Politics

In Iran, two parallel scenes are unfolding today. Two scenes that do not cancel each other out, but rather exacerbate the critical situation: streets seething with sporadic but persistent protests, and an authority that responds with increasingly brutal repression, carried out jointly by the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader. This parallel does not reflect balance, but rather fear. Regimes confident in their power do not need such a level of sustained violence, while regimes in crisis know that any security breach could lead to their collapse. However, the most serious question concerns not only the Iranian regime's ability to withstand internal pressures, but also the repercussions of any instability or potential collapse on the entire region. Iran has never been a country isolated from its crises, but rather the center of a transnational network of influence, carefully constructed over more than four decades. Any crack at the center will inevitably have repercussions on the periphery. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the regime has rested on a clear equation: an ideological legitimacy that takes precedence over the popular will, and an effective instrument of repression that protects this legitimacy by force. Today, the first pillar is eroding with the expansion of social, economic, and political protests, while the second is weakening, as the Revolutionary Guards are forced to act as a domestic police force rather than an instrument of regional expansion. This paradox is not a mere detail, but a structural flaw that strikes at the very heart of the Iranian project. Every hour the Revolutionary Guards spend suppressing domestic dissent is an hour lost for exerting influence abroad. Every escalation of domestic security measures increases the cost of the regional project—politically, financially, and morally. Consequently, increased repression does not necessarily mean that the regime will be stabilized; It could rather indicate that the country is entering a prolonged period of attrition, where the crisis is being managed, but far from resolved. In this context, two main scenarios emerge regarding the outcome of the Iranian crisis. The first is that of a regime that manages to contain the demonstrations through excessive violence, while preserving the cohesion of state institutions and the Revolutionary Guards. In this case, the regime does not collapse immediately, but is forced to retreat to the regional stage, and the absolute priority becomes maintaining domestic power. The second scenario is that of repression that could fuel unrest, leading to large-scale demonstrations and plunging the country into an uncontrollable spiral of escalation. This could pave the way for a political collapse, rapid or gradual, but with profound consequences. In Yemen, this development directly affects the Houthi movement. This group, whose rise was linked to Iranian support, will see its Iranian funding, weaponry, and expertise diminish. As the crisis in Iran intensifies, resources allocated to external issues, particularly those of lesser strategic importance, will be reduced. Consequently, the Houthis may be forced into a political agreement guaranteeing them a minimum of influence, or they risk internal disintegration under the pressure of the war, the economy, and the local social fabric. In Iraq, the impact of the Iranian withdrawal will be more complex. The militias linked to Tehran, accustomed to operating under the aegis of a powerful regional coalition, will be forced to redefine their role. Without unconditional support, divisions will emerge between factions seeking to "Iraqi-ize" the decision-making process and those favoring escalation to preserve their gains. In this context, the intensification of repression in Iran, initially a source of strength, becomes a weakness, as it deprives these forces of their symbolic and political cover and opens a breach—albeit a perilous one—allowing the Iraqi state to regain some of its sovereignty. Lebanon, by its very nature, absorbs the repercussions of regional crises even more rapidly. Hezbollah, as the most organized extension of the Iranian project, will be directly affected by the reduction in Tehran's funding and support capabilities. With the intensification of repression in Iran, the party is losing some of the moral legitimacy that has long served to justify its transnational ideological role. This reality presents it with a double dilemma: either maintain its arsenal in the absence of regional protection, or reposition itself politically within the Lebanese state. In this context, the question of the political calendar in Lebanon appears crucial. Holding elections at the height of Iran's incomplete withdrawal could give pro-Tehran forces an opportunity to regroup. Many believe that any technical postponement, given the decline in funding and military support—especially after the "war of support" and the devastation it caused without a clear prospect of reconstruction—could accelerate the erosion of the Shiite duo's popular base and reveal the extent of the social crisis facing their supporters. Here, the debate is no longer merely constitutional, but fundamentally political, linked to the evolving balance of power in the region. At the regional level, the convergence of growing protests and fierce repression in Iran signals the beginning of an unstable transitional phase. The Gulf States are observing cautiously, aware that Iran's weakness could be an opportunity to restructure regional security, but also carries a risk of chaos. Israel sees Tehran's focus on its domestic affairs as an undeniable strategic advantage, but fears the potential for escalation. Turkey, for its part, is preparing to fill any potential vacuum, particularly in Syria and Iraq. The intensification of protests in Iran, met with unprecedented repression by the Revolutionary Guards, does not mean the regime has won the battle. Rather, it has entered a protracted phase of attrition. At this stage, the question is no longer simply when the regime will fall, but how, at what cost, and at whose expense in the region. The fall of the Iranian regime, should it occur, would not be an event to celebrate, but a perilous moment demanding strong nations and astute political elites. Without them, the collapse of this center of power could degenerate into widespread chaos… with no alternative.

