Lebanon Between Negotiating Conditions and Decision-Making Complexities

Israel sets as a precondition the disarmament of Hezbollah before any negotiations — a demand it knows in advance to be beyond the reach of the Lebanese state, since the decision of war and peace remains, to a very large extent, outside the framework of that state's institutions. Israel has nonetheless taken a notable step by appointing Ron Dermer as head of its delegation to negotiations with Lebanon — a senior official close to decision-making circles, and particularly to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This appointment lends the Israeli move undeniable political substance and sends an unambiguous signal to the international community: Israel is ready to engage in a high-level negotiation process.

By contrast, the Lebanese state is attempting to form a negotiating delegation that reflects the internal sectarian balances underpinning the political system. But this attempt quickly ran up against the complexities of Lebanese reality: Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri refused to name the Shia member of the delegation, conditioning his participation on a full ceasefire before any negotiating session. This comes at the very moment when Hezbollah has declared its rejection of any ceasefire before the end of the war against Iran, stating that it has committed all its capabilities to this conflict and will fight to the end or until victory is achieved.

Such positions effectively close the door to any ceasefire in the near term and narrow the room for maneuver of any political initiative or negotiating process. They also lay bare the clear divergence between the logic of the Lebanese state — which seeks to contain the crisis through diplomatic channels — and that of the armed forces, which tie their decisions to a broader regional context that transcends Lebanon's borders.

In light of these facts, Israel appears to have succeeded in scoring an additional point with international public opinion: it will come across as the party that demonstrated its willingness to negotiate by sending a high-level envoy, while Lebanon will appear as a state unable to unify its internal decision-making or meet the prerequisites for a transition to a political settlement. This perception, whether accurate or overstated, weakens Lebanon's negotiating position and makes it harder to defend its interests in international forums.

In the final analysis, these developments reveal once again the depth of the predicament in which Lebanon finds itself, where a state of limited capacity collides with a military and political force that makes its decisions outside state institutions. In this context, any negotiating process or political settlement becomes hostage to regional balances over which Lebanon has no control. While the state strives to consolidate its place at the negotiating table, the real challenge lies in restoring the decision of war and peace to its constitutional institutions — for without that, Lebanon will remain a theater for the liquidation of regional conflicts rather than a state capable of defending its national interests.