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Iraq: a Step Toward Sovereignty, Under Tehran’s Shadow

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Iraqi soldiers deploy in Jurf al-Sakher, in Babil province, on November 20, 2026. (AFP)
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Publié Nov 20, 2026 - 21:15

The Lebanese dream of it; the Iraqis have done it. On Friday, Baghdad began—at least in principle—the process through which it intends to extend its sovereignty over the entire country and gradually free itself from Iranian influence, the main obstacle to building a functioning state.

Iraqi government forces entered Jurf al-Sakhar at 6 a.m. on Friday. Located some 60 kilometers south of Baghdad, the main stronghold of the pro-Iranian Kataeb Hezbollah has, since 2014, become a militarized zone containing bases, weapons depots, and workshops producing rockets and drones.

Admittedly, the deployment took place under an agreement—or rather, a compromise—reached with the group on Thursday under the auspices of Esmail Qaani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. It provides for the redeployment of the group’s fighters to the outskirts of Jurf al-Sakhar, but only in a month’s time, and makes no mention of a withdrawal. For now, two Popular Mobilization Forces brigades whose ranks include Kataeb Hezbollah fighters are among the forces present in Jurf al-Sakhar. The one-month timeframe was set to allow further negotiations over a withdrawal.

Nevertheless, politically, the process marks a genuine turning point in an Iraq undermined by armed groups. Its symbolic significance is particularly important to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who is determined to establish a state monopoly on arms and extend state sovereignty over the entire country, despite the many obstacles involved. His plan echoes that of the Lebanese authorities, who, unlike the Iraqi prime minister, do not dare take concrete steps to enforce it.

In Beirut, officials remain at the stage of rhetoric, while the pro-Iranian Hezbollah continues to defy them. Still, they deserve credit for no longer turning a blind eye to the group’s subversive activities, as demonstrated by the seizure of several tons of explosives in Dahr al-Baydar last October, and the recent arrest, about ten days ago, of five members of the group allegedly carrying out a security mission high in the mountains between the districts of Zgharta, Koura and Bsharri.

Returning to Iraq, the significance of the compromise that allowed state forces to deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar lies in its having averted a confrontation that could have dragged Iraq into an internal armed conflict. The question now is whether Ali al-Zaidi can see his plan through.

The Iraqi prime minister enjoys strong support from Washington, which regularly accuses Tehran of exploiting Iraq’s economy to circumvent sanctions and seeks to weaken Iranian proxies in Iraq, as in Lebanon. This is especially significant given that, in both countries, illegal weapons have become a tool fueling corruption.

There should, however, be no illusions. The process’s success depends largely on how the regional standoff between the Israel–US alliance and Iran unfolds.

In Yemen, regular attacks by the pro-Iranian Houthis against Saudi Arabia demonstrate, if any further proof were needed, just how much disruptive power Iran retains. On Friday, Houthi threats escalated around the strategic port of Hodeidah, which the group controls.

After calling on civilians to evacuate port facilities, the Riyadh-led international coalition announced that it had struck structures it said were being used to smuggle and transport weapons and ballistic missiles. The Houthis were quick to respond: they threatened to target Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea ports, the kingdom’s airspace and Riyadh’s financial district, which had already been targeted the previous day.

The renewed war in Yemen thus shows that Tehran, though weakened, still has the means to significantly destabilize the region. This is a prospect Arab countries want to avoid, and it therefore weighs heavily on Washington’s political and military calculations.

U.S. President Donald Trump also remains vague about the next steps in operations against Iran. In an interview with Fox News on Thursday, he suggested that he would not make a decision before January. “We’ll see what happens after January 1st,” he replied when asked by his host. On January 3, however, the new Democratic-majority Congress will take office and will be able to limit the president’s war powers without fear of a Republican veto.

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