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In Lebanon, moderation is summoned whenever the country approaches the brink of explosion, only to recede once the distribution of power begins. Moderates are asked to calm tensions, smooth over differences, and keep the doors of dialogue open, while the forces most capable of obstruction are left to determine the terms of the settlement. In this sense, moderation is assigned a role in containing crises without necessarily having the ability to alter the conditions that produce them. This is where its fundamental crisis lies. A moderation that limits itself to preventing the worst remains bound by other people’s agendas. It waits for escalation before calling for calm, for obstruction before seeking a way out, and for division before proposing common ground. These roles may be necessary in moments of danger, but they are not enough to build a future. Lebanon needs a form of moderation that has a vision of government, that can take the initiative, confront challenges, and organize, and that can explain to people what will change in their lives if they place their trust in it. For that to become possible, moderation must be freed from the confusion that equates it with simply standing halfway between opposing sides. In disputes over spending priorities, economic policies, or the management of public utilities, multiple legitimate choices exist, and compromise is part of democratic politics. But when the issue concerns the primacy of the state, the submission of everyone to the law, and citizens’ right to choose their representatives without intimidation, compromise should concern the means of applying these rules, not the principle of adhering to them. Here, moderation is clear about its objective, gradual in its methods, and accountable for the consequences of its actions. This distinction is essential when it comes to Hezbollah’s weapons. The state’s monopoly over military force and over decisions of war and peace is a basic condition for the existence of a national authority accountable to its citizens. Upholding this principle does not require hostility toward Hezbollah’s social base, nor does it justify ignoring Israeli attacks or the fears experienced by the people of southern Lebanon. Rather, it requires a serious answer as to how they are to be protected, how the army is to be strengthened, and how the conditions for stability, return, and reconstruction are to be secured. Firmness in principle must be accompanied by political, security, and social action that makes the transition to the state both possible and credible. Yet moderation loses its credibility if it is firm toward weapons while remaining tolerant of the capture of institutions. Calls for a single authority are inconsistent with treating the administration as a system of political shares, the judiciary as a shield, and public funds as a source of influence. The state that the Lebanese are being asked to trust must itself change. President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural address linked the monopoly of arms with reform of the administration. The political task is to turn that connection into a program of action, so that citizens feel that restoring the authority of the state also means restoring their rights within it. This is where the deeper issue emerges. Citizens may want the state, yet remain tied to the leader or party that meets an immediate need. When access to medical treatment, employment, or the completion of an administrative procedure depends on mediation, the political relationship becomes part of managing everyday life. It is not enough to urge people to free themselves from clientelism without providing them with a reliable alternative. Those who can afford to do without an intermediary can easily condemn dependency. Those who need one to gain admission to a hospital pay for their independence with their own and their family’s security. Building moderation therefore requires reducing the cost of citizens’ independence. Every public service delivered as a clearly established right, every job made available on the basis of merit, and every administrative procedure completed without intervention expands the space in which Lebanese citizens can make political choices freely. In this sense, institutional effectiveness becomes part of changing the balance of power. Political loyalty takes on a different meaning once it is no longer a condition for obtaining the most basic rights. For the same reason, moderation needs a clearly defined economic and social content. The word “reform” is not enough unless it is explained who bears the burdens, who receives protection, and how opportunities are distributed. In the financial crisis, for example, progress toward an agreement with the International Monetary Fund is a path with clear legislative and financial requirements. But a political project must also be judged by its position on the distribution of losses, the protection of small depositors, accountability, and the restoration of financing for productive activity. Any settlement that hides these choices behind technical language leaves people outside the decision that will determine their future. Moderation has sometimes been associated in many people’s minds with the ability to reach an understanding with everyone. Yet any serious reform will collide with the interests of groups that benefit from the status quo, and any removal of a privilege, opening up of competition, or subjection of appointments to publicly declared criteria will generate opposition. The moderate therefore needs to accept the cost of taking a position. Anyone who makes the approval of all political forces a condition for action gives every vested interest the power to block it. This confrontation can be pursued within the law, with clear arguments and openly declared alliances, without sectarian mobilization or accusations of betrayal. This