
Are we intellectually equipped to understand the conflict we face and win it? Will we continue to be at its mercy, or will we finally become the agents of our own history? As asymmetric and existential regional conflicts close in around us, and as strengthening the army, in terms of both manpower and equipment, becomes essential to the exercise of our sovereignty, the question of Lebanon’s intellectual resources may be even more pressing than that of its military or economic capabilities.
For Lebanon, “winning” the conflicts now under way cannot mean militarily crushing a neighboring power or empire – a geopolitical impossibility. Lebanon’s victory will be won above all in the realm of conceptual sovereignty and the diplomatic skill it makes possible.
Potential and Structural Traps
To address the initial question with the candor and nuance it demands, we must examine the richness of Lebanon’s intellectual potential and identify the structural traps that prevent it from being put to use. We must begin by recognizing the exceptional intellectual resources that Lebanon’s history and culture have given it for thinking through complexity. It is one of the few countries in the Middle East, if not the only one, whose conceptual tools have emerged from diversity.
Unlike the monolithic or theocratic regimes that held sway throughout the last century (see Ghassan Tueni and Jean Lacouture’s Un siècle pour rien), Lebanon was born under the sign of pluralism. By its very nature – even if it has sometimes had to learn through suffering – it knows what it means for multiple identities to coexist. To think about conflict from a Lebanese perspective is therefore, at its core, to reject the trap of simplistic dualism: the reduction of the world to a struggle between “good” and “evil” that the regional “empires” seek to impose. It is also to draw on the considerable freedom of historical inquiry afforded by a Christian and understanding-based anthropology.
Lebanon has always been – at considerable cost to itself – the intellectual lung of the Arab world: a place where ideologies were born and died, where national liberation movements confronted tyrannies, where competing utopias took shape, and where political systems were debated, translated and theorized. This took place not only in leading academic institutions such as the American University of Beirut (AUB) and Saint Joseph University (USJ), to name the oldest, but also in intellectual circles, cafés and forums for public and private debate.
This very diversity made the Lebanese thinker ideally placed to act as an intellectual bridge across disciplines, bringing together reason and faith, rationality and mysticism, the historical sciences and the theology of history. Such an intellectual profile provides the ideal tools for decoding the Machiavellianism of powers that use Lebanese territory – and the world at large – as a battlefield.
The Silo Mentality
Why this potential has yet to translate into victory is another matter. Several deep-seated flaws stand in the way of the emergence of a distinctly Lebanese political philosophy. One of these is sectarian reductionism, or what is commonly referred to as the “silo mentality.”
In practical terms, Lebanon’s intellectual resources are fragmented along intellectual, sectarian and geographical lines. The “silos” are often separated by no more than a few buildings, a neighborhood or a handful of streets. Yet they remain impervious to one another, each developing in isolation. Information is not shared, books do not circulate, and specialists interact only with their own peers. The Ministries of Education and Culture are given short shrift, while the more “lucrative” portfolios of Public Works and Health take precedence. Each community – and, by extension, each academic community, not to mention the school system – tends to embrace the providentialism or geopolitical narrative of its regional patron: Iran for some; Cairo, Riyadh, Paris, London or Washington for others. Instead of thinking about the conflict with Lebanon as a whole in mind, each camp approaches it from its own side and in the service of its own interests.
This fragmentation has a grave consequence: the absence of a collective memory. Lebanon has never, at an intellectual level, come to terms with its own civil war, let alone examined its origins and the historical trajectory that runs from Versailles to 1948, from Patriarch Howayek to Ben-Gurion, and from the 1967 debacle to the wars waged in support of Hamas and Tehran.
The collective amnesia imposed in the 1990s has prevented the country from critically examining the mistakes of the “civil war”, some of whose roots reach back into the soil of the nineteenth century. Without such self-examination, Lebanon risks continuing to fall into the same cycles of exploitation by outside powers.
The Capitulation of the Elites
As Lebanon remains fragmented and subject to decisions made in Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington, part of its intellectual elite has capitulated in the face of the Machiavellian cynicism of all sides. The belief that Lebanon is too fragmented for anything to be changed has paralyzed the effort to formulate an independent national strategic doctrine.
Caught between the trap of the purely earthly city and that of utopian messianism, Lebanon’s conceptual victory lies in forging a middle way. This means upholding the Lebanese model of coexistence as the antithesis of theocracy, in opposition to rhetoric of hatred and mutual destruction, wherever it may come from. In the realm of international law, it means promoting neutrality as a way of thwarting foreign providentialism visions that use Lebanon as a theatre for strategic confrontation and as a possible springboard for their ambitions.
Intellectual victory means calling things by their proper names and stripping the empires’ narratives of their mystique. It means recognizing that the attempt by a theocratic regime to erase a state, or by a heavily armed state to wipe villages off the map, is driven simply by a lust for power – what Saint Augustine called libido dominandi – not by any holy war.
A Dismantled Weapon
To prevail, we must think about the human person at the appropriate anthropological depth and ensure that our national education system fosters and sustains this depth of thought. At this critical juncture, as we find ourselves caught in the grip of theocratic utopias from another age, international law remains one of Lebanon’s most powerful intellectual tools against the ideological or theological strongholds of Machiavelli’s disciples. Victory will mean shifting the conflict away from the terrain of apocalyptic theology and onto that of law, justice and diplomacy.
Lebanon, then, has the intellectual resources it needs in its very genes, its universities and its diaspora. Yet this intellectual equipment remains a dismantled weapon, its parts scattered among the country’s different communities. The challenge is not to create a new body of thought, but to bring existing thought back together around the country’s vital interests.























