


Pierre-Antoine Donnet, AFP’s Beijing correspondent from 1984 to 1989, a specialist on China and Tibet, and editor-in-chief of the quarterly Asia Magazine since 2024, emphasized in a recent interview with Pierre Verluise, founder and director of Diploweb: “We have reached a point where one of China’s greatest assets may not be its actual power but its ability to establish the perception of its power—a perception (…) that fails to take account of China’s many vulnerabilities.”
What, then, is “power,” and what are we to make of the idea that power could assert itself without being truly real?
In Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (1962), Raymond Aron defines power as the ability of a political entity to impose its will on other political entities. This ability rests on military strength, economic and technological power, political and social cohesion, geography, resources, diplomacy and alliances, as well as prestige and international influence. This echoes Mr. Donnet’s remarks about China—or rather, about how many commentators perceive China.
Power thus appears, in a sense, to be relational. It is exercised, asserted and exists only in comparison with the power of other states, or with how other states judge and assess a state’s degree of power.
A definition of power
Regardless of how other states perceive a state’s power, power means imposing “one’s will” in order to “act—get others to act—prevent others from acting—compel others to act” (R. Aron).
On this definition, power is an attitude, an aptitude and a determination that enable a state to acquire all the capabilities needed to assert, impose and exercise it in implementing its grand strategy. This overarching policy requires taking all the necessary measures and decisions to acquire power and put it into practice:
Act: act freely to achieve one’s own objectives.
Get others to act: induce other states to act in the desired way through persuasion, influence, incentives or pressure.
Prevent others from acting: deter or block another state from taking an action it wishes to pursue.
Compel others to act: this is where coercion comes into play.
R. Aron also distinguished potential power—the resources available to a state—from effective power—the ability to turn those resources into real influence.
From definition to reality
These preliminary observations are useful and applicable to the issues discussed in a series of articles published in Levant Time* concerning command of the seas, maritime power and naval power. A state may possess a large navy or an extensive coastline, along with a large exclusive economic zone (EEZ), all of which represent potential power. But only its ability to control maritime spaces and defend its interests at sea demonstrates genuine, effective power. Military strength and wealth are not enough.
As explained in the articles cited above, power may be exercised in a given region, but not necessarily on a global scale.
Such a policy and its associated strategy draw on broad instruments, particularly in the maritime domain, such as:
- Force (the actual use of military assets).
- Persuasion (diplomacy, maritime diplomacy through the deployment of formidable assets, influence and soft power).
- Deterrence (dissuading others from taking action, maritime diplomacy).
- Coercion (compelling others through threats, sanctions or limited action).
This analytical framework is particularly useful for examining maritime power. A powerful navy not only ensures freedom of navigation (the ability to act), but also protects its own trade routes (the ability to act and get others to act), blocks those of an adversary (the ability to prevent others from acting), or imposes a blockade, enforces maritime control, or forces shipping to use alternative routes (the ability to compel others to act).
As outlined in the three-part framework mentioned earlier, maritime power and sea control are distinct concepts. The former describes overall potential; the latter, an operational capability.
Maritime power is a state's ability to use the sea to defend its interests, secure its prosperity, and exert international influence. It is one of the foundations of national power. The concept encompasses political, economic, industrial, and military dimensions: it describes the resources available to a country. Today, the US merchant fleet has shrunk considerably, and both civilian and military shipbuilding capacity is inadequate. Although still undisputed, US maritime power has nonetheless weakened compared with its position at the turn of the century.
Sea control is a strictly operational and military concept: it describes what a navy can do, or prevent others from doing, in a given area. It refers to a navy's ability to operate freely in a maritime area, protect its own ships, and deny an adversary the use of that same area. Sea control may be global, local, temporary, total, or partial. It is achieved through naval, air, and undersea superiority, along with intelligence dominance.
Raymond Aron's Concept of Power Applied to Current Situations
Strait of Hormuz
US sea control is heavily contested in the Strait of Hormuz, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, despite lacking maritime power, exercises local sea control through unconventional naval capabilities. This sea control is itself unconventional, being limited in both space and time.
The superiority of US naval and naval aviation assets challenges established definitions and principles of sea control. Unconventional means and methods producing unconventional sea control may be a new reality!
In the Red Sea
To ensure safe passage through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which links the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, naval forces from the United States (Fifth Fleet), France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and China have been deployed, supported by air assets based in Djibouti.
