Politics

The jugular vein that once supplied it with weapons and ammunition has been severed. And yet, Hezbollah refuses to abide by the commitments made in its name through Nabih Berri. Because it does not believe it has been defeated—and because the fertile ground of the South, where it took root, has not contradicted that belief. To be perfectly frank, a handful of dissenting and comforting Shiite voices are hardly enough to bring it back to reason. Though the party of the mullahs has taken a beating, it has not abandoned the fight. It has gone underground to preserve the core of its forces. According to certain sources, it has even rebuilt its military capabilities. In other words, it is recovering. At the same time, it has worn down Western diplomacy, which is openly hostile to it. It can therefore savor its victory. Playing the card of “strategic patience,” learned from seasoned masters, it has created such a diplomatic mess that France has once again rushed to Lebanon’s bedside—to untangle the knot. A “second mechanism” to monitor disarmament is currently being devised, said Jean-Noël Barrot, France’s foreign minister—so as to avoid escalation, he added. Have the gentlemen at the Quai d’Orsay ever wondered how much their Lebanese sympathies cloud their judgment? Strategic Patience and Its Price Caught in a trap, Hezbollah has lost around forty fighters in southern villages since last October. And that is not all. Since the November 2024 ceasefire, the IDF has killed more than four hundred of its supporters. It is a heavy toll, but what do such sacrifices matter to the Resistance? They are merely the minimum price of that same “strategic patience” instilled by its Iranian mentors. In reality, the Party of God has shifted onto the Lebanese state the obligations that weigh upon it—chief among them, disarmament. It stalls. It drags its feet. It splits hairs, drawing a subtle distinction between north and south of the Litani River. And who bears the brunt of constant pressure and American anger, voiced by the likes of Tom Barrack or Tom Harb? I’ll let you guess. An Admission of Powerlessness Hezbollah has jammed the “engine of the state,” and it is the Lebanese army that pays the price and takes the blows. Threats are made to cut off aid and funding; the army commander’s visit to the United States is canceled; harassment comes from all sides. In his bunker, Sheikh Naïm Qassem must be rubbing his hands: not a single dollar for the Lebanese state without prior disarmament. And thus the indispensable—and well-hidden—secretary general has plunged the Lebanese cabinet and its members into embarrassment. After all, as some observers across the Atlantic slyly remark, “these people cannot deliver.” Can anyone truly claim that Hezbollah has lost its “battle for Lebanon”? There will be other battles indeed —but only the final one will seal its demise.

Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi and former ambassador Simon Karam—Lebanon’s representative at the meetings of the ceasefire supervision mechanism with Israel—clearly unsettle pro-Hezbollah circles because they herald the long-overdue return of external sovereignty. That sovereignty means a state’s refusal to submit to any higher authority and its recognition by other states as an equal. Youssef Raggi and Simon Karam come at exactly the right moment—at a time when most Lebanese have grown disillusioned with everything. Many now look back with nostalgia to the period preceding the 1975 civil war, that blessed era when the Lebanese state was master in its own house, exercising both external and internal sovereignty—that is, exclusive authority over its territory and population. “One does not carry the homeland on the sole of one’s shoe.” It is worth recalling that there was a time—peaking in the 1970s—when patriotism was considered outdated. Certain activists and self-proclaimed intellectuals sought to outbid one another by being more Palestinian than Lebanese, placing Yasser Arafat’s interests above their own country’s(1). These lost souls, affiliated with countless fringe groups and seduced by the dream of a universal revolution, were little more than extras playing the role of useful idiots, much like pro-Soviet sympathizers in Western Europe during the Cold War. Later, these same rebels—our local “hardliners”—allowed themselves to be endorsed by the regime installed in Damascus, a regime that ruled with an iron whip. In the end, these “Young Turks” were absorbed by the Hariri system, which granted them comfortable retirements(2). What a heroic journey it was—from underground activism under the First Republic to cushy sinecures under the Taif Republic! And what of our sovereignty in all this, one may ask? Erasure and Renunciation Lebanese citizens had lost their taste for independence. No longer masters of their own destiny, they succumbed to the supposed comforts of submission to “certain demands.” Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli, and Iranian actors—separately or simultaneously—had all abducted Lebanon’s national sovereignty. The “party of foreign interests” prevailed, and collaborators could strut proudly as the state was hollowed out from within. Crude officers roamed freely in fashionable salons, while courtiers responded only with bows and flattery. Our politicians—mere supplicants—queued in Anjar, hoping for an audience with the masters of the moment. The outcome: a tamed parliament, subjugated armed forces, an infantilized judiciary, a “Finlandized” diplomacy—and the list goes on. Without Shame No, Youssef Raggi will not mince his words. He will not travel to Tehran any more than anyone else would have gone to Canossa. Minister Araqgi can meet him in Switzerland, on neutral ground. The days when our officials were summoned to Damascus, or when orders from the Pasdaran were instantly enforced, are over. Moreover, Simon Karam’s appointment marks a reset of the rhythm. Hezbollah will no longer deal with a pliable figure heading Lebanon’s delegation to the ceasefire monitoring committee. In his time, the former ambassador rejected Syrian domination over our national will. With full latitude, he will defend Lebanon’s interests—not those of the mullahs. Add to this that his appointment has stripped the Speaker of Parliament of decision-making powers he had wrongly appropriated. So, enough is enough—the patriots are back. And nothing is more exhilarating than breaking the chains that bind the homeland. 1-They were supposedly persecuted by « political maroniticism » 2- Then they could convert their militant past into financial assets or posts as ministers.

The Gulf States emerged and accumulated wealth through the exploitation of their energy resources, but they have also undergone, in rapidly successive stages, a profound transformation that has enabled them to assert themselves on the international stage. Eager not to remain merely “the Gulf States,” Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar sought to move beyond a purely regional status by building on the assets they had acquired, while multiplying and developing them through a process resembling a forced march—sometimes judged excessive or unrestrained, yet reflecting a determination that has allowed them to pursue their ambitions and achieve global recognition. The regional identity that characterizes these Gulf States has been given an international dimension. As a group, they have become a pivotal element in the world, a point of convergence. Their image has evolved, enabling what might be called their entry into globalization, to borrow a common expression in the Anglo-Saxon lexicon. Each, in its own way, has been careful not to remain isolated and has therefore made communication a priority—speaking with most regional actors, but also with those that exert influence, in various ways, over this part of the world. In this regard, one may cite the United States and Europe, Russia and China, but also Turkey and Iran, as well as India today. Dialogue in all directions: speaking with everyone and positioning themselves to facilitate exchanges, meetings, talks and negotiations. These are actions in which they now play a major and sometimes indispensable role. Their outlook, attention and actions have extended beyond the region between the Red Sea and the Gulf toward the East and the North, and today toward Africa, with a dynamism comparable to that of other countries diversifying their global relations—notably Russia, China and Turkey, and more recently, though still in an embryonic manner, Japan—without overlooking the former colonial powers and, of course, the United States of America. On the geostrategic level, these states have deployed an effective diplomacy that now enables them to engage with Iran or Israel, with a mediation capacity grounded in their economic strength, the remarkable development of their diplomatic tools and expertise, and their determination to be an indispensable actor the world can rely on. All of this has earned them recognition and a role that may go beyond their initial objectives, because they have been able to mobilize their strengths to achieve their goals and seize every opportunity that arose—sometimes amid regional disputes—where they demonstrated wisdom and diplomacy in order, ultimately, to gradually assert an aspect of their power. Relations, diplomacy, alliances, partnerships, dialogue, mediation, influence… The Gulf States have thus moved from what could be termed “hard power” to “soft power.” Their hard power was exercised as exporters of energy commodities and through their actions in finance, the construction of conference centers and exhibition halls, sports competitions and urban development, as well as the development of ports of international importance—Dubai was the world’s 11th largest container port in 2024 and ranks among the six leading players in the maritime sector. As for soft power, these states have developed it through