Eisenkot and Trump: What Could Change for Lebanon?

Could Gadi Eisenkot become Israel’s prime minister with the votes of Arab lawmakers? And if Donald Trump loses the Republican majority in the US Senate, would Lebanon become safer?

Behind both questions lies an understandable anxiety. Lebanese citizens who want to return home, rebuild their houses, or feel reassured about their children’s future want to know whether political changes in Israel and the United States could bring the end of the war closer. But understanding what might happen requires distinguishing between election results and the ability to turn them into political decisions.

In Israel, citizens do not directly elect their prime minister. They elect members of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, after which negotiations to form a government begin. A party may finish first in an election yet find itself unable to govern if it cannot secure partners willing to provide the necessary majority.

The current figures illustrate the problem. Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc holds 53 seats, Eisenkot’s bloc 48, and the Arab parties 19, out of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Neither bloc therefore commands the 61 seats required for a majority on its own. Mathematically, however, Eisenkot’s bloc and the Arab parties could bring together 67 seats.

This is why the Arab parties are said to hold the key to the next government. The reference here is to Arab parties elected in Israel, not to Arab countries.

But holding the key does not mean the door will open easily. Several parties in Eisenkot’s bloc rejected the possibility of forming a government dependent on Arab parties during their election campaigns. If they now want to remove Netanyahu from power, they will have to reconsider those pledges, attract parties from his bloc, or seek a different compromise. Moreover, support from Ra’am alone, with its eight seats, would not be enough to bring Eisenkot’s bloc to the 61-seat threshold.

Put simply, Eisenkot could reach the premiership with Arab support, but doing so would require a political agreement, not merely an arithmetic calculation. That support could come through participation in the government or from outside it, depending on the arrangement reached. A recommendation that he be tasked with forming a government would be only a first step, not a guarantee of success.

What would this mean for Lebanon?

Above all, we must avoid assuming that a government brought to power by Arab lawmakers would automatically become friendly toward Lebanon. These lawmakers represent their voters and their demands. Supporting a government does not, by itself, give them control over military or foreign policy.

Eisenkot also comes from Israel’s military establishment. There is therefore no basis for assuming that he would abandon a hard line toward Hezbollah or Israel’s security demands. His approach to managing the Lebanese file might differ from Netanyahu’s without necessarily changing all the underlying objectives.

The potential difference could lie in how those objectives are pursued. A new government might be more willing to reach a clearly defined security arrangement, with specific Lebanese steps matched by specific Israeli measures, accompanied by monitoring mechanisms and guarantees. But that remains a possibility to be tested, not a promise that attacks will end or that withdrawal will follow automatically.

The opposite scenario is also possible. A government accused of having come to power with Arab support might feel compelled to demonstrate greater security toughness in order to deprive its opponents of that argument. This is why it is not enough to ask who will govern Israel. We must also ask what that government will accept, what commitments it will make, and how their implementation can be guaranteed.

For Lebanese citizens, the criteria are clear. Have the attacks stopped? Has the Israeli army withdrawn? Have people been able to return safely to their villages? Has the Lebanese state become the sole authority responsible for military decisions? These are the results worth monitoring, regardless of who serves as Israel’s prime minister.

In the United States, the question is different.

The elections scheduled for November 3, 2026, will determine control of Congress, which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. If Republicans lose their Senate majority, that does not mean Trump will lose the presidency. He will remain president and retain broad executive powers, but his ability to advance certain decisions and secure confirmation of his appointments will face greater constraints.

According to reports on recent polls conducted by The New York Times in cooperation with Siena University, Democratic candidates are leading in several crucial states. These findings strengthen the possibility of Republicans losing their Senate majority, but they do not make the outcome certain, as some margins remain within the margin of error. It is therefore possible to speak of waning prospects for Trump’s camp without treating defeat as a foregone conclusion before votes are cast and counted.

To make the situation more familiar to Lebanese readers, one might say that the head of the executive branch could remain in office while facing an opposing parliamentary majority, although the American and Lebanese political systems are, of course, different.

The Senate plays a particularly important role in confirming senior officials, ambassadors, and judges, as well as overseeing the administration. If Democrats take control, they could increase scrutiny of Trump administration officials and block some of his appointments. But that would not make them responsible for conducting foreign negotiations or directing American diplomacy.

It would therefore be an exaggeration to claim that losing the Senate would bring Trump’s regional policy to an end, just as it would be an exaggeration to say that such a loss would have no effect whatsoever.

For Lebanon, a new majority could open a broader debate over assistance and US policy in the region, while increasing scrutiny of the administration’s decisions. But there is no reason to assume that Democrats would automatically embrace Lebanese demands or that American support for Israel would end simply because the Senate majority had changed.

Nor can Trump’s own reaction be predicted with certainty. A domestic defeat might prompt him to seek a diplomatic achievement abroad, or it might lead him to adopt a tougher stance to project strength. Both paths are possible, which is why actual decisions matter more than predictions.

If Eisenkot comes to power and Republicans lose control of the Senate, the conditions for negotiations could change, and a new opportunity for de-escalation might emerge. But an opportunity does not turn itself into an agreement, and any agreement requires guarantees and the political will to implement it.

This is where Lebanon’s responsibility comes into play. If the state has a unified vision, clear demands, and the ability to fulfill its commitments, it can negotiate an end to the attacks, an Israeli withdrawal, the return of displaced residents, and security guarantees. But if the authority to decide on war remains divided and Lebanon’s position remains contradictory, governments around the world may change while our crisis stays exactly where it is.

Lebanese citizens have every right to take an interest in Israeli and American election results because those outcomes affect their lives. But they also have the right to ask their own government what it intends to do and whether it is prepared to deal with the different possible outcomes.

Eisenkot may come to power, or Netanyahu may remain in office. Trump may lose the Senate majority, or Republicans may retain it. In every case, Lebanon needs a state capable of turning any external change into a tangible gain for its people: a home to return to, land to cultivate, secure borders, and decisions on war and peace that are not made outside the country’s institutions.