Politics

Longevity is often mistaken for stability. In geopolitics, this is one of the most costly analytical errors. Some regimes do not survive because they are strong, adaptive, or broadly supported. They survive because they have learned how to manage decline: suppress dissent, fragment opposition, externalise internal failures, and stretch coercion beyond legitimacy. Over time, this creates an illusion of permanence. But permanence built on control rather than consent is, by nature, brittle. As we move into 2026, two states stand out as emblematic of this dangerous illusion: Iran and Venezuela . Both regimes are routinely described as resilient. Iran projects power far beyond its borders through an extensive network of regional proxies. Venezuela’s leadership has outlasted sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and economic collapse. To many observers, endurance itself has become proof of stability. That conclusion is deeply flawed. Regimes do not fail only when economies weaken. They fail when control mechanisms erode faster than legitimacy can be rebuilt . They fail when repression substitutes for consent, when founding narratives lose credibility, when elite cohesion frays, and when regional leverage no longer compensates for domestic exhaustion. This is the phase both Iran and Venezuela are now entering. In both cases, the foundational stories that once justified power have worn thin. In Iran, the nearly five-decade-old religious revolutionary narrative has lost its hold over a young, urban, hyper-connected population that no longer sees sacrifice, ideological purity, or permanent confrontation as pathways to dignity or prosperity. In Venezuela, the Chávez–Maduro Bolivarian project has degenerated into a system of managed decay, where regime survival depends less on ideology than on patronage, coercion, and the exhaustion of society. This is how modern regime failures unfold: not through sudden collapse, but through the accumulation of internal pressures inside tightly controlled systems — pressures that appear manageable until an external shock exposes their depth. States fail because they become overextended, internally hollowed, and unable to absorb stress. When that moment arrives, external events — even limited ones — can produce disproportionate consequences. In both Iran and Venezuela, domestic dynamics have reached the boiling point . Externally, both regimes are also confronting a quiet but decisive shift: their regional relevance is diminishing . For nearly half a century, Iran’s clerical regime has defined itself through two core pillars : establish a Shia crescent in the Arab World, competing for Muslim Leadership with Saudi Arabia and Qatar AND its ideological drive to destroy Israel, a prerequisite to establish its credibility in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Iran’s external strategy has profoundly destabilised the Middle East in the past fie decades. It has triggered civil war and famine in Yemen, fuelled the political and economic collapse of Lebanon, and prevented the emergence of a two-State solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by supporting Palestinian extremist factions. The October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas triggered a forceful regional response that severely degraded Hamas in Gaza, crippled Hezbollah ’s leadership structure in Lebanon, and significantly weakened the operational capacity of the Houthis in Yemen. Far from consolidating influence, Iran’s long-standing ambition to impose a “Shia Crescent” has exposed the limits of its power projection. That strategy is now yielding sharply diminishing returns. Iran’s proxy network has become more costly to sustain and less effective strategically. In Venezuela , the trajectory has been different but the outcome similar. Hugo Chávez rose to power in 1998 on a wave of popular anger against corruption and inequality, promising radical reform under the banner of the Bolivarian Revolution. What followed was not renewal, but institutional erosion: authoritarian consolidation, economic mismanagement, massive underinvestment, and one of the largest peacetime emigrations in modern Latin American history. Once a leading economy in the region, endowed with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela has seen its strategic weight steadily evaporate. Externally, its geopolitical utility to allies has narrowed as its economic, diplomatic, and regional relevance has continued to shrink. History suggests that the most dangerous phase for entrenched regimes is not open crisis, but the moment when governance gives way entirely to survival management . That moment has come. 2026 matters not because it promises a headline-grabbing event, but because it may mark the point at which delay strategies stop working . Leadership aging, succession uncertainty, generational rupture, information leakage, and declining external buffers are converging. When that happens, even tightly controlled systems can destabilize with remarkable speed. After weeks of attacks by US forces on Venezuelian drug-smuggling vessels and a tight blockade on its il exports, On January 3rd 2025, the US army carried out “a large scale strike against Venezuela and captured Nicolas Maduro and his wife” as announced by the White House this morning. Jan 3rd operation marks the final demise of the Bolivarian Revolution and a new beginning for Venezuela. When it comes to Iran and the Middle East, January 2nd meeting between Benyamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump, at the time where large scale popular uprisings in many Iranian cities may also point to a massive military operation by Israel in Iran in Lebanon, a prelude to the completion of the tectonic shift that has started on October 7th. Israel needs strong regimes at its borders to achieve a lasting peace. Syria and Lebanon are the two remaining missing pieces. Taking Lebanon’s Hezbollah away permanently and installing a strong regime in Lebanon is the next step. That also requires a radical change to its failed sectarian democratic system. And it needs to free itself permanently from the threat of Iran’s Mollah’s regime. The conditions are ripe for such action. And the time may have come.

