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Philosophy as Cosmified Social Conflictuality (1/20)

From the Divided City to the Figures of the World: Immanence and the Aporias of the Universal

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Published Nov 19, 2026 - 06:19

The Universal Has Its Thursday: The Aporias of a Philosophy Tasked with “Civil Peace”

I have never felt any particular fondness for UNESCO’s commemorative calendars; “World Philosophy Day” is no exception. Yet I have on occasion linked certain texts published on its eve or the day after to this celebration, not by chance but under the influence of the trend: thought itself is not immune to the conventions of its time. Still, before mocking this solemn occasion, I must acknowledge the reasons that brought it into being. Celebrated under UNESCO’s auspices as early as 2002, then officially proclaimed a “world” observance by the General Conference on 19 October 2005, the day was intended to encourage critical and independent thinking, strengthen the teaching of philosophy, particularly among young people, foster exchanges between cultures, and reaffirm the public value of questioning. Its promoters also hoped to contribute to tolerance and peace. None of this is trivial. The difficulty lies in the almost imperceptible shift from the institutional protection of the conditions of philosophizing to the assignment of a pacifying function to philosophizing itself. A philosophy welcomed because it invites reflection risks becoming less welcome once it carries disagreement beyond the programme laid down for reflection.

The proclamation has another, less immediately apparent significance: it suggests a community of people who work in philosophy, teach it, study it, translate it, practise it, or expose themselves to it as interlocutors. The 2005 resolution does not establish an international professional association of philosophers; it calls upon schools, universities, associations, and various publics to take part in a common activity of thought. I have no reason to disdain this gesture. The idea of a worldwide community of those who philosophize appeals to me more than that of a universal heritage to which each culture would come to present its contribution at the appointed hour. Yet this community remains problematic: what experience of disagreement can it share if its members cannot even agree on what deserves to be called philosophy? And what would be universal about it if mutual recognition never required those extending the welcome to revise their criteria?

The adjective “world” contains an ambiguity more serious than this irony. The geographical reach of a celebration does nothing to establish the universality of the activity being celebrated. A day may be observed on several continents while reproducing, within the implicit definition of philosophy, the particular categories of a tradition that presumes to speak for all the others. The universal is neither a sum of invitations nor the simultaneous translation of an administrative programme. Perhaps it begins, on the contrary, when the welcomed interlocutor ceases to be merely an illustration of diversity and acquires the power to modify the rules of inquiry. I remain deeply drawn to the Greeks; this allegiance gives me no right to decide in advance what, within the Indian darśanas, Chinese cosmologies, or the philosophical traditions of Islam, deserves to be recognized as philosophy. The aporia is complete: a universality without criteria dissolves into an inventory of differences; a universality that never revises its criteria preserves, under the name of the common, the privilege of its place of origin.[1]

Ancient Philosophical Schools: Clashing Allegiances

Yet I feel more at home among the philosophical “parties” of Antiquity than in the reassuring image of a profession gathering once a year under the patronage of good fellowship. I use “party” without any electoral anachronism: schools, hairéseis, doctrinal loyalties, and communities of life constituted intellectual allegiances involving far more than a preference for one theory over another. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Epicurean Garden, and the Stoic Portico offered neither the same education of the soul, nor the same relation to the city, nor the same disposition toward the order of the cosmos. Pierre Hadot has reminded us of this masterfully: in an essential part of ancient philosophy, discourse, spiritual exercise, and the choice of a way of life determined one another reciprocally. I draw no vague eulogy of ancient wisdoms from this reading; Aristotelian theoretical life, Epicurean friendship, and the Stoic discipline of assent are not three versions of the same therapy. They express rival ways of articulating truth, life, and the world.[2]

In the imperial period and Late Antiquity, some of these affiliations even approached what I would be tempted, with due caution, to call philosophical religions. Plotinian contemplation, exercises in the soul’s ascent, and later the theurgy of Iamblichus and certain subsequent Neoplatonists involved representations of the divine order and practices of self-transformation that the modern separation between rational doctrine and religious conduct describes only imperfectly. Early Christianity, too, could claim the name of philosophy. This rapprochement effaces neither the polemics among schools, nor disagreements over rites and divine mediations, nor the fact that Plotinus is not to be conflated with Iamblichus. Rather, it restores the intensity of these communities’ commitments and, at times, their exclusivism and hierarchies. I do not dream of their return. Their history nevertheless seems better suited to illuminating my perspective: conflicts situated between forms of life became conflicts over the structure of reality, the destiny of the soul, and relations between city and cosmos. Cosmification did not arise from a prior concord; it also proceeded from these clashing allegiances.[3]