Welcome to Tropic Thunder , a five-part short series by Levant Time designed to help you understand the different reasons behind the current U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean. This series was completed 48 hours before the American attack on Venezuela.

Bogota, Colombia, by Maxime Pluvinet In the Colombian capital, spontaneous gatherings have been organized in recent days, bringing together Venezuelans, most of whom are political refugees. Most of them supporters of the opposition, they are celebrating the fall of former Bolivarian leader Nicolás Maduro, captured on January 3 by the United States. Report. In Bogotá, Lourdes Square was for an hour covered with the three horizontal yellow, blue, and red stripes, adorned with eight stars, that characterize the Venezuelan flag. A few dozen members of the diaspora gathered on Sunday to celebrate the fall of former Chavista president Nicolás Maduro, captured by the United States during a lightning operation in central Caracas. “We are satisfied” Despite the victims of American airstrikes, including 32 Cuban soldiers, many of them support Donald Trump's intervention, calling it the best short-term option. For Jaylin, a Venezuelan in Colombia since 2018, “it’s an honor, a joy to be able to count on this new Trump Administration, which we like.” Smiling, she has high hopes for Washington's support, “even if some say they will steal the oil, if it benefits us in some way, we are satisfied.” The joy is shared by Gaby Arellano, a politician and member of the opposition in exile. For her, as María Corina Machado, one of the leaders of the Venezuelan opposition and recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, declared in a statement, “the hour of freedom has struck.” Happy about the fall of Nicolás Maduro, she castigates the Chavista government by repeating the accusations made by the Donald Trump administration: “This system in power that we are confronting is a criminal system, mafias that have connections with Hezbollah, who not only harm Venezuelans, but are linked to global drug trafficking.” For Gaby, there is no doubt: 2026 will be the time to return to her native country. “If there is freedom for political prisoners and the guarantee of the Constitution, believe me that all political exiles from around the world will arrive, in the time it takes an airplane to reach Caracas.” “The people, that’s all of us” José Cova, however, does not have the same certainty. While he joyfully celebrates the fall of Maduro, he does not yet believe in the immediate return of opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, whose portrait is displayed everywhere by demonstrators alongside that of María Corina Machado. “Our will is to see Urrutia and Machado return soon to exercise their mandate obtained through popular vote (in the August 2024 elections)… However, for now, there is a transition process, we do not know how long it will take… but it will happen, and must happen for peace and justice.” But José is well aware of one thing: Chavismo has its supporters in the country. The army in particular, that institution on which Maduro and his predecessor Chávez had staked everything for their security. “There is also a question: when we talk about the people, we are talking about everyone. And among the people are the armed forces. For now, control of the army still belongs to the representatives of the current government. People designated by Nicolás Maduro himself, people he surrounded himself with, thinking he would be protected, and that was not the case.” In the meantime, the Trump Administration does not seem to be betting in the short term on the opposition coming to power, having even stated that María Corina Machado did not enjoy popular support in Venezuela. Furthermore, Delcy Rodríguez, a central figure of Chavismo and vice-president of the Venezuelan regime since 2018, has been appointed interim president by the Chavista authorities. A nomination under tutelage, however: Donald Trump has publicly threatened her administration, stating that the United States now exerts direct pressure and control over the political situation in Venezuela. And without forgetting to remind Delcy Rodríguez that, if she does not follow Washington's directives, a fate similar to or worse than Maduro's awaits her.