It is not the first time that Iranians have taken to the streets to challenge their rulers. But this latest popular movement is distinguished by the mobilization of a new actor: the Bazaar merchants, considered one of the pillars of the Islamic regime. It all began on December 28, when Tehran merchants launched a strike to protest against hyperinflation and economic stagnation. The movement has since expanded to include political demands. Since the beginning of the protests, the authorities have adopted a dual approach, combining appeasement, by recognizing "legitimate demands" related to economic difficulties, and firmness against any attempt at destabilization. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in power since 1989, stated on Saturday, the seventh day of the popular uprising, that the economic demands of the demonstrators were "just" but that the "rioters" should be "put in their place"... Decades of popular dissent Protest movements have punctuated the life of the Islamic Republic since 1999. In July of that year, a student protest movement erupted, seeking to defend the reformist president Mohammad Khatami. The violent intervention of the Bassij virtually put an end to the protest. In June 2009, the disputed re-election of ultraconservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khamenei's favorite, triggered a protest movement denouncing fraud. The authorities eventually crushed the revolt with severe repression that left dozens dead and thousands arrested, thereby crushing opposition political and intellectual circles under the weight of often very heavy sentences. In late December 2017, hundreds of people demonstrated in Mashhad, the country's second-largest city, and in other cities against rising prices, unemployment, and the government. In November 2019, demonstrations were organized shortly after the announcement of a sharp increase in gasoline prices. Hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests were also reported. In July 2021, protests erupted against water shortages in the drought-stricken Khuzestan province. Meanwhile, in Tehran, people protested against electricity cuts. An increasing number of Iranian women are appearing bareheaded in public in Tehran and major cities, defying the obligation to wear the veil in force since the advent of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The last, and probably most bloody, uprising dates back to September 2022. The death in custody of Mahsa Amini, a young Iranian Kurd arrested for allegedly violating the dress code with a poorly adjusted veil, triggered months of demonstrations across the country, under the rallying cry "Woman Life Freedom!". Several hundred people died, including dozens of security force members, and thousands of protesters were arrested. An unprecedented mobilization Returning to the current wave of defiance, it has mobilized large cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and even the holy city of Qom, a bastion of Khomeinist thought, where a man was killed by the explosion of a grenade he intended to use. Some protesters did not hesitate to chant "death to the dictator!", the famous slogan launched against the Shah during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This slogan is now being used by the people against the tyranny of the mullahs... According to Lebanese journalist and Iran specialist Ali al-Amine, "for the first time, we are witnessing a movement that has emerged from within the Iranian bazaar," which, in his opinion, is "a significant indicator that will have a considerable impact." Mr. Al-Amine recalls that this "takes us back to the Iranian revolution, to its beginnings in 1979: what tipped the course of events at the time was the strike organized by the bazaar, which played a major role in the fall of the Shah's regime." Why the bazaar? "The mullahs' regime rests on three main pillars: the seminaries (the Hawza) and religious authority, the Revolutionary Guards, and the bazaar," says Ali al-Amine. "All previous movements took place outside this trio." He adds, "Today, the bazaar has entered the scene and even influences religious authority thanks to 'Khoms' (one-fifth or 20%), an Islamic tax that is an obligation for all Shiites. This tithe effectively serves to finance the clergy. Seminaries are funded by Khoms funds, etc. This money is always in the hands of the wealthy classes, i.e., the bazaar merchants." One ill, several triggering symptoms The Iranian streets are stirring because the country's economy is weakened by decades of Western sanctions related to its nuclear program. The chronic depreciation of the Iranian rial leads to hyperinflation (52% year-on-year in December) and high price volatility. Discontent is also generated by the consequences of "the 12-day war" that pitted Israel against Iran last June, during which Iran's nuclear facilities were hit by Israeli and American raids. "Iran is currently at a dead end," states Ali al-Amine. "Even during past demonstrations, Iran could always address its population by saying: 'We are at Israel's borders, we are at the Mediterranean borders, we control Iraq, we control Syria...' This constituted a kind of guarantee for the regime's internal survival." "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran!" The Iranian authorities also find themselves isolated after the blows dealt to their regional allies: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad's Alawite regime. Some Iranians harbor long-standing resentment against Tehran's financial and military support for these allies, while the country suffers economically. Iran International , a Persian-language television channel based abroad and critical of the government, reported a slogan "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran!", chanted by some demonstrators. "With its withdrawal from Syria and the revelation of its activities in other regions it had not previously targeted, Iran now faces several problems: growing internal crises, declining regional and international influence, strained foreign relations, and increasing American and Israeli pressure," continues Mr. al-Amine, before adding: "One of the most striking developments, according to Iranian sources, is that the demonstrations now involve both the middle and upper classes. Protests are observed in the heart of Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz, cities traditionally marked by movements from the affluent and middle classes, and this is another important indicator. These movements are among the options currently available to the Iranian regime, and their fate depends on the evolution of the situation." Ali al-Amine states that "Trump's declaration, according to which he will intervene to defend the protesters, is a significant indicator. It strengthens the motivation of the Iranian people and encourages them to mobilize!" Notably, Israeli Mossad last Wednesday called on Iranian protesters to intensify their social mobilization: "Come out together into the streets. The time has come. We are with you," Israel's external secret services emphasized on their X account, addressing the protesters in Farsi! Quo vadis? The options available to Iranians, given this internal and external stalemate, also depend on the evolution, duration, and escalation of events. "I believe that Iran is currently faced with a choice: either conclude an agreement and accept significant concessions regarding its nuclear and ballistic programs, or simultaneously negotiate a definitive agreement with the Americans, which would effectively amount to a surrender," states al-Amine. According to Ali al-Amine, "this is a major asset for the regime, and we could also witness the implementation of a plan already almost publicly discussed, aiming to replace the Supreme Leader with a three-member committee. This committee would include Khamenei's son, Mojtaba, a very close collaborator of his father and head of his office, effectively controlling the main state institutions and the decision-making process in Iran. This would pave the way for the concessions demanded by the Americans." State institutions are not limited to the religious apparatus or the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards). Mojtaba Khamenei also oversees a network of companies that form a kind of parallel economy, equivalent to 60% of Iran's GDP. The volume of this industrial, commercial, and energy empire has been estimated at 95 billion dollars by a Reuters study...

