Politics

The complex relationship between a segment of Lebanon's Shia community and Hezbollah cannot be grasped through conventional political analysis alone. It reaches beyond strategic calculations or immediate interests into a deeper realm — the cultural and symbolic architectures that shape how communities perceive themselves and inhabit the world. This is where the tools of sociology and anthropology become indispensable, particularly what Émile Durkheim offered us on the collective consciousness, and what Claude Lévi-Strauss illuminated about the deep cultural structures that organize how societies make sense of reality. Collective Consciousness and Obedience in the Time of Fear Durkheim argued that every society produces a system of shared values and beliefs — what he called the collective consciousness. This system does not merely define what the community holds to be right or wrong; it also exerts a moral pressure on individuals, compelling them to conform to what the group deems necessary for its own survival. In times of existential crisis or war, the collective consciousness tends toward rigidity and closure. Communities that feel threatened seek out powerful symbols capable of organizing their collective fear and transforming it into a sense of cohesion. In such moments, ideological organizations emerge as bearers of collective identity — not merely as political actors. This is the lens through which the rise of Hezbollah becomes legible. The party succeeded in presenting itself not merely as a political or military organization, but as a symbolic body embodying a threatened collective dignity. Over time, this symbolic dimension became woven into the collective consciousness of the environment that had given it birth. Dissent from the party thus became, in the eyes of many, tantamount to dissent from the community itself — no longer a critique of a political decision, but a betrayal of belonging. Yet Durkheim also reminds us that the collective consciousness can become a conservative force resistant to critical revision — especially when communal values become entangled with powerful or sacred institutions. When this happens, debate about political and military choices becomes nearly impossible, for the question shifts from political discourse to one of identity. From the Pluralism of Jabal Amel to the Centrality of Resistance To understand this transformation more fully, we must return to the social history of the Jabal Amel region in southern Lebanon. Before the final decades of the twentieth century, Shia society in this region was neither monolithic in structure nor governed by a single political narrative. It was, rather, a social space of multiple reference points: independent religious scholars, vast family networks, rich educational traditions, and an active emigration toward Africa and the Americas — a movement that had nurtured a relatively open social culture. In that era, religious affiliation was an important element of identity, but it was not the sole framework through which the individual related to the world. Ameli culture had historically produced remarkable intellectual and scholarly achievement, yielding thinkers and scholars who played formative roles in the religious and cultural life of the region. But the Lebanese civil war, along with the occupations and armed conflicts that accompanied it, shattered and remolded this social fabric. In that turbulent landscape, Hezbollah emerged as an actor capable of organizing collective fear and channeling it into a coherent political and military project. Gradually, the political identity of the community was reformulated around a single central idea: resistance. The Symbolic Structure of Identity Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis helps us understand this cultural shift. Cultures, in his view, do not operate through isolated ideas, but through deep symbolic structures that organize a community's perception of the world. These structures typically rest on fundamental binaries: interior and exterior, protection and threat, community and enemy. In the Hezbollah experience, collective identity was reorganized around a single stark duality: resistance versus the enemy. This symbolic structure does not operate only in political discourse — it becomes the very framework through which society interprets daily events. Losses can be read as necessary sacrifices; crises, as trials of endurance; internal criticism, as a fragment of external conspiracy. In this way, reality is perpetually reinterpreted in a manner that preserves the coherence of the founding narrative. Yet this very structure carries within it the peril of closure. When the entire world is reduced to the binary of resistance and enemy, the capacity to perceive broader political and social complexity narrows to a vanishing point. From Resistance Movement to Social Power Structure Over time, Hezbollah ceased to be merely a military organization or a resistance movement. It transformed into a comprehensive social power structure within the Shia environment. The party built a vast network of educational institutions, media outlets, and social services, alongside an extensive economic and charitable apparatus. This network created an organic relationship between the party and society, such that the party's presence became woven into the daily life of much of the population. In this sense, the party was no longer a political force to be supported or opposed — it had become a social framework that organized multiple dimensions of community life. This transformation reinforced its capacity to entrench the symbolic structure upon which its discourse rested. But at the same time, it deepened the entanglement between collective identity and political organization, making any critique of the party appear as a threat to the community itself. Yet this sociological reading does not amount to an absolution of the party's political and moral responsibility. An organization that places itself in the position of exclusive representative of a community must also bear responsibility for the price that community pays for its choices. When those choices lead to recurrent wars, to the displacement of populations, or to the exposure of society to permanent risk, a fundamental question becomes inescapable: does this strategy still protect the community — or has it itself become part of the crisis the community endures? The Moment of Reckoning Social history shows that communities do not remain captive to their symbolic structures forever. When contradictions accumulate between discourse and lived reality, the collective consciousness itself begins to shift. This process is slow — often invisible in its early stages — but it constitutes the true turning point in the history of peoples. What Lebanon is living through today may be one of these hinge moments. Social exhaustion, economic collapse, and mass displacement are all forces pressing people to reconsider the relationship between identity and arms, between promised protection and actual cost. The question Lebanon's society faces today is not only one of security or politics. It is a deeper question: how can dignity and protection be redefined outside the logic of permanent war? A society asked to sacrifice without end may begin, at some moment, to seek a different form of security — one grounded not in arms and allegiance, but in the state and the law.