the organization of various events that sometimes drew criticism, but were always carried out using the most modern and innovative means. Rejecting isolation, they decided to engage with all actors on the international stage, relying on their economic and diplomatic strength and rejecting the adage that “my enemy must be your enemy.” Why should that be a rule? They do not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; should all relations with Russia therefore be severed? They provide their own answer. Thus, the Gulf States are not a minor partner for Russia today. Pragmatism—far beyond this single issue—has enabled them to achieve the international status they now enjoy and to carry out a genuine revolution in their operating methods, their conduct in international relations, and their dealings with partners. Their credo? To engage only in battles that are truly their own. There are issues in which one should not interfere; others’ interests need not be theirs. This blend of action and neutrality should not be mistaken for inaction. Note: The importance of this theme prompted the organizers of the 4th Mediterranean Strategic Meetings (RSMed 2025) – a conference held annually in Toulon, France, since 2022 by the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES) – to dedicate a roundtable discussion to it in the program for these days (October 8 and 9, 2025). Next article: The Gulf States, in search of a very specific kind of power (3/3)

Power is imposing one's will: to do, to make others do, to prevent doing, to compel others to do (Raymond Aron). The Gulf States emerged and grew wealthy thanks to the exploitation of their natural resources—oil and gas—particularly since what was later called the first oil shock of 1973. This shock was significant for what is commonly referred to as the West, namely North America and Europe, even though at that time in the 1970s a large part of Europe was not, by any means, part of the European Union and was still subject to the Soviet yoke and, equally, to that of communism for nearly another twenty years. Could it not be said that since the dawn of the 21st century, the Gulf States have, in a way, emancipated themselves from this dependence, which still provides them with a significant financial windfall, but which they have managed to use and radically transform to achieve a status other than that of rentier states? Furthermore, would it not be pertinent to say that these states have undergone, in rapidly progressing stages, a veritable cybernetic conversion akin to a revolution in the truest sense? The Gulf States in question here are, as a reminder, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. They are not all at the same stage in this evolution and transformation, but the movement is well underway for each of them, each at its own pace, according to the path it has chosen for the implementation and development of its own specific characteristics and objectives. This is therefore not an abandonment—not yet—of oil and gas, nor a break with what still sustains them, but rather an emancipation enabling them to carry out what can truly be called a revolution. Starting with the wealth offered by energy resources, they aspire to become powerful. What is this power, what processes are employed to achieve it, and what are their objectives? Concurrent Development Some data relating to these states are similar, though not identical. Geographically close, they border the Persian Gulf—only Saudi Arabia and Oman have other maritime access—and they have developed concurrently: high-quality urban planning without fearing gigantism; modernization in all areas (finance, economy, commerce, tourism) that does not shy away from climate challenges; maritime development; port and logistics hubs; and an identity also focused on luxury and excellence. Some of these states are now essential points of convergence and intercontinental air hubs. They adopted a strategy aimed at demonstrating their existence and awareness, prior to official recognition, by showcasing organization and the capacity to act in fields as diverse as sporting, cultural, and artistic events, meetings, and large-scale demonstrations. Iraq, as a Gulf state, should legitimately have been included among them. Its fate, unfortunately sealed in 2003, has not yet allowed it to join forces with the other states. Faced with Iran, which also aspires to be a Middle Eastern power, these states as a whole have asserted themselves as a genuine regional power. A different kind of power, certainly, but a power nonetheless. Next article: The Gulf States, from regional to international Note: The importance of this theme prompted the organizers of the 4th edition of the Mediterranean Strategic Meetings (RSMed 2025), a conference organized in Toulon (France) every year since 2022 by the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES), to dedicate a round table to it in the program for the days of October 8 and 9, 2025.