Like a play. Last act in Venezuela… The deus ex machina from the United States, so long announced, has finally intervened. Donald Trump's administration materialized its threats of a direct intervention on Venezuelan soil against the government of Nicolas Maduro, early Saturday, January 3, 2026. For the record, it's worth noting that it was also on January 3rd that Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force (part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), was assassinated in Baghdad in 2020, on the orders of President Donald Trump. It was also on January 3rd that the President of Panama, Manuel Noriega, surrendered to the Americans following a U.S. intervention in Panama. Returning to the operation of January 3rd, 2026, alongside air strikes launched near military positions in the capital Caracas and other regions of the Bolivarian Republic, Maduro was captured with his wife by a unit of US special forces and evacuated to the United States, where he faces criminal charges for drug trafficking. This US military operation obviously upsets the geopolitical landscape in Latin America and across the American continent, but its impact also extends beyond this part of the world. More specifically, for the populations of the Levant, the Middle East, and the Gulf generally, a fundamental question arises in light of these upheavals: will the fall of Maduro consequently weaken, by ripple effect, the already struggling Iranian mullahs' regime, especially in recent days? The American administration indeed affirms that close ties exist more than ever between Caracas and Tehran. The Islamic Republic would consequently be deprived of a precious ally at a time when it faces a popular uprising, an unprecedented socio-economic crisis, and increased American pressure. A second question arises acutely in this context for the countries of the Levant, and more particularly for Lebanon: will the changes in Venezuela truly contribute to further drying up the funding sources of Hezbollah, accused by the Trump Administration of exploiting the Maduro regime's card to engage in large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering operations? While awaiting credible answers to these questions and also more precise information regarding the developments of the last few hours and their short-term repercussions on Venezuela, three other equally fundamental questions arise concerning the circumstances and the short-term impact of the American intervention. First major question: was Maduro's “exit” the result of a negotiation? Despite the state of emergency and statements by Venezuelan officials, who early Saturday claimed not to know the whereabouts of the Bolivarian leader, the option of a negotiated exit had been mentioned by the media and Western chancelleries for several months. While American interventionism in the Caribbean Sea has been justified since mid-August by the fight against drug trafficking, the net tightened around Nicolas Maduro from the start, accused for several years by Washington of being at the head of the supposed Cartel de Los Soles, in addition to being called an illegitimate president. Nicolas Maduro had repeatedly called for direct talks with Trump, and recent visits by American officials to Belarus had hinted at a possibility of fleeing to Minsk. The equivalent of a Bashar in Moscow… An admission of weakness? The fact remains that an operation of this kind, like the one that occurred on January 3, takes the unprecedented form of a forced extradition; a scenario not seen in Latin America since the capture of Noriega in Panama in 1990. The fact remains that the idea of a negotiated exit is not new, knowing that the outcome of such a negotiation could only be to Maduro's disadvantage. But negotiations still allowed for saving face, in a way… A sign, no doubt, that Maduro had become aware of his lack of legitimacy in the face of the crises his country had been confronting since the great wave of repression in 2017. What about the short-term future? Second unknown, for now: should we expect a power vacuum in Venezuela? It must be noted in this regard that the opposition is fragmented in the face of Chavism. In 2017, Juan Guaido was President Trump's protégé in the wake of unprecedented demonstrations that had shaken the country, causing one of the largest exoduses in the world: according to the UN, more than 8 million Venezuelans have left the country since then. However, Guaido was relegated to the background in his golden retreat in Florida. Following the controversial 2024 elections, Edmundo González Urrutia had been declared the winner, but he had been forced into exile. Despite promises of return, it was ultimately Maria Corina Machado, recently honored with the Nobel Peace Prize, who was openly supported by Washington. This change of figure internally betrays a difficulty in maintaining a united and coherent opposition, especially since Machado's voting instructions were not followed by the opposition base. This is without counting a part of Venezuelan society committed to the ideals of Chavism and opposed to the American embargo. This public, beyond its appreciation or not of Maduro, maintains ideological – rather than concrete – support for the regime in place. In this context, it is important to emphasize President Trump's attitude towards Iran – Venezuela's great ally. Saturday's muscular intervention will obviously facilitate access to Venezuela's mineral, oil, and gas resources, but it also aims, and above all, to cut off Russia, China, and the Iranian axis. It remains to be seen whether internal dissensions in Venezuela will cause chaos that may have been underestimated by the United States. The fight against drug trafficking Last unknown, in conclusion: what impact should be expected at the regional level? The unprecedented deployment of American forces, especially since November 13, the official launch date of “Operation Southern Spear,” has as its proclaimed raison d'être the fight against drug trafficking. However, Venezuela is far from being, according to UN experts, the main producing country and the main transit country for cocaine. The first place in this regard goes to its Colombian neighbor. Colombia, led since 2023 by left-wing president Gustavo Petro, it should be noted, has experienced the worst bilateral relations in its history with the United States since President Trump's return to the White House. From the migratory issue to the Gaza war, via the fight against drug trafficking, almost everything opposes the South American leader to Donald Trump. Customs tariffs, visa restrictions, threats to end funding for the Colombian army, nothing works… The Colombian president was even placed on the famous OFAC Clinton list, putting him and several of his relatives under the purview of US Treasury sanctions. The question is whether, in the shadow of the current situation, the current escalation also concerns him, five months before the Colombian presidential elections which will take place in an unprecedented context of a shift to the right, since 2022, of elected governments in the countries of this part of the world.