The Salam government’s decision to outlaw Hezbollah’s military and security activities – and to prosecute those behind them – is undoubtedly historic. Yet, it remains insufficient given the sheer scale of the “descent into hell” that this Iranian proxy has, once again, forced upon Lebanon. It is historic because it shatters a long-standing Lebanese tradition of political self-effacement and complacency – a stance long dictated at times by a fear of an internal strife and at others by political opportunism toward a group that has, over the years, successfully imposed its grip on the country and built a security and military apparatus that surpasses the capabilities of the Lebanese state. It is insufficient because it does not empower the authorities to shield the country and its population from the danger posed by an organization whose leaders and members consistently prove that their Lebanese identity is a mere administrative formality. For Hezbollah is, and remains, one of the primary transborder paramilitary instruments of the Iranian clerical regime. The proof – as if any more were needed – lies in its predictable involvement in the war between Iran and the Israel-US coalition, as well as its reaction to the government’s decisions to outlaw its military activities. Its leaders were quick to go on the offensive. The group’s deputy leader, MP Mohammad Raad, denounced “intimidation measures” and “reckless decisions.” While he conceded the state’s right to decide on war and peace, he accused the Salam government of “attacking those who reject the Israeli occupation.” The deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qomati, blasted the government for “remaining silent in the face of occupation,” for “seeking to weaken Hezbollah – Lebanon’s true strength,” and for “violating international law, which grants peoples the right to fight against occupation.” Yet this rhetoric no longer fools anyone. Neither do Hezbollah’s motivations and objectives. The suicide war in which the group is currently engaged – and from which it cannot emerge unscathed – falls strictly within the framework of the reprisals promised by the Pasdaran following the confirmation, on March 1st, of the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who was killed during the large-scale Israeli-American raids on his Tehran headquarters on February 28th. It also aligns with Iran’s repeated warnings to the United States that any attack on the Islamic Republic would set the region ablaze. Tehran has made good on that threat, mobilizing its regional proxies to open multiple indirect fronts and transform a targeted operation into a generalized confrontation. How else can one explain the drone attack on a British military base in Cyprus during the night between Sunday and Monday? According to Western media outlets citing Cypriot officials, the two Iranian-manufactured drones were reportedly launched from Lebanon – striking just as London had authorized Washington to use its bases on the Mediterranean island as part of its offensive against Iran. It must be noted that this is indeed the first time Hezbollah – which has neither confirmed nor denied these accusations – has attacked Cyprus. Yet, it’s not the first time it has threatened the island. In June 2024, the group’s former Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah – assassinated by Israel in September of that year – had warned Nicosia of reprisals if the island allowed Tel Aviv to use its airports or military bases to attack Lebanon. Today, Israel has not attacked Lebanon from Cyprus, nor has Nicosia opened its bases to the Jewish state. In doing so, Hezbollah has once again confirmed its status as an Iranian vassal. Reinforcing Monday’s decisions Can the state realistically prevent Hezbollah from conducting its military operations? The answer is no. It can obstruct them – for instance by arresting those launching rockets, but it cannot halt them entirely, given the massive resources Iran has poured into its protégé and the very structure of the organization, which commands a significant fighting force. Above all, Lebanon is not yet prepared to launch a large-scale operation to dismantle Hezbollah’s entire paramilitary infrastructure. It can, however, bolster Monday’s decisions with further political measures. These would grant the government greater credibility in the eyes of skeptical Lebanese citizens and the international community, which is still waiting for Beirut to honor its commitment to asserting sovereignty over its entirety territory. To achieve this, however, the government must have the courage of its convictions and cease tolerating the terrorism – even in its verbal form – practiced by Hezbollah against the State and those Lebanese who do not share its agenda. Hezbollah’s activities and the bellicose rhetoric of its officials, under the pretext of defending Lebanon against an occupation they themselves provoked, are illegal because they lack State authorization. The State’s primary responsibility is to protect its citizens, not a paramilitary group that continues to arrogate to itself the right to drag Lebanon and its people into destructive wars, and which has long considered itself above the law while enjoying a galling level of impunity. Shifting the Balance The Lebanese authorities have a range of means at their disposal to shift the balance: – Legal recourse, first: What is to prevent the initiation of legal proceedings in response to the threats regularly issued by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, or by the group’s senior cadres in opposition to its disarmament? In Lebanon, the Judicial Council – an exceptional tribunal whose decisions are final and not subject to appeal – was established to handle cases involving crimes against state security. Is there any assault more grave than which has been inflicted for years upon the Lebanese people by a militia whose sole purpose is to serve the interests of Iran? Is it acceptable for a country to be dragged into destructive wars it rejects by a group pledging its allegiance to a foreign state? – Political, next. It is paramount today that the Lebanese state does not repeat the monumental error of 2005. At the time, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian forces, the pro-Syrian political-security apparatus – of which Hezbollah was a core part – was not dismantled. The opposition, encouraged by the international community. had instead prioritized the legislative elections, scheduled for just a few months later. In doing so, Lebanon had just missed a momentum . The consequences of this miscalculation were devastating. A wave of bombings and political assassinations – the investigations into which stalled and in which Hezbollah was implicated – targeted opposition figures. Under the pretext of ensuring stability, an ill-fated electoral alliance known as the “quadripartite agreement” was struck between the Future Movement of Sunni leader Saad Hariri, the PSP of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Hezbollah, and its Shiite ally, Amal. While that alliance shattered a year later, it had in the meantime allowed Hezbollah to establish a powerful presence in Parliament and, for the first time, to enter the government. Following the Syrian withdrawal, Hezbollah’s strategy shifted. Anxious to preserve the grip of its axis over the country, the group was no longer content with indirect representation in the government through Amal ministers. It sought to become a partner in its own right within the executive. It achieved its goal – but for Lebanon and the Lebanese, this marked the end of an era of hope and the beginning of a new descent into hell. Today, a new regional dynamic is taking shape – one that is different and even more decisive than that of 2005. Much like then, however, it risks being costly for Hezbollah and could prove lifesaving for Lebanon. Will the authorities be able to seize this opportunity and cast off the fear of Hezbollah’s retaliations, in order to liberate the country from destructive Iranian influence? They are not being asked to declare war on a militia that would not hesitate to turn its weapons against the Lebanese people, as it did in 2008. They are simply being asked to stop stalling in the hope that the problem will resolve itself. Over the past few months, the disappointment of the Lebanese people – who had believed in the promises of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to disarm the militias and restore sovereignty under the rule of law – has been as profound as the hope they once harbored.