Bogota, Colombia, by Maxime Pluvinet An impromptu development that occurred in the middle of this week could significantly impact the ongoing events in Latin America. A thaw in relations is (timidly) emerging between the United States and Colombia, as relations between the two countries have been particularly tense for several months. Accused by Washington of facilitating the actions of drug traffickers in the American continent, particularly targeting the United States, Colombian President Gustavo Petro was recently targeted by American sanctions. This bilateral tension escalated significantly following the 'blitz' operation carried out on January 3rd in Caracas by American forces. This intervention led to the arrest by a US commando unit of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who was then extradited to the USA. Following this aggressive attack, President Donald Trump pointed the finger at the Colombian head of state, implying that he could be one of the next targets in the fight against drug trafficking. But an unexpected development occurred on this front in the last forty-eight hours: just as President Petro was preparing to deliver an incendiary speech and heavily criticize the Trump Administration, a telephone conversation took place between the head of the White House and the Colombian president. According to reliable sources in Bogota, this telephone conversation took place in a relaxed and serene atmosphere. As a result, Petro's speech was much less virulent than observers had expected. In diplomatic circles in Bogota, it is indicated that this turnaround marks the beginning of a thaw between the United States and Colombia. A process of frank discussions and talks would have been initiated 'with the blessing of Saudi Arabia and certain European countries,' according to diplomatic circles. A meeting was notably held at the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a representative of the Trump Administration. « This is a first step on the path of a long bilateral dialogue process that must cover several dossiers of primary importance, including the lifting of sanctions against President Petro, who should be able to travel to Washington to conduct negotiations with President Trump, » affirms a high-ranking diplomatic source in Bogota. This dynamic, if confirmed and brought to fruition, will undoubtedly introduce a significant new element into the delicate geopolitical chess game currently being played out in the American continent.

