Politics

In Syria, the question is no longer whether Bashar al-Assad’s regime could endure. That chapter is now closed. The real issue lies elsewhere. Can Syria, in the aftermath of the old regime’s collapse, rebuild a unified and viable state, or does the risk of disintegration and partition linger, merely taking on new forms? The fall of Assad’s regime at the end of 2024, followed by Ahmad al-Chareh’s rise to power during the transitional period, marked a major turning point in the Syrian landscape. While this upheaval did not, in itself, bring an end to the crisis, it profoundly reshaped its political contours. The debate has shifted from the fate of a regime to the very future of the state itself. First: What has truly changed since Assad? The collapse of the old regime did not simply involve a change in leadership; it represented the downfall of an entire system, built on: – a single-party structure, – sprawling security apparatuses, – tightly centralization, – and strong external alliances, particularly with Iran and Russia. The transitional phase, overseen by Ahmad al-Chareh, has been marked by a radically different message: the goal is no longer to restore a regime, but to rebuild the state itself. Consequently, the old Constitution has been repealed, the Baath Party dissolved, the former security apparatus dismantled, and the process of reconstructing state institutions launched on new foundations, though these remain fragile. What is even more significant is that the new leadership made it clear from the outset that Syria’s unity is non-negotiable. More than that, it rejected any discussion of partition or the establishment of a community-based federation. This was not a mere slogan, but a concrete political choice. Second: Has the risk of partition been eliminated? The precise answer is that the danger has been reduced, but it persists. At the height of the war, particularly between 2012 and 2016, partition was a very real possibility. Talk of a “useful Syria,” maps of mini-states, and stark divisions between zones of influence had made the country’s dismemberment a seriously considered project on the international stage. Today, the landscape is different for several reasons: 1 - The existence of a new central authority with transitional legitimacy Ahmad al-Chareh does not inherit the old regime. He is seeking to build a new legitimacy, bolstered by cautious American and Arab engagement, as well as conditional international endorsement. 2 - The absence of international consensus on partition At present, the United States, Russia, and regional powers see no advantage in partitioning Syria. The costs would be high, and the risks far outweigh any potential benefits. 3 - The failure of the idea of community-based mini-states In the shadow of Turkish refusal and American disengagement, it is impossible to establish a viable Alawite mini state, a unified Sunni entity, a secessionist Druze project, or even a Kurdish state. As a result, the partition of Syria is no longer seen as a feasible solution, but rather as a collapse scenario, should the new state fail. Third: The American turnaround… and the abandonment of the Kurds One of the most significant changes in post-Assad Syria has been the clear shift in American policy. Washington, which for years had supported the Kurds as a de facto force in north-eastern Syria, has now redefined its priorities. The American message was clear: – No support will be given to a separatist Kurdish project. – No permanent protection will be provided to an independent autonomous administration. – Priority is given to the stability of a unified Syrian state. This shift in position has pushed the Kurdish leadership towards an option previously little considered: negotiating with the new regime. Agreements have been reached to gradually integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions, manage resources and border crossings, in exchange for guarantees on cultural and citizenship rights. This does not mean that the Kurdish question has been resolved, but it has shifted from a logic of separation to one of fragile and uncertain integration. Fourth: From dismemberment to a return to centralization… but at what cost? Syria is now moving from a phase of actual dismemberment to an attempt to restore a central state. This new centralization is different – or should be different – from that which prevailed under the old regime. The main challenge Ahmad al-Chareh faces is not merely military, but also political and social: – How can a strong state be built without reverting to despotism? – How can diversity be managed without causing the center to implode? – How can state authority be asserted without reproducing repression? For now, the signs are mixed: – progress has been made in regaining control over the territory, – yet the economy remains fragile, – minority communities are anxious, – and former forces, which once enjoyed considerable autonomy, remain wary. In other words, the danger is no longer Syria’s partition into mini states, but the failure of the new central state to manage its diversity. Fifth: is Syria truly out of danger? Syria has avoided the scenario of a rapid and chaotic partition, but it has not yet entered a phase of lasting stability. The situation can be summarized as follows: – Syria has escaped total collapse, – it has avoided community-based partition plans, – and it has avoided the transformation of dismemberment into a permanent reality. However, it has not yet overcome: – economic collapse, – the fragility of civil peace, – the risk of a return to violence in new forms, – and the test of popular legitimacy for the new government. The Syrian state therefore exists today, but it remains under trial. Sixth: the most plausible scenario In the short to medium term, the most likely scenario is one of: – a unified state, – clear political and security centralization, – limited administrative decentralization, – gradual integration of local forces, – and international support conditioned on reforms and stability. This model does not resemble pre-2011 Syria, nor does it resemble the partition scenarios. Rather, it resembles a state emerging from a long war, seeking to redefine itself. The success of this scenario hinges on a crucial factor: will the new transitional authority become a unifying state, or will it be yet another iteration of strong power devoid of a social contract? The fall of Assad’s regime has closed one chapter, but it has opened a more difficult one. Syria now faces a rare historical opportunity: to move beyond the logic of the old regime without falling into the trap of dismemberment. The danger of partition is no longer imminent, but it has not been entirely eliminated. It lies in political failure, not in geography. Ultimately, the question is no longer whether Syria will be divided, but whether it can succeed in becoming a unified state after the fall of the regime that once claimed to govern it in the name of unity.

