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Why Are the Lebanese Divided Despite All That Unites Them?

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Published Nov 16, 2026 - 19:37

Is Lebanon a country divided along sectarian lines, or a society torn by conflicting political and social interests? Do the Lebanese really disagree about their country's future, or do they agree on most of what they want while differing over the means and the actors expected to achieve those goals? And why does division seem stronger than common ground, even though the crises affecting the Lebanese make no distinction between one sect and another?

These questions go beyond everyday political disputes because they concern the very nature of Lebanese society and the ability to rebuild a state that accommodates all its citizens.

It is easy to describe Lebanon as a sectarian country. But while this description is partly accurate, it is no longer sufficient to understand the transformations taking place within society. Divisions are no longer confined to Christians and Muslims, or Sunnis and Shiites. They now run through sects, regions, families and sometimes even individual households.

Some Shiites support Hezbollah and insist on retaining its weapons, while others reject the continued existence of these weapons outside state control. Christians disagree over sovereignty, regional choices and the structure of the political system. The same applies to Sunnis and Druze, whose positions differ regarding power, alliances and the country's future.

We are therefore dealing not with a traditional sectarian divide, but with a political division that feeds on sectarianism, deepens under the weight of the social and economic crisis, and ultimately reveals a disagreement over the very concept of the state.

Real Differences That Cannot Be Ignored

The Lebanese disagree, first and foremost, over power and legitimacy. Who has the authority to decide on war and peace? Does the state alone have authority over weapons? Can an armed force be allowed to operate outside constitutional institutions, regardless of the justifications invoked for its existence?

They also disagree over Lebanon's place in the region. Some want a country that maintains balanced relations with its Arab surroundings and the international community, away from the struggles between rival regional blocs. Others believe Lebanon's security depends on regional alliances and balances of power extending beyond its borders.

They disagree over the political system itself. Some regard the Taif Agreement as a foundation whose implementation must be completed. Others see federalism or expanded decentralization as the way to address existing imbalances. Still others believe the problem lies not in the constitutional texts but in the forces that have obstructed their implementation.

Economically, disagreements concern the distribution of financial losses, the future of bank deposits, the role of banks, the size of the public sector, and tax and social policies.

These are serious differences, some of them existential, and they cannot be overcome through emotional appeals to national unity. Yet their existence does not mean that the Lebanese disagree about everything.

More Common Ground Than We Think

On the other hand, what do the Lebanese want in their daily lives?

They want security and stability, job opportunities, electricity and water, education and healthcare, an independent judiciary, institutions that do not discriminate between citizens, and an economy that allows their children to remain in their country.

They want their bank deposits back, an end to corruption, the reconstruction of devastated areas, the protection of Lebanese territory against attacks, and an end to the constant fear of war.

These demands have no sectarian identity.

A Shiite citizen who has lost his home in the South has the same need for security and reconstruction as a Christian citizen who fears for his future, a Sunni citizen looking for work, or a Druze citizen who wants institutions that protect his rights.

Even on the most contentious issue, that of weapons, a fundamental point of agreement can be found: protecting Lebanon. The disagreement begins when it comes to determining the means of protection, who makes the decisions, and who bears responsibility for the consequences.

This is where the distinction between agreeing on an objective and agreeing on the means becomes clear. The Lebanese may agree on the need to protect their country, yet disagree fundamentally over whether weapons outside state control provide a guarantee of security or constitute an additional source of danger.

The Social Divide We Do Not See

There is another dimension that receives insufficient attention: the social divide that cuts across sectarian boundaries.

Lebanon today is divided not only between supporters and opponents of one party or another, but also between those who can secure their livelihoods and futures and those who have become dependent on aid, financial transfers and services provided by political parties, institutions and associations.

Strikingly, the economic collapse has not generated broad social solidarity among those affected. At times, it has instead reinforced political dependency.

Rather than uniting to demand their rights, some citizens find themselves compelled to seek protection from the political organization that provides them with a minimum level of services.

Need thus becomes an instrument of influence, while political affiliation becomes, in some cases, a means of obtaining rights that the state is supposed to guarantee to everyone.

