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Lebanon: The Return of Assassinations and the Dictatorship of Powerlessness

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Published Nov 16, 2026 - 21:02

The Lebanese are haunted by the trauma of assassinations. Our history is burdened with hundreds of them, from the early years of independence and the assassination of Prime Minister Riad al-Solh to that of Lokman Slim, before the cycle resumed with the assassination of Iraqi MP Ahmad al-Alwani, known for advocating Iraq’s return to the Arab fold and for his outspoken opposition to Maliki and Iran. He had spent many years in prison and was living in Erbil, far from his homeland, until he was lured to Beirut.

The gravest danger would be for Beirut to become, once again, an unsafe place where political and security-related scores are settled, whether domestic or regional.

The assassination was preceded by the discovery of explosives in Dahr al-Baidar which, according to experts, were intended for use in an attack. It was immediately followed, at this particular juncture, by the arrest of five Hezbollah members in the highlands of Bsharri. They were found carrying lists, maps, names and military classifications relating to intervention groups.

Lebanon’s security situation has therefore begun to deteriorate. The noose is tightening around Hezbollah, which feels threatened. Its support base is fragmented and no longer what it once was. Iran, meanwhile, is seeking to regain its strength following Trump’s defeat, for which it claims credit! It believes it has an opportunity to turn the tables.

When Hezbollah feels it has nothing left to lose, it turns against the domestic front and brandishes its weapons against it. Once again, Lebanon is confronted with the fragility of its internal situation, while Israel’s war has never stopped.

What new treacherous path lies ahead?

The first signs of a security state

Statements by the army commander sparked a wave of debate and reactions that extended beyond Lebanon to the US administration itself.

In his speech, the army commander declared that “the army’s policy is the national policy,” before adding: “Anyone who speaks ill of their country’s army has no place in Lebanon and no right to remain there.” The statement brought back memories of General Michel Aoun’s repeated words: “If you don’t like it, leave.”

The army commander’s remarks were regarded as a threat to public freedoms and an overstepping of the military institution’s role. He is effectively deciding who qualifies as patriotic and who should leave the country. The statements made by the “minister” of defense were even more troubling. He bypassed the civilian executive authority he is supposed to represent, asserting that the Council of Ministers’ powers are limited to “general policy,” while orders in the field fall exclusively under the army commander’s authority. He insisted that the Council of Ministers’ powers “do not extend to executive orders issued by the army command.”

The defense minister is thus entrenching the military institution’s independence from elected political authority. This lays the theoretical groundwork for a security state, in which the “military commander’s assessments” of the national interest and civil peace take precedence over decisions made by the constitutional government. His statement coincided with the president’s own position, as he too praised the army leadership despite the criticism.

Yet the sequence of these events reveals a structural contradiction between an arrogant military discourse and a fragile reality on the ground, exposed by the activities of the five-man group in the Batroun area. Their arrest, just hours after the army commander’s statements, demonstrated how vulnerable the security apparatus really was.

Both the army commander and the defense minister are exercising a form of “top-down monopoly over patriotism.” They have appropriated the right to define what constitutes patriotism. This is a direct expression of a security-state mentality. The security establishment places itself above democratic accountability and turns legitimate political criticism of its performance into “national betrayal” and a “stab in the back,” to use the minister’s own expression.

The paradox of the Bsharri and Batroun highlands: A security state without sovereignty

One need only examine the arrest of the five Hezbollah members in the Batroun highlands to realize how far we are from the “strong security state” defined by Max Weber.

The presence of reconnaissance operatives belonging to a political party, equipped with maps, documents and lists of names deep inside geographically and politically sensitive areas, constitutes a blatant security challenge. It demonstrates that the militia operating “outside the law,” according to decisions by the executive authority, continues to behave like a power that crosses internal boundaries at will. Hezbollah’s secretary-general himself proclaimed his own canton in his Martyrs’ Day speech when he said: “Let Israel attack. What business is it of yours?” This is a militia that pays no heed to the state’s decision to establish a monopoly over weapons.