It is a grave mistake to approach American and Israeli expansionism through the same lens, despite the apparent convergence of their projects at pivotal regional moments. Conflating them not only obscures the fundamental structural differences but also misleads us into understanding the nature of today's conflicts and the forms of control now exercised in the name of security, deterrence, or “stability.” Expansion, as a political-strategic concept, is not singular in its motives or tools, even when it leads to similar outcomes. What unites the United States and Israel today is not a unified project, but rather an overlap of interests and a shared set of tools, at a transitional moment in which the meaning of control and influence is being redefined. First: American Expansion… An Empire Without Maps Historically, American expansionism has not been geographical expansion in the classical sense of ancient empires or European colonialism. Since World War II, the United States has built its global influence on a different foundation: economic and commercial dominance as the core of power, and military force as a tool to protect this influence, not as an end in itself. Washington is not seeking territory to annex, nor flags to raise over the map. What it wants is: • Opening markets and integrating them into the American economy, • Protecting supply and energy routes, • Imposing the rules of the global financial system, • And controlling supply chains and technology. In this sense, American expansion is an expansion of economic space, not of maps. A country may be politically “independent,” but it is economically subservient, tied to the dollar, or dependent on international financial institutions, or reliant on the American market. Here, control is achieved without occupation, and influence without direct administration. Even American military intervention, when it occurs, is often presented as a means of ensuring this system: protecting allies, preventing market collapses, securing maritime routes, or containing forces that threaten global economic balances. Therefore, in recent years, Washington has tended to reduce direct military involvement without relinquishing influence, in a clear shift from “hard warfare” to “smart conflict management.” Second: Israeli Expansion… Land as Identity, Not as a Tool In contrast, the Israeli project is based on a radically different logic. Israeli expansion is ideological and historical, where land constitutes the core of the Zionist project, not merely a means. From the “Promised Land” to the doctrine of fluid borders, geography has remained an element of identity and survival, not simply a sphere of influence. In this context, expansion cannot be separated from Israel’s founding narrative, in which land is presented as: • a historical right, • a security guarantee, • a condition for the state’s existence and continuity. However, this logic, despite its ideological entrenchment, has clashed with political, demographic, and security realities that have made direct occupation more of a burden than an asset. Prolonged ground control has become costly on multiple levels: • Constant resistance drains the army, • Demographic burdens threaten the "Jewish character of the state," • Increasing international pressure deepens political isolation. Therefore, the Israeli project has not abandoned expansion, but rather redefined it. Third: From Occupation to Control… Expansion in its New Form In the current Israeli transformation, expansion is no longer synonymous with annexing or directly administering land. Today, expansion means controlling land without occupying it—that is, keeping it within the sphere of control, not within the state's borders. Here, air superiority and technological dominance emerge as modern tools of expansion. The skies have become the substitute for the land, and technology has replaced direct civil and military administration. This model is based on clear elements: • Open skies with no effective deterrent, • Intelligence and technological superiority that allows for constant surveillance, • The ability to strike whenever and wherever it chooses, • Imposing a diminished sense of sovereignty on adversaries. In this model, the land may not be officially occupied, but in practice, it lacks full sovereignty. Security decisions, freedom of movement, and even daily stability remain contingent on the will of the dominant power in the air. Fourth: Unity of tools… not unity of project Here, the American and Israeli logics converge, at least temporarily, not because the projects are identical, but because the tools of modern control have become shared. The United States, which manages its expansion through economics and markets, finds in this Israeli model a means of controlling the region without direct involvement. Washington does not object to Israeli air superiority as long as it: • Prevents a major regional conflagration, • Contains adversaries within certain limits, • Does not drag the United States into a full-scale war. Conversely, Israel benefits from this American cover to entrench its model of remote control, maintaining its deterrent capability without bearing the burdens of direct occupation. However, this convergence remains a convergence of interests, not a merging of projects. When American economic calculations clash with Israeli ideological impulses, the differences become clearly apparent, as seen in the limits of war, the timing of escalation, and the management of major crises. Fifth: Lebanon as a Model… Sovereignty Under the Sky This transformation is most clearly evident in the Lebanese case. Lebanon today is not an occupied state in the classical sense, but it is also not a fully sovereign state. The daily violations of its airspace and Israel's ability to conduct aerial and intelligence operations without real obstacles place the country at the heart of the new expansionist model. Here, there is no need to occupy the land: • The skies are sufficient, • Technology is sufficient, • And the distorted deterrence equation is sufficient to impose political and security realities. This is expansion in its contemporary form: no tanks on the borders, but control above them. No flags raised, only a sovereign decision suspended. Control at minimal cost… the most dangerous form of expansion. Ultimately, regional transformations cannot be understood without recognizing that expansion is no longer what it once was. That's it. Land is no longer a prerequisite for control, and occupation is no longer the sole form of domination. We are facing a phase where conflicts are managed with less blatant tools, but with deeper and more impactful ones. The United States manages its expansion through economics and trade, and Israel manages its expansion through air power and technology, but the shared objective is the same: control at the lowest cost and with the greatest influence. Herein lies the danger of the coming phase, because this type of expansion is less overt, more difficult to confront, and more capable of persisting… without being called by its true name.

