Russian or Ukrainian Victory: What Consequences for the Middle East? (5/5)

The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides, and more specifically the Russian and Ukrainian capitals.

In order to better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what led to this (fratricidal?) war—by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved, including the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member countries with the exception of Turkey), and by recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to achieve peace, or at least negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many.

To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete consequences of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by the same token, what would the repercussions be for the West and the Middle East?

In a series of five articles,Jean-Patrick Dayras, a rear admiral in the French Navy, presents his vision and analysis of the issue.

The consequences of the war in Ukraine for the Middle East depend largely on the outcome of the conflict, and more specifically on how it ends (a negotiated agreement, a ceasefire, or a clear military victory).

If Ukraine wins

For Iran

Iran, which has supplied Russia with drones and strengthened its military cooperation with Moscow since 2022, would see its regional partner weakened. This could limit certain technological or military cooperation efforts, though Iran would retain other partners and its own capabilities.

For Israel

Israel might view a weakened Russia as reducing Russian influence in Syria, but this could create new uncertainties if other actors seek to fill that void.

For Syria

A Russia less capable of projecting power could reduce its military or financial involvement in Syria, potentially shifting the balance between the Syrian government, Iran, and Turkey.

For the Gulf states

Countries such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates would likely seek to maintain relations with all major powers. A weakened Russia could, however, carry less sway over certain energy or diplomatic matters.

If Russia wins

Strengthening of the Moscow-Tehran axis

A Russian victory would deepen cooperation between Russia and Iran across military, energy, and diplomatic spheres.

Syria

Russia could be in a position to maintain, or even strengthen, its support for the Syrian government, depending on the resources available to it after the conflict.

Israel

Israel would need to continue managing Russia's military presence in Syria. It will seek to preserve its coordination mechanisms with Moscow while maintaining its strategic partnership with the United States.

Turkey

Turkey will in all likelihood continue its balancing act between Russia and Western nations. For several years now, it has demonstrated its ability to cooperate with Moscow on certain issues while remaining a NATO member.

Other consequences

Energy

Regardless of who prevails, the impact on oil and gas markets will depend primarily on:

The evolution of sanctions, or the costs and allocation of responsibility for reparations.

Production and export capacities.

The decisions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners (OPEC+), in which Russia plays a significant role.

Near Eastern oil-producing countries will continue to adapt their strategy based on global prices and demand.

U.S. Influence

A Ukrainian victory could reinforce U.S. credibility with certain regional allies, while a Russian victory could fuel questions about the willingness or ability of the United States to provide sustained support to its allies. However, these perceptions will also depend on other factors, particularly U.S. policy (post-Trump) in the region.

It is worth noting that a Russian victory coupled with a favorable deal for Iran would almost certainly reshape alliances and partnerships across the Near and Middle East in profound ways, particularly for all countries in the Arab-Persian Gulf. It is too early to map out every contingency, but one can already sense growing anxieties in various Gulf states that would lead them to reassess their partnerships and their sense of security. A major upheaval is on the horizon!

A Region Shaped by Its Own Dynamics

It is important to emphasize that the Near East is influenced by many factors that do not directly depend on the war in Ukraine: relations between Iran and Arab states; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the situation in Syria; rivalries between regional powers; and energy markets.

A Russian or Ukrainian victory would have repercussions on the diplomatic and military balance in the Near East, but it would not by itself determine how the region evolves. The most likely effects would concern Russia's role in Syria, relations with Iran, the strategic calculations of Turkey and the Gulf states, and perceptions of the U.S. role. These consequences would be significant, but they would unfold within a broader set of regional dynamics already in motion. More upheaval ahead!

And Africa? Forgotten?

All of Africa will be affected by either outcome. The influence of China, India, the UAE, and Turkey, in particular, will be altered to varying degrees — but especially in the event of a Russian defeat. Yet another upheaval in the making…

The Winner

China, which for the time being is increasingly backing Russia. As long as this war continues, Western attention is diverted away from Asia. Meanwhile, the United States is putting on the sorry spectacle of an already-failed negotiation with Iran. The weapons that would be most needed to defend Taiwan against China are depleted, and it will take at least three years to replenish stocks.

The Loser

If China wins, the United States can only lose. One fears that someday people will say: 'What changed starting in 2022 was the United States. They stopped mattering.'

Looking Back

The first missed opportunity lies in the post-Maidan period. Engaging with Russia, allowing it to see the possibilities for Ukraine — and perhaps for itself — to become one or two states associated with Europe, with NATO staying well clear of the negotiations. It would certainly have taken time, but time was not in short supply between 2014 and 2022. What was needed was a discussion among all EU member states and with the British, the defining of a common position, and the adoption of a credible collective stance.

No secret talks with the United States, whose track record is far too murky and short-sighted: the abandonment of the Interposition Force in Beirut in 1982 without reaching any resolution, followed by the Italians, while the French were left alone; the withdrawal from Afghanistan without any warning or path to a solution. One can only question American geopolitics, riddled as it is with failures, errors, and outright blunders. This country is driven solely by its economic interests — now more than ever. Throughout history, they have done nothing but make mistakes, with the sole exception of the Kissinger era, and even that was only a brief window.

It is, of course, naive to believe this could ever have happened. One must not forget that the former Soviet states joined the EU primarily to gain entry into NATO, and secondly to benefit from the subsidies offered by Europe — funded by European taxpayers. It would have required the Western European countries (France, the Benelux nations, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and the British to make a once-and-for-all decision not to behave as vassals of the United States — though, naturally, this applies less to France. It would therefore have required France to be strong and resolute enough to bring all these countries on board. That was not the case.

This counterfactual could only have become reality under a de Gaulle, perhaps a Pompidou, a Mitterrand, or a Chirac — not the others. It would have demanded a long-term, very long-term strategic and geopolitical vision from the heads of state of the aforementioned countries. It therefore had no real chance of coming to fruition. Yet it would have been good — even excellent — for peace, and for the economic and military power of the European Union, while preserving the sovereignty of each of its members, with genuine security guarantees.

The second counterfactual could have come about if the heads of state and government of the European Union and the British had committed to a role of cooperation and facilitation, enabling Turkey to broker a peace acceptable to both belligerent nations and securing their shared interests.

The Europeans lacked the courage and the foresight the situation demanded, and they allowed Boris Johnson — most likely acting on instructions from the United States — to torpedo the early stages of a peace agreement.

All these heads of state and government bear responsibility for the millions of dead, wounded, missing, bereaved families, and shattered lives.

Who will tell the people this before they cast their next vote?

The future of Europe as a community of sovereign nations lay with Russia and, of course, Ukraine — but certainly not with Ukraine to the exclusion of Russia.

Ultimately, was this war really ours to fight? There are so many wars that go unnoticed — so many conflicts that are none of our business. Was this one more ours than the others? On what grounds? Because a handful of 'thinkers' dislike Putin? There are plenty of heads of state who deserve to be disliked. Should we therefore go to war with all of them? These brilliant 'thinkers' would do well to remember our stance on Kosovo and what followed. That story is not over. Nor is the one concerning the Russia-Ukraine conflict.