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Hezbollah: What If Disarmament Began in Janta?

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بقلم
نُشر Nov 19, 2026 - 07:16

At the beginning of this week, Israel launched an airstrike on the mountainous area of Janta, targeting a “shipment of combat equipment” that was on its way to Hezbollah, according to an announcement by the enemy army.

For those unfamiliar with it, the area stretches along a broad section of the Lebanese-Syrian border, without oversight or control, specifically along the eastern border highlands as far as Hermel.

A visit to the area is enough to see, with the naked eye, the party’s resources and its ability to arrange the transport of everything its former secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed it possessed, whether missiles or other equipment.

These slopes offer ample freedom of movement, transit and storage. The landscape speaks for itself, revealing the reality without any need for further investigation. Roads have been cut from the foot of the slopes to the mountaintops. Some are paved, while others are dirt tracks. During the war in Syria, “they served as passageways for fighters and for trucks whose contents we did not know,” explains a security source in the Bekaa.

More importantly, the state has no presence here: no army, no Internal Security Forces, no police station, not even municipal council personnel. The truck carrying explosive materials that Lebanese security services intercepted at Dahr al-Baydar last month, which Hezbollah claimed belonged to it, may have passed through Janta on its way to Beirut.

This is no secret. The security forces know that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command used this area for “military bases protected by Syrian army SAM missiles. But after Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the General Command abandoned these positions and Hezbollah took them over. The party used them to train its members, as well as Iraqi and Yemeni personnel affiliated with the Iranian axis,” explains a retired military official, adding that “the party turned them into security zones and does not allow civilians to enter.”

Today, there are reports that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, who withdrew from the south to the Bekaa, are using these sites, along with other areas beyond the state’s control, to continue overseeing the party, which has been shaken since Nasrallah’s assassination.

In light of these far-from-secret details, the question arises: why are the security services, both the army and the Internal Security Forces, ignoring these areas, which have no operational connection to the south?

Addressing the causes of this situation goes beyond the geographical scope of efforts to extend state sovereignty. It also affects issues that will determine the fate of the framework agreement, whose implementation talks have been paralyzed because Israel has made its withdrawal from the areas it occupies in southern Lebanon conditional on the party’s disarmament, while the party insists that it will not hand over its weapons to the state before the Israeli withdrawal.

Demonstrating the state’s ability to act in this regard could also provide a cornerstone for filling the vacuum that will result from the end of UNIFIL’s mission in Lebanon under Resolution 2790.

The extension of state sovereignty can therefore proceed gradually, through small but steady steps. This would move the issue of the party’s weapons beyond the Byzantine debate that keeps circling around the same point. It would also put an end to reliance on chance to intercept a truck that ended up, perhaps deliberately, in full view of a security checkpoint, or to raid a warehouse in a neighborhood of the southern suburbs or Beirut.

Such gradual and consistent steps on Lebanese territory, without media spectacles or provocations that each side or party could exploit to its own advantage, would pave the way for the next phase, which might require seeking whatever assistance is necessary to support the Lebanese army wherever the overriding national interest demands it. Lebanon would then be in a position to propose resuming direct negotiations to implement the framework agreement and amend provisions unfair to Lebanon, with stronger cards in hand. Most importantly, the state would be able to gradually contain Hezbollah’s arsenal until it secures the handover of its weapons through the most conciliatory means possible.

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