Yahya Sinwar died without laying down his arms. For some who praise him, this fugitive fought with pride until his last breath. He may now serve as a model to emulate for Hezbollah’s fighters. Like him—and before him—there was Saddam Hussein, unflinching before the gallows. And with that, you expect Hezbollah to surrender its weapons and submit to conditions imposed upon him… Living Dangerously Al-silah zinat al-rijal (that is, “weapons are the adornment of men”), a slogan repeated in South Lebanon, a region where a whole generation has tasted the brotherhood of arms. Military operations have given combatants a taste for the “heroic life,” an addiction one does not escape unscathed. An addiction the majority of Lebanese do not share. Moreover, the emblematic figure of al-Hussein, who fell with weapons in hand, makes any idea of capitulation odious, if not impious. The Domino Effect In any case, it is not up to Lebanese Hezbollah, nor to its command hiding in underground bunkers, to decide whether the weapons should be surrendered. On this matter, it is the Iranians—and they alone—who decide. The proxy militia in which Tehran has invested so much is merely a pawn in the regional game of Wilayat al-Faqih . It cannot be sacrificed except on the altar of the Ayatollahs’ International, whether in Qom or elsewhere. Disarmament cannot be contemplated for the sake of restoring any Lebanese sovereignty. And if the Republic of the Pasdaran were to concede Hezbollah’s weapons to whomever is entitled to them, it would set a dangerous precedent—one that would trigger a chain reaction. The Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq would soon have to play along, and Iran, that entrenched camp, would lose one defensive line after another. That said, Tehran cares little if, to delay the inevitable, its Lebanese harkis were crushed under Israeli bombs for refusing to comply with UN resolutions. The Rematch In a month or a year, hostilities between Twelver Shiites and Zionists will come to an end, if only through the exhaustion of one of the two sides. But does that mean disarmament will automatically follow? Certainly not. The Shiite tandem intends to stay on its guard. On the one hand, it needs to intimidate its Lebanese countrymen; on the other, it has not forgotten that it has made enemies with long memories. Our Syrian neighbors have neither forgiven nor forgotten the support given to Bashar al-Assad’s regime by the “Radwan forces” and other irregulars. Sooner or later, Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian quagmire since 2011 will backfire on the entire Shiite community. The revenge match is inevitable. In such a scenario, better to keep one’s weapons than to be a sitting duck—an easy target. Let the Lebanese government harbor no illusions: there will be no voluntary disarmament. Our strategists must look for more successful ways.

The two years following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack on Israel have marked a decisive turning point not only for the Levant region but for the entire Middle East. In this ongoing regional upheaval, Iran has not escaped unscathed; indeed, it has been severely affected. In a context of heightened geopolitical turbulence, the Islamic Republic of Iran now faces a dual challenge: to regain its prestige on an international level, and, simultaneously, to restructure itself internally so as to be prepared for the various scenarios that could rapidly emerge on the horizon. Bluster on the international stage is no longer an option. Iran’s dual support for the Houthis and Hezbollah, in particular, must be carefully weighed in light of the risks involved, foremost among them those posed by President Donald Trump, who, for the time being, remains the most powerful figure on the international stage. Should China – his main competitor – force him into a direct, fierce confrontation with them, one could then expect President Trump to settle any dispute in a manner that safeguards his reputation and almost unassailable position. China has no desire to intervene in a Middle Eastern powder keg; it prefers to wait for the right moment to exploit the situation to its advantage. Domestically, Iran must take preventive measures to prepare for all scenarios that could arise in the event of the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Three potential outcomes are conceivable. First scenario – The religious leadership quickly appoints a successor to the Supreme Leader, and Iran remains as it has been since 1979. But do the Pasdaran truly have any ambition other than to follow the directives – at least ostensibly – of the Supreme Leaders? Could some of them harbour the aspiration, having already played the role of a “state within the state,” to become the real rulers of Iran? What would they do if, exploiting even a temporary vacancy at the top of the religious hierarchy, the population – particularly young people and women – took the initiative to spark a revolt, or even a popular uprising, or at the very least the first stirrings of one, to assert the Iranian people’s aspirations for freedom?