Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (7)
This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions.
The previous six instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, and the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South.
Death of Hafez al-Assad and the Growing Iranian Influence in Syria and Lebanon
On June 10, 2000, fifteen days after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hafez al-Assad died of a heart attack. In the aftermath of his death, his son Bashar took over the presidency. Under his rule, Baathist Syria drew steadily closer to Iran. The country became a satellite of Tehran and a platform through which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) projected its power and influence toward Lebanon, as well as toward the West Bank via the Syrian-Jordanian border. The extent of IRGC control in Syria was clearly described in January 2009 by former Syrian vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam (1984–2005), who stated: “Iran is involved at the very heart of the Syrian regime: in its security services, in its military forces, in its economic institutions and in its mosques.”
Southern Lebanon: A Hezbollahland With Military, Political and Social Dimensions
Following the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, President Émile Lahoud categorically refused to deploy the Lebanese army in the southern part of the country, up to the border with Israel. In doing so, he effectively relinquished the principle of national sovereignty and left the field open to Hezbollah, which quickly transformed South Lebanon into a multidimensional stronghold. The pro-Iranian militia reigned supreme there, under the complacent attitude of the Lebanese authorities and the Syrian occupation army. The latter was itself overseen by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers operating discreetly in the background. South Lebanon thus became a veritable Hezbollahland.
At the military level, the Shiite organization expanded its rocket stockpile from a few thousand to around 15,000 units. In addition to the conventional Katyushas with a range of 20 km already in its possession, the pro-Iranian group was supplied by Iran with Fajr-3, Fajr-5, and Zelzal rockets, with ranges of 40, 72, and 250 km respectively. This arsenal was designed to give it the capacity to strike the entirety of Israeli territory.
This large-scale rearmament was accompanied by the digging of an extensive network of tunnels and underground bunkers, intended to shield Hezbollah’s firing capabilities and protect its infrastructure from surveillance and Israeli airstrikes. This tactical preparation further reinforced expectation of an imminent war.
The strengthening of Hezbollah’s military apparatus was also accompanied by growing political integration, marked by the movement’s entry into government for the first time in 2005, followed by its alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun through the Mar Mikhael Agreement, concluded in 2006. This pact enabled Hezbollah to break out of its sectarian isolation and consolidate its political influence in Lebanon.
Through this unnatural alliance, the FPM primarily provided the armed extremist group with a rear base within the Christian community. For the first time in the country’s modern history, a predominantly Christian party carried out a U-turn that ran directly counter to its founding political line. After having shaped Lebanese national consciousness for more than a decade through its sovereigntist aspirations and its call for a rule-of-law state in Lebanon, it ultimately aligned itself with a faction beholden to a hegemonic regional power, which, quite clearly, would drag Lebanon into destructive wars.
Hezbollah also established a quasi-parastatal social foothold in South Lebanon through near-free healthcare services and reconstruction efforts (notably via the engineering company “Jihad al-Bina’”) offering low-cost services under its own structure. These forms of support earned it the unwavering loyalty of the Shiite population.
This multidimensional expansion enabled the group to maintain constant pressure along the Blue Line in South Lebanon, up until its cross-border military operation in July 2006, which triggered the third Israel-Hezbollah war, known as the 33-Day War.
Prelude to the Third War With Israel
A year after the Israeli withdrawal on May 24, 2000, it was clear that the presence of IRGC officers and long-range rockets in Lebanon was in no way intended to liberate the Shebaa Farms, but rather to turn the country into a missile-launching platform against Israel. This strategy served Iran’s geopolitical interests, notably by diverting attention from its nuclear program, which came under open international debate from 2002 onward, and by rallying the Arab world around Tehran on the Palestinian question.
On the eve of the 2006 war, this situation did not reflect preparations for a direct Israel-Hezbollah confrontation but rather signaled an impending clash between Israel and Iran. The question was therefore not whether a war would break out, but when it would occur. A replay of the 1993 and 1996 conflicts was evident, but this time with heavier, longer-range rockets. Hezbollah officials made no secret of such intentions. In January 2002, Sheikh Nabil Kaouk, vice-president of the executive council of the pro-Iranian movement, declared in an impassioned tone: “More than 2.5 million Israelis are now within range of our missiles.”
Ali Larijani Inspires the July 12 Cross-Border Attack and Pulls the Strings
Under international pressure over its nuclear program, Iran is said to have encouraged Hezbollah to carry out a cross-border attack that its then secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, was likely reluctant to endorse. The pro-Iranian movement reportedly sought to maintain calm along the border, a position clearly reflected in Nasrallah’s remarks during meetings of the “national dialogue conference” held in parliament in the spring of 2006. These discussions focused on a “national defense strategy.”
Nasrallah had stressed the need to prevent Israel from dragging the country into war, insisting at the time that the movement’s arsenal served as a deterrent against Israeli aggression, rather than as a tool to initiate conflict. On the day of the attack itself, Nasrallah held a press conference in which he stated that the cross-border operation – during which two Israeli soldiers were captured – was intended solely as a means to secure a prisoner exchange. He added that he did not wish to see escalation into a full-scale war. Was this a genuine appeal to Israel not to widen the conflict, or a calculated posture?
Two days before the operation, Ali Larijani(1), then secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, travelled to Damascus, where he met senior officials of the Assad regime as well as Hassan Nasrallah. He is reported to have informed his interlocutors that negotiations with Western powers over Iran’s nuclear program had reached an impasse. According to some reports, he indicated that “action” was necessary, suggesting the opening of a new front to divert international pressure on Tehran.
The Gaza front had already been burning for around two weeks. Before Larijani’s visit to Damascus, and more specifically in the spring of 2006, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program between France, Britain, Germany and Iran had entered a deadlock phase following Tehran’s decision to resume uranium enrichment. The dialogue, initially conducted by the European trio, was then expanded to the P5+1 group, bringing in the United States, Russia and China, in an effort both to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic and to present it with a package of proposals. In June 2006, a major package of economic and technological incentives was presented to Tehran by Javier Solana, then High Representative of the European Union.
In return, Western powers demanded a complete suspension of uranium enrichment as a precondition, a requirement Iran categorically rejected. This diplomatic impasse, perceived by Tehran as unbearable pressure, very likely contributed to the outbreak of hostilities by Hamas in Gaza, with the capture of an Israeli soldier on June 25, followed by the launch of Operation “Sincere Promise” in Lebanon. These two similar operations were aimed at prisoner exchanges between Israel on one side, and Hamas and Hezbollah on the other. Iran sought to position itself at the center of negotiations, as it had done during the Berlin talks in February 2000 and in other indirect negotiations conducted by Hezbollah with the Israeli state. Tehran had likely considered using the issue of prisoners held by Hamas and Hezbollah as leverage to ease the pressure it was facing over its nuclear file. This did not materialize, as the first UN Security Council sanctions against Iran were adopted in late July 2006, in the midst of the Gaza and Lebanon wars. (to be continued)
(1) Ali Larijani was assassinated on March 17, 2026, in an Israeli strike in Tehran.
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Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (6)
Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5)
Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4)
Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3)