In this respect, “civil peace” deserves a place of honour in the vocabulary of good intentions. I defend civil peace without reservation when it protects bodies from violence, dissidents from persecution, and controversies from the arbitrariness of those in power. But I refuse to take it as an ideal of intellectual tranquillity. Peace among persons entails no obligation of peace among arguments; on the contrary, it protects the possibility of their most irreconcilable confrontations. As soon as concord becomes an imperative of doctrinal propriety, debate turns into an exercise in civility: disagreements remain permissible, provided they disturb neither protocol nor seating arrangements. This is not an objection to peace, but to its use as an instrument of anaesthesia. The history of philosophy does not readily fit into a programme of cultural activities devoted to the smiling coexistence of truths.

Science and Power: The Soviet Contradiction

Another celebration, now defunct, comes more readily to mind: Soviet Science Day. The comparison has a wry edge, since the Soviet Union hardly stands out in my memory as a universal model of hospitality toward objections. It nevertheless strikes me as more intellectually provocative than a special day reserved for philosophy. Instead of isolating philosophy within the category of estimable cultural activities, the Soviet tribute brought out, at least in its declared ambition, the relationship of philosophical thought to scientific activity as a whole. A less ceremonial question immediately emerged: how does a society conceive the unity of the forms of knowledge, and how might it arrogate to itself the power to decide their truths? The contrast obliges us to prefer the gravity of the problem to the respectability of the celebration.

Instituted in 1979 and fixed on the third Sunday in April, Soviet Science Day (День советской науки) recalled Lenin’s initiative of April 1918 in favour of a programme of scientific and technical work. I recognize here an insight worth recovering: philosophical inquiry has no territory definitively separated from mathematics, physics, medicine, history, or the social sciences. It by no means follows that the sciences should await an official philosophy to provide the meaning of their discoveries. The real problem is precisely the reverse: what conception of knowledge can acknowledge the disciplines’ requirements of proof, their internal disagreements, and their conceptual transformations without rendering their methods mutually alien? The Soviet ambition of a common scientific culture remains interesting; the claim of political power to dictate its conclusions constitutes its sinister contradiction.[4]

The Lysenko affair admits of no retrospective indulgence. This was neither a controversy that had unfortunately become political nor a misunderstanding for which a few scientists happened, through bad luck, to pay the price. Lysenkoism was supported by a state apparatus intent on having what doctrine, party, and force guaranteed recognized as scientific truth. Arrested in 1940, Nikolai Vavilov, one of the most remarkable geneticists of his time, died in prison in 1943. The session of the USSR Academy of Agricultural Sciences, from 31 July to 7 August 1948, sanctioned, with Stalin’s approval, the institutional crushing of Mendelian genetics: dismissals, prohibited teaching, ruined careers, and objections stripped of their right to be tested by evidence. The catastrophe was not an excess of the conflictuality proper to science; it was the political abolition of the conditions under which a scientific conflict can take place. The same state that celebrated science empowered authority to dictate its findings. One might almost be tempted to admire the ceremony’s consistency, had that consistency not served to destroy research and lives. I see no dialectic of knowledge here, only its bureaucratic strangulation.[5]

This experience brings the epistemological question directly to the heart of my argument. The sciences do not develop in a social vacuum: instruments, classifications, institutions, and choices of problems have a history. Yet their historicity does not turn the validity of results into a prerogative of the power that funds or oversees research. Ernst Mach interests me precisely because he subjects to scrutiny the genesis of the categories that mechanics had come to treat as almost self-evident properties of reality. His critique of the substantialization of scientific concepts implies neither that nature is an invention of thought nor that every hypothesis must submit to a government’s preferences. Lenin’s objections to Mach, together with Dominique Lecourt’s reading of Lysenko, sharpen this point: a philosophy of science can illuminate the mediations of knowledge or become the learned language of its police. Conflict between theories is not factional struggle disguised as experiment; conversely, proof never entirely frees itself from the conditions that allow it to take shape.