` Second scenario – Civilian authority seizes the reins of power. The choices and conduct of the President of the Islamic Republic, since assuming office, suggest that he is biding his time. Evidence for this includes the recent establishment of a National Defence Council (NDC) and the high-level endorsement of Ali Larijani, a moderate, to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Could this be a transitional arrangement intended to enable a swift move to seize power? President Massoud Pezeshkian presumably expects that the population – particularly the youth and the country’s active forces – would support such an intervention. The circumstances surrounding his predecessor’s accidental death, which allowed him to ascend to the presidency, raise concerns and prompt the question of whether there was an intentional design to appoint the current president in order to pave the way for greater moderation. Third scenario – The population would immediately and forcefully, if not violently, express its desire for change in the country’s governance, exhausted as it is under the weight of increasingly unbearable sanctions imposed on Iran. Public frustration is particularly heightened by the regime’s mistakes regarding women and young people. This discontent manifests itself, among other ways, through covert yet tangible actions carried out by Iranians living abroad or political refugees via social media networks. Such a situation risks escalating into a civil war, the outcome of which would be both uncertain and deeply concerning. The second scenario would undoubtedly be the most desirable, yet it risks leading to clashes between the civilian authorities and the leaders of the Pasdaran. The stance of the regular army – which is not the strongest against the Pasdaran – and of the troops forming the backbone of the Revolutionary Guards will, of course, be decisive, as will any prudence or long-term vision exhibited by the Pasdaran leadership. As for the third scenario, it is one that no one desires, either in the region or in the West – not even China. Nevertheless, a large-scale popular movement could be co-opted by the President, which would effectively return the situation to the second scenario. The worst outcome is therefore not necessarily inevitable. For the time being, the Supreme Leader remains firmly in command. He is attempting to strengthen and consolidate national sentiment without relinquishing control, yet doing so in a measured, rational manner. Can a policy of “iron hand in a velvet glove” be maintained while achieving the goal of preserving a strong and united nation? In the shadow of such a dual Iranian and regional context, are the regime’s senior figures today primarily concerned with the Houthis and Hezbollah, while Ali Khamenei is politically and personally weakened and facing Israeli threats? Probably not. If that is the case, the hour of Hamas and Hezbollah will have arrived.

Even under heavy bombardment, even upon being chased by Syrian revenge or international justice, Hezbollah’s zealots will never dissolve into the national melting pot. They will not behave like the partisans of the Amal Movement, who are so typically Lebanese in their flaws, their rhetoric, their compromises and convenient settlements. And there is indeed some reason for that, as our contemporary history offers a precedent that still raises doubts. No one has forgotten what happened to the Lebanese Forces upon accepting the Taif Agreement and laying down their arms. They paid the heavy price: their leader was imprisoned, and their cadres were persecuted and even liquidated. Their convictions however remained intact, and their numbers did not significantly shrink. Their resilience was praised and attributed to their ideological indoctrination—an indoctrination that did not prevent them from reintegrating into secular civil life. This raises a legitimate question: can the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih and its sacred dimension truly fit within a state governed by the rule of law, a state that is supposed to be grounded in the principles of individual freedoms and secularism? Naivety and Blindness Meanwhile, well-meaning voices keep repeating: “Hand over your weapons, return to the State’s fold, you will have the place that is rightfully yours.” But Hezbollah, long before becoming a militia the size of an army, emerged from a centuries-old religious-political movement. To turn it into a party like any other would be to deny its essence. And besides, Hezbollah has no intention of dissolving itself. Even if it agreed to disarm and disband, the Iranian-backed party is not ready to give up Lebanon, their capture and trophy. The Iranian establishment has infiltrated our administration to the point that its parallel networks hold real decision-making power—not just the ability to block decisions. The deep state that Hezbollah has taken over functions as “an invisible power, undetectable within the legal institutions of the Republic, yet influencing major political decisions and social dynamics.” American envoys who take turns watching over Lebanon keep repeating this warning, while the formal executive authority rejects the obvious and prefers the comfort of denial. The German Example of Denazification After World War II, the Western Allies undertook to eradicate Nazism in the occupied zones. They conducted investigations focusing on the education sector, as well as on the legal, financial, and media professions. The process was democratic but yielded limited results. On the Soviet side, however, the approach was very different and more successful: large-scale purges, summary executions, and one-way tickets to the gulag. How to “De-Hezbollize” the Public Sector? Back to Lebanon, a nation stuck in a dead end. Our country cannot reform while tolerating the current reality. What would be the point in keeping officials loyal to a foreign power and linked to Tehran’s apparatus? To pull Lebanon out of its crisis, much more is needed than disarming and disbanding a militia. Yes, indeed, far more is required than simply demilitarizing the party of the ayatollahs.

Direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel have officially begun with the aim of reaching a peace agreement. Their fundamental condition is the disarmament of Hezbollah. Other points, both essential and secondary, are on the table, notably economic cooperation enabling both countries to move forward on the path to recovery, the reconstruction of South Lebanon, and security and stabilization on Israel's northern border. Before going into detail and analysis, before examining the various perspectives, and before reviewing the events that have led Lebanon to pay the heaviest price in the Arab-Israeli conflict for over half a century, a simple question arises: what is the alternative to peace with Israel, to Lebanon's recovery, and to the country's reconstruction? There is no clear answer. The state has been absent for decades, and the Iranian militia based in Lebanon decides, unilaterally, when to launch a war, when to conclude a truce, when to negotiate, when to support Gaza, when to provoke Israel, or when to destabilize neighboring Arab countries. It builds tunnels to continue the wars instead of constructing shelters and hospitals. Until the day Hezbollah trapped itself in a strategic dead end. The war it instigated to serve the Iranian project under the slogan of "unity of fronts" is one it can no longer end. Tehran has gradually withdrawn the cover it provided to Hezbollah. It seeks to buy time to preserve the regime and maintains Hezbollah for future use. But Israel now refuses to tolerate any continued threat posed by Hezbollah. He pushed this militia back north of the Litani River, which proved simpler than carrying out Nabih Berri's famous quip to his visitors, who were warning him about the deteriorating situation, suggesting that the Litani River should be moved to the border with Israel! As a result, Hezbollah is no longer acting according to the old rules of deterrence. In fact, it isn't reacting at all. It has endorsed a truce, but a truce is merely a respite between two wars. The Lebanese leaders, long absent and hesitant, even overwhelmed by the de facto reality, have finally woken up. They have taken the initiative, but hesitated, then failed to follow through. What they will not accomplish, Israel will do in their place—but the price to pay will be far higher. It was within this specific context that a historic event occurred: the exceptional visit of Pope Leo XIV; a visit that took on a political dimension due to its central theme, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Just hours after the departure of the Holy Father, who urged the Lebanese to choose peace, the commission monitoring ceasefire violations was transformed into a committee for direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. The peace negotiations initiated between Lebanon and Israel serve Lebanon's national interest. They are in the interest of Lebanon's security and its very vocation as a "message country," rather than a "hotbed of conflict." They offer an alternative to Hezbollah's rhetoric, based on endless war and "resistance for resistance's sake," solely aimed at serving Iranian influence in the region. Direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel offer the possibility of reaching a peace agreement. Direct negotiations have long been taboo in Lebanon, with no one even considering the possibility or initiating a debate on the subject. If Lebanon doesn't negotiate with Israel to defend its own interests, then who will? Hezbollah negotiates on behalf of Iran, serving the expansionist agenda of the Wilayat al-Faqih (the Islamic Observatory). Direct negotiations thus mark Lebanon's renewed assertion of its sovereign role and the beginning of a decline in Iranian influence. The talks have begun officially, seriously, and effectively. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tasked a team from the National Security Council with joining the technical committee, known as the "mechanism," and meeting with Lebanese officials. The Lebanese presidency has announced that President Joseph Aoun has appointed Ambassador Simon Karam to represent Lebanon. The direct negotiations will not only address ceasefire violations but also lay the groundwork for future economic relations and cooperation between Lebanon and Israel. The US Embassy in Beirut supported the initiative in a statement: “Sustainable progress is only possible,” the statement emphasized, “if the concerns and aspirations expressed by both parties are addressed.” “Both lebanese and Israeli perspectives are being taken into account.” Ambassador Michel Issa welcomed the Lebanese government’s decision to opt for dialogue after decades of uncertainty. He stated that direct negotiations are a constructive step toward