Having covered the birth of the Barcelona Process and its development into the Union for the Mediterranean, which marked its expansion, it is worth asking: where does the Union stand today? What has it achieved, and what challenges remain? This article takes stock and offers a snapshot of the situation, along with prospects for 2026. The Barcelona Process is known by three main terms: “process,” “partnership,” and the “Med” in Euromed. These labels reflect the initiative’s goal of fostering cooperation, dialogue, and exchanges between countries forming a Mediterranean community, as well as those closely connected geographically. Later, neighboring countries joined, along with organizations representing sub-regions, such as the EU and the Arab Maghreb Union. Thirty years on, the initiative is far from defunct. Yet, tested by time and events, it had to evolve within a new framework: less ambitious, but more pragmatic and realistic. Euromed was a long-term strategy, ambitious in scope, driven by political dialogue and encompassing cooperation across three pillars. Institutionalization was a success, but results – particularly economic ones – fell short. It became clear that projects should be redirected towards regional initiatives, supported by a more agile and operational institutional structure. While the ambition seemed to have softened, the potential for impact was greater: easier to implement, more effective, and – crucially – more visible to the people. The 2005 Barcelona Summit marked a political turning point: ten years after the partnership’s launch, it aimed to revive it, enhance its visibility and effectiveness, and set a five-year program. The Barcelona Process aimed to involve southern Mediterranean countries in European integration. Yet the ideal scenario – creating a virtuous cycle similar to that seen in Central and Eastern Europe, where trade liberalization spurred institutional reforms beneficial to development – never materialized. The verdict was harsh: the process had stalled. By the mid-2000s, political cooperation among Mediterranean countries was hindered by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while signs of institutional fatigue appeared in the EU. In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, then a candidate for the French presidency, proposed a Mediterranean Union limited to coastal states. With strong German backing and support from the European Commission, the plan was widened to avoid alienating non-Mediterranean countries. The initiative became the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), formally adopted at the Paris Summit on 13 July 2008. Its purpose was to rekindle the momentum initiated in 1995 and revive Euromed. This transition effectively extended and revitalized the Barcelona Process, in a pragmatic, operational form with shared governance. Projects, now regional and concrete, cover transport, energy, the environment, education and youth, and gender equality. Since 2010, the UfM, comprising 43 members, has maintained a permanent secretariat in Barcelona. 2025 Review Technical progress and concrete projects – investment pipelines, sectoral initiatives, and academic and youth cooperation – have been achieved. Nevertheless, regional economic integration remains limited. Recurring geopolitical crises – regional conflicts, the fallout from the war in Ukraine, and instability in the Sahel and the Middle East – along with multiple tensions, constitute persistent political and structural challenges. A political relaunch is underway, supported by the New Pact for the Mediterranean , which focuses on three pillars: education, mobility and employment; more integrated and sustainable economies; and security and migration. The OECD and the UfM recognize these advances but stress the need for a more targeted approach and stronger integration. Critics argue that European priorities are overemphasized and that political and financial resources –particularly private investment – remain insufficient to achieve the anticipated transformation, especially for major cross-border projects. Local ownership, civil society involvement, and guarantees for rights are essential to turn initiatives into tangible outcomes. Prospects and Recommendations for 2026 Develop major regional programs in renewable energy, logistics corridors, and technical training; support practical reforms, including trade facilitation, port governance, and recognition of professional qualifications; increase participation from civil society and the local private sector to legitimatize projects and ensure social impact, including employment and rights; implement cooperative resilience measures to prepare for climate, food, and migration risks. The Assessment The Barcelona Process has created a space for dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean and facilitated cooperation programs. Projects with social and cultural dimensions, along with the involvement of civil society, are important assets for meeting future challenges. However, the free-trade zone has not been fully realized. Funding remains a major hurdle, as do regional conflicts and the wider Mediterranean context, characterized by migration and instability. In conclusion, the Barcelona Process continues today in a modern form, combining pragmatism, realism, and regional dialogue to deliver concrete projects. The UfM – the Process’s successor –now includes 43 states, which is a success in itself. Future efforts will remain primarily political and financial, focusing on selecting sectoral initiatives and implementing tangible, visible regional integration. Next and final article: an assessment of Lebanon since 1995 and the specific role the country could play in the Union: acting as an initiator and unifying force that would bring together all Lebanese communities in this process. Previous articles: 1/5 Mediterranean Union: what has become of the Barcelona process? 2/5 The Mediterranean idea put to the test of European balances 3/5 A cooperation rich in promises, the Barcelona Process