leads to the link that is so often missing: organization. It is not enough to have respected figures, experts with solutions, or a public exhausted by conflict. The political capacity of a moderate current requires institutions that bring these people together around common priorities, distribute responsibilities, choose representatives, and hold them accountable after they reach power. It also requires a permanent presence in municipalities, trade unions, universities, and neighborhoods, where trust is built through accumulated work. Nor should this presence reproduce networks of loyalty under a new label. If moderates provide services in exchange for support, they have adopted the very mechanism they criticize. Their role is to help people gain access to their rights, expose the reasons those rights are obstructed, and work to make them available to everyone. They also need transparent financing, internal rules for accountability, and leadership rotation. A project that calls for a state of institutions should demonstrate in its own structure the ability to move beyond the dominance of a single individual. It is also wrong to assume that a ready-made moderate majority exists, waiting for someone to speak on its behalf. Fear of war does not mean agreement on defense policy, and rejection of corruption does not automatically produce agreement on economic reform. Such a constituency must be built through dialogue over interests and choices and by testing cooperation on specific issues. It may bring together people who disagree on many matters but agree on the primacy of the state and on the rules of political competition and accountability. This agreement allows them to manage their differences without turning them into mutual threats. Moderation also cannot be confined to one sect or place on a single community the permanent burden of compromise. It needs partners within different constituencies who acknowledge their fears without turning them into justifications for permanent privileges. It needs a discourse that protects people’s right to their identities and affiliations while affirming that their political and civil rights do not pass exclusively through the leaders of those communities. In this sense, moderation becomes a project for changing the way power is exercised: from bargaining over shares to competition over programs, from protection granted by an influential patron to a right guaranteed by an institution, and from settlements that postpone conflict to rules that allow it to be resolved. Such a project requires patience, but it also requires declared deadlines and objectives, so that gradualism does not become yet another pretext for delay. The real test of Lebanese moderation begins with its ability to produce this organized force and to present commitments for which citizens can hold it accountable. The calmness of its discourse then becomes an expression of confidence and capacity, and dialogue becomes a means of achieving a clear objective. Moderation that possesses nothing more than a call for moderation, by contrast, will remain in demand when explosion draws near and marginalized when the time comes to decide what follows.

Warnings about the risks associated with the development of artificial intelligence are mounting and, with increasing urgency, are overtaking every other threat in the news, whether war, environmental and climate concerns, or financial collapse. Progress in this field is advancing at such a rapid pace that there seems to be no turning back, with machines emerging from laboratories every day that are capable of moving independently, working in teams, and making complex decisions. This technological revolution now threatens to give rise to an ideology of its own, a form of technological totalitarianism carrying immense promises and dangers that cannot be ignored. Most recently, images of robots in the streets breaking free from control and seizing the power of their developers have sounded alarm bells in more than one quarter. How can a robot trained in a laboratory escape and kill humans? Is it not dangerous to continue manufacturing robots equipped with increasingly powerful guns, such as the “ThunderMax 9000,” which is to equip the future “Death-Machine-8,” currently in the testing phase? Likewise, should laboratories really continue designing highly capable, extremely autonomous, and heavily armed defense systems? And should financial interests ever be allowed to prevail over humanity’s ethical imperatives? Warnings are multiplying, along with concerns raised by Pope Leo XIV, amid numerous questions about the future of this fifth industrial revolution. They come in the wake of the uproar caused by Microsoft founder Bill Gates’s remarks about risks that have become serious enough to enable events that could result in “the death of a billion people,” whether through non-state actors manufacturing biological weapons, hackers, or runaway AI agents launching cyberattacks against foreign companies or infrastructure. Yet something even more dangerous is unfolding beyond what is happening on Earth. A new space race is currently under way, but this time the competition is not about space exploration. It is about weaponizing space. The United States has become the first country to acknowledge deploying weapons designed to establish control in space in order to defend itself against adversaries. The United States has not specified what these weapons are, but military experts have speculated that they could include lasers or high-powered microwave systems designed to disable satellite electronics, or even offensive satellites using robotic arms to seize enemy spacecraft or push them out of orbit. China was quick to condemn the American move, saying it opposed any “arms race in space.” Russia likewise stressed that space should remain free of weapons. This militarization of space is another discouraging example of the erosion of the international governance framework established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Negotiated at the height of the Cold War, the treaty was a remarkable achievement. Today, it enjoys the support of 118 countries. It enshrines principles according to which space should remain a common domain for all humankind and prohibits the deployment of any weapons of mass destruction in orbit, even as numerous countries and companies compete for strategic and commercial advantages. More than 80 countries now operate satellites, with a total of 18,000 satellites currently orbiting Earth. Elon Musk’s “Starlink” service accounts for more than half of them. Even more alarming, however, is the prospect of any country beginning to destroy its adversaries’ satellites. The nightmare scenario is that cascading space debris could make it impossible to operate any satellites in low-Earth orbit for generations, a phenomenon known as the “Kessler Syndrome.” This is in addition to the use of such weapons, which has already begun in the war in Ukraine and in the Middle East, in what amounts to a double betrayal of humanity and a departure from the very concept of deterrence, under which all sides know one another’s capabilities and understand the potential consequences of their actions. U.S. President Donald Trump showed a degree of openness when he found time to hold candid discussions on the matter in Washington with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping. Hence the need to agree on basic standards for oversight, model testing, and the creation of containment mechanisms to reduce risks. There is a similar need for clear rules of engagement regarding artificial intelligence and nuclear and space weapons systems. Moreover, the greatest challenge may come from competitors developing powerful models they do not fully understand and cannot control, without complying with safety regulations. Chinese officials are explicit in viewing America as the primary source of threats to AI safety, through its intensive use of AI-generated content to produce cyberweapons. China is seeking to broaden the range of technical tools used to assess risks and deepen international cooperation, particularly with countries of the Global South, while strengthening bilateral negotiations with the United States in areas where it believes it is lagging behind. The challenge now is to turn such concerns into a basis for discussions at the forthcoming G20 summit in Miami on December 14 and 15, to which Russian President Vladimir Putin has been invited. China may be prepared to establish a “leadership group” on artificial intelligence and wants an equal say in determining what should collectively be considered safe. The likely starting point would be a comprehensive agreement on artificial intelligence that eases shared concerns over rogue models and agents. Such an agreement would also require the participation of European Union countries, which remain behind in the global race. At the same time, messages to the summit warn of the threat posed by advanced artificial intelligence models, or Frontier AI , to cybersecurity, as well as the risks of “more serious scenarios involving simultaneous financial-market disruptions across multiple companies or technological interdependence,” calling on finance ministers and central bank governors to impose safeguards on the technology. A letter issued by the Bank of England, whose governor also chairs the Financial Stability Board, underscores the extent to which the guardians of the global financial system are concerned about the risks of AI-assisted cyberattacks capable of penetrating external institutions and creating fake identities to deceive those carrying out tests. This further exposes existing vulnerabilities, including inflationary pressures, higher interest rates, the growing influence of investors, and inflated equity valuations. There will be attempts to persuade the United States to reconsider its permissive approach to regulating a technology that threatens the financial system and beyond, while financial innovation itself could undermine the dollar’s dominance in global finance. Rising public debt, concerns over the erosion of central-bank independence, and the weaponization of the dollar through financial sanctions are all encouraging diversification away from the currency. Policymakers around the world now speak incessantly about moving away from the dollar, while gold’s share of central banks’ international reserves has risen sharply. The dollar’s share of foreign-exchange reserves now stands at 57 percent, compared with 71 percent in 2000. The “dollar privilege” that allowed the U.S. Treasury to issue debt at relatively favorable interest rates has also almost disappeared. This undoubtedly paves the way for multipolarity. The Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and Swiss franc have increased their combined shares of cross-border payments and reserves. Yet the sheer size of U.S. capital markets compared with those of other countries remains a major advantage, alongside America’s first-mover advantage in enabling private-sector innovations in settlement technologies that reinforce the dollar’s dominance. Conversely, countries that try to insulate themselves from these new technologies will be the most vulnerable. They need to develop broad, well-regulated financial markets, maintain disciplined monetary and fiscal policies, and strengthen the rule of law in order to confront reckless U.S. policies at a moment when trade, technology, security, and geopolitics are increasingly intertwined. Perhaps most troubling of all is the absence of any currency capable of anchoring the confidence of global investors amid disruptions that cannot be halted and that could lead to catastrophe in the Middle East, where everyone speaks in their speeches of peace, security, and growth, yet does little to stop the war and secure stability.