initiating processes that could one day allow the two countries to coexist in an atmosphere of peace, mutual respect, and dignity. In this context, the ambassador reaffirmed his country’s commitment to supporting all efforts that strengthen peace, stability, and security. The start of negotiations is not the solution in itself, but it represents an important opening. They will continue alongside Israeli operations aimed at dismantling Hezbollah’s military wing and putting an end to its economic—and even social—activities. The most explosive scenario could come from Iran: Tehran could launch a full-scale confrontation if it perceives that Hezbollah’s role is over or that the regime is nearing its end. He could then completely sacrifice Hezbollah to achieve some gains. These different scenarios could emerge behind the scenes of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.

The Levant has, over the past two years, witnessed profound and dramatic upheavals that have reshaped the region’s geopolitical landscape. The chain of events set in motion since Hamas’s deadly attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023 seems to have paved the way for the emergence of a new Middle East, as Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, repeatedly asserts. As 2025 draws to a close, what overall picture, what prospects, and what political and security assessment can be made of this region? By stepping back and looking at the wider picture, it becomes easier to examine closely the developments under way and the sweeping changes that have unfolded across Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Gaza (and the Palestinian territories), as well as Iran. Already severely shaken by the apocalyptic explosion at Beirut’s port on 4 August 2020 and by the economic and financial collapse of 2019, Lebanon finds itself, at the end of this year, grappling with the far-reaching repercussions of the indefensible – and absurd – “support war” (for Hamas) launched by Hezbollah on 8 October 2023. This armed conflict, seemingly instigated by the Iranian mullahs’ regime, resulted in the assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, the elimination of the Shiite party’s military command, the destruction of numerous villages in South Lebanon, and Israel’s occupation of five strategic positions within Lebanese territory. The President’s Commitments In the shadow of such a context, it has become imperative to press Israel to put an end to its tendency to make use of Lebanese territory and airspace at its discretion, for better or for worse. There is, however, a corresponding obligation: the Lebanese state, backed by its population, must decide to implement the UN resolutions as well as all the commitments made by President Joseph Aoun in his inaugural address on the day of his election to the highest office of the State, on 9 January 2025. The Lebanese population must support the State’s efforts in this regard, fully aware that the necessary dismantling of Hezbollah’s military apparatus and the total disarmament of the party may not occur without friction yet will ultimately benefit all of Lebanon’s communities – and first and foremost Lebanese Shiites. Such resolve must be expressed without equivocation. In this framework, Syria, Iran and Israel must acknowledge that this is a deliberate initiative on Lebanon’s part, one that will be pursued to its conclusion and is, in the end, in the interest of the entire region. Faced with the self-centered and reductive behavior of the main Levantine actors, it is worth noting that Lebanon can – and should – play the role of a catalyst, setting in motion a broader, much-needed dynamic of recovery. As for Lebanon’s strictly internal situation, the bonds that tie its various communities together need to be rewoven – and only President Joseph Aoun can set this new “reweaving”. To that end, he must make it unmistakably clear through his actions that he was elected President to lead, in every sense of the word. Without firm resolve, without a clear and unequivocal will on his part, without the courage he has demonstrated throughout his career, Lebanon will not be able to restore the flourishing, prosperous and peaceful State it once was. The Syrian Earthquake The upheaval that has had the greatest impact on Lebanon over the past months has undoubtedly been the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For half a century, this Syrian dictatorship imposed an occupation and a hegemony on Lebanon that profoundly altered the country’s political landscape. The new order emerged in Syria in the wake of the sudden – yet foreseeable – vacuum created by the collapse of the Assad regime. This abrupt fall of Baathist power was accelerated by the astonishing lack of