The question of the Iranian regime's future today arises not as a theoretical question, but as a consequence of the unprecedented accumulation of internal crises and external pressures since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. However, the importance of this question lies not only in the fate of Tehran, but also in the repercussions of any change within the Iranian decision-making center on its regional structures, notably Hezbollah in Lebanon, considered the most successful model of a 'functional weapon' beyond Iranian borders. First: The nature of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah The impact of any upheaval in the Iranian regime on Hezbollah cannot be analyzed without a precise description of the nature of the relationship between the two. This relationship: • Is not a circumstantial political alliance. • Is not limited to financial or military support. • Is based on an ideological, organizational, and strategic link. Hezbollah emerged in the context of the export of the revolution and developed according to the doctrine of the 'Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist' (Wilayat al-Faqih), which confers a supranational character on its supreme authority. Therefore, any modification within this center of authority affects not only the level of resources, but also the legitimacy of its role, function, and decision-making power. Second: The Iranian regime between security resilience and structural erosion The Iranian regime demonstrates a clear capacity to control the population through: • The cohesion of the Revolutionary Guards. • Control over key sectors of the rentier economy. • The management of repression at a calculated cost. However, this cohesion masks a structural erosion manifested by: • A decline in popular legitimacy. • The rupture of the social contract. • The transformation of ideology from a mobilizing force into a burden. • A silent division within the elites between the logic of the state and that of perpetual revolution. This model, structurally, resembles historical ideological systems that did not collapse at the height of protests, but rather when they lost the ability to manage their internal contradictions. Third: Historical Comparison – Lessons to Apply 1. The Soviet Union The Soviet Union did not collapse as a result of a direct popular revolution, but rather due to: • Prolonged economic exhaustion. • The inability to reform ideology from within. • The loss of control over the periphery before the collapse of the center. Proxy parties in Eastern Europe did not collapse immediately, but they suddenly lost their function when the center disappeared. This model can be partially applied to Hezbollah if Iran's ability to finance and provide strategic protection to it diminishes. 2. The Shah's regime Despite a different context, the fall of the Shah demonstrates that: • Powerful institutions are insufficient if they hesitate at the decisive moment. • Legitimacy, once lost, cannot be restored by force. • External forces cannot save a regime that has lost its internal cohesion. Ironically, the regime that overthrew the Shah is today facing a similar dynamic, with the difference that it possesses a network of regional armed groups. 3. Arab regimes after 2011 The Arab experience has shown that: • Regimes do not always fall, but they lose their ability to maintain total control. • Affiliated armed groups become more aggressive as central power weakens. • Fragile states pay a double price for this weakness. Fourth: Possible scenarios for the impact of Iranian transformation on Hezbollah 1. Continuity and gradual decline In this scenario, the regime remains in place, but its ability to: • Provide substantial funding. • Manage open confrontations. • Protect its allies from international pressure is reduced. This would lead Hezbollah to: • Reduce the stakes of engagement. • Focus on internal issues. • Redefine its priorities. 2. Compensatory tensions A regime in crisis could resort to: • Regional escalation. • The use of its allies as a means of deterrence. This scenario is the most dangerous for Lebanon, as it transforms the Lebanese arena into a space for compensating for the weakness of the central government. 3. Strategic transformation If a fundamental change occurs in the structure of the Iranian regime, Hezbollah will face a historic choice: • Either transform into a full-fledged Lebanese party, with all necessary redefinitions of its armament and role. • Or find itself confined to a specific environment, accelerating its internal isolation. Fifth point: Lebanon, a fragile system facing external transformations Lebanon is not merely a spectator of this trajectory, but an integral part of it. The weakness of the Lebanese state: • Makes any regional upheaval more devastating. • Prevents the absorption of shocks. • Transforms internal divisions into instruments of external conflict. Conversely, any decline in Iranian hegemony theoretically opens an opportunity to restore balance, but this opportunity remains conditioned by the existence of: • A comprehensive national project. • The ability to manage the transition without resorting to vengeance. • The will of the Shiites to break the monopoly of representation. Therefore, even if the imminent collapse of the mullahs' regime cannot be predicted with certainty, it can be affirmed that this regime has entered a prolonged period of structural instability. In such phases, the pillars of the regime do not collapse immediately, but gradually lose: • The clarity of its functioning. • The solidity of its support. • The ability to impose previous power structures. Given its fragility, Lebanon will be the first affected, not by the final collapse itself, but by the process of erosion. The real challenge is not to predict the end of the Iranian regime, but to assess Lebanon's capacity to confront a Middle East where Tehran is no longer able to exert its influence as before.

Welcome to Tropic Thunder , a five-part short series by Levant Time designed to help you understand the different reasons behind the current U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean. This series was completed 48 hours before the American attack on Venezuela.

Welcome to Tropic Thunder , a five-part short series by Levant Time designed to help you understand the different reasons behind the current U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean. This series was completed 48 hours before the American attack on Venezuela.