At the helm of Iran since 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had, for over three decades, embodied the ideological continuity of the Islamic Republic and its declared confrontation with the United States—the “Great Satan”—and Israel, designated as its implacable enemy. At 86 years old, the Supreme Leader was the longest-serving leader in the Middle East. Wearing the black turban of the ‘sayyed,’ a symbol of his claimed lineage from the Prophet Muhammad, he concentrated the vast majority of power in his hands. As head of the Iranian theocratic system, he held ultimate authority over religious, political, and military affairs. His portrait dominated the country’s public spaces, while the question of his succession remained taboo. Ali Khamenei assumed the highest office in June 1989, upon the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. At the time, he was about to turn 50. His rise to power was smooth: president of the Republic for eight years marked by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), he consolidated his stature by frequently appearing in military fatigues on the front lines, shaping his image as a committed leader. Human Rights Violations His decades in power were punctuated by major crises. In 2009, the Green Movement contested the re-election, deemed fraudulent, of the ultraconservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In 2022, the Women, Life, Freedom uprising ignited the country after the death in custody of Mahsa Amini, arrested for allegedly wearing a headscarf improperly. More recently, the massive demonstrations last January were described by the Supreme Leader as an attempted coup. Quick to denounce what he called "plots" orchestrated by the United States and Israel, Khamenei regularly equated protests with "sedition," thus legitimizing a brutal and bloody crackdown. The Islamic Republic has been repeatedly criticized by NGOs and the United Nations for human rights violations. Born on April 19, 1939, in Mashhad, into a modest Azerbaijani family, the son of an imam, he studied in the centers of Shiism, in Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran). His opposition to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi led to several prison sentences in the 1960s and 1970s. A devoted follower of Khomeini since 1958, he was appointed in 1980 to lead Friday prayers in Tehran, a highly important position. The following year, he was elected president, a few months after surviving an assassination attempt that left his right hand partially paralyzed. A seasoned orator who led a notoriously austere life, he rarely traveled abroad. His most notable trip was to the United States in 1987 to address the United Nations General Assembly. He resided in a relatively modest home in central Tehran. During the Israeli airstrikes of June 2025 targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, he took refuge in a secret location. Since the Twelve-Day War, his public appearances were no longer broadcast live. A State Within a State Under his leadership, the Supreme Leader's office had transformed into a powerful structure, comparable to a state within a state. He oversaw six presidents of varying political orientations, from reformers Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani to conservatives Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ebrahim Raisi. During his tenure, the Revolutionary Guards strengthened their grip on political and economic life, while also extending Tehran’s regional influence, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. However, this “axis of resistance” was weakened after Hamas’s October 2023 attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli retaliation. Khamenei distinguished himself with virulent rhetoric against Israel, which he described in 2018 as a “malignant tumor” that needed to be eradicated. He also sparked controversy by referring to the extermination of Jews during World War II as a “myth.” More recently, he had threatened to attack the American aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln deployed in the Gulf, asserting that Washington would not succeed in bringing down the Islamic Republic. Economically, Iran remained weakened during his rule by international sanctions, despite a slight recovery in the 1990s and after the 2015 agreement governing the Iranian nuclear program. A Difficult Succession Less well-known to the general public, the Supreme Leader cultivated a passion for literature. An admirer of Victor Hugo and his novel "Les Misérables," which he described as "prodigious" for its exaltation of "goodness and love," he was also a lover of poetry, a passion inherited from his mother. Before the Revolution, he translated Arabic works and composed poems himself. In 2019, a photograph released by his office showed him smiling at the Iran Book Fair. In Tehran, he was leafing through a collection of poems by Ahmad Shamlou, a Marxist poet long reviled by the authorities. A father of six, he regularly saw speculation about his succession. His son, Mojtaba, an influential cleric without an official position, was sometimes presented as a potential successor, a hypothesis that the Supreme Leader had publicly dismissed.

The rumor had started circulating shortly after the beginning of the American-Israeli raids launched early on Saturday morning, February 28, against Iran. The most violent attack had occurred in Tehran, more specifically against the vast residence of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Ali Khamenei, which had been targeted by 30 large-caliber bombs. The raid had completely destroyed the residential center. Iranian authorities had then rushed to indicate that Imam Khamenei had been transferred to a “highly secured location.” Around noon, one of the Israeli television channels indicated that “all contact with Khamenei had been lost for several hours.” Later, in the early afternoon, the television channel indicated that it was “very unlikely, if not almost impossible, that the Supreme Leader emerged unharmed from the airstrike.” Two hours later, the same source stressed that evidence of Khamenei’s death was becoming increasingly numerous. Rumors claiming that Imam Khamenei had been killed in Saturday morning's raid grew until late in the evening when President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly announced that the Iranian Supreme Leader had indeed been killed. The news of his death sparked popular demonstrations of joy in several neighborhoods of Tehran late in the evening. Shortly before midnight, an authorized Iranian source, however, categorically denied the news, going so far as to claim that Imam Khamenei would address the Iranians shortly. It should be noted in this context that an identical scenario in all respects, maintaining ambiguity and spreading information that turned out to be completely false, had been put in place after the death of Hassan Nasrallah and the former Iranian president. A few hours after the start, on Saturday morning, February 28, of the air attacks launched by the American and Israeli air forces and navy against Iran, the greatest uncertainty reigned on Saturday afternoon regarding the fate of several high-ranking leaders of the mullahs' regime, including especially the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei. At the beginning of the raids, an Israeli source had indicated that a series of assassinations had been launched against high-ranking officials. In the early afternoon, one of the Israeli television channels indicated that “contact with Khamenei had been interrupted for several hours.” The same channel specified a little later that “the probability that Khamenei emerged unharmed” from the raid that destroyed his residence in Tehran “is very low, if not zero.” In the mid-afternoon, the same source stressed that it was increasingly likely that Khamenei had been killed. Reports of Khamenei's death were, however, denied by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghtchi, who stated that, to “his knowledge,” the Supreme Leader is alive. In the mid-afternoon, Reuters reported that the Iranian Defense Minister, the commander of the Pasdaran, and the head of Military Intelligence had been killed. Simultaneously, Iranian missiles intermittently struck Dubai (until evening), Qatar, Riyadh, as well as Kuwait, where a drone targeted the international airport. In the early evening, the Israeli army indicated that its air force was conducting intensive raids “against hundreds of Iranian military positions.” Earlier, in the morning, command centers of the Revolutionary Guards, Military Intelligence, as well as certain ministries in Tehran were the targets of the airstrikes. These bombardments targeting the Iranian power infrastructure would constitute, according to an authorized Israeli source, “a first phase that will extend over four days,” which would indicate that the American-Israeli offensive is expected to take on a large scale in the coming days.

