Eisenkot Appointed: Is Lebanon Capable to Capitalize on It?

Benjamin Netanyahu is no longer the only man holding the keys to power in Israel. Israeli President Isaac Herzog's decision to task Gadi Eisenkot with forming a new government, after he secured the backing of 67 lawmakers compared with 46 for Netanyahu, opens the door to a different political chapter. But the question that should concern the Lebanese is not whether Netanyahu will leave office, but whether Lebanon is prepared to take advantage of any change that may occur in Israel.

History has taught us that a change of government in Israel does not necessarily mean a change in its policies toward Lebanon, and that a general who trades his military uniform for a tie does not automatically become a dove of peace.

Eisenkot is neither a political unknown nor a man emerging from a peace movement. A former chief of staff of the Israeli military, he knows Lebanon and Hezbollah well. He was part of the military establishment that placed confrontation with the group at the heart of its security doctrine. Treating him as a moderate version of Netanyahu would therefore be a misreading of reality.

But the opposite mistake would be to assume that all Israeli governments are so alike that political change makes no difference. The differences may lie not in their security objectives, but in the means employed to achieve them, in their relationship with Washington, and in their willingness to translate military gains into political understandings.

This is precisely where a potential opportunity for Lebanon lies.

A Mandate Is Not the Same as Governing

Eisenkot secured the support of 67 lawmakers for his nomination, but that figure conceals a political dilemma. The Jewish parties backing him do not, on their own, command the required majority. The votes of the Arab parties proved decisive in tipping the balance in his favor during consultations with the president.

Paradoxically, the man who benefited from the endorsements of Arab lawmakers still refuses to bring their parties into his government under the existing terms.

The road from receiving the mandate to becoming prime minister is therefore far from clear. He must either win over additional parties, find a formula that allows a minority government to take office, or face the prospect of failure and a return to political deadlock.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, has lost the majority that enabled him to govern, but he is by no means out of the picture. He could benefit from his rivals' difficulties, particularly if their disagreements over the composition of the next government persist.

This means Lebanon may be facing a relatively prolonged period of political transition in Israel rather than an immediate change of government.

Could a General Be More Willing to Negotiate?

The question may seem strange, but it deserves consideration.

A military officer who understands the limits of force may be more aware than a politician who exploits it in domestic power struggles that wars do not always end in decisive victories, and that stability requires political and security arrangements.

But this is a political hypothesis, not a guarantee when it comes to Eisenkot.

The government he seeks to form may be more inclined to approach negotiations as a means of establishing security arrangements along the border, and perhaps better equipped to persuade Israeli society and its security institutions to accept a settlement.

Conversely, Eisenkot may be more demanding when it comes to clear security guarantees, and more determined to make Hezbollah's disarmament, or the elimination of its independent military capability, a fundamental component of any long-term understanding.

A willingness to negotiate should not be confused with a willingness to make concessions.

What Does Lebanon Stand to Gain?

If Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government, an opportunity may emerge to revive unresolved issues: Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, an end to attacks, consolidation of the ceasefire, the return of displaced people, and the launch of reconstruction.

But none of these issues will move forward simply because the name of Israel's prime minister changes.

They require a Lebanese state that knows what it wants, controls its own decisions, and is capable of fulfilling its commitments.

And here we arrive at the heart of Lebanon's problem.

We watch American and Israeli elections, await the outcome of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, and follow shifts in the regional balance of power, as though Lebanon's future were determined exclusively beyond its borders.

But where is Lebanon's own decision-making power?

Do we have a clear vision of the settlement we want? Have we defined the terms of withdrawal, the security guarantees, and the verification mechanisms? Have we drawn up a practical plan to place all weapons under the exclusive authority of the state? And can the Lebanese government speak on behalf of all Lebanese, or are there still those who regard decisions of war and peace as their private property?

Lebanon cannot demand that the world treat it as a fully sovereign state while the internal debate continues over the state's exclusive right to possess weapons and make decisions that determine the country's fate.

Between Washington's Diplomatic Track and Waiting for Tehran

Developments in Israel take on added significance in light of the debate in Lebanon over negotiations: should Lebanon participate in them directly, or leave others to negotiate on its behalf?

Some believe it would have been better to wait for the outcome of US-Iranian negotiations, as though Lebanon were merely a detail in a major regional bargain, and as though Tehran were better placed than Beirut to determine the interests of the Lebanese people.

But why should the alternative to direct Lebanese negotiations be to delegate the task of negotiating on our behalf to Iran?

If a change of government in Israel could open a new window, it would make sense for Lebanon to be present when that window opens, rather than wait for someone else to tell it what has been decided about its future.

This does not mean making concessions without anything in return, abandoning Lebanese rights, or automatically moving from security negotiations to political normalization.

It simply means that the Lebanese state must be in control of its own decisions, and that negotiations must serve as a means of recovering rights, not as a reward granted by Israel or a privilege monopolized by an armed Lebanese faction.

Don't Bet on Eisenkot… Bet on the State

Eisenkot may succeed in forming a government, or he may fail. Netanyahu may leave office, or remain in power through a new political arrangement or another election.

But one thing must not change: Lebanon's position.

Israeli withdrawal is a demand that does not depend on who occupies the prime minister's office in Tel Aviv. An end to attacks is Lebanon's right, not a favor bestowed by anyone. And the state's monopoly on weapons is not a concession to Israel, but a Lebanese national obligation whose fulfillment has been delayed for far too long.

It would be a mistake to allow the future of southern Lebanon to become hostage to Israeli elections, just as it has been held hostage to regional calculations that have nothing to do with the interests of its inhabitants.

The people of the South want to return to their villages, rebuild their homes, reclaim their land, and live without fear of another war. Whether Israel's prime minister is Netanyahu or Eisenkot matters far less to them than having a Lebanese state capable of protecting them.

And protection does not mean slogans, storing weapons among residential homes, or proclaiming victories invisible to those whose homes lie in ruins. It means an army deployed on the ground, functioning institutions, secure borders, and enforceable guarantees.

Political change in Israel must not become yet another occasion for Lebanon to wait and see, rather than an incentive to regain the initiative.

Eisenkot's nomination may mark the beginning of change in Israel, but it will only become an opportunity for Lebanon if the Lebanese decide to change the way they govern their state.

What is needed is not to wait for a less hardline Israeli prime minister, but to build a Lebanese state more capable of defending its rights.

And if Netanyahu has lost his majority, Lebanon must not once again lose the opportunity to reclaim its sovereignty.

Because, ultimately, the problem is not only who governs Israel, but who governs Lebanon, and who holds the power to decide on war and peace within it.