Welcome to Tropic Thunder , a five-part short series by Levant Time designed to help you understand the different reasons behind the current U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean. This series was completed 48 hours before the American attack on Venezuela. Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State, Quito, Ecuador, September 5, 2025: “Nicolás Maduro is a drug trafficker charged in the United States and a fugitive from American justice.” This accusation, repeatedly hammered home by Washington for several years, is currently Donald Trump’s main justification for the operations carried out in the Caribbean Sea. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is also under U.S. sanctions, accused in particular of leading an organization recently designated as terrorist by the United States: the Cartel of the Suns. A name that may evoke, in the collective imagination, the same reality as other organizations such as the Medellín Cartel led by Pablo Escobar in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, or the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel in Mexico. However, the structured and hierarchical nature of the Cartel of the Suns has never been proven. It is above all a journalistic expression that emerged in the early 1990s to describe the system of endemic corruption and clientelism in Venezuela, which intensified under the Bolivarian Republic starting in 1999. It is worth recalling that Venezuela has been governed since 1999 by a government stemming from the Chavista movement founded by Hugo Chávez, which claims a socialist identity and nationalized certain key sectors, such as oil. Since Nicolás Maduro came to power in 2013, the regime has maintained this ideological line while facing a severe economic, political, and social crisis, worsened by international sanctions and internal tensions. But let us return to the accusations of drug trafficking against Venezuela, labeled a narco-state by the United States: Since September 2025, the United States has conducted a military campaign in the Caribbean and the Pacific targeting vessels described as “narco-boats,” with at least 30 boats attacked and more than 100 people killed, including at least one case of a double strike intended to kill survivors. Washington claims these vessels are linked to drug trafficking, but no public evidence has been provided to substantiate these accusations: neither geolocation coordinates nor lists of the names of those killed. International law experts and some U.S. officials have denounced these operations as potential extrajudicial killings, pointing to the lack of transparency and possible violations of international law, while some allied governments have expressed concern over the absence of concrete evidence. The designation of Venezuela as a narco-state is itself problematic: international data significantly qualify this narrative. According to the UN World Drug Report, Venezuela does not rank as a significant global producer of cocaine, unlike Colombia, which accounts for the majority of worldwide production and trafficking. The “narco-state” accusation rests mainly on claims that Venezuelan territory is used as a transit route, but this corridor would represent less than 5% of total cocaine flows to the United States, according to the same UN sources. Independent analysts emphasize that most shipments destined for the United States first pass through Colombia and then Mexico, and that the Pacific route is in fact far more heavily used—something international reports have confirmed for years.

Welcome to Tropic Thunder , a five-part short series by Levant Time designed to help you understand the different reasons behind the current U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean. This series was completed 48 hours before the American attack on Venezuela. EPISODE 1 — Operation Southern Spear Over the past few months, the Caribbean Sea has once again become an area of heightened geopolitical tension. On August 14, the United States ordered a massive military deployment to the southern Caribbean, mobilizing U.S. Navy units, Marines, and air power, in what some analysts describe as the largest concentration of U.S. forces in Latin America in decades. Since November 13, the U.S. Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, has officially launched the ongoing operation, known as Operation Southern Lance . By the end of December, as many as 15,000 personnel are deployed as part of this operation. Among the assets involved is a carrier strike group centered around the USS Gerald R. Ford , the largest aircraft carrier in the world, as well as a nuclear-powered submarine. One additional detail: the USS Ford had previously been deployed in the eastern Mediterranean due to the various conflicts in the Levant since 2023. Officially, U.S. President Donald Trump claims that this mobilization serves a clear priority: fighting drug cartels and organizations labeled as “narco-terrorists” operating in the Western Hemisphere. From Caracas, however, President Nicolás Maduro denounces what he describes as an attempt at regime change—an accusation Washington denies. Thus, while the fight against drug trafficking remains the stated justification, the buildup of naval, air, and ground forces near Venezuela’s coastline raises questions about Washington’s true strategic objectives, amid growing pressure on the government of Nicolás Maduro, which the United States considers an illegitimate regime. One final important point: the anti-drug offensive declared by Donald Trump claims to target cocaine trafficking routes. Yet while cocaine consumption is increasing in countries of the so-called Global North, in the United States it is primarily the opioid crisis—particularly the extremely potent fentanyl—that lies at the heart of an unprecedented public health emergency. This crisis caused tens of thousands of deaths last year alone. Fentanyl, a synthetic drug, is not produced in the Caribbean; it mainly originates in China.