Why Disarmament Remains Unlikely

Yahya Sinwar died without laying down his arms. For some who praise him, this fugitive fought with pride until his last breath. He may now serve as a model to emulate for Hezbollah’s fighters. Like him—and before him—there was Saddam Hussein, unflinching before the gallows.
And with that, you expect Hezbollah to surrender its weapons and submit to conditions imposed upon him…

Living Dangerously 

Al-silah zinat al-rijal (that is, “weapons are the adornment of men”), a slogan repeated in South Lebanon, a region where a whole generation has tasted the brotherhood of arms. Military operations have given combatants a taste for the “heroic life,” an addiction one does not escape unscathed. An addiction the majority of Lebanese do not share. Moreover, the emblematic figure of al-Hussein, who fell with weapons in hand, makes any idea of capitulation odious, if not impious.

The Domino Effect

In any case, it is not up to Lebanese Hezbollah, nor to its command hiding in underground bunkers, to decide whether the weapons should be surrendered. On this matter, it is the Iranians—and they alone—who decide. The proxy militia in which Tehran has invested so much is merely a pawn in the regional game of Wilayat al-Faqih. It cannot be sacrificed except on the altar of the Ayatollahs’ International, whether in Qom or elsewhere. Disarmament cannot be contemplated for the sake of restoring any Lebanese sovereignty.

And if the Republic of the Pasdaran were to concede Hezbollah’s weapons to whomever is entitled to them, it would set a dangerous precedent—one that would trigger a chain reaction. The Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq would soon have to play along, and Iran, that entrenched camp, would lose one defensive line after another.

That said, Tehran cares little if, to delay the inevitable, its Lebanese harkis were crushed under Israeli bombs for refusing to comply with UN resolutions.

The Rematch

In a month or a year, hostilities between Twelver Shiites and Zionists will come to an end, if only through the exhaustion of one of the two sides. But does that mean disarmament will automatically follow? Certainly not. The Shiite tandem intends to stay on its guard. On the one hand, it needs to intimidate its Lebanese countrymen; on the other, it has not forgotten that it has made enemies with long memories. Our Syrian neighbors have neither forgiven nor forgotten the support given to Bashar al-Assad’s regime by the “Radwan forces” and other irregulars.

Sooner or later, Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian quagmire since 2011 will backfire on the entire Shiite community. The revenge match is inevitable. In such a scenario, better to keep one’s weapons than to be a sitting duck—an easy target.

Let the Lebanese government harbor no illusions: there will be no voluntary disarmament. Our strategists must look for more successful ways.