Donald Trump has just committed American forces to a large-scale operation against the Iranian regime. This is the real McCoy, the real thing, not a simulated raid nor a mere warning shot. The face of the Middle East is about to change. And, truth be told, it is the arrogance of the ayatollahs that will have brought about their downfall. Indeed, only a few days ago, the United States dealt Iran an affront that the ayatollahs had every interest in keeping quiet. During the latest conclave held in Geneva on Thursday, under the auspices of the Sultanate of Oman, Steve Witkoff, the American negotiator, abruptly broke off the talks and withdrew from the meeting on the pretext that he had other obligations to fulfil. In fact, he was heading to meet, on the other side of Lake Geneva, a Ukrainian delegation. Bitter pills to swallow One can easily imagine the indignation of Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. This heir to the Achaemenid Empire of Cyrus and Darius was treated as a nobody. Swallowing his pride, the Iranian foreign minister nevertheless declared that “good progress” had been made during the talks, which he described as “one of our most intense and longest series of negotiations.” Moreover, Araghchi announced that a new round of talks would take place in less than a week. The Omani mediators, seeking to calm tensions, immediately confirmed this, specifying that negotiations were expected to resume at technical level the following week in Vienna. Their optimistic tone appears to have been contradicted by events, since the American team was evidently disappointed by the Iranian proposals. As evidence, there was the brevity of the second session, from which Donald Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, withdrew under a questionable pretext. Times have changed Discussions were taking place under the threat of an imminent strike that, in the event, was launched this morning. The American military build-up in the region is unprecedented: two carrier strike groups centred on aircraft carriers, 200 aircraft, aerial refuelling equipment and submarines equipped with Tomahawk missiles, not to mention the presence of 50,000 troops. This is no longer the period of 2013–2015 under Barack Obama, who did not harbour principled hostility towards Iran. Indeed, John Kerry, who replaced Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State in 2013, quickly conveyed the message to the relevant parties: the United States was ready to modify its stance towards Tehran. It was prepared, at least de facto, to recognise the legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear programme and to abandon the demand that the ayatollahs’ regime suspend uranium enrichment activities, a demand that had blocked any possibility of reaching an agreement for seven years. The negotiations launched at that time culminated on 14 July 2015 in the agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But that was not the end of the story, since during his first term Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement. Everything had to begin again from scratch, this time under the shadow of aircraft carriers. For Iranian negotiators, however, the years 2013 to 2015 were a “blessed era”, during which they played the leading role, demonstrating professionalism and firmness while accumulating successes. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister, spoke loudly and was listened to. Never would his American counterpart, John Kerry, have allowed himself an incivility such as Witkoff’s. Never would he have so flagrantly snubbed him. Trump as warlord This Saturday’s American intervention has changed the equation, and Donald Trump now presents himself as a wartime leader. Too much has been said about his businessman’s instincts, supposedly inclined to avoid confrontation. Yet he was not without calculation. Has he not always hinted that he hesitated to cross the Rubicon? The page has now been turned, and his true face revealed. “Strategic ambiguity” has paid off, and it is up to free Iranians to reap the fruits.

The Iranian people — along with other populations across the Levant — had long awaited this D-Day. The intensive American and Israeli air raids launched early this Saturday morning, February 28, do not appear to be a limited, one-off strike confined in time and scope. On the contrary, they seem to signal the prelude to a comprehensive and radical offensive — both militarily and politically — against the mullahs’ regime in power in Tehran. This assessment stems not only from the breadth and scale of the U.S.-Israeli air strikes, but above all from the televised and radio address delivered in the morning by President Donald Trump (likely recorded Friday evening). With his customary frankness, the White House leader outlined without ambiguity the broad contours of the offensive, dubbed by Israel “Shield of Judah” — an allusion to divine protection. Building on the particularly firm and harsh remarks he had made in recent days regarding the Iranian regime, notably during his State of the Union address, President Trump announced in his broadcast message that the United States had launched a “large-scale” attack against Iran, adding that the operation “will continue against Iran to prevent it from posing a threat to America.” Emphasizing the geostrategic scope of the assault, President Trump added: “We will ensure that Iran’s proxies no longer pose any threat to the region,” in a clear reference to the outposts of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Lebanon (through Hezbollah), Iraq, and Yemen. Regarding Lebanon specifically, the White House chief underscored — in what marks a first for an American president — that Iran’s allies were responsible for the 1983 attack against U.S. Marines in Beirut, noting that the terrorist operation orchestrated by the mullahs’ regime resulted in 241 American soldiers killed. President Trump was particularly explicit about the objectives of the February 28 offensive. “We will destroy Iran’s missiles; we will level Iran’s naval forces,” he stated. “I call on the Revolutionary Guards to lay down their arms. If they do, they will be safe; if not, we will destroy them.” Addressing the regime directly, he continued: “Lay down your arms, and you will receive Justice.” In plain terms, President Trump is demanding the regime’s total capitulation — a demand that could only result in its collapse and eradication, and thus a radical reshaping of the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. Finally, the White House chief addressed the Iranian people: “The hour of your liberation is near.” A message swiftly embraced by residents of the al-Ahwaz region in southwestern Iran, largely populated by citizens of Arab origin, who by late morning proclaimed a rebellion against the central “Persian” authority of the mullahs. Expansion of Military Operations A sign that the offensive is not limited or temporary, the air raids were not confined to Tehran but extended to several major cities, likely targeting air defense systems and long-range missiles. Among the targeted locations were Qom, Tabriz, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Khorramabad, Karaj, and Garmdarreh. In retaliation, the Pasdaran launched around thirty ballistic missiles late in the morning toward northern Israel, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. Significantly, Iranian missile fire also targeted — on a smaller scale — Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Jordan, and even Riyadh. Tehran claimed it was striking American bases, although these had reportedly been evacuated days earlier by U.S. forces. The Position of the Lebanese State As the American-Israeli military offensive against Tehran continued, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam each issued statements explicitly stressing the need to keep Lebanon entirely out of the conflict, thereby denouncing Hezbollah’s apparent intention to join the ongoing battle. For his part, Foreign Minister Joe Raggi echoed the same stance, declaring bluntly: “Lebanon’s interest must prevail over any other consideration… Neutrality, neutrality, neutrality.”

