Dismantled, Yet Still Dangerous: Iran After Operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion”: (1/2)

In this first instalment, we examine the military and industrial impact of Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion on Iran’s conventional capabilities. It will be followed next week by a second and final part exploring the conditions that could lead to Iran’s implosion over the medium to long term.

The Iranian regime suffered heavy losses during the US-Israeli war fought between February and April 2026.

Yet despite the scale of the damage, the collapse of the Islamic Republic did not materialize, and Tehran showed no sign of flexibility in response to U.S. sanctions and the American naval blockade.

Historical experience and the assessments of many analysts suggest that an authoritarian system as deeply entrenched as Iran’s is far more likely to yield under the pressure of an internal implosion. Such a scenario would be triggered by the convergence of prolonged economic strangulation and a critical threshold of popular mobilization.

International sanctions and the US naval blockade have undoubtedly weakened the Iranian state’s resources, but they remain only catalysts. The decisive rupture occurs when internal fractures – previously contained through repression – begin to spread and converge. More than 30,000 people were killed last January, while over 50,000 punitive and preventive arrests were carried out in February.

Returning to the 40-day US-Israeli war against Iran, two key questions emerge: what is the true extent of the Islamic Republic’s military and economic losses, and what prospects lie ahead as it confronts the American blockade and protracted negotiations?

What Remains of Iran’s Navy?

The two joint military operations – America’s Epic Fury and Israel’s Roaring Lion – conducted between February and April 2026, involved a total of 20,000 airstrikes. Over a period of just 40 days, that figure amounted to 60% of all coalition strikes carried out against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq over five years.

The US-Israeli campaign dealt a decisive blow to Iran’s regular navy. Strikes on the country’s main naval bases at Bandar Abbas and Konarak destroyed most of its major surface combatants. Destroyers, frigates and support vessels were either sunk or damaged beyond repair, depriving Iran of its conventional blue-water naval capability. This strategic setback has forced Tehran to rely on residual, asymmetric and highly mobile assets to defend its coastline and, above all, to maintain a threat to maritime traffic in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Although partially degraded, Iran’s submarine force retains the ability to disrupt operations in shallow waters through its remaining midget submarines. The three Russian-built Kilo-class attack submarines were damaged or sunk while docked. Half of the 23 domestically produced Ghadir-class midget submarines were also destroyed at their berths. The surviving fleet of these midget submarines – estimated at between 10 and 12 vessels and equipped with torpedoes and missiles – has been deployed on the front line in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. These mini-submarines provide maritime guerrilla capabilities, including mine-laying operations, torpedo attacks and covert missions launched from the region’s rugged coastline.

At the same time, most of the surface fleet operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has survived, largely because of its dispersed structure. It consists of hundreds of armed fast attack craft, as well as light missile patrol boats such as the Peykaap II and Houdong classes. These small warships are designed to conduct coordinated swarm attacks in overwhelming numbers before rapidly withdrawing into coastal inlets and sheltered coves.

Iranian Tactics in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

Iran’s strategy for targeting civilian and military shipping now relies primarily on midget submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles, each crewed by no more than seven sailors. It also draws on missile-equipped fast attack craft, typically operated by crews of four to five, as well as shore-to-sea anti-ship missiles, naval mines and attack drones. Roughly 70% of Iran’s anti-ship missile inventory – estimated at several hundred projectiles – remains intact and can be launched from around 30 coastal sites. These include the Iranian-made Ra’ad, Noor, Qader and Khalij Fars systems, all derived from China’s C-802 missile. With ranges of between 130 and 360 kilometers, they are deployed on mobile launch platforms concealed deep inland.

Mine-laying remains a relatively simple capability for Tehran. However, US underwater countermeasures have succeeded in clearing several maritime corridors through the Strait of Hormuz. Between 10 and 20 commercial vessels, including giant oil tankers, currently transit these routes every day.

Ships navigating these narrow passages switch off their radars and tracking systems, coordinate with the US Navy – which monitors them by radar – and receive remote escort protection. A similar pattern prevails on the Iranian side of the strait.

Shahed-type suicide drones serve as an aerial extension of Iran’s maritime assets, helping to saturate American and Arab air-defense systems. Dozens of commercial vessels have been struck by these weapons. Yet Iran’s more sophisticated attacks, combining anti-ship missiles and drones, have failed to hit US naval vessels.

While these remaining capabilities do not challenge American naval supremacy, they are sufficient to sustain chronic insecurity across key shipping lanes and to exert pressure on the global economy.

What about Iran’s air defenses?

In parallel, the massive US-Israeli coalition strikes have severely degraded Iran’s air defense capabilities, effectively opening Iranian airspace to American and Israeli aircraft.

Before the conflict, Iran operated an integrated air defense system built around layered “bubbles” of access denial designed to restrict hostile aircraft and missiles across large parts of the Middle East.

By early 2026, this system consisted of three complementary layers. The long-range layer relied on fixed batteries such as Russia’s S-300PMU-2 systems and their Iranian equivalents, the Bavar-373. This tier was tasked with protecting nuclear facilities and urban centers over distances of several hundred kilometers. A second, medium-range and highly mobile layer included domestically developed systems such as the Khordad-15, Raad and Talash, capable of engaging fighter jets and drones. A third, close-range defensive layer continued to operate through short-range systems such as Russia’s Tor-M1 and Pantsir-S1, supported by thousands of anti-aircraft guns and man-portable air-defense systems. The entire network was coordinated by an integrated command structure within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ “Khatam al-Anbiya” headquarters, fed by an extensive network of ground-based and coastal radar systems.

The combined US-Israeli strikes – using anti-radiation missiles, B-2 stealth bombers and bunker-busting munitions – neutralized much of the fixed infrastructure and early-warning radar network. They eliminated both the long-range and medium-range layers, drastically reducing Iran’s ability to detect incoming aircraft and conduct long-range air denial operations.

In response, Tehran has adopted a survival doctrine, relying in particular on intermittent radar shutdowns to evade enemy electronic warfare, increased use of optical sensors, and the dispersal of mobile batteries across coastal and mountainous terrain.

Its units now conduct what analysts describe as “air ambushes.” They fire missiles from temporary positions before immediately relocating. This tactic has allowed them to shoot down several Israeli and American MQ-9 drones, the most recent in May 2026.

The loss of heavy systems prevents Iran from denying its airspace to coalition stealth aircraft. Its new posture nonetheless remains dangerous: it retains an effective harassment capability against drones and low – to medium – altitude aircraft, the ability to mount saturation threats against enemy defenses, and sporadic ambushes that have, for example, forced coalition aircraft to avoid flying below 7 kilometers.

Iran’s coastal air defenses have also been heavily degraded: most fixed long-range sites protecting Bandar Abbas, Jask and Kharg have been neutralized.

Nuclear Sites and Military-Industrial Complexes

The US-Israeli offensive also caused severe damage to a wide range of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, Parchin and Isfahan, which had already been bombed in June 2025.

Similarly, drone production sites and a majority of ballistic missile infrastructure were either fully or partially destroyed. Critical energy and civilian infrastructure was also targeted, triggering fuel shortages in major cities.

In conclusion, the heavy military, nuclear, industrial and economic losses – estimated at $14 trillion – have not eliminated Iran’s remaining asymmetric capabilities, which still allow it to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. However, today’s Iran is significantly degraded compared with its pre–June 2025 posture. Its nuclear, ballistic and drone capabilities, as well as its capacity to support regional allies such as Hezbollah, have been severely eroded.