The Levant in Turmoil: Iran Caught in the Tornado (3/3)

The two years following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack on Israel have marked a decisive turning point not only for the Levant region but for the entire Middle East. In this ongoing regional upheaval, Iran has not escaped unscathed; indeed, it has been severely affected. In a context of heightened geopolitical turbulence, the Islamic Republic of Iran now faces a dual challenge: to regain its prestige on an international level, and, simultaneously, to restructure itself internally so as to be prepared for the various scenarios that could rapidly emerge on the horizon.

Bluster on the international stage is no longer an option. Iran’s dual support for the Houthis and Hezbollah, in particular, must be carefully weighed in light of the risks involved, foremost among them those posed by President Donald Trump, who, for the time being, remains the most powerful figure on the international stage. Should China – his main competitor – force him into a direct, fierce confrontation with them, one could then expect President Trump to settle any dispute in a manner that safeguards his reputation and almost unassailable position. China has no desire to intervene in a Middle Eastern powder keg; it prefers to wait for the right moment to exploit the situation to its advantage.

Domestically, Iran must take preventive measures to prepare for all scenarios that could arise in the event of the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Three potential outcomes are conceivable.

First scenario – The religious leadership quickly appoints a successor to the Supreme Leader, and Iran remains as it has been since 1979. But do the Pasdaran truly have any ambition other than to follow the directives – at least ostensibly – of the Supreme Leaders? Could some of them harbour the aspiration, having already played the role of a “state within the state,” to become the real rulers of Iran? What would they do if, exploiting even a temporary vacancy at the top of the religious hierarchy, the population – particularly young people and women – took the initiative to spark a revolt, or even a popular uprising, or at the very least the first stirrings of one, to assert the Iranian people’s aspirations for freedom?`

Second scenario – Civilian authority seizes the reins of power. The choices and conduct of the President of the Islamic Republic, since assuming office, suggest that he is biding his time. Evidence for this includes the recent establishment of a National Defence Council (NDC) and the high-level endorsement of Ali Larijani, a moderate, to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Could this be a transitional arrangement intended to enable a swift move to seize power?

President Massoud Pezeshkian presumably expects that the population – particularly the youth and the country’s active forces – would support such an intervention. The circumstances surrounding his predecessor’s accidental death, which allowed him to ascend to the presidency, raise concerns and prompt the question of whether there was an intentional design to appoint the current president in order to pave the way for greater moderation.

Third scenario – The population would immediately and forcefully, if not violently, express its desire for change in the country’s governance, exhausted as it is under the weight of increasingly unbearable sanctions imposed on Iran. Public frustration is particularly heightened by the regime’s mistakes regarding women and young people. This discontent manifests itself, among other ways, through covert yet tangible actions carried out by Iranians living abroad or political refugees via social media networks. Such a situation risks escalating into a civil war, the outcome of which would be both uncertain and deeply concerning.

The second scenario would undoubtedly be the most desirable, yet it risks leading to clashes between the civilian authorities and the leaders of the Pasdaran. The stance of the regular army – which is not the strongest against the Pasdaran – and of the troops forming the backbone of the Revolutionary Guards will, of course, be decisive, as will any prudence or long-term vision exhibited by the Pasdaran leadership.

As for the third scenario, it is one that no one desires, either in the region or in the West – not even China. Nevertheless, a large-scale popular movement could be co-opted by the President, which would effectively return the situation to the second scenario. The worst outcome is therefore not necessarily inevitable.

For the time being, the Supreme Leader remains firmly in command. He is attempting to strengthen and consolidate national sentiment without relinquishing control, yet doing so in a measured, rational manner. Can a policy of “iron hand in a velvet glove” be maintained while achieving the goal of preserving a strong and united nation?

In the shadow of such a dual Iranian and regional context, are the regime’s senior figures today primarily concerned with the Houthis and Hezbollah, while Ali Khamenei is politically and personally weakened and facing Israeli threats? Probably not. If that is the case, the hour of Hamas and Hezbollah will have arrived.