The war in Ukraine, triggered by the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, is entering its fifth year. Moscow's offensive initially aimed to overthrow the Ukrainian state in a few days, but it met fierce Ukrainian resistance and massive mobilization by Westerners to help them. The worst conflict on European soil since World War II has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries, while millions of Ukrainian refugees have fled into exile. On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the conflict's outbreak, Levant Time interviewed Constantin Sigov, philosopher, director of the Centre for European Studies at Mohyla University in Kyiv and of the Dukh i Litera (Spirit and Letter) publishing house. «Four years after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, the first observation is that Ukraine has survived, it has not given in at all,» Mr. Sigov immediately emphasizes. «It even won the Battle of Kyiv, whereas exactly four years ago, on February 24, 2002, Russian President Vladimir Putin was convinced that this battle would be decided in three days,» he affirms, echoing the statements of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky who was receiving the heads of state and government of Ukraine's allied countries in Kyiv. «Everything Ukraine has endured must not be abandoned, forgotten, or betrayed,» Mr. Zelensky declared in an address to the nation. Mr. Sigov reminds us that Ukraine has been resisting for twelve years, since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. «Ukraine is not only defending its territory, it is defending a principle particularly relevant today in the Middle East and among our European neighbors, namely that borders must not be changed by force and violence.» But this resilience is threatened by the changing US policy towards Ukraine and NATO allies. It is true that G7 leaders, including Donald Trump, affirmed their "unwavering support for Ukraine" last Tuesday, while some thirty leaders of Kyiv's allied countries urged Russia to accept a "complete and unconditional ceasefire". For its part, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Tuesday, February 24, reaffirming its support for Kyiv and its territorial integrity: the text was adopted by 107 votes in favor, 12 against, and 51 abstentions… including the United States, because the text emphasizes "firm commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders". The Americans do not want to refer to «Ukraine's territorial integrity and international law so as not to put pressure on ongoing peace negotiations.» The battle for Europe's independence A year ago, a month after Donald Trump's return to the White House, the United States, with Russian support, pushed a resolution through the Security Council calling for a swift peace, but without mention of Ukraine's territorial integrity, much to the dismay of Kyiv's European allies. Saluting President Trump's diplomatic efforts, Russian Ambassador Vassili Nebenzia assured that Russia was participating "in good faith" in the negotiations. The same Vassili Nebenzia was present at the Council meeting on February 24, 2022. He fiercely defended his country's good intentions while 150,000 Russian soldiers massed on Ukraine's borders, before being interrupted by his Ukrainian counterpart, in tears after being informed by his government that the Russian army had broken through the front... Asked to comment on this new reality, namely the complete drying up of financial and military aid from the Biden era, Mr. Sigov reminds us that polls show that the majority of Americans wish to further support Ukraine. A factor that, especially on the eve of the US congressional elections, must be taken seriously by the Trump administration. Kyiv is thus banking on the coming months, which will be decisive. Mr. Sigov also recalls the «decisive» role of economic sanctions: «The essential thing is to deprive Russia of its capacity to harm. And if Europe clearly sets this objective, the solution will become possible.» He added: «One can generally say that the battle for Ukraine's independence, today, has become the battle for Europe's independence. Independence from both Russian gas and oil, but also from American influence. And in this sense, for a long time, Ukraine, Europe, and democratic countries in general are in the same boat.» A real awakening of consciousness «For the moment, we are witnessing a real awakening of consciousness. I think it was clear at the Munich Security Conference that, indeed, the Scandinavian countries, along with Germany, France, and Great Britain, are sensitive to this approach. But there is a terrible delay in decision-making, especially concerning the «Russian ghost fleet,» those oil tankers clandestinely used by Russia to export its oil despite international sanctions.» «But unfortunately, there is still funding coming from European Union countries. To name just Orban's Hungary and Slovakia, which have not chosen to be on the right side of history and justice.» On another note, Mr. Sigov recalls the experience gained by Ukrainians due to their determination: «From the invasion, Ukrainians were very inventive, they used drones which greatly helped to stop the aggressor, and even in some places to make them retreat, as in the Kharkiv Oblast (administrative region).» But he also reminds us that the country «is paying an enormous price: hospitals are receiving a great many seriously injured men and women, a true daily tragedy.» «It is therefore clear that what is severely lacking is massive military aid, which has been decided upon but is slow to be sent.» Mr. Sigov adds in this context, not without a hint of bitterness: «There is truly an asymmetry when we know that North Korea, without having an economy like Germany or France, supplies more ammunition to Russia than the European Union sends to Ukraine. So, I believe that what is lacking behind all this is a true political will and a determined strategic decision.» An impossible peace The academic recalls Putin's declaration: «Russia has no borders,» before quoting Orwell: «They are perfectly capable of putting their boot on the face of a human being of any nationality.» «So, we are truly witnessing a genocidal war, according to all the criteria developed by the greatest jurists at the time of Nuremberg and afterward. This term was coined by Raphael Lemkin, himself a jurist who studied at the University of Lviv.» He continued: «According to these criteria, the idea of the erasure of a nation, of its culture, of its identity, and the means of systematic aggression against civilians, including by cold, by all inhumane means, appears.» Mr. Sigov asserts that there is no political will on the Russian side to end the aggression: «One should not look for a black cat in a dark room (…). In my opinion, the war will only end when Putin no longer has the resources to continue it.» Indeed, the Kremlin affirmed on Tuesday, February 24, that "Russia's objectives have not yet been achieved," adding: "That is why the special military operation (the name given by Russia to the invasion) continues" in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, for his part, considered that the Westerners, who arm and finance Ukraine, had not managed "to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia on the battlefield". Conflict of interest Moscow, which occupies about 20% of Ukraine, continues a slow but steady advance on the front. Russians regularly carry out massive drone and missile strikes, which have devastated Ukraine's energy grid, causing power and heating outages in the middle of a freezing winter. Near the front, entire cities have been reduced to rubble and the cost of rebuilding Ukraine over the next decade is estimated at more than 500 billion euros, according to an international report published last Monday, February 23. Several rounds of negotiations have taken place in recent weeks. Washington is pushing to end the war based on its plan, unveiled in late 2025, which grants enormous concessions to the Russians in exchange for US security guarantees for Ukraine. Moscow indeed demands that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the areas they still control in Donbas and thus abandon this large industrial basin in eastern Ukraine to the Russians… which Kyiv refuses, especially since the American guarantees are very vague. The Americans are represented in the discussions by Trump's close advisor, Steve Witkoff, and the president's son-in-law, Jared Kushner. The appointment of the two negotiators is criticized in Washington and Europe for what it represents as a conflict of interest. Especially since, whether in Ukraine or Gaza, Trump's associates will be the primary beneficiaries of the peace dividends.