reaction from the regime’s popular base, alongside the disarray and collapse of its troops. For now, however, the new regime lacks robust foundations internally. The abuses committed against minorities – without firm intervention from the new authorities – further weaken the regime. President Ahmed al-Shareh was received, with all the honours due to his rank, by Presidents Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron. He is now called upon to prove that such honours were indeed deserved. His future – and that of Syria, or at least the part under his control – depends on the distance he is able to keep between his country, on the one hand, and Hamas and Iran, on the other. His survival depends on it. Next article: The Levant in Turmoil: Iran Caught in the Tornado

On November 6 th , the United Nations Security Council, driven by the United States, voted to lift UN sanctions against Syrian President Ahmad el-Chareh. This measure followed a similar decision earlier in the summer, when both the United States and the European Union ended their sanctions against Bashar el Assad’s Syria, which had been imposed during the civil war that began in 2011. The general lifting of sanctions will allow Syria to reintegrate into the Arab sphere and the global economy, paving the way for renewed investment and the reconstruction of the country. The Caesar Act The most emblematic measure among the sanctions targeting Assad’s Syria was the adoption of the Caesar Act by the United States in 2019. The law was named after a Syrian military photographer who smuggled out more than 50,000 photographs documenting abuses committed by the Baathist regime during the civil war. The Caesar Act targeted vital sectors of the Syrian economy more severely than previous UN or EU sanctions. It penalized any individual or company providing direct or indirect support to the Assad regime, especially in the arms, energy, and financial services sectors. The Effects of the Caesar Act The Caesar Act financially strangled Bashar al-Assad’s regime and his inner circle, who controlled large portions of the economy. It hastened the regime’s economic collapse but also completely isolated Syria from the outside world, deepened the depreciation of the Syrian pound, crippled the economy, and fueled smuggling and widespread drug trafficking networks. On June 30, 2025, Donald Trump signed an executive order repealing the Caesar Act, pending confirmation by the House of Representatives. However, the Act will remain in force against Bashar al-Assad and his associates and will be lifted only for activities relating to Ahmad el-Chareh’s administration. Economic Rehabilitation The first step toward the country’s rehabilitation is its return to SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), the platform used by most banks worldwide for cross-border fund transfers. Despite the existence of alternative systems, most global financial transactions are still processed through SWIFT. In June, Syria carried out its first transaction on the platform in more than 14 years. Excluded from SWIFT in 2011, at the onset of the civil war, the country had been unable to conduct international wire transfers, relying instead on cash transactions that made it impossible to verify the origin or destination of funds. Reintegration into SWIFT will bring greater transparency to money transfers. The platform relies on a network of correspondent banks that act as intermediaries and are subject to compliance rules intended, for example, to prevent transactions involving Bashar Al Assad or individuals close to him. A Surge in Activity The gradual lifting of sanctions is already producing visible effects. Since last summer, numerous forums, summits, and conferences for investors interested in the Syrian market have taken place across several Arab capitals. According to Ahmad el-Chareh, the country has attracted nearly 28 billion dollars in investments, primarily from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The speed at which the necessary funds will be released, the rapid involvement of Gulf countries, and the signing of agreements for major infrastructure projects—all against the backdrop of a progressive easing of sanctions—are key factors that will attract additional investors, stimulate reconstruction, and reintegrate Syria into international trade. In short, the gradual lifting of sanctions is clearly the cornerstone of reconstruction efforts. The road remains long, and much work lies ahead. The challenges are many, but so are the opportunities. In this context, it is crucial to analyze and highlight the main obstacles and prospects facing Syria’s new leadership. To be continued… Next article: Syria, between challenges and opportunities: a new lease of life (1/3)