do nothing to change that reality. On the contrary, they sidestep the central question underlying his policy toward Iraq, a policy that is bound to fail as long as the militias’ weapons, rather than the institutions of the state, continue to have the final say. Everything else is mere detail, and ultimately meaningless.

The threats issued by the Houthis in Yemen against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic serving its ports have neither political nor military prospects. It is simply impossible for the Houthis to carry out their threats to impose a blockade on Saudi ports. In reality, through their grandiose but hollow rhetoric, the Houthis have squandered the opportunity to become a full participant in Yemen’s political process, a process aimed at reaching a political settlement that excludes no party. By openly aligning themselves with the Islamic Republic, they have effectively removed themselves from that political process. They have demonstrated, quite simply, that they are Iranians rather than Yemenis, and that any hope they might regain even a minimum sense of national consciousness was always misplaced. Such expectations amounted to nothing more than a waste of time. Over the past few years, particularly since the Saudi-Iranian agreement brokered by China in March 2023, the Houthis had exercised a measure of restraint, projecting an image of neutrality. They sought to maintain dialogue with Riyadh while avoiding any form of provocation. Those exchanges, whether direct or indirect, were intended to establish a framework for coexistence between the two sides. Then, almost overnight, when the Islamic Republic in Iran, or more precisely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), decided to escalate militarily, the Houthis, through their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, revealed their true nature: they can be nothing other than an instrument of Iran. They chose to become part of Iran’s offensive against the Arab Gulf states and Jordan, an offensive that reflects an unprecedented level of Iranian bankruptcy. In doing so, the Houthis demonstrated that they are nothing more than another branch of the IRGC, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon. To be sure, they are capable of disrupting shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, with the help of Somali pirates who can be hired to carry out specific missions. But that is a far cry from possessing the ability to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the indispensable gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The reason is straightforward: the Houthis do not control the Yemeni port of Mokha, which commands maritime traffic through Bab el-Mandeb. They lost Mokha in the autumn of 2014, when Yemeni forces drove them out of the country’s south, including that strategic port. It is no secret that those local forces, which also expelled the Houthis from Aden, Mokha and several positions in Shabwa province, enjoyed the backing of the United Arab Emirates, whose Yemen policy was clear from the outset: to prevent the Houthis from taking control of the entire country, and particularly the south. Sooner or later, the international community and regional powers will have to return to Yemen, a country of exceptional strategic importance for at least two reasons. The first is that Yemeni territory could provide a corridor for oil pipelines that would bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The second is that, unless such pipelines can carry oil across Yemen to the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea, neither the countries of the region nor the wider world will be able to tolerate Iran’s continued presence in Yemen indefinitely. Put simply, the international community cannot afford to allow Iran to keep disrupting navigation in the Red Sea from Yemeni territory. It is no secret that the Islamic Republic is determined, through the Houthis, to maintain its presence in Yemen and use it to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and strike vessels transiting the passage on their way to the Suez Canal. That is indeed the Houthis’ intention. Yet their loss of control over the port of Mokha deprives them of the means to carry out those threats. It should also be recalled that the Houthis have controlled Sanaa and a substantial part of Yemeni territory since 21 September 2014. Nothing better illustrates Iran’s determination to preserve its presence in Yemen than its recent insistence on violating the restrictions imposed on Sanaa International Airport. Tehran dispatched a civilian aircraft there under the pretext of transporting a Yemeni delegation to attend the funeral of the late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Nor did Iran stop there. The Houthis suddenly launched a campaign against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accompanied by explicit threats, after a long period of calm and dialogue with Riyadh. During that period, the Houthis had obtained certain gains, either directly or through the mediation of the Sultanate of Oman. The question today has two dimensions. The first concerns the Houthis’ actual ability to carry out their threats against Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic in the Red Sea. The second concerns the bankruptcy of the Iranian regime. As for the first, the Houthis remain capable of targeting merchant vessels and oil tankers transiting the Red Sea, particularly because they control the strategically vital port of Hodeidah on its coastline. Iran, meanwhile, has chosen to direct its aggression against the Arab Gulf states and Jordan rather than confront the United States or Israel directly. Tehran targets Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman, while assigning the Houthis the task of attacking Saudi Arabia. Yet it does not dare lay a finger on a single American warship sailing in the Gulf. Ultimately, the Houthis’ threats are nothing more than a manifestation of Iran’s bankruptcy, a bankruptcy beyond which there is no deeper collapse. These threats, made at the expense of Yemen and the Yemeni people, reveal that the end of the Iranian regime is inevitable. It is now only a matter of time, after the Houthis exposed the weakness of the Islamic Republic and the depth of its bankruptcy.

Will Donald Trump have better luck with Iraq than he has had with Iran? The question naturally arises after the exceptionally warm welcome the U.S. president extended to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Washington. Trump lavished praise on al-Zaidi, overlooking the fact that, until not long ago, he owned a bank that had been placed under U.S. sanctions on charges of laundering money for the benefit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Trump received the Iraqi prime minister at the White House at a time when intermittent clashes between the United States and Iran have resumed, with particular focus on the Strait of Hormuz. The American president discovered, rather belatedly, that the memorandum of understanding he signed with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was, in reality, worth very little. A wide gulf still separates Washington from Tehran. Each side continues to interpret the memorandum according to its own interests. On the American side, the agreement had been negotiated by Vice President J. D. Vance, accompanied by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The renewed confrontation between Washington and Tehran is ultimately a reflection of Trump’s profound disappointment with the outcome of the Islamabad process and the failure of Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Ali al-Zaidi has succeeded in rehabilitating his political standing and rising to the office of prime minister, the most powerful position in Iraq, after the U.S. president vetoed the return of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the leading Shiite figure within the so-called Coordination Framework. So far, al-Zaidi has demonstrated genuine resolve through his government’s anti-corruption campaign. Yet that campaign remains incomplete because it has not reached the major figures who have stood at the heart of Iraq’s corruption since 2003, when the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, with all its flaws, before effectively handing this strategically important country over to the Islamic Republic of Iran. What Iraq is now expected to do under Ali al-Zaidi’s government is to chart a course independent of Iran. That, however, appears highly unlikely, for one simple reason: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still controls the country’s principal levers of power. The clearest evidence of this remains the continued prominence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization comprising several sectarian militias loyal to Tehran that continues to serve as one of the main centers of gravity in Iraqi political life. The PMF even assumed a security role during the funeral ceremonies for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Karbala and Najaf, attended by influential figures such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, and Qais al-Khazali. Even more telling, the day of Khamenei’s funeral was declared an official public holiday in Iraq. Sooner or later, Iraq will face its moment of reckoning. The issue extends far beyond an anti-corruption campaign that is unlikely to progress much further than it already has. The real challenge lies in the weapons held by the various factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as by other Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Contrary to what President Trump appears to believe, neither Ali al-Zaidi nor any other Iraqi leader will find it easy to free Iraq from Iran’s grip so long as Tehran continues to hold the real keys to power in Baghdad. How does al-Zaidi explain the launch of drones from Iraqi territory toward Kuwait? How does he account for the continued attacks on the Kuwaiti consulate in Basra, while the Islamic Republic persists in targeting the Arab Gulf states and Jordan under the pretext of retaliating against American strikes? Equally revealing was the seizure by the Syrian authorities, at the Iraqi border, of a shipment of weapons that included 150 drones and missiles en route to Baniyas, home to an oil refinery. The weapons were reportedly destined for Hezbollah, which the Syrian authorities described as a terrorist organization. Who carefully packed these weapons in Iraq before sending them through Syria to Hezbollah and into Lebanon? Is the mere formation of an Iraqi investigative committee enough to ensure that no one in Iraq continues to sympathize with Hezbollah? There is no doubt that the Iraqi government’s decision to designate the Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is a step of the utmost importance. Yet one fundamental reality remains: at least for now, Ali al-Zaidi’s government has proven incapable of making a complete break with Hezbollah, which has managed to penetrate more than one Iraqi militia that continues to sympathize with it. But who knows? Perhaps, through its position on the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi government is merely throwing dust in people’s eyes rather than confronting the reality of what might be called the “Iraqi Hezbollah.” Trump spoke at length about the importance of Iraqi oil and what it represents for American companies. One cannot help but fear that his bet on Iraq may fare no better than the one he placed on Iran and on the memorandum of understanding that a faction within his administration reached with the Islamic Republic. Questions of this kind will continue to linger so long as no profound change takes place in Iran. Such a change may come… or it may never come. Until then, the entire region, Iraq included, will remain hostage to that uncertainty, whether Ali al-Zaidi is in power… or not.