Here lies one of Lebanon's paradoxes: two citizens from different sects may experience exactly the same economic hardship, yet stand on opposite sides politically because each is convinced that protecting his own community is the only way to protect himself.

Why Does Division Prevail Politically?

If there is so much common ground, why is it not reflected in political life?

The answer is that differences are organized, while common interests are fragmented.

Political parties have leaders, institutions, media outlets and the capacity to mobilize supporters. They can turn any disagreement into a political or sectarian battle. Citizens who want a functioning state, meanwhile, do not necessarily form an organized force capable of imposing their priorities.

There is another, deeper reason: fear.

Fear of the other, of losing influence, of shifts in the balance of power, and of losing protection sometimes leads citizens to cling to political choices even when they are convinced that these choices will not improve their lives.

This fear is not confined to any particular sect. Its causes differ from one community to another, but its outcome is the same: the reproduction of traditional loyalties and the weakening of prospects for a unifying national project.

More dangerously, some political forces succeed in portraying any objection to their choices as an attack on the sect they claim to represent. Political disagreement thus becomes a threat to the community's collective existence, and democratic competition turns into a confrontation between identities.

Which Prevails: Division or Common Ground?

Here, a distinction must be made between society and power.

In terms of daily needs and social interests, the points of agreement among the Lebanese appear to outweigh their differences. But at the level of political decision-making, disagreements remain more influential and more capable of asserting themselves.

This does not mean that a homogeneous political majority exists whose size can be determined without serious opinion surveys. Rather, it means that shared interests do not automatically translate into unified political positions.

The Lebanese may agree on the need for reform but disagree over who should carry it out. They agree on justice but disagree when it reaches their own leaders. They agree on sovereignty but do not all attach the same political meaning to it.

Therefore, the claim that the Lebanese have more in common than what divides them is valid in terms of their fundamental interests. But that alone is not enough to build a state.

Some disagreements, even if fewer in number, carry more weight than dozens of points of agreement. Broad consensus on electricity, education and healthcare cannot compensate for the absence of agreement on the state's authority and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

This explains the persistence of the Lebanese crisis: the problem is not that the Lebanese do not know what they want from the state, but that they have yet to agree on the rules that would allow that state to govern.

From Coexistence to Citizenship

Lebanon does not need to eliminate differences or impose a single political opinion on all its people. People have the right to disagree, and pluralism is part of the nature of Lebanese society and one of the sources of its richness.

What it needs is a transition from coexistence among communities that fear one another to citizenship among individuals equal in rights and duties.

The difference between the two models is considerable.

Coexistence based on a balance of fears remains fragile because it changes with shifts in the balance of power. Citizenship grounded in the Constitution, the law and institutions, by contrast, allows differences to be managed without turning them into a permanent threat to stability.

The Lebanese can disagree over economic policies, the structure of public administration, political alliances and electoral programs. But a state cannot function properly if the authority of the law, the legitimacy of institutions, and decisions on war and peace remain matters open to negotiation among political forces.

Addressing Lebanon's divisions, therefore, does not begin by convincing everyone that they agree. It begins by acknowledging real differences, placing them within a common constitutional framework, and then translating shared interests into an actionable political program.

What Unites Us Still Lacks a Strong Enough Voice

The Lebanese are not a homogeneous society, and they never will be. But neither are they separate communities bound together by geography alone.

They share economic, social and cultural interests, a long history of living together, a widespread desire for stability, and a common need for institutions capable of protecting everyone.

Nevertheless, the forces that exploit division remain more capable of exerting influence than those seeking to build on common ground.

It can therefore be said that common ground is broader socially, while division is stronger politically.

This is not a final judgment on Lebanon's future, but a description of an equation that can change if forces emerge capable of transforming shared demands into a national project rather than mere electoral slogans.

The problem is not that the Lebanese have differences, but that their differences are converted into political power, while their shared interests still lack adequate political expression.

In a country whose people are united by the fear of war, poverty, emigration and state collapse, the paradox is stark: what divides the Lebanese governs them, while what unites them does not yet govern.

Has the time come for what unites the Lebanese to become stronger than those who exploit their divisions?

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