The Mexican army has killed Nemesio Oseguera “El Mencho”, leader of the Jalisco Cartel and Mexico’s most powerful drug trafficker, wanted by the United States with a $15 million reward. Analysis with Dr. Edgar Guerra, jurist Emiliano Alba, and Levant Time correspondents, Maxime Pluvinet and Miroslava Salazar. The Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection Omar García Harfouch (of Lebanese origin), accompanied by Claudia Sheinbaum, President of Mexico, during a press conference following the death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho”, leader of the Jalisco cartel. (Gerardo Vieyra/NurPhoto via AFP) Sunday, February 22, 2026: Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho”, leader of the Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Cartel, was killed by the Mexican army. The cartel's retaliation was almost immediate: roadblocks, vehicle fires, and acts of violence in the state of Jalisco as well as in several other regions of the country. According to mapping carried out by the Dataint platform, violent events were recorded in at least 22 states, with a particularly marked impact in Jalisco, Puebla, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, and Baja California. The reaction following the operation highlighted the cartel's true scale in many regions: its territorial control, its presence in both legal and illegal economies, and, above all, the solidity of its organizational structure and its capacity for immediate mobilization. This turning point can be compared to the arrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, which occurred on the same day twelve years earlier. “This is undoubtedly the most significant blow dealt to organized crime under President Claudia Sheinbaum's administration,” states Edgar Guerra, a specialist in organized crime, violence, and security, in an interview with Levant Time. The hundred-headed hydra The operation that led to the death of “El Mencho” is a double-edged sword. As Emiliano Alba, security and organized crime analyst, points out, in the short term, Claudia Sheinbaum's government can politically capitalize on this event as a victory in the fight against drug trafficking, thus sending a message to national public opinion and the United States: “Something has been done.” However, the structural effects are of a different nature. “Concretely, we will witness a new reorganization within the cartel. Violent internal conflicts for succession are to be expected,” explains Alba. Nemesio Oseguera held a central position within the CJNG and had no clearly designated successor. For Alba, the leader's fall represents a conjunctural vulnerability, but not a structural collapse. “It is a temporary operational weakness, but the organization remains,” he insists, recalling that the CJNG does not rely solely on a central figure, but on a consolidated apparatus, with territorial, financial, and political networks ensuring its continuity. The analyst emphasizes that historical experience shows that the strategy of “decapitation” of criminal organizations often produces counterproductive effects: “Cutting off the hydra's head makes others emerge.” Fragmentation, territorial struggles, and violence related to succession are well-known dynamics in Mexico. This observation is all the more relevant given that, according to Alba, the strategy of the Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection, Omar García Harfuch, had progressively moved away from targeted elimination of leaders to prioritize the dismantling of structures. “It was no longer about beheading cartels, but about attacking their political, financial, and territorial networks,” he specifies, referring to operations like Enjambre, targeting political alliances and institutional protection networks. Two scenarios emerge: either the CJNG continues its activities without its leader, or it descends into an internal war for control of power. In the latter case, the impact on public security would be direct. “We would see an increase in homicides,” warns specialist David Saucedo to AFP. The United States: the troublesome neighbor For Edgar Guerra, the international context is crucial. “One cannot understand the security policy of Claudia Sheinbaum's government without considering the pressure exerted by the United States. The Donald Trump administration exerted strong pressure on Mexico: fentanyl seizures, increased migration control, reinforced operational requirements. All of this is part of the same set of demands.” The Mexican government has also confirmed that the operation benefited from American intelligence support. “This is not just a Mexican or Jalisco problem. It is a global problem,” emphasizes Guerra. He adds: “The United States is among the main consumers of illicit drugs and one of the main producers of weapons. This fuels the economic and material incentives for drug trafficking. It is therefore a shared problem, but with clear structural responsibility on the American side.” A never-ending war The “war on drugs” is not new in Mexico. From Felipe Calderón's mandate to those that followed, direct confrontation with cartels has been a constant for almost twenty years. However, far from sustainably reducing violence, the country has gone through repeated cycles of criminal fragmentation, territorial recomposition, and expansion of illicit economies. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 33,241 homicides were recorded in 2024, 71.8% of which were by firearms. Under Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), 122,462 assassinations were counted; under Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), 157,158; and under Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), 202,336. Faced with this reality, Alba believes that an exclusively confrontation-based approach is insufficient. “Strategies against organized crime must be comprehensive. It’s not just about fighting organizations, but about restoring state authority in these territories and ensuring the safety of the population. This goes far beyond the use of force.” Guerra shares this diagnosis: the problem is deeply institutional. “Politicians and local and regional officials protect these groups and have allowed their consolidation. Dismantling these protection networks will be essential.” To this is added a key factor: impunity. “Organized crime thrives in Mexico because impunity is structural. Without it, these organizations could not be sustained.” In this context, the death of “El Mencho” does not constitute a decisive break, but a new stage in a prolonged conflict. More than an end, it marks the beginning of an internal recomposition often synonymous with increased violence. As Alba summarizes: “We might witness a moment of calm, like a lull in the eye of the storm, but only in the short term. Then will come the reorganization.” Thus, what appears today as a political victory could herald a new phase of violent reconfiguration. The question is no longer whether there will be consequences, but which ones, where, and with what intensity. For millions of Mexicans, the doubt remains: is this the peace before the storm?