The Energy Gamble in the Face of Economic Collapse With the signing of the maritime boundary delimitation agreement with Cyprus in 2025, the exploitation of offshore resources is emerging as a potentially decisive lever for reviving Lebanon’s deeply troubled economy. While this agreement has provided a formal legal framework for maritime boundaries, it has not, however, eliminated all the economic and geopolitical challenges. Development delays, persistent regional disputes, and political gridlock present Lebanon with a complex equation: seizing energy opportunities without compromising its national interests. Oil First: From Legal Risk to the Choice of Agreement According to General Khalil Gemayel, an expert in maritime boundary delimitation, Lebanon was convinced that resorting to international maritime courts to resolve the dispute with Cyprus would have transformed the Lebanese oil blocks adjacent to that country—blocks 1, 3, 5, and 8—into disputed zones until a final ruling was issued. Such a situation would have, de facto, led to a considerable delay in exploration operations, as major international oil companies systematically avoided the disputed areas. In this context, the signing of the agreement was seen as a way to remove these zones from legal uncertainty and make them immediately exploitable, without legal obstacles. Legal Clarification, Deferred Exploitation However, Gemayel strongly qualifies this interpretation. He points out that the recent award of Lebanon’s Block 8 granted the TotalEnergies-led consortium a three-year period to decide, based on the results of seismic surveys, whether or not to proceed with drilling a well. According to him, this “open” period could, in practice, prove to be much longer than the time required for a ruling by a competent international court, a ruling that would have guaranteed Lebanon’s rights and definitively, clearly, and unambiguously established its maritime borders with Cyprus, leaving no room for interpretation. Limited Legal Gains in a Complex Diplomatic Environment Gemayel does not expect the agreement to significantly contribute to strengthening Lebanon’s legal or diplomatic stability. He believes the agreement was concluded without the involvement of a key player in border demarcation, namely Syria. He also emphasizes that Turkey rejects any infringement on the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey and Syria: Absent but Decisive Actors He warns that Turkey, through the presence of its military vessels, is effectively preventing any oil company from conducting exploration activities in areas it considers to fall under the rights of Turkish Cypriots. This reality, combined with the unresolved maritime dispute with Syria, could pose both a practical and political risk to the effective implementation of the agreement. The Outstanding Tripartite Point: A Border Time Bomb Gemayel emphasizes that the agreement left the issue of Tripartite Point No. 7 (Syria – Cyprus – Lebanon) unresolved, pending the completion of the delimitation with Syria. However, according to him, the problem runs much deeper. Damascus considers the disputed maritime zone with Lebanon to extend from Lebanese Point No. 5 in the south to Point No. 7 in the north, covering a contested area estimated at approximately one thousand square kilometers. Gemayel warns that this situation could eventually become a genuine strategic problem for Lebanon. The necessary roadmap: accelerate delimitation and compensate for losses In light of these factors, Gemayel believes that Lebanon must, as a priority, accelerate the resolution of the maritime dispute with Syria in order to definitively establish its northern borders. He also calls for expediting the allocation and exploitation of Lebanese oil blocks adjacent to Cyprus, with the aim of compensating for some of the losses incurred by an agreement that he considers fundamentally unbalanced. Strategic analysis of the agreement: three key lessons While Gemayel's statements clearly highlight the legal and geopolitical risks, a strategic analysis reveals three major observations: Rapid investments, temporal uncertainty 1. The short-term economic priority: Lebanon has chosen to remove legal obstacles in order to reassure investors and quickly attract oil companies. However, this approach did not allow for immediate exploitation of resources, particularly due to the long delayi. granted for block 8. Regional conflicts resurface at sea 2. Persistent regional threats: Disputes with Syria and Turkey's refusal to recognize the rights of Turkish Cypriots expose Lebanon to