Politics

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, Libya has not been undergoing some unfinished transition, but has settled into a lasting state of political dissolution. Far from paving the way for a reconstruction process, the brutal disappearance of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, on the contrary, triggered a long sequence of fragmentation, where armed violence progressively replaced the state as the organizing principle of power, as in Sudan. This series offers a structural reading of the Libyan war as a stabilized and coherent system in itself, embedded in regional and international rivalries, and now capable of eliminating any political alternative that does not fit its logic.

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, Libya has not been undergoing just any unfinished transition, but has settled into a durable state of political dissolution. Far from paving the way for a reconstruction process, the brutal disappearance of Muammar Gaddafi's regime instead triggered a long sequence of fragmentation, where armed violence has, as in Sudan, progressively replaced the state as the organizing principle of power. This series offers a structural reading of the Libyan war as a stabilized and coherent system in itself, inserted into regional and international rivalries, and now capable of eliminating any political alternative that does not fit into its logic.

What would be the point of a strike ordered by Trump? Are we to believe it would put an end to the repression raining down on Iranian protesters? In reality, no one is in a position to halt the reprisals that the Revolutionary Guards are inflicting upon their fellow citizens. And even if an agreement were concluded in Oman to avert an American military operation, nothing suggests that civil peace would immediately take hold. In either case—whether the mullahs reach a cut-rate understanding with the United States or not—the Iranian protest movement will be left to the ferocity of a so-called “pacification” that fires live ammunition at point-blank range at demonstrators and other opponents.

A few weeks before the international Paris Conference scheduled for March 2026, whose goal is to mobilize international support for the Lebanese army, the army's commander-in-chief finds himself at a critical strategic turning point. In a Lebanon beset by political and regional uncertainties, every decision made on the ground or within the general staff can have repercussions far beyond its borders and influence not only the survival of the military institution, but also the international perception of its role as a national stabilizer. According to General Maroun Hitti, the army does not only face external and internal threats: it is subjected to cumulative pressure, where multiple mandates, ambiguous political decisions, and popular expectations combine to test its endurance, cohesion, and credibility. The stakes are twofold: maintaining its credibility in a volatile internal context and convincing the international community that the army remains an indispensable pillar of Lebanon's stability.

In a particularly sensitive regional and domestic context, any assessment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) must go beyond a simple inventory of aid received and equipment required. The real issue lies in examining the political, doctrinal and strategic foundations of the military institution itself. The central question is not so much what the army possesses, but what the state expects – or refuses to take responsibility for – it to do. Since the late 2000s, the Lebanese army has benefited from sustained international assistance, notably from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other European partners. This support has taken the form not only of equipment deliveries and new infrastructure, but above all, of the introduction of a structured capability-development approach. The establishment of a joint capability vision with the United States marked a turning point, prioritizing the optimization of existing assets rather than the creation of entirely new capabilities.

Paris, by Arthur Bassil Since the beginning of January, the Iranian diaspora in Europe has been mobilizing to stigmatize the Islamic Republic and the massacres perpetrated against the Iranian people. In Paris, this gathering is renewed every Sunday. Around 3 PM, Place de la Bastille, this Sunday, February 8, a sunny day in Paris. Approximately five thousand demonstrators are gathered around the Iranian flag adorned with the lion and sun to denounce the massacres perpetrated by the Islamic Republic. In addition to this strong symbol, demonstrators brandish images of the victims of these massacres. On January 8 and 9, 2026, exactly one month ago, the Khamenei regime committed the unthinkable: thousands of Iranians were killed in cold blood. Their crime? Having dared to demonstrate against the socio-economic crisis, but above all against the oppression that has plagued Iran for decades.

“To hope is to defy the future.” – Emil Cioran This quote, photographed by Édouard Elias, was written by journalist Samir Kassir on a piece of paper two weeks before his assassination in 2005. It is among many personal artifacts Elias has photographed to preserve the legacy of victims of political assassinations in Lebanon since that date. These portraits and relics will be showcased in the photo exhibition “Remaining” , on the occasion of the 5th commemoration of Lokman Slim's assassination. The exhibition will run from February 7 to March 3 at Union Marks, Burj Hammoud, from 2:00 pm to 8:00 pm. The inauguration took place in the presence of a large crowd and several prominent figures, including MPs Marwan Hamadé and Michel Moawad, and former minister May Chidiac. This exhibition is a collaboration between photographer and photojournalist Édouard Elias and journalist and filmmaker Katia Jarjoura, curator of the project. It is produced by the Lokman Slim Foundation, with the support of the French Institute.

As the date of the international conference in support of the Lebanese army, scheduled for March 2026 in Paris, approaches, Lebanon finds itself at a critical juncture. This meeting, intended to mobilize the international community in favor of the regular forces, comes at an extremely complex political and regional time. Every decision or lack thereof by the Lebanese state regarding the monopoly of weapons, in particular, will have a direct impact on the effectiveness of international aid to the troops and, more broadly, on the very future of the army and national sovereignty. The chosen date, March 5, 2026, remains conditional, however. According to General Maroun Hitti, the conference could be postponed if a crucial step is not taken by Lebanon by then. This step consists either of a unanimous political decision within the Lebanese government, including Hezbollah and Nabih Berri’s ministers, for the State to take charge of the weapons issue and for Hezbollah to submit to its authority, or of a major regional event. This could be a cataclysm or an armed conflict that would force Iran to comply with the demands of the international community, thus altering the balance of power in the region.

Analytical focus on the war in Sudan which, since 2023, has already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced people, with a particularly overwhelming human cost in Darfur, where mass violence, sieges, and forced displacement have taken on a dimension that many international actors now qualify as genocidal. The Sudanese war regularly leads to announcements of mediation, imminent ceasefires, and “diplomatic windows.” At almost regular intervals, an international actor thus “rediscovers” the conflict, promises an initiative, or convenes talks. These sequences essentially produce political noise, and sometimes a temporary suspension of fighting on a specific front, but they never alter the structure of the conflict. However, the repetition of the same pattern does not constitute an accidental failure of diplomacy; it is the product of a deeper misunderstanding of the very nature of the ongoing war.

Analytical focus on the war in Sudan which, since 2023, has already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced persons, with a particularly devastating human cost in Darfur, where mass violence, sieges and forced displacement have taken on a dimension that many international actors now describe as genocidal. It seems necessary to analyze Iran's role in the Sudanese conflict alone, even though the latter does not present itself in the classic form of an identified sponsor, an overt political support or an assumed alliance. It is more diffuse, more indirect, but, in many respects, more structuring. Tehran is not a central actor in the Sudanese theater; it is a kind of strategic amplifier, inscribing the conflict in a broader regional architecture, dominated by the Red Sea and new forms of asymmetric warfare.