Why Reject Rubio’s Tutelage Only to Give Iran Power of Attorney?

One can oppose US policy, question Washington’s ability to exert pressure on Israel, and criticize any negotiating track that fails to protect Lebanon. These are legitimate political rights, indeed obligations when territory, people and sovereignty are at stake. But arguing that the state made a mistake by choosing Rubio’s track and should instead have joined the Islamabad talks raises a question simpler than all the analyses: where would Lebanon sit under this alternative? And who would speak on its behalf?

If the idea is to have Iran negotiate the Lebanese file as part of its own talks, then what is being proposed is the surrender of national decision-making to another state. The disagreement becomes one over the identity of the power exercising tutelage, while Lebanon is reduced to an item on the negotiating table, waiting for others to decide its fate.

What is striking is that some of the fiercest opponents of American dictates see no problem with granting Tehran a mandate. They demand that the state refuse to listen to Rubio, then suggest that it accept the outcome of negotiations in which it has taken no part. As though independence from Washington could be achieved by handing Iran power of attorney.

Lebanon needs a seat at the negotiating table. And that seat means a Lebanese delegation carrying a Lebanese mandate, presenting clear demands and reporting its results to the constitutional institutions. Placing the Lebanese file in an Iranian negotiator’s briefcase, by contrast, would mean subordinating our priorities to the requirements of his own negotiations.

The question, then, is no longer whether Iran is a friend or an adversary, or whether we trust its intentions. States negotiate to advance their interests. Tehran’s interests may coincide with Lebanon’s on one issue and conflict with them on another. Iran is entitled to set its own priorities, but the Lebanese state has a duty not to allow another country to determine where its citizens’ rights stand in the order of priorities.

If sanctions, regional security, military capabilities and relations with the United States are all on the table, who can guarantee where Lebanon will rank among them? What would prevent calm along its front from becoming part of a broader bargain? And who would have the authority to object if the Iranian negotiator decided that a gain he had secured justified making a concession on an issue whose direct costs would not be borne by his own people?

In such circumstances, a mandate would include the power to rank demands, postpone some of them and agree to compromises concerning others. No Lebanese party has the right to delegate such authority abroad, because it concerns the rights of all Lebanese citizens.

We are told that the track backed by Washington may lead nowhere. This is a possibility that must be taken seriously. But the failure or stalling of a negotiating process calls for a reassessment of its instruments, conditions and guarantees. It does not make surrendering the right to negotiate a wiser decision. The state can seek additional diplomatic backing, clearer guarantees or a more effective international role. It can raise objections, reject an unfair proposal and reconsider its position. All of this is part of exercising sovereignty.

Waiting to see what Iran obtains, on the other hand, would deprive Lebanon even of the right to decide when to say yes or no.

Likewise, describing any Lebanese option as “Rubio’s track” reduces the state to the will of the US secretary of state, suggesting that its institutions have neither a will nor interests of their own. Such a reduction requires evidence. Negotiations should be judged by their substance. Do they help end the attacks? Do they demand withdrawal and the recovery of occupied territory? Do they safeguard the return of residents? Do they strengthen state authority and the state’s monopoly on arms? What guarantees and enforcement mechanisms are in place?

If a negotiating track fails to meet these criteria, it should be criticized accordingly. If it achieves progress, it should be judged by what it has accomplished. Rejecting it solely because of the mediator’s identity does not constitute an alternative policy.

The same applies to negotiations with Israel. There is room for disagreement over their format, timing and level of representation. But negotiation is a means of addressing a conflict that carries a heavy human and national cost. A state that negotiates asserts its rights, tests the possibility of securing them and assumes responsibility for its position before its people. It does not thereby absolve the other side, nor does it accept its terms in advance.

The paradox is that negotiations between Lebanon and Israel are rejected, while Iranian negotiations over Lebanon’s future are deemed acceptable. By this logic, the problem is that the Lebanese want to speak for themselves. Meanwhile, the substance of the negotiations, including any concessions or arrangements they might entail, is left to whoever has been authorized to speak on their behalf.

The people of southern Lebanon, particularly the Shia communities who bear the cost of confrontation in their homes, livelihoods and children’s futures, have a direct interest in ending this arrangement. They have the right to know who is demanding their return, what conditions are being discussed, and what is being accepted or rejected in their name. They also have the right to hold those responsible accountable. No Lebanese citizen can hold an Iranian negotiator accountable, change his priorities or demand that he disclose what took place behind closed doors.

This is why the state’s recovery of its authority over negotiations is part of reclaiming its responsibility toward these people. The state cannot be expected to protect them while being denied the political and diplomatic means to do so. Nor is it consistent to accuse it of impotence while insisting that decisions concerning war and negotiations remain outside its institutions.

Those who wish to challenge the state’s choice should present an alternative that specifies the demands, means, guarantees and the authority answerable to the Lebanese people. As for the claim that “we should have gone to Islamabad,” it remains incomplete until it answers the fundamental question: would we go as a state negotiating for itself, or as a file whose fate is negotiated by the Iranians?

We are not being asked to trust Rubio or to give any mediator a blank check. What matters is recognizing Lebanon’s right to take charge of its own cause and holding its state accountable for how it handles it. Anyone who refuses to let the Americans decide for us must reject, with equal clarity, the prospect of the Iranians deciding for us.

Lebanon does not need a different agent. It is time to reclaim its signature.