recurring risks that could hinder exploration and production. The agreement provides a legal framework but offers no real protection against political or military tensions. Defined borders, fragile sovereignty 3. A fragile internal balance: The agreement reflects a swift political decision, but it leaves Lebanon with legally defined borders while remaining vulnerable to future disputes. This situation reduces the country's room for maneuver in future negotiations and weighs on the expected economic benefits. Conclusion: A legal agreement without strategic guarantees Ultimately, the agreement with Cyprus offers Lebanon formal stability and a legal framework, but exposes it to major strategic challenges. The success of this agreement as a tool for economic sovereignty and energy security will depend on Lebanon's ability to quickly resolve its dispute with Syria, accelerate exploration operations, and prudently manage its regional relations, thereby transforming a mere legal text into a genuine opportunity for the national economy and the energy sector. Previous article: Lebanon-Cyprus EEZ: Between Legal Gains and Maritime Losses

In the first part of this analysis, we began by contrasting the two visions of Europe as seen by its founders, in the aftermath of the Second World War, particularly Robert Schuman, and as it exists today, deprived of its founding impetus and obscuring its Christian and Greco-Roman roots. Here is the second part, based on an analysis by the philosopher Chantal Delsol, who has just published a book on the "Old Continent". In The Insurrection of Particularities, Chantal Delsol draws a severe conclusion of a gradual departure from this founding spirit. According to her, contemporary Europe has substituted an ideology of neutrality for heritage, administration for culture, and abstract individualism for Christian anthropology. By claiming to base itself exclusively on universal norms detached from all tradition, it has progressively delegitimized the concrete affiliations – nations, cultures, religions, ways of life – which nevertheless structured the European space. From this evolution arises what Delsol calls an “insurrection of particularities”. Peoples and identities rebel against a Europe perceived as distant, normative, and indifferent to particularities. Where Schuman saw nations as necessary mediators for peace, contemporary Europe tends to consider them as survivals to be overcome. This rejection produces a paradox: by wanting to abolish differences in the name of the universal, it провоkes their return in the form of tensions, identity retrenchments, and fractures. This cultural crisis is now compounded by a major geopolitical crisis, brutally revealed by the war in Ukraine. The return of a high-intensity conflict on European soil acts as a revealer: Europe, which had built itself on the refusal of war, discovers that it has also forgotten how to think about power, defense, and conflictuality. The illusion of a definitively pacified continent, governed solely by law and commerce, collapses in the face of historical reality. The Ukrainian conflict highlights the limitations of European military capabilities, long neglected in the name of a pacifism that has become structural. Dependent on NATO and, ultimately, on the United States for its security, Europe struggles to conceive of itself as an autonomous strategic actor. This military weakness is not merely technical: it is the symptom of a deeper, cultural and political disarmament. A continent that no longer knows what it is, nor what it wants to defend, logically struggles to accept the idea of force. This fragility also appears in other geopolitical issues, such as the debates sparked by American ambitions regarding Greenland. The "Old Continent", once the world's center of gravity, sometimes seems to become an object of covetousness rather than a sovereign subject of history. Here again, strategic weakening reflects the erosion of civilizational consciousness. For Chantal Delsol, Europe has forgotten what made it unique: the ability to articulate the universal and the particular. By breaking with Christianity as a cultural foundation — not as a state religion, but as a vision of man and the world — it has lost its principle of internal unity. The insurrection of particularities is therefore not an accidental deviation, but the logical consequence of this amnesia. The confrontation between Schuman and Delsol thus reveals a decisive alternative. Where post-war Christian democracy made memory - of "Never again" - a driving force for construction, contemporary Europe seems to want to base itself on forgetting. However, a continent that no longer knows where it comes from, nor what it wanted to avoid, finds itself vulnerable, both internally and in the face of external power dynamics. Perhaps the war in Ukraine tragically invites us to rediscover Schuman's founding intuition: a Europe aware of its limits, faithful to its heritage, capable of uniting without erasing, of defending itself without denying the soul that gave it birth and the history that shaped it. Previous article: The "Old Continent" between founding memory and civilizational disarmament