From Temperaments to Attitudes: The Social Genesis of Arguments

Such a difficulty invites us to return to the dispositions of philosophers themselves. In the first lecture of Pragmatism (1907), William James presents the history of philosophy, “to a great extent,” as a clash of human temperaments. The formulation has the merit of unsettling the image philosophy likes to give of itself: a succession of reasons wholly detached from the preferences, aversions, and sensibilities of those who produce them. The taste for unity, the appeal of experience, the need for stability, confidence in order, or fidelity to plurality need not be alien to the formation of a metaphysics. With the freedom of a caricaturist hardly concerned with civil peace, James distinguishes the tender-minded and tough-minded temperaments, drawn respectively toward certain orders of principles or toward the test of facts. I do not read this opposition as a definitive taxonomy of philosophers. It introduces a more difficult question: how does an existential orientation eventually assume the impersonal form of an argument about the nature of reality?[6]

The answer certainly does not lie in reducing doctrines to psychological portraits. Spinoza does not cease to have arguments because he thinks in terms of the unity of substance; James’s critical force is not reducible to a temperament enamoured of multiplicity. A genealogy of dispositions can explain an investment in a problem, not decide its solution. Otherwise, the interpreter would have discovered a marvellously economical method: seek out a philosopher’s personality rather than read his demonstrations. What I retain from James, therefore, is not a universal cause of philosophies but a first breach in the illusion of thought without a body, preferences, or situation. Yet the very possibility of this breach calls for a broader analysis of the institutions that cultivate attitudes and the history of the conflicts that give them significance.[7]

This is why Stéphane Madelrieux’s research, notably William James: The Empiricist Attitude and Philosophy as Attitude, usefully shifts the debate. Temperament does not amount here to a psychological fate: an attitude is formed, tested, worked on, and corrected through practices of knowledge and through a way of confronting the consequences of one’s ideas. It thus becomes possible to take James seriously without reducing philosophy to a collection of sensibilities. But the notion of attitude retains a difficulty of its own: what social history allows certain dispositions to become intellectual virtues, certain preferences to acquire the prestige of a method, and certain styles of inquiry to establish themselves as the legitimate forms of truth? The passage from temperaments to attitudes does not close the problem; it gives it a depth whose conditions sociology, history, and epistemology can now put to the test.[8]

I do not, however, confuse the social formation of an attitude with the validity of its arguments. A demonstration is not refuted by its author’s origins; a theory is not shielded from criticism by the nobility of the aspirations it serves. Nevertheless, it remains impossible to pretend that the languages of philosophy, educational institutions, traditions of proof, and hierarchies of speech do not weigh upon the formation of problems themselves. The philosopher who believes he speaks solely from the standpoint of the universal sometimes benefits from conditions so particular that he no longer perceives them. The conflict of temperaments then meets that of social formations: experiences do not have equal power to become concepts, objections an equal chance of being heard, or traditions an equal capacity to present themselves as the measure of others. I seek not to replace a sovereign metaphysics with a sovereign sociology; I wish only to understand how their respective claims are historically constituted and intellectually open to challenge.

Cosmifying Conflicts Without Turning the Cosmos into Their Mirror

It is at this intersection, rather than at the summit of a definition, that my hypothesis of philosophy as “cosmified social conflictuality” takes shape. It means neither that every doctrine disguises a class antagonism nor that the cosmos reproduces the quarrels of the city on a gigantic scale. It names, as a perspective still to be constructed, a double displacement. Conflicts experienced within a shared existence become questions concerning being, order, necessity, causality, time, matter, or the possibility of knowing; conversely, ontological and cosmological constructions alter the ways societies conceive their dependencies, hierarchies, freedoms, and struggles. But there is nothing automatic about this passage. An analogy is not a line of descent, a homology is not causal proof, and the kinship between two vocabularies never dispenses us from understanding their distinct operations. Conflict between physical theories is not a civil war; the opposition of the Indian darśanas does not anticipate a Hegelian dialectic; Spinozist causality cannot be deduced from its author’s passions. The proposed perspective will remain fruitful only so long as it can encounter such resistances.

Frédéric Neyrat provides a particularly salutary objection here to any overly facile cosmification. In The Cosmos of Walter Benjamin: A Communism of Distance, the relationship to the cosmos is not tantamount to the appropriation of the distant by a humanity that has finally become master of its world. The distant resists; that resistance prevents it from becoming a mere mirror of social experience or a reservoir of cosmic legitimation for politics. Social conflictuality does not become cosmic through an inflation of vocabulary, and communism gains no additional depth by proclaiming itself a law of the universe. What I retain from Neyrat is of a different order: a politics of the common has something to gain from taking seriously what does not belong to it, what its power of organization cannot simply draw near, reduce, or absorb. This distance prevents the cosmic from becoming the metaphysical alibi for a conquest of the world.[9]

In Walter Benjamin’s work, notably in “To the Planetarium,” technical mediations involve collective history in a relationship to the cosmos whose power can promise a new experience just as readily as it can precipitate catastrophe. Neyrat’s example of the sky as a point of orientation for fugitives seems decisive to me: a cosmic orientation can become a situated resource within a history of domination and emancipation without the stars dictating that history’s meaning. I thus discern a first distinction: the cosmic can displace the meaning of social conflict, but it can never explain it on its own; the conflictual can inform an image of the world, but its intensity confers no truth upon that image. We must still understand why certain representations of the world are desired, defended, or contested with such ardour. The question brings us back to James; more profoundly still, it passes through Nietzsche, whose genealogy of values prevents us from treating concepts as innocent of their affective life, without thereby invalidating their claims to truth.[10]



[1]UNESCO, General Conference, Actes de la Conférence générale, 33rd session, vol. I: Résolutions, Paris, 2005, resolution 37, “Proclamation de la Journée mondiale de la philosophie,” adopted 19 October 2005, pp. 90–91 (preparatory document 33 C/45). UNESCO’s Philosophy Day programme began as early as 2002; see UNESCO, “L’UNESCO célèbre la Journée mondiale de la philosophie 2014,” 18 November 2014.

[2]Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, Paris, Gallimard, 1995, part two (especially the chapters on the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Hellenistic schools) and “Philosophie et discours philosophique”; Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Paris, Albin Michel, 2002, “Exercices spirituels.”

[3]Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, op. cit., part three, “Les écoles philosophiques à l’époque impériale” and “Le christianisme comme philosophie révélée”; Iamblichus, Réponse à Porphyre (De mysteriis); Plotinus, Ennéades (on the differences between contemplative practices and theurgical constructions).

[4]Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, decree of 2 March 1979 establishing the annual Soviet Science Day on the third Sunday in April; see also the decree of 1 October 1980 on holidays and commemorative days. V. I. Lenin, “Draft Plan of Scientific and Technical Work,” April 1918, Collected Works, vol. 27, 1972, pp. 314–317.

[5]Svetlana A. Borinskaya, Andrei I. Ermolaev and Eduard I. Kolchinsky, “Lysenkoism Against Genetics: The Meeting of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences of August 1948, Its Background, Causes, and Aftermath,” Genetics, vol. 212, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1–12, DOI: 10.1534/genetics.118.301413. See also Dominique Lecourt, Lyssenko : histoire réelle d’une « science prolétarienne », Paris, François Maspero, 1976.

[6]William James, Le Pragmatisme. Un nouveau nom pour d’anciennes manières de penser, translated by Nathalie Ferron, preface and notes by Stéphane Madelrieux, Paris, Flammarion, 2007, lecture I (original: Pragmatism, 1907), “The Present Dilemma in Philosophy.” The English wording is: “The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments.” “To a great extent” is essential: James does not propose an exclusively psychological causality. On the “tender-minded” and “tough-minded” typology, see the comparative table in the same lecture.

[7]James himself specifies that his types are convenient combinations, not portraits to which every philosopher would uniformly correspond: Le Pragmatisme, translated by Nathalie Ferron, Flammarion, 2007, lecture I.

[8]Stéphane Madelrieux, William James. L’attitude empiriste, Paris, PUF, 2008; La philosophie comme attitude, Paris, PUF, 2023, part one, chapter 1, “Philosophie et tempérament.” See also his distinction between doctrine, method, and attitude in the introduction to the latter work.

[9]Frédéric Neyrat, Le cosmos de Walter Benjamin. Un communisme du lointain, Paris, Kimé, 2022. The exact subtitle of the work is Un communisme du lointain.

[10]Walter Benjamin, Sens unique, final section “Vers le planétarium” (1928). First published in Einbahnstraße, Berlin, Ernst Rowohlt, 1928; original section title: “Zum Planetarium.”

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