By February 2026, the temperature in the Persian Gulf is approaching a boiling point. The U.S. Fifth Fleet has completed a military buildup rarely seen since the Cold War. Strategic bomber wings rotate through forward bases. Tel Aviv experiences intermittent GPS signal jamming. News feeds oscillate between predictions of “World War III” and dramatic narratives of a “Sino-Russian alliance defending Tehran to the death.” The world is staring at radar screens, waiting for ignition. Yet if we strip away the ideological noise, the confrontation deserves to be analyzed through a far more sober framework: game theory. Game theory – a branch of applied mathematics – studies strategic interaction in situations where the outcome for each actor depends on the choices of others. It is not about morality or rhetoric. It is about incentives, constraints, equilibrium. And once we apply this lens, the crisis looks less like chaos – and more like a forced systemic adjustment. The Geopolitical Balance Sheet Military activation is the most dramatic way of settling geopolitical bad debts. “To strike or not to strike” is ultimately a choice of liquidation method – kinetic versus negotiated. But it may not change the final geopolitical balance sheet. To understand the equilibrium toward which this system is moving, we must first identify what is truly at stake for each player. United States Washington’s objectives are straightforward: – Eliminate Iran’s nuclear threshold capability. – Dismantle medium and long-range offensive missile capacity. – Degrade or sever Tehran’s regional proxy networks. The U.S. can coexist with the Mullah regime – provided it ceases regional destabilization and removes the existential threat to Israel. Recent deployments in the Middle East have cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Deterrence must now be monetized through tangible strategic results. The United States seeks to secure energy corridors and free up strategic bandwidth for the Indo-Pacific. Israel For Israel, the equation is existential. Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile infrastructure represent a red line. Any residual nuclear threshold capability invalidates long-term deterrence. Israel’s objective is not symbolic containment – it is the physical dismantling of capabilities that could enable annihilation. Regional Arab States For Gulf monarchies and regional Arab states, the priority is stability. Their economies depend on uninterrupted energy exports and secure maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz. War would endanger critical infrastructure – oil terminals, desalination plants, financial hubs. Their objective is simple: avoid systemic fire. China and Russia Beijing and Moscow have more nuanced objectives. They do not want the United States to control Iran’s energy reserves outright. Nor do they want Iran completely neutralized and folded into a Western sphere. Iran functions as a geopolitical node: – It absorbs U.S. military attention. – It supplies discounted crude to China. – It anchors multipolar leverage in the region. A fully pacified, Western-aligned Iran would allow the U.S. to pivot decisively toward the Indo-Pacific – an outcome Beijing seeks to avoid. The Iranian Regime and the IRGC For the Mullah regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the objective is survival. The nuclear program and missile capabilities are not merely strategic tools – they are legitimacy assets. They justify the IRGC’s monopolization of domestic resources and political authority. An unconditional surrender would fracture the internal power structure and risk mutiny within the Guard. Regional Proxies Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other aligned groups face a harsher reality: survival under attrition. Without sustained logistical and weapons support, they degrade from semi-conventional forces into fragmented militias. Their strategic leverage diminishes rapidly without supply chain continuity. Why a “Grand Compromise” Does Not Exist On the surface, one could imagine a clean formula: Disarmament in exchange for economic normalization. But once we model the incentives properly, frictionless consensus becomes implausible. – Khamenei cannot sign a document that “pulls out all the teeth” without triggering internal instability. – China and Russia do not benefit from a fully pacified Iran that frees U.S. forces for Asia. – The IRGC cannot accept disarmament without compensation. Therefore, equilibrium cannot be absolute peace. It must be calibrated. The Customized Equilibrium The most plausible convergent state is not total surrender, but a high-precision strategic excision – a controlled amputation of specific capabilities while preserving others. The system stabilizes along three parameters. 1 - Zeroing Nuclear Threshold Capability No ambiguity. No “59.9% enrichment” Schrödinger scenario. High-grade centrifuges are dismantled. Enriched stockpiles are removed. Verification is intrusive and irreversible. Israel and the United States obtain physical security. Iran retains the narrative of peaceful nuclear use. 2 - Locking Down Strategic Missile Ranges Medium- and long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel and Europe are destroyed. However, coastal anti-ship cruise missiles remain. This preserves Iran’s tactical defensive leverage over the Strait of Hormuz – and ensures the U.S. Fifth Fleet cannot simply exit the theater. China and Russia thereby maintain a strategic anchor that keeps American attention partially tied to the Gulf. 3 - Downgrading Proxy Networks Precision-guided munitions supply chains and financial ties are severed. Hezbollah and other actors degrade from quasi-strategic strike forces into localized, lower-intensity entities. Israel gains substantive border security. Tehran maintains rhetorical influence through the “Axis of Resistance” narrative. Why Would the IRGC Accept This? The answer lies in internal interest substitution. Authoritarian regimes operate through compensation mechanisms. When external expansion is forcibly curtailed, internal rent extraction expands. In exchange for surrendering nuclear and proxy ambitions, the IRGC could receive: – Control over unfrozen funds. – Allocation rights on crude export quotas. – Expanded domestic economic monopolies. The transformation would be clear: From geopolitical warlord to internal oligarchic guardian. Sanctions relief and energy revenues would buy compliance at the top. The Zombie Equilibrium The final settlement of this crisis may not resemble victory or defeat. It would resemble a structurally stable, morally ambiguous arrangement – a Zombie Equilibrium. – The U.S. and Israel eliminate existential nuclear risk. – China and Russia preserve a non-Western energy node. – The Iranian regime survives, inward-focused and economically transactional. Iran ceases to be a revisionist chess player and becomes a calibrated energy plug in a multipolar system. Its “teeth” – nuclear threshold, strategic missiles, proxy strike networks – are removed. Its “claws” – internal security apparatus and maritime denial capacity – remain. The systemic game has reached bedrock. At this stage, fighter jets taking off from carrier decks may be less about altering the outcome and more about shaping negotiating leverage. The central question is not whether pressure will force structural change. It is whether ideology will be traded for survival, bearing in mind that Iran’s current economic and financial situation will ultimately lead to the demise of the regime in the longer term. And that is why negotiations are long, tense, and delicately staged. Because in this game, equilibrium is already mathematically visible – even if politically unspoken.