Third article in our series of articles on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership: the Barcelona Process, its evolutions, its funding, and its replacement from 2008 by the Mediterranean Union, which became the Union for the Mediterranean The Mediterranean, rich in cultures, an space of interconnection, a crossroads of civilizations, is a group of countries sharing a heritage, in which their different cultures have enriched each other. Relations have extended to economic and scientific exchanges. This unique identity has fostered the creation of networks that endure against a backdrop of a feeling of regional unity. The European Union proposed a framework for multilateral cooperation with all the countries of the Mediterranean basin, initiating a new phase in their relations, addressing for the first time economic, social, human, cultural aspects and common security issues. This partnership was concretized by the adoption of a declaration at the Barcelona Conference (November 27 and 28, 1995) by EU member states and the twelve Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs): Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria (suspended since May 2011), Tunisia, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority and, as an observer, Mauritania. The League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) were invited. The final declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference was the start of what was called the "Barcelona Process" or "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" (EMP), also known as "Euromed". Its objectives and modalities are structured around three main components: political and security cooperation with the aim of defining a common area of peace and stability, economic and financial cooperation for the construction of a zone of shared prosperity, cultural and social cooperation to foster understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The ultimate objective was thus to create a zone of shared prosperity within a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), which was initiated in the framework of the UfM in 2010. The financial instrument of this Euro-Mediterranean policy was the EU's MEDA program (Financial and Technical Accompanying Measures) for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its activities. From January 1, 2007, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) took over. Ten EU partner countries benefited, through the MEDA program, from funds from the European Investment Bank. This conference and the adopted declaration laid the foundations for a process aimed at achieving a multilateral framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean third countries, also allowing for the definition of a work program: Within the framework of the political and security partnership, members undertake to support a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of conflicts in the Middle East, based in particular on the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Within the framework of the economic and financial partnership, the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area is governed by Euro-Mediterranean association agreements and free trade agreements between the MPCs. These agreements are concluded in compliance with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Partners define priorities for facilitating the establishment of the FTA and must also set cooperation priorities concerning transport infrastructure, the development of information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. Regarding the social, cultural and human partnership, members cooperate with the aim of developing human resources and fostering understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. In 2005, with the aim of strengthening and tightening the links of the partnership while reaffirming and developing its objectives, which thus gain depth, the objective of establishing a free trade area between all Euromed countries was affirmed. This partnership, based on peaceful relations between all member states who share common interests as well as a long history of mutual exchanges, extends to immigration and the fight against terrorism, which become priority areas. The Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, is a unique and ambitious initiative that laid the foundations for a new regional partnership within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The partnership was implemented in 2008 with the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean. November 2025 marked the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, a historic initiative for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation launched in 1995 with the hope of shared peace in the Middle East. This initiative brought together countries from both sides of the Mediterranean to strengthen their ties and address common challenges in political, economic, cultural, social, and environmental fields. The Barcelona Process paved the way for the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, consolidating a spirit of regional cooperation that endures today. The conflict in the Middle East has proven that the stability of the region is crucial for global security, and any crisis within or around it inevitably reverberates worldwide. Furthermore, the region faces growing economic disparities, a deepening climate emergency, social fragility, