Strategia

For some time now, a significant portion of public opinion has been accusing the army – and/or its commander-in-chief – of failing in its duty, if not outright mutinying against the government that tasked it with dismantling Hezbollah’s military arsenal. The Lebanese Army has thus become a favorite target for certain journalists, bloggers, and social media activists, even as it is admired – and nearly deified – by their counterparts in the opposing camp. The absurdity – and the sheer inadmissibility – of the situation lies in the fact that today’s admirers were yesterday’s fiercest critics, blaming the army for every ill. They accused it of “collaboration” with American “imperialism” – a clichéd label casually affixed by just about anyone to whatever they happen to dislike – in reference to military cooperation between Lebanon and the United States, even though, without American assistance, our army would have been rendered inoperative, given the paltry defense budget.

Analyses often miss the mark. We tend to drift into an excess of objectivity and a lack of imagination, or vice versa. At times, we even mistake our own desires for reality. It is a sobering fact that neither the most tragic events, nor their ultimate outcomes, were ever foreseen by even the most seasoned analysts. Only a few enlightened minds proved visionary, yet they were rarely heard within the high corridors of power, mired as they were in political, financial, and economic affairs. The Catalyst of the Two World Wars Few predicted the First World War. No belligerent truly desired it, especially following the various agreements and the carving up of global spheres of influence among the great powers of the era. Analysts, convinced that such a conflict could never be repeated and that Germany had been subdued for good, branded it the “War to End All Wars.”

For the past week, a new war – the fifth in 34 years – has pitted Israel against Hezbollah. It is yet another war that the Lebanese people never wanted. All the agreements that ended the previous four wars proved to be little more than temporary truces, exploited by Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and by Israel on the other to prepare for the next round of fighting. All of this unfolded under the watchful eye of the Assad regimes, father and son, and of Lebanese presidents and governments beholden to Damascus or Tehran, particularly during the tenures of Hraoui, Lahoud, and Michel Aoun. The costs of these wars have been paid dearly, willingly by Hezbollah’s unconditional supporters, under the numbing effect of ideology; reluctantly by other Lebanese; and by Arab countries that financed reconstruction for both humanitarian and geopolitical reasons. The same scenario has therefore repeated itself for four decades: war, ceasefire, rhetoric of victory, the deterioration of Lebanon’s political authority, Hezbollah’s preparations for endless wars, mutual deception, and then war again. A proverb drawn from popular wisdom says that “a donkey does not stumble twice on the same stone.”

The Iran-U.S. confrontation recalls a quote by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu (4 th – 5 th century BC): "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting". President Donald Trump seems to adopt a strategy based on this quote, and he deliberately maintains ambiguity to keep his strategic objectives and military thinking secret. Strikes, large-scale war, sustained threats (from both sides) that risk escalating at any moment… Speculation is rife. The concentration of American war assets in the Middle East is enormous and leaves no doubt as to the vast damage these assets can inflict on Iran. In this regard, and speaking of his warships, President Trump told reporters last week: "They have to sail somewhere. They might as well sail near Iran".

The recent meeting held at the United States Embassy in Madrid, centered on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2797 adopted last October 31 regarding the Moroccan Sahara, was no ordinary diplomatic encounter. Algeria’s presence, represented by its Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, was particularly significant, as it restored matters to their proper context: the dispute over the Sahara is, at its core, a Moroccan-Algerian conflict, while the Polisario Front serves merely as an instrument employed by the Algerian regime to justify a war of attrition waged against Morocco for nearly half a century, ever since Rabat recovered its Saharan provinces following Spain’s withdrawal in November 1975.