Three international arrangements are particularly important: the European Union's EUNAVFOR Aspides, covering the strait and the Red Sea; EUNAVFOR Atalanta, combating piracy north of Somalia; and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which brings together 47 countries and coordinates several task forces, including CTF 151, dedicated to counter-piracy operations. Regional forces from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Yemen, and Djibouti provide support.
The Houthis, who exercise partial control over the strait, possess ballistic and anti-ship missiles, attack and reconnaissance drones, and remotely controlled explosive boats. These are supported by intelligence and coastal surveillance capabilities, as well as the means to control stretches of coastline and islands in the strait.
In conventional naval terms, the balance of power is overwhelmingly in favor of the international powers. However, the Houthis retain a significant capacity to disrupt shipping, potentially making navigation dangerous and costly.
It is clear that even obvious naval superiority cannot ensure absolute control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as long as the threat from Yemeni land-based and coastal forces persists. The ability to “act” does not guarantee the ability to “get others to act” or to “prevent others from acting.” “Compelling” action would entail direct intervention, with troops on the ground.
In the Black Sea: the Russia–Ukraine conflict
This is not a maritime theater for either “getting others to act” or “compelling them to act.” It is a mix of “acting” and “preventing others from acting.”
A theater with no strategic depth: skirmishes, pinprick attacks, strikes with no follow-through, blows intended to inflict pain. But inflicting pain is itself a form of action.
In the South China Sea
By contrast, this is an area of “acting” and “preventing others from acting.” China violates the rules laid down by the international community under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. It takes possession of a chain of uninhabited islets and reefs, develops them, equips them with infrastructure and airstrips, and firmly—even violently—denies access to states that consider them their own.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued an award in favor of the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute. The tribunal also concluded that none of the disputed islands or shoals, such as Scarborough Shoal, generates an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its own that would allow China to justify its broader claims.
China has chosen to disregard the ruling and continues to appropriate almost the entire South China Sea within a nine-dash line. This affects not only the Philippines but also Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Taiwan in various ways: claims to islets, encroachment on EEZs, attacks on fishermen operating in waters purportedly within China's EEZ, and so on. China acts as it sees fit and prevents other countries from acting.
Taiwan, still supported by the United States, Western countries, Japan, and Australia, has not only military but also industrial and technological assets that can deter China from attempting to seize the island by force. The US Navy, in particular, remains capable and powerful. At present, China can neither “act,” nor “get others to act,” nor “prevent others from acting,” nor compel action. This will remain the case as long as Xi Jinping stays cautious and measured, as he has been so far. But for how long?
A textbook case: the Falklands War
During the Falklands War (April–June 1982), the British sought to control the surrounding waters by unilaterally establishing an exclusion zone, outside the framework of international law, in which Argentine ships and aircraft could be treated as military targets. The aim was to isolate the Falkland Islands militarily, prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching Argentine forces, protect the British naval force, and prepare for a landing.
This is an interesting historical example of control over maritime areas through a combination of law, deterrence, and the establishment of an exclusion zone. On April 12, 1982, a 200-nautical-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone was established around the Falklands, applying to all Argentine naval warships and auxiliary vessels. On April 30, 1982, the measures were strengthened with the introduction of a Total Exclusion Zone, applying to any vessel or aircraft present in the area without authorization from the British Ministry of Defence.
On May 2, 1982, the British submarine HMS Conqueror torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano while it was outside the 200-nautical-mile Total Exclusion Zone. The British justified the attack on the grounds that the vessel posed a military threat and maintained that their right to self-defense was not confined to the boundaries of the exclusion zone. The operation remains politically and legally controversial.
The British position is particularly relevant to the study of control over maritime areas, an approach that can be summarized as follows: define an exclusion zone, notify states and maritime and aviation operators, detect and identify, and deny access. Although a unilateral declaration does not establish a right to prohibit all foreign vessels from navigating through the zone or their aircraft from flying over it, the British acted, prevented others from acting, and imposed their own way of operating by bending international law to their will.
*Changing the rules of the naval game worldwide (1/3)
*Sea control, naval power, maritime power (2/3)
*Russia, Ukraine, Iran, China, Japan: naval or maritime powers? (3/3)