From Gaza to Yemen, via Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, the deadly attack by the Palestinian Hamas against Israel on October 7, 2023, will remain in the collective memory as the starting point of military and political upheavals all pointing toward the establishment of a new regional order. In Israel, where the memory of the attack—which killed more than 1,200 civilians—was marked by several commemorative ceremonies on Wednesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to “complete the mission” launched on October 7, 2023, referring to Tel Aviv’s relentless war against Hamas. He spoke of a “settling of accounts that is not over,” without specifying, however, whether this “mission” is limited to Hamas or also includes its backer, Iran, which is held responsible for this large-scale operation. As is well known, the October 7 offensive had a domino effect, triggering, with unusual speed, a series of events whose consequences would have been hard to imagine in peacetime. Who would have imagined that Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime could fall, that Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran would be decapitated and weakened, or that Lebanon itself could witness, under Washington’s auspices to be sure, direct talks with Tel Aviv aimed at curbing the murderous madness unleashed on its soil since Hezbollah decided to come to Hamas’s aid the day after the attack? No end in sight Three years later, the Middle East is certainly no longer the same, but the end of the path onto which it was catapulted remains out of sight. The war raging in Yemen between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-backed government forces, with control of a strategic crossing point in the Red Sea at stake, confirms the deadlock in which the region remains trapped. For some, it is a natural consequence of the lull observed by Israel and, above all, Washington on the regional front, as both are focused on their upcoming elections—October 27 for Israel and November 3 for the United States. But a number of factors raise fears that, in the long term, a kind of cold war could take hold in the region, one that would be highly damaging to countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, which are expected to free themselves from Iranian influence. These concerns stem from the outcome of the events unleashed on October 7, 2023, and in particular from the difficulty the United States and Israel have faced in achieving their war objectives. Although decapitated, Iran retains a significant capacity to cause harm. Even though it has lost some of its positions in the region, its proxies can still act as troublemakers. The war in Yemen is a perfect example: the Houthis, who entered the fray after the weakening of Hezbollah, Iran’s main military arm in the region, have shown that they can simultaneously threaten Saudi Arabia, maritime routes, and even U.S. and Israeli interests in the region. More importantly, the fact that they opened the Bab el-Mandeb front just as Israel was preparing to commemorate October 7 cannot be insignificant. Through this group, Tehran is still seeking to show that the dynamics of the conflict remain unchanged and that it continues to hold cards allowing it to assert itself as an indispensable regional player, despite the enormous pressure being exerted on it. Iranian threats made on Wednesday by an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official, who announced an upcoming blockade of “illegal maritime routes” in the Strait of Hormuz, point in the same direction. In Lebanon, not only has Hezbollah still not been neutralized—mainly because Lebanese politics remains hostage to the calculations and timidity of those in charge—but, according to Reuters, it continues to receive logistical support from the Islamic Republic. The news agency reported on Wednesday that Hezbollah received $200 million from Tehran last month to help its supporters displaced by the war with Israel, citing “two people directly informed about the transfer.” If this information is confirmed, questions can be raised about the effectiveness of the measures taken to choke off Iran and dry up the funding sources of its proxies. In Gaza, all Hamas has managed to achieve, at the cost of horrific losses, is to put the Palestinian cause back at the center of the international debate and delay Riyadh’s accession to the Abraham Accords.

An alliance activated for the first time The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is undergoing a profound transformation as the Yemen issue within the Mecca Pact officially shifts from a theoretical security agreement to an active military operational plan. Following a major Houthi strike near the holy city of Medina and aggressive advances by the group along the strategically vital Red Sea coast—advances that have been reversed in recent days—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan convened an emergency meeting in Riyadh on October 5, 2026. This critical gathering triggered the first-ever invocation of the alliance's mutual defense pact since its initial signing in August 2026, marking the start of concrete military coordination and a series of military deployments: Pakistani forces, long deployed on Saudi soil, are set to reinforce their presence, while Turkey, whose involvement had been limited to military advisers, is preparing to send troops. After a hesitant start, concrete commitment This immediate activation marks a decisive turning point, as Turkey and Pakistan had initially been especially hesitant. When it was signed on August 7, 2026, the original text provided very little detail on the actual military obligations of each signatory, initially fueling skepticism among international observers. In the face of the first Houthi missile barrages in September, Ankara and Islamabad had been reluctant to intervene militarily or respond to requests for assistance, preferring not to jeopardize their respective roles as potential mediators in the broader conflict between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. Saudi Aramco facilities ablaze after Houthi strikes near Riyadh. (AFP) Many experts noted at the time that Pakistan favored mediation over intervention, while Turkey chose to showcase its technological capabilities without formally committing to