The fragility of security control

Moreover, party members removed phones and documents from the places where the detainees had been staying as soon as news of their arrest spread, in order to conceal evidence. Attempts were also made to tear up papers and maps. This demonstrates the limited ability of official security agencies to confront Hezbollah.

A genuine security state imposes its authority on everyone through brute force. What we are witnessing here, however, is “verbal intimidation of civilian and political critics,” accompanied by helplessness and hesitation on the ground in the face of Hezbollah’s expanding security activities, under the pretext of “protecting civil peace and avoiding strife.” But what if the five-man group’s plan had succeeded? Would we then have protected Lebanon from such strife?

Sanctifying the institution and criminalizing criticism

Unable to implement government decisions on disarmament or enforce sovereignty in the South and the North, and facing enormous international and American pressure to deliver tangible results, the military and political leadership resort to sanctifying the institution and criminalizing criticism.

The real fear is not the establishment of a full-fledged military dictatorship controlling the country, but the emergence of a “dictatorship of powerlessness,” in which citizens are forbidden to criticize the state’s failures on the grounds of the “sacredness of the institution,” while the armed state within a state continues to draw its maps over everyone’s heads.

A state that guards collapse

The ruling establishment, through its political and security apparatuses, does not govern the state in order to rebuild it or protect its citizens. Instead, it works to “preserve the status quo” and maintain a fragile civil peace, even if the price of that peace is the death of the state itself and the disintegration of its sovereignty.

While citizens are asked to be patient, accept austerity and revere institutions, there are fears that efforts to seize maps and monitor military movements in the highlands will be watered down, and that major cases, such as the Dahr al-Baidar explosives affair, will be closed through political settlements. People will then be expected to believe that the law applies to everyone.

This reality is precisely what breeds a profound sense of alienation. Citizens are neither confronting a clearly identifiable repressive regime against which they can rebel nor living under the protection of the rule of law. Instead, they are trapped in an absurd theatrical performance in which grand patriotic slogans are used to conceal complete helplessness in the face of overwhelming armed power.

What is different this time

Political and diplomatic observers believe that the position of the ruling establishment, led by Nabih Berri and Hezbollah, has changed from what it was until now.

Hezbollah, whose losses have mounted both among its leadership and on the battlefield, no longer commands the overwhelming advantage in power that once enabled it to impose its will on governments, the judiciary and security agencies. It recently tried to do so with Judge Hajj and failed. Tehran, meanwhile, is preoccupied with reshaping its regional position, weakening the deep state that had provided Hezbollah with cover.

There is also strict international scrutiny. Both the prime minister and the president understand that the international community and regional actors are unwilling to issue blank checks. No financial assistance, reconstruction aid or pressure on Israel will be forthcoming without the effective implementation of the state’s monopoly over weapons.

The barrier of fear that once prevailed has been broken. Once the judiciary and security agencies begin acting openly, any political retreat becomes costly in the eyes of domestic and international public opinion. We need more courageous and upright judges.

Nevertheless, Lebanese citizens still perceive a form of “collusion” among the presidents, which those close to power describe as a “calibrated gradual approach” intended to dismantle an entrenched system without igniting strife or civil war. But there is a danger that this “calibrated gradual approach” could become a permanent cover, giving Hezbollah enough time to rebuild its depleted security and military apparatus under the state’s very eyes.

Sovereigntist politicians have both the will and the political interest to break the hegemony of arms, since doing so is a condition for their political survival and the expansion of their influence. Yet their ability to bring about a decisive break remains constrained by the balance of power within the sectarian system and by their choice to avoid violence.

The streets, the media and public opinion will therefore remain the only real “safety valve” capable of preventing politicians from going back on their public declarations and accepting last-minute compromises under pressure from the deep state.

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