Devastated by nearly a decade of civil war opposing the internationally recognized government to Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, Yemen is now facing a new fault line. A confrontation with southern separatists has upset the balance of the conflict and pitted two long-standing regional allies against each other: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Tensions escalated in early December when the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist movement supported by the United Arab Emirates but officially a member of the anti-Houthi coalition, seized vast territories in eastern Yemen, gaining control of the Hadramout province and a large part of the neighboring Mahra province. On Tuesday, Saudi Arabia carried out an airstrike targeting the port of Mukalla in the east of the country. Riyadh publicly accused Abu Dhabi of adopting "extremely dangerous" behavior by supporting the separatists, stating that its national security constituted "a red line." Emirati forces subsequently withdrew from Yemen following a Saudi ultimatum. The STC aims to re-establish an independent state in southern Yemen, a region that formed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen between 1967 and 1990, before its unification with the North. Hadramout, the country's largest province, covering nearly a third of the national territory, concentrates most of Yemen's oil fields, a key resource for public finances. The STC's advance allowed the movement to reach the Saudi border, in a region of historical and symbolic importance, from which several influential Saudi families originate. The Bin Ladens, Bakhachab, Al-Jafali, Al-Amoudi, and Al-Zamel all have "Hadrami" origins and own eponymous companies that play a major role in the Saudi economy. Damaged military vehicles, reportedly sent by the United Arab Emirates to support the separatist forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), following an airstrike carried out by the Saudi-led coalition in the port of Mukalla, southern Yemen, on December 30, 2025. (AFP Photo) While Riyadh states it prefers a stable and non-hostile Yemen on its southern border, Abu Dhabi's actions are part of a broader regional strategy. The United Arab Emirates seeks to strengthen its influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, relying on a network of allies in southern Yemen. Furthermore, for the past decade, Abu Dhabi has pursued an active foreign policy in the Middle East and Africa, particularly to counter movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which are considered by Emirati authorities to be a threat to regional stability. The United Arab Emirates has notably become Egypt's main financial backer since the overthrow of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. In Sudan, their support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), engaged in a war against the regular army, is an open secret. In Libya, Abu Dhabi supports Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who opposes the internationally recognized Government of National Accord. In 2020, the United Arab Emirates normalized its relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords, an initiative that Saudi Arabia refuses to join as long as there are no prospects for the creation of a Palestinian state. This normalization is part of a strategic convergence in the face of common adversaries, notably Iran and certain Islamist groups. Abu Dhabi has also strengthened its economic and security ties with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed independent territory of Somalia. The Dubai Ports World group has invested 442 million dollars in the port of Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden. Last week, Israel became the first state to officially recognize Somaliland's independence, a decision that the Axios website attributes, citing Israeli officials, to mediation by the United Arab Emirates…

The signing of a trilateral military cooperation plan between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus for 2026 marks a significant step in consolidating a security axis in the Eastern Mediterranean. Officially, the agreement, disclosed last Sunday by the Israeli army, provides for reinforced joint exercises, cross-training, and strategic military dialogue. But beyond its technical framework, it is part of a broader logic of collective deterrence, in a context of Turkey's rising military, diplomatic, and maritime power, particularly around exclusive economic zones, energy routes, and disputed airspaces. The project, discussed for several months, to establish a rapid reaction force - non-permanent but quickly deployable on land, at sea, and in the air - illustrates a major doctrinal evolution. It is no longer just about punctual or bilateral cooperations, but rather the progressive construction of a credible multinational operational capability. In a region marked by the war in Gaza, Syrian instability, persistent tensions in Lebanon, and competition over gas resources, this approach aims as much to prevent crises as to respond to them. Israeli Air Superiority In recent years, Turkey's actions have contributed to strengthening the shared sense of threat felt by Athens, Nicosia, and Tel Aviv: Repeated violations of airspace in the Aegean Sea, naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean, activism in Libya, and the desire to permanently anchor its influence in Syria have convinced these capitals that Ankara is testing regional limits. For Israel, the fear is that increased Turkish influence might eventually restrict its freedom of maneuver, particularly in Lebanese and Syrian airspaces. This trilateral dynamic is part of a broader regional framework, where energy security, freedom of navigation, and military projection are now closely intertwined. It also reflects a structural trend: the regionalization of security, as the direct involvement of major Western powers becomes more selective. At the same time, Turkey is multiplying initiatives aimed at consolidating its influence. Ankara is involved in the multinational force deployed in the Gaza Strip and is holding discussions with the two rival Libyan governments with a view to negotiating a new maritime agreement. Such a move could strengthen its dominant position in the maritime space of the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, to the detriment of its neighbors. The partnership between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus is not new. This military cooperation has developed continuously since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in 2003. As soon as Turkish airspace was closed to Israeli planes, Israeli air force pilots found a vast training ground in Greece. Joint exercises intensified, intelligence cooperation deepened, and in the early 2020s, this relationship became institutionalized through long-term defense agreements and significant arms contracts. In this context, the criticisms made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against the Israeli-Greek-Cypriot trilateral summit attest to the centrality of this strategic realignment. While reaffirming Ankara's support for Gaza, the Turkish head of state denounced any infringement of Turkey's "rights" in the Mediterranean.