an open conflict. Furthermore, the lack of a unified military command and the time needed to develop operational interoperability, as with NATO's historical processes, cast doubt on the short-term credibility of this security architecture. Pakistan, the alliance’s manpower pillar However, the severity of the recent direct attacks on Saudi territorial integrity forced both nations to overcome their initial reservations. Already maintaining a permanent presence of more than 15,000 military personnel assigned to training and operational support missions in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is preparing to deploy a substantial reinforcement of as many as 20,000 to 25,000 additional soldiers, backed by air-defense systems and advanced drone technology. In response to the activation of the Mecca Alliance, these strategic forces are being deployed across several critical areas of the Kingdom: a major component is being stationed at air bases and near infrastructure along the Saudi-Yemeni border, while reinforced security arrangements are protecting energy facilities and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina against the threat of Houthi strikes. At the same time, although Islamabad's official position strictly favors protecting Saudi territory in order to avoid a direct conflict with Iran, Pakistani personnel and advisers operating under contract have also reportedly been present more discreetly in southern Yemen, particularly in Aden, illustrating Pakistan's growing integration into the peninsula's security architecture. Turkey, the technological shield for energy infrastructure For its part, Turkey, which has maintained a contingent of more than 200 military advisers and electronic warfare experts on Saudi soil since 2025, is preparing to significantly expand its presence. Although the exact size of this new military contingent is still to be determined and must be approved by the Turkish Parliament in October 2026, the deployment plans could include the establishment of a permanent Turkish military base in Saudi Arabia. The Turkish armed forces' main mission will be highly strategic and strictly defensive: they will be responsible for protecting and securing four of the Kingdom's most important energy facilities, including major gas and electricity production sites. To this end, Ankara will deploy its own short- and medium-range air defense systems, as well as its most advanced electronic warfare technologies, in order to create a protective denial bubble against the threat posed by Houthi missiles and drones targeting the Saudi economy. A NATO-inspired model and unified command in Riyadh Under this now-activated pact, which will operate according to a collective deterrence model resembling that of NATO—whereby an attack on one member is considered an attack on all—Turkey and Pakistan are deploying forces directly on Saudi soil. To manage this influx of troops and oversee the complex strategic and political coordination required by the crisis, the alliance has formalized its command structure by appointing former Pakistani Army general Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as secretary-general. He will direct operations from the alliance headquarters in Riyadh. Objective: break the Houthis' warfighting capacity The Mecca Alliance's immediate operational objective is to systematically degrade and eliminate the Houthis' capacity to wage war, an effort that has already triggered major aerial and technological escalation across the region. The Saudi-led coalition has significantly increased its air support for the internationally recognized Yemeni government's troops, mobilizing an armada of more than one hundred modern fighter jets meeting the most advanced U.S. standards to carry out large-scale offensives that, according to government forces, have already destroyed hundreds of Houthi military targets. Turkey's formal entry, alongside Pakistan, brings NATO's second-largest standing army into this theater of operations, introducing an overwhelming force combining advanced electronic warfare capabilities, cutting-edge drone technology, and formidable defensive power, thereby profoundly altering the balance of power. Limits of the engagement: no ground troops in Yemen Despite this display of overwhelming strength, the alliance still faces deep structural frictions and the long-term complexities of the Yemeni issue. Although the current activation is based on defensive troop deployments within Saudi borders and aggressive air support over Yemen, carried out by the Royal Saudi Air Force, direct air or ground intervention by Turkish or Pakistani infantry in Yemen's mountains remains highly unlikely. Such a move would entail massive domestic political risks for Ankara and Islamabad, while also risking a regional expansion of the conflict involving Iran. The Red Sea: the next front By contrast, the maritime front along the Red Sea is likely to become an extremely active theater of operations; Houthi forces are aggressively pressing toward Taiz in an effort to encircle it, and their return to the vicinity of the Bab al-Mandab Strait remains a possibility if they manage to mount a counteroffensive. Consequently, a coordinated naval effort involving the alliance is highly likely to secure these vital global shipping lanes, especially since the Turkish and Saudi navies are active in the Red Sea and off the Horn of Africa. Shadow diplomacy: the delicate Iranian issue At the same time, the alliance's diplomatic strategy will likely focus on further isolating the Houthis and choking off their logistics. This will require delicate handling, as Pakistan and Turkey must carefully preserve the balance of their diplomatic relations and their shared borders with Iran. This means the alliance will rely heavily on intense behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure on Tehran to withdraw or reduce its support for Houthi advances. However, Tehran will undoubtedly demand a price, complicating the backchannel process. Toward a controlled military stalemate Recent developments suggest that the Yemen issue will take the form of a massive air and air-defense campaign designed to block Houthi movements and protect Saudi Arabia from reprisals, thereby imposing a stalemate on the ground without becoming bogged down in a prolonged war of attrition.

