Hezbollah’s Support for Tehran Extends Beyond Lebanon

At the beginning of this week, reports attributed to Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri suggested that Hezbollah would not intervene in support of Iran, which is preparing for a confrontation with the United States and Israel should they decide to resume their war against it.

Those leaks, however, confined the pledge to Hezbollah’s political wing, excluding its military wing. They can hardly be relied upon in the first place, since the distinction between the two wings is little more than a farce. What is certain is that Hezbollah’s political representation, whether in Parliament or the Cabinet, is merely one of the instruments through which it maintains its presence on Lebanese soil to carry out Iran’s will.

Any attempt, therefore, to deal with Hezbollah as a Lebanese component is unlikely to achieve anything. One need only recall the demand made by Esmail Baghaei, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the negotiating delegation, for “a firm commitment to ending the war on all fronts, including Lebanon,” as an explicit condition for any agreement with the United States concerning the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Nor can much credence be given to the argument that Iran has no need for Hezbollah’s support, since it possesses sufficient capabilities to withstand any American attacks that might be launched against it. The evidence shows that Hezbollah is an integral part of Iran’s military power. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the revelations of Yemen’s Interior Ministry, which reported that 21 foreign experts were working alongside the terrorist Houthi militias, including 14 members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and seven experts from Lebanese Hezbollah. According to the ministry, they “carry out financing, arming, training and direct supervision duties, participate in planning and managing operations, and build the Houthi militias’ military capabilities, alongside political, organizational, social and media activities aimed at consolidating long-term influence and establishing structures and networks of allegiance designed to detach Yemen from its Arab surroundings.” And that is without even mentioning the Syrian and Iraqi arenas, among others.

It is hardly surprising, then, that Iranian claims about Hezbollah’s independence in making its own decisions are not taken seriously. What is surprising is that Nabih Berri should seek to obscure this reality through such leaks, perhaps in an effort to preserve his position as a channel of communication with regional and international powers, presenting himself as the only figure capable of helping convey messages and facilitate the necessary compromises.

Yet neither Berri nor any other Lebanese official has any real role to play in the face of Iran’s determination to monopolize decisions of war and peace in Lebanon. Tehran relies on Hezbollah for support, particularly through the party’s efforts to undermine the process of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations under American supervision. Hezbollah does so both by refusing to surrender its weapons and by refusing to withdraw from its military positions to make way for the Lebanese Army, preferring instead to hand those areas over to the Israeli military.

Under the present circumstances, a multitude of calculations surround the role Hezbollah may be called upon to play in accordance with Iran’s requirements, pending the changes expected on the horizon. These may result from the American midterm elections or from the Israeli elections and their complications. The new political landscape could, in turn, shape developments on the military front, particularly amid growing speculation that attacks against Iran could take place in the coming days. This raises the possibility of open wars aimed at settling the balance of power and competing spheres of influence across the Middle East.

Against this backdrop, the leaks attributed to Berri, one of the two pillars of the Shiite duo, suggesting that Hezbollah would refrain from supporting its Iranian handler, carry little weight. Far more consistent with reality are the remarks made by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who stressed “the need to keep Lebanon out of any new war,” warning against dragging the country “into futile adventures serving foreign interests.” He also condemned, without naming Hezbollah, its interference “in the internal affairs of Arab countries, particularly through military activities that threaten their security and stability.”

Whether Hezbollah supports Tehran or refrains from doing so is not a decision for Berri or any other Lebanese official to make. Nor is that support confined to Lebanon. It has long extended wherever Iranian interests demand it.