The Gulf States have emerged and become rich, certainly, thanks to the exploitation of their resources, but they have carried out, through rapidly crossed stages, a true cybernetic conversion that amounts to a revolution in the proper sense. The era of soft power in which they engaged was achieved through reorientations, observations, transformations, and adaptations, thanks to which they became a regional power. They subsequently expanded their capabilities and developed their multi-service area of action, which conferred upon them a global status. But these states did not want to stop there. The dynamism that allowed them to achieve their sought-after goals did not stop at this stage. The will and energy that characterized all these existential transformations led them to board the train configuring a new world, that of networks, data, their processing and management: the world of flows, connectivity, and also of space. They are becoming important actors in the new globalization scheme; they are at the « smart power » stage. The United States is perceived as the protector in military and strategic terms. As for the rest: talk to everyone and intervene where their interests are perceived. Act in areas where they will increase their wealth, maintain their current status, in order to develop and strengthen their positions. This is why Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates wanted to be accepted into the BRICS+ group; Kuwait and Bahrain have submitted their candidacies. Are the Gulf countries in question powerful? Are they all powerful together? Independently of one another? Another way to ask the question: do they have the means of power? It appears clear that their power is relative and selective. Referring to Raymond Aron's succinct but well-founded definition, the Gulf States are far from being powerful. But all together, and each partially and individually playing their part, they assert themselves as an indispensable focal point in many regional and global problems. Their wisdom in many difficult-to-solve issues, their know-how as mediators, their asserted and often very clear political and strategic positions place them above certain countries where it would be futile, illusory, to engage in negotiations. Economy, Finance, Diplomacy, Listening, Intra- and extra-regional positions, Entry into BRICS+, Modern and quality armaments dedicated to their own defense, Industrial-maritime and port development, Trade, Tourism, Global sporting, cultural, artistic events: the list of their advantages is long. It constitutes proof of the multiplicity of their assets, conferring upon them an international stature. Their power is not what one might expect from great countries, but it is progressing. The transition from hard power to soft power was an evolution. The transition to smart power is a revolution at the end of which no one is yet able to say how far it will go and who the winners will be. Let's consider these Gulf States. Their power is their importance in all these sectors of excellence. Their will is to be present where the world already counts on them, where they believe their place should be. NB: The importance of this subject prompted the organizers of the 4 th edition of the Mediterranean Strategic Meetings (RSMed 2025), a conference organized annually in Toulon (France) since 2022 by the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES), to dedicate a round table to it in the program of October 8 and 9, 2025. Read on the same topic: The Gulf States, from oil to power (1/3) The Gulf States, from regional to international (2/3)

Somaliland's official recognition by Israel, announced last Friday by Benjamin Netanyahu, offers a new perspective on Red Sea security, the stability of the Horn of Africa, and global geopolitical balances. While the Israeli government intends to capitalize on the positive outcomes of its diplomacy, opinions diverge within the Hebrew State and worldwide. The territory of Somaliland, located in northwest Somalia, covers 175,000 km² and is populated by approximately five million inhabitants. It corresponds to the former colony of British Somaliland, while Italy had occupied the rest of the country. The territory declared its independence in 1991, while the Republic of Somalia plunged into chaos after the fall of the military regime of autocrat Siad Barre. Somaliland controls a strategic maritime facade on the Gulf of Aden, in the immediate vicinity of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a key passage connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Approximately 10% of global maritime trade transits through this area. Major strategic point For several years, this route has been weakened by attacks by Yemeni Houthis, supported by Iran, against commercial vessels, in a context of regional conflict expanded since the Gaza war. For proponents of recognition, this geographical factor is central. Israel, engaged on several security fronts, sees Somaliland as a potential platform for cooperation in intelligence, maritime surveillance, and the fight against asymmetric threats, particularly drones and missiles. Approximately 300 to 500 km from Houthi-controlled areas, the territory would offer a strategic depth similar to what Israel has developed with Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Iran. An Atlantic Council analysis revealed that traffic at Bab el-Mandeb dropped during the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and the International Monetary Fund estimated that the volume of trade at Suez had decreased by approximately 50% in early 2024. Political stability Beyond its location, Somaliland is presented by its supporters as a regional exception. For over three decades, it has had its own institutions: an elected Parliament, currency, army, police, and civil administrations. It has organized several pluralistic elections, ensured peaceful transitions of power, and maintained relative stability, contrasting sharply with neighboring Somalia, which is plagued by the Islamist insurgency of Al-Shabab and chronic political fragmentation. Alignment with the West Israel also highlights Somaliland's political alignment. The authorities in Hargeisa, the capital of the secessionist region, have sent numerous signals to Western powers, the United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, and now Israel, while displaying their hostility to Chinese, Turkish, and Islamist influence in the region. In a context of increased rivalry between major powers over strategic maritime routes, ignoring a relatively stable and cooperative actor would, according to this interpretation, be a strategic oversight. This recognition is also perceived as a message to Washington. Several Israeli officials and analysts believe that the United States should follow Tel Aviv's example. They emphasize