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa was in Riyadh on Tuesday, where he was received upon arrival by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for talks focused on regional developments and bilateral relations. This was Mr. Sharaa’s third visit to Saudi Arabia, the first country he visited in February 2025 after overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. He returned to the kingdom in April of the same year as part of a tour of the Gulf countries. The aim of that tour, which also included Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Türkiye, Jordan and Egypt, was to reintegrate Syria into its natural Arab environment. Mr. Sharaa’s visit to Riyadh comes as Saudi Arabia is engaged in an open war with the Houthis in Yemen. His trip is certainly not related to the conflict, but at the same time, it cannot be entirely separated from it. His visit, it should be stressed, comes amid regional geostrategic shifts and a realignment of the balance of power that Iran is precisely seeking to counter. Through the Houthis, the Islamic Republic is putting its future as a regional power on the line, as it sees its influence significantly diminished after having succeeded, in a predominantly Sunni environment, in establishing a network of Shiite proxies that helped bolster its regional power. In Yemen, Iran is therefore playing for the highest stakes. On the ground, Yemeni government forces, backed by Riyadh, which has mobilized hundreds of aircraft for this purpose, say they are advancing. On Tuesday, they said they had retaken strategic positions around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on the Red Sea, which the Houthis had managed to control in late September. Information on the matter, however, remains contradictory. The pro-Iranian group denied the Yemeni forces’ claim. Its spokesman said the group had repelled “several Saudi attempts to advance toward Bab el-Mandeb.” He also claimed an attack on Riyadh airport using drones, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. On the night from Monday to Tuesday, the Houthis had targeted three other airports in the south of the kingdom. The Saudi General Authority of Civil Aviation remained silent on the attack targeting Riyadh airport, but reported strikes on the three other airports, saying three people had sustained minor injuries and that there had been material damage. The Houthis also warned airlines that Saudi airspace was “not safe.” An Expanded Sunni Coalition? Although they may have inflicted significant losses on the pro-Iranian group, government forces and Riyadh are struggling to achieve military superiority without the international support they have been denied. President Donald Trump, who once again expressed his support for Saudi Arabia on Tuesday in its war against Iran’s allies, does not want to become involved in a conflict that could spiral out of control. Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, have agreed to “immediately begin implementing the mutual defense agreement” signed in Mecca in August. On Monday, Ankara and Islamabad said they would provide Riyadh with “the agreed-upon military forces and capabilities and rapidly deploy them in the kingdom.” But the announcement primarily points to “a defensive deployment” aimed at intercepting Houthi missiles and drones, Hamish Kinnear of Verisk Maplecroft told AFP. Ankara and Islamabad, he noted, remain “reluctant to be drawn into a war with Iran and keen to preserve their role as mediators between Washington and Tehran.” The lukewarm stance of Riyadh’s two allies could be seen as a boon for an Iran determined to maintain its grip on Yemen, which shares a border with Saudi Arabia, and to keep up pressure on both Riyadh and maritime trade in the Red Sea, without directly intervening in the conflict. The question is whether, in light of the shifting balance of power in the region, Iran’s strategy is sustainable. It could, in fact, have the opposite effect and accelerate the process set in motion by Washington when it launched its war against the Islamic Republic: neutralizing Tehran’s military power and weakening its influence. At the same time, it could contribute to consolidating, and even expanding, the Sunni coalition around Saudi Arabia. The recent rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, following a period of tensions, points in that direction. The Islamic Republic no longer has a foothold in Syria. It has been weakened in Lebanon, where the power of its military arm, Hezbollah, is now limited to verbal sparring and threats of retaliation, as once again demonstrated by a speech delivered by its leader, Naim Qassem, on Tuesday. The same is true in Iraq, where the process of disarming pro-Iranian armed factions is underway, despite the posturing of some of them.