At its core, one question demands an answer: what drove Iran to so flagrantly violate the memorandum of understanding it had reached with the United States through the negotiations held in Switzerland with an American delegation led by Vice President J. D. Vance? There are, no doubt, many reasons that may explain Iran’s strange behavior, bordering on irrationality. It prompted President Donald Trump to go so far as to describe Iranian officials as “sick” and “liars” with whom no meaningful dealings are possible. He went even further, using language that revealed profound disappointment with Iran’s leadership before announcing the end of the memorandum of understanding. The most important explanation for Iran’s irrational conduct, however, lies in the determination of the region’s countries to find ways of bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, whether through the Red Sea or the Mediterranean. Such a strategy requires understandings with Jordan and Syria, or with Iraq and Türkiye, to allow oil and gas to reach ports from which they can be exported to Europe and other parts of the world without remaining at Iran’s mercy. Tehran simply realized that time, on which it had long relied, was no longer working in favor of its strategy and that serious efforts were underway to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway it regarded as its principal leverage in confronting the United States. The Gulf states’ search for alternative routes for oil and gas pipelines has deprived the “Islamic Republic” of its strongest card, the very one that persuaded the US administration to conclude the memorandum of understanding with Iran, unaware that it was dealing with a regime unlike any other, one detached from every value associated with international law and respect for the sovereignty of other states. Since its establishment in 1979, the Iranian regime has consistently pursued only one policy: blackmail. In any case, the United States’ decision to launch military strikes in response to attacks by the Revolutionary Guard on commercial tankers, including one Qatari and one Saudi vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz, reflected President Trump’s belated discovery of the true nature of both Iran’s leaders and the regime itself. Even a belated realization is better than no realization at all. Even a delayed recognition of the Iranian regime is preferable to none at all. It should never have taken this long for Donald Trump to understand whom he was dealing with or to realize that the Iranian regime has never changed. At no point has it respected international law or even the most basic humanitarian values. The tragedy inflicted on South Lebanon by the “Islamic Republic” stands as compelling evidence. From Tehran’s perspective, the memorandum of understanding with the US administration was nothing more than an opportunity to buy time. Nor did the regime honor its central provision, namely what Washington understood to be the guarantee of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Keeping Hormuz open was a matter of strategic importance to Trump himself, who regarded falling oil prices as a major achievement that he could present to the American public. He needed that accomplishment to strengthen his standing with ordinary American voters. It therefore came as no surprise that he reacted furiously when the Revolutionary Guard once again began obstructing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. By then, Iran had already realized how seriously the countries of the region were pursuing alternatives to the strait. That explains Tehran’s renewed focus on Yemen and the Houthis, who resumed threatening Saudi Arabia after observing a relatively long period of restraint. For Iran, the Houthis can play a decisive role in disrupting navigation through the Red Sea and preventing oil tankers from passing. It was no coincidence that the “Islamic Republic” violated the internationally imposed restrictions on Sanaa Airport to demonstrate that the Houthis remain one of its strategic cards and are in no position to break free from Tehran’s authority. One further point is of critical importance. Donald Trump is not the only one to have rediscovered the true nature of Iran and the regime in Tehran. Pakistan, too, has come to the simple realization that its mediation between the United States and Iran serves no real purpose. At most, Islamabad can function as another Iranian card, nothing more. The “Islamic Republic” exploited Pakistan to the fullest. Islamabad helped convince the Trump administration that a balanced agreement with Iran was possible, one built on preserving freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s strategy of buying time has ultimately backfired. Before anyone else, the countries of the region have made it clear that they refuse to remain hostage to the Strait of Hormuz. That, more than anything else, explains Tehran’s increasingly irrational behavior, which failed to anticipate that Donald Trump would eventually lose patience and revert once again to the logic of force. Has the war returned? That is the great question, and it is still too early to answer. One thing, however, is certain: depriving the “Islamic Republic” of the Strait of Hormuz as its principal strategic card, and the regional effort to bypass the waterway, prompted Tehran to jeopardize its memorandum of understanding with the United States. After all, what value does such an agreement still have if Iran no longer possesses the Hormuz card with which it could pressure the world and influence global oil and gas prices? The strait was Iran’s trump card. It enabled Tehran to secure a memorandum of understanding under which the United States made significant concessions, including linking Iran to the search for a solution in Lebanon. The regional drive to bypass the Strait of Hormuz is much like taking a favorite toy away from a child. The Revolutionary Guard’s conduct is, in the end, nothing more than the reaction of a child who has just had its favorite toy taken away.