that America's commitment to the principle of a 'unified Somalia' no longer reflects realities on the ground, and that Somaliland's stability rests precisely on its separation from Mogadishu's dysfunctional political system. Somaliland officials have also offered the United States access to a strategic port and a Cold War-era airstrip in exchange for official recognition. Tribal system However, this optimistic reading is challenged by some. Many experts indeed believe that the Israeli decision carries major risks and could prove counterproductive. The first criticism concerns Somaliland's internal fragility. Despite its image of stability, the territory is marked by deep divisions. Clan affiliation plays a central role in politics, land ownership, and representation. Hybrid war On a strictly military level, critics deem the idea that Somaliland can alter the strategic balance against the Houthis as illusory. The latter have withstood years of Saudi and American airstrikes and continue to disrupt navigation with inexpensive means. According to this analysis, only a ground campaign led by actors with structured armies and genuine political will could defeat them, capabilities that Somaliland does not possess. Host territory for Palestinians? This year, press reports indicated that the United States and Israel had approached Somaliland, among other countries, about hosting Palestinians from Gaza. Neither Somaliland, which at the time stated that no such discussions had taken place, nor Israel addressed this issue in their respective statements on Friday. Terrorist risk Another major risk concerns extremism. Al-Shabab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, immediately condemned the recognition and threatened to fight any Israeli attempt to 'use' Somaliland. Analysts fear that the strong anti-Israeli sentiment present in part of Somali society could be instrumentalized by Islamists to strengthen their recruitment and legitimacy, by presenting the Hargeisa government as an ally of 'Zionism' and a traitor to the Palestinian cause. All-out condemnations Diplomatically, the recognition has sparked a wave of condemnations. The African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, as well as key countries like Egypt, Turkey, and China, have reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia's territorial integrity. Many African states, themselves facing secessionist claims, fear the creation of a precedent. Even the United States, despite being courted by Hargeisa, refused to follow Israel. Donald Trump publicly dismissed immediate recognition, highlighting the potential diplomatic isolation of such a move. Saudi Arabia, for its part, expressed its opposition, reducing the impact of this initiative on a possible extension of the Abraham Accords. On Saturday, Tehran denounced a "malicious maneuver by the Zionist regime" and a "plot to disintegrate" Somalia. Asked by the New York Post about potential recognition by Washington, the US president replied "no," refusing to follow his Israeli ally. He added: "we're going to look into it," before wondering: "Do people actually know what Somaliland is?"... Between geostrategic opportunity and destabilizing factor, the real effects of this decision can only be measured with the passage of time and regional dynamics.

Who can believe that the Shiite community—especially that of South Lebanon—will withstand this perfidious war of attrition? Day after day, Israeli strikes taunt it, challenge it to retaliate, and impose a hellish pace. If, at the outset, Hezbollah’s restraint was synonymous with self-control, that is no longer the case. And the Party of God can no longer claim to be exercising self-discipline after a year of provocation. Hence the question of whether it will finally choose the path of confrontation or yield to the demands of disarmament ? Will the perseverance of the israeli army ultimately overcome the legendary patience of civilians? For discontent is rising among an exasperated Twelver population. Worked up to a fever pitch, it sees no way out of this conflict, nor any benefit in it. And who could still deceive it when the evidence is so clear: the day after October 7, it was sacrificed on the altar of Palestine, and now, a year later, it is immolated on the altar of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Hezbollah will have to answer to its own supporters, who stood by it in difficult times. Sooner or later, it will have to give an account. After all, by accepting the terms of the ceasefire, it backpedaled. It can no longer claim the mantle of resistance, so much is it entrenched in retreat and contraction. “Per un pugno di dollari” This low-intensity war—long-term nonetheless—is exhausting, if only for the mental health of civilian populations. Disarray and anxiety in the face of the imbalance of forces engaged! It is practically a game of clay-pigeon shooting, where the aggressor risks nothing, while victims fall at a steady rate and the South’s communication routes are rendered impassable by the threat from the sky. Do you think there will long remain recruits willing to go to their deaths “per un pugno di dollari” at the end of the month? As a matter of fact, that is exactly what is happening. Israel can strike Lebanon without fearing reprisals against Nahariya, Metulla, or Kiryat Shmona. In this sense, it is the indeed the Party of God that guarantees Israel’s impunity while sending its fighters to almost certain death in perilous zones. And all this under the pretext of rebuilding its arsenal and its military capabilities! When will the great reckoning come? This situation cannot go on. Grumbling and dissent within Shiite circles are beginning to gain media attention. Ismail al-Najjar, a YouTuber known for his angry tirades, exclaimed very recently: what is Hezbollah waiting for to take up the gauntlet Israel has thrown in its face? If it backs away once again from confrontation, all that will remain is to “recite the Fatiha over it”. In other words, its popularity is finished. And in his bluster, this imprecator went on: it is too much humiliation! What does a general conflagration matter, or even a catastrophic end? So then, let us hasten the Twilight of the Gods and let the ravaging fire devastate the entire region! That said, it is quite possible that certain mindsets lend themselves to an apocalyptic vision of the end times—a vision that would hasten the birth of a regenerated world, a catharsis bearing the promise of collective redemption. Such thinking may make sense for adherents of millenarianism! But since we are compatriots, and since we share, to some extent, the same Lebanese destiny, allow us a brief interruption: we did not sign a Faustian pact with Mephistopheles—any more than with a Pasdaran or a Houthi. So please, do not drag us down with you in your fall!