We could have mourned her passing as one mourns a beloved friend, and suffered as one suffers when death severs a part of a shared life: a friendship, a brotherhood, a family. She might also — and perhaps it would have been the easier path — have spent her life in sheltered comfort, protected from the hardships of origin and the harshness of destiny. She was the daughter of a noble and prosperous household, heir to a legacy that allowed her to lean upon inherited security and remain beneath the shade of a family untouched by either disgrace or deprivation. But she was not “just any woman.” She was Leila Shahid. With her passing a few days ago, sorrow thickens into a wound both heavy and deep. For what has been lost is not merely a friend; it is a life that resisted the easy temptation — the temptation to save oneself and leave one’s homeland to its fate. Our story with her begins when she was still an infant… yes, at that threshold History rarely opens in the biographies of the great, though it is the very source of the narrative. Her mother, Sirine, nursed my sister Hayat alongside Leila, and my mother, Salma, nursed Leila together with Hayat. In our home, Leila was the daughter of Kamel and Salma; in theirs, we were the children of Mounib and Sirine. Thus were we introduced to the world: without borders between houses, without distance between bloodlines. From those early days, Leila was a force in motion — driven by curiosity, by the hunger for discovery, by the urge to raise questions endlessly. She was a whirlwind of energy, as if she had been created to unsettle stillness, challenge inertia, and set even stone into motion. Armed with the knowledge she acquired at the American University of Beirut, she rushed into the field — not as one who “visits” camps, but as one who returns to her own. She went to the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon as one goes back to one’s own children. She left the comfort of her life for the heart of tragedy, not to write and testify from afar, but to encounter reality from within and earn the right to speak of it because she had carried its weight. She then immersed herself in journalism when the magazine Monday Morning was founded alongside Fawaz Najieh, a journalist and publisher of stature. There, on the demanding ground of rational thought rather than easy rhetoric, her diplomatic gifts began to unfold: articles, interviews, research were developed and written with seriousness, rigor, and scholarship. This approach was not cultural ornamentation; it was a set of instruments forged for struggle. Major media outlets quoted her, for her voice was not the “clamor of a cause,” but a discourse of knowledge and responsibility. Then came the diplomatic path: her appointment as representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, chosen by Yasser Arafat. Leila served her homeland because she believed — with early political intuition — that a homeland belongs to all its citizens, and that a leader is “mandated,” not “crowned.” Even with Abu Ammar, she perceived him as entrusted with a mission, not enthroned for eternity. This was not severity toward him; it was mercy toward the cause. For causes that transform into the worship of individuals are sacrificed upon the altar of individuals. During her diplomatic mission, Europe — yes, Europe — was often more severe toward the Palestinian cause than America. The Old Continent was shaken by terrorism carried out in the name of resistance: airplane hijackings, the tragedy of Munich. Palestinian representation operated within a context marked by the Cold War and Soviet alignments that led the West to see the Palestinian not as the bearer of a right, but as a potential threat. Added to this was the wave of assassinations carried out by the Israelis against Palestinian representatives; this other kind of war emptied the political stage of men and figures of great stature. During that phase, Leila was, in many respects, alone. She was the political representative; she left her imprint on the media, on research centers, on cultural life, on university lectures, on meetings in policy circles… she embodied the “Palestinian face,” all with an endurance rarely demanded of a single human being. Leila Shahid had succeeded. More than that, she triumphed — in the way justice is permitted to triumph in the great capitals: through argument, through reason, through intellectual and linguistic eloquence that does not descend to the level of the crowd and does not solicit demagoguery. She debated with a ferocity of mind — the ferocity of an eagle protecting her young… her Palestinians. She confronted her adversaries in France, in the media and in public, not through invective, but by transforming the cause into a narrative that could be understood… then accepted… then progressively freed from conditions. She moved the wall, stone after stone, pushing Europe from instinctive rejection toward conditional acceptance, and then working to dismantle the conditions. Until she was awarded the French Legion of Honour at the rank of Officer — not as an ornament upon her chest, but as evidence that she had wrested recognition of dignity in the midst of a fierce struggle. Yes, it is natural to grieve the loss of Leila Shahid, because we have lost a friend. But our sorrow today weighs heavier than the absence of friendship. We are living through a “new Nakba,” and Palestine more than ever needs a civilized leadership, clean-handed and clear-minded, one that resembles its people and does not treat them as bargaining currency. Leila Shahid was — had destiny been just — the closest thing to a “President of Palestine,” in the moral rather than protocol sense: culture, experience, commitment to the Palestinian citizen — wounded, expelled, scattered to the four corners of the earth. She had moved Palestine from the state of bargaining and corruption toward an upright patriotism that forced even the malicious to confront their own shame. That is why we weep: because we have bid farewell to a woman who was light in a time of darkness, and because we have been deprived, once more, of a model of leadership that does not demand ovations but seeks to fulfill its mission. It is almost a sacrilege that Palestine should lose women like Leila… and it is deeply lamentable that our age remains orphaned of women like her.