The Gulf States, from the regional to the international stage (2/3)

The Gulf States emerged and accumulated wealth through the exploitation of their energy resources, but they have also undergone, in rapidly successive stages, a profound transformation that has enabled them to assert themselves on the international stage.

Eager not to remain merely “the Gulf States,” Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar sought to move beyond a purely regional status by building on the assets they had acquired, while multiplying and developing them through a process resembling a forced march—sometimes judged excessive or unrestrained, yet reflecting a determination that has allowed them to pursue their ambitions and achieve global recognition.

The regional identity that characterizes these Gulf States has been given an international dimension. As a group, they have become a pivotal element in the world, a point of convergence. Their image has evolved, enabling what might be called their entry into globalization, to borrow a common expression in the Anglo-Saxon lexicon. Each, in its own way, has been careful not to remain isolated and has therefore made communication a priority—speaking with most regional actors, but also with those that exert influence, in various ways, over this part of the world.

In this regard, one may cite the United States and Europe, Russia and China, but also Turkey and Iran, as well as India today. Dialogue in all directions: speaking with everyone and positioning themselves to facilitate exchanges, meetings, talks and negotiations. These are actions in which they now play a major and sometimes indispensable role. Their outlook, attention and actions have extended beyond the region between the Red Sea and the Gulf toward the East and the North, and today toward Africa, with a dynamism comparable to that of other countries diversifying their global relations—notably Russia, China and Turkey, and more recently, though still in an embryonic manner, Japan—without overlooking the former colonial powers and, of course, the United States of America.

On the geostrategic level, these states have deployed an effective diplomacy that now enables them to engage with Iran or Israel, with a mediation capacity grounded in their economic strength, the remarkable development of their diplomatic tools and expertise, and their determination to be an indispensable actor the world can rely on.

All of this has earned them recognition and a role that may go beyond their initial objectives, because they have been able to mobilize their strengths to achieve their goals and seize every opportunity that arose—sometimes amid regional disputes—where they demonstrated wisdom and diplomacy in order, ultimately, to gradually assert an aspect of their power.

Relations, diplomacy, alliances, partnerships, dialogue, mediation, influence… The Gulf States have thus moved from what could be termed “hard power” to “soft power.” Their hard power was exercised as exporters of energy commodities and through their actions in finance, the construction of conference centers and exhibition halls, sports competitions and urban development, as well as the development of ports of international importance—Dubai was the world’s 11th largest container port in 2024 and ranks among the six leading players in the maritime sector. As for soft power, these states have developed it through the organization of various events that sometimes drew criticism, but were always carried out using the most modern and innovative means.

Rejecting isolation, they decided to engage with all actors on the international stage, relying on their economic and diplomatic strength and rejecting the adage that “my enemy must be your enemy.” Why should that be a rule? They do not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; should all relations with Russia therefore be severed? They provide their own answer.

Thus, the Gulf States are not a minor partner for Russia today. Pragmatism—far beyond this single issue—has enabled them to achieve the international status they now enjoy and to carry out a genuine revolution in their operating methods, their conduct in international relations, and their dealings with partners. Their credo? To engage only in battles that are truly their own. There are issues in which one should not interfere; others’ interests need not be theirs. This blend of action and neutrality should not be mistaken for inaction.

Note: The importance of this theme prompted the organizers of the 4th Mediterranean Strategic Meetings (RSMed 2025) – a conference held annually in Toulon, France, since 2022 by the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES) – to dedicate a roundtable discussion to it in the program for these days (October 8 and 9, 2025).

Next article: The Gulf States, in search of a very specific kind of power (3/3)