Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In a forthcoming series of articles, we intend to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of impassioned, ideological, or romanticized narratives that overlook the realities on the ground. Our aim is to give readers the tools to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously challenge the sterile rhetoric of “resistance” – not with counter-rhetoric, but through a deeper approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built on sovereignty.

To understand the present, few things are as revealing as revisiting contemporary history, which continues to shape collective memory. The wars between Israel and Hezbollah deserve a closer look – beginning with the first conflict in 1993, along with the key events that preceded it, not to mention Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on 25 May 2000, and the preceding and subsequent events, including the wars of 1996, 2006, 2023–2024, and 2026.

Thirty-three years of conflict may seem chaotic at first glance, but in reality, they follow a clear pattern, orchestrated behind the scenes by the Mullahs in Tehran. Events continue to unfold within a complex tableau, where local, regional, and international interests intersect. As an international actor, the United States – an unrivaled global power since 1990 – has long also played a regional role, for better or worse, exerting influence across nearly every country in the region except Iran, while maintaining military bases throughout the Arab world.

The interests of Washington, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Riyadh, and Tehran intersect, converge, diverge, pull apart, and clash in constant flux, while Lebanon’s singular interest – its sovereignty, denied for more than 50 years, and the subsequent rebuilding of its state institutions – remains unfulfilled. Numerous non-state actors in Lebanon, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and other illegal armed groups, as well as Lebanese parties allied with Hezbollah, often supported or tolerated by one regional power or another, have played major roles over the past decades, obstructing Lebanon’s path to sovereignty. Opportunities to reclaim that sovereignty, which have emerged repeatedly over the years, have been consistently thwarted by local decision-makers – by incompetence, narrow self-interest, cowardice, greed, or divided loyalties.

Hezbollah’s Three Agendas

Hezbollah continues to pursue three parallel agendas. The first, regional, centers on meddling in Arab countries to destabilize them in Iran’s favor – particularly Iraq, along Iran’s western border – with the aim of preventing the rise of an any new leader in the mold of Saddam Hussein, a nightmare for Tehran’s Mullahs. The second, focused on Israel, relies on a rhetoric of resistance – used to support a local agenda that is ultimately Hezbollah’s hegemony over Lebanon. Its supporters, driven by a religious ideology beyond debate, are convinced they are carrying out a divine mission, modeled on Iran, where a state exists in name but key decisions are made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a state within a state with extensive social, economic, security, and military ramifications.

The Lebanese model envisioned by the pro-Iranian party is a façade state, handling day-to-day and ceremonial affairs, while Hezbollah operates both within and outside the state, with its militia and political, cultural, and social institutions. In practice, it is Hezbollah that makes strategic decisions and projects them onto Parliament and the government. For its supporters, the party thus embodies sovereignty, provides social and security guarantees, and, above all, advances their ideological ambitions.

This issue is at the heart of current events, yet the “divine” party’s four-decade trajectory, which has led to today’s situation, deserves careful scrutiny, especially for the generations of Lebanese born under its hegemony. For them, Hezbollah is part of everyday life, and for some, coexistence with the party’s arms in the name of a resistance that has dragged on for 44 years seems acceptable. In this context, certain figures are particularly instructive: The war that ended with the Treaty of Westphalia lasted 30 years (1618–1648); World War I, four years; World War II, six years; the First Indochina War (France vs. Viet Minh), nine years; the Vietnam War (United States vs. North Vietnam), ten years; and the Arab-Israeli conflict (excluding Palestine), 25 years.

It is clear that for the past 44 years, Hezbollah has drawn its legitimacy only in the shadow of a state of belligerency. Accordingly, it has little incentive to end its conflicts with Israel. It is now evident that only the Lebanese themselves can resolve their issues, by ending the state of war with the Israeli state, without necessarily negotiating a formal peace treaty. Six Arab countries have already taken this path ahead of Beirut. Lebanon could achieve the same, with the support of these Arab states and other friend nations.

The Taif Agreement

To revisit recent history, the starting point must be the Taif Agreement, signed on 22 October 1989 in Saudi Arabia with American endorsement. Its aim was to end the fifteen years of successive wars in Lebanon. The two final conflicts that hastened the signing and forceful implementation of the agreement were among the most devastating: the Lebanese–Syrian “War of Liberation” and the intra-Lebanese “War of Elimination.” These wars threatened to divide the Arab states and undermine a complex regional stabilization process desired by Washington and Riyadh following the conclusion of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. Implementation of the agreement, stalled for months, became a priority for its sponsors after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. For all regional and international players, it was essential to halt the ongoing wars in Lebanon after the agreement’s signing. Consequently, the international and Arab community gave the green light to Baathist Syria to impose stability in Lebanon by military means, in exchange for its alignment with the Arab–international coalition against Iraq aimed at liberating Kuwait.

On 13 October 1990, Damascus forces thus invaded Baabda Palace and the Ministry of National Defense, both controlled by the Lebanese military government headed by General Michel Aoun. A few months later, in early 1991, Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait, and parts of Iraq were occupied by the anti-Saddam coalition. The outcome was the weakening of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the subsequent rise of Iran and its ally Hezbollah. This period marked the beginning of the wars waged by Hezbollah against Israel – and vice versa – before and after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on 24 May 2000.

This period witnessed a global upheaval, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the weakening of the USSR and its regional allies, including Iraq and Syria, followed by Syria’s rapprochement with the United States, which granted it greater freedom of action in Lebanon. In addition, the Gulf countries, allied with the United States – which had become unrivaled on the international stage – aligned themselves with Assad’s Syria and gave Iran room to maneuver its confrontation with Saddam’s Iraq. This fundamentally altered reality was misread by General Aoun’s military government at the time, culminating in the disaster of 13 October 1990. (to be continued)