The American military operation against the jihadist group Daesh (Islamic State or IS) launched last Friday to Saturday night follows the attack perpetrated on Saturday, December 13, by the terrorist organization against American and allied forces in Syria. This attack was carried out by a member of the Syrian security forces, embarrassing the Damascus government, which is trying to get closer to the United States. While "more than 70 targets" were hit across the country, US President Donald Trump spoke of "very heavy reprisals". Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth announced on X that it was a "direct response" and a "declaration of vengeance" after the attack on Saturday that killed two American servicemen and a translator in Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that at least five IS members were killed in the strikes in Deir Ezzor province. Among them was "the head of an IS cell" in charge of drones, added the NGO, which is based in the United Kingdom but has a vast network of sources in Syria. A member of the Syrian security forces is reportedly involved in the Daesh attack against US soldiers, thus embarrassing President Ahmad al-Chareh, who is trying to get closer to the United States and recently joined the Washington-led international anti-jihadist coalition. After dissolving the military and security bodies of Bashar al-Assad, whom he overthrew a year ago, interim President Ahmad al-Chareh integrated the Islamist groups allied with him, including foreign jihadists, into the new army. This is the first time such an attack has been reported in Syria since he came to power. Earlier, the spokesman for the Syrian Ministry of Interior had stated that the forces of the international coalition, led by Washington, had not heeded Damascus' warnings regarding a risk of Daesh infiltration. "There were prior warnings from the internal security command to partner forces" in the Palmyra region, spokesman Anwar al-Baba told state television. A Syrian military official, who requested anonymity, indicated that the firing broke out while Syrian and American officers were gathered at a Syrian security outpost in Palmyra. The United States Central Command (Centcom) announced from its headquarters in Tampa, Florida, that it had launched Operation « Hawkeye » (Hawk's Eye) on the orders of the commander-in-chief. « Centcom forces struck more than 70 targets in several locations in central Syria using fighter jets, attack helicopters, and artillery, » the command's statement said. « Jordanian armed forces also provided support with fighter jets. The operation used more than 100 precision munitions targeting known Daesh infrastructure and weapons sites, » the statement added. Jordanian Participation « This operation is crucial to prevent Daesh from inspiring terrorist plots and attacks against US territory, » said Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of Centcom. « We will continue to relentlessly pursue terrorists who seek to harm Americans and our partners throughout the region. » « Following the December 13 attack against US and Syrian service members, US forces and their partners conducted 10 operations in Syria and Iraq, resulting in the neutralization or capture of 23 terrorists, » the statement continued. The strikes targeted IS cells in the Homs, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor regions, according to a Syrian security source. Neighboring Jordan said it had supported this operation aimed at "preventing extremist organizations from exploiting" southern Syria to launch attacks "threatening the security of its neighbors and the region". The Jordanian army expressed concern about "the reconstruction of IS forces". Israel, which also shares a border with Syria, for its part, affirmed that it had "apprehended" on Wednesday in the south of that country an "alleged terrorist affiliated" with IS who was brought into Israel. Nearly 80 Operations « Since July, US forces and their partners in Syria have conducted nearly 80 operations to eliminate terrorists, including Daesh elements, who posed a direct threat to the United States and its interests abroad, » the Centcom statement added. « Over the past year, Daesh has organized at least 11 plots or attacks against targets in the United States. In response, Centcom operations have resulted in the arrest of 119 terrorists and the death of 14 of them over the past six months, thus disrupting Daesh's efforts to reconstitute itself and inspire terrorist attacks globally, » the statement continued. « Last month, US service members from the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve collaborated with the Syrian Ministry of Interior to locate and destroy more than 15 sites housing Daesh weapons caches in southern Syria. The joint operation resulted in the destruction of over 130 mortars and rockets, numerous rifles, machine guns, anti-tank mines, and equipment used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. « We have now conducted several collaborative campaigns with the Syrian government to counter specific Daesh threats, » said Admiral Cooper. « These are tangible security gains that we can achieve on the ground through close cooperation with Syrian government forces. » What about the American contingent in Syria? « The deployment of our forces to eliminate these individuals strengthens the security of the United States and the region, » Cooper said. « We will continue to work closely with our Syrian partners to track down IS networks and prevent their resurgence. » During the war in Syria, triggered in 2011 by pro-democracy demonstrations, IS had controlled vast territories, including the Palmyra region, before being defeated by the international coalition in 2019. Despite its defeat, its fighters, having retreated into the vast Syrian desert, continue to carry out sporadic attacks. Donald Trump's return to power, generally skeptical of US troop deployments abroad, raises the question of maintaining this military presence. The Pentagon had announced in April that the United States would halve the number of American soldiers in Syria, whose current total strength is not officially known. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), based in the United Kingdom but with a vast network of sources in the country, the visit of the American delegation to Palmyra "is part of a US strategy aimed at expanding its presence in Syria," particularly in desert areas. Present in Syria for several years, the Americans established a base in Al-Tanf in the south of the country in 2016, at the intersection of the borders of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. They are also present in the provinces of Hasakah and Raqqa, to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the Kurds of "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan). They are fighting pro-Iranian militias based in the Deir Ezzor region. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the Kurds and supported by the United States, hold a portion of the eastern bank of the Euphrates. They gained these territories by fighting with the support of the Washington-led coalition against Daesh. Indeed, the SDF were the spearhead of the fight against IS, which was driven from its strongholds in Syria in 2019, after a rapid rise in power in 2014 and the conquest of vast territories in that country and neighboring Iraq. Daesh was officially declared "defeated" in 2019 in Baghouz, on the Syrian-Iraqi border. The international coalition also has bases at the Al-Omar oil field, the largest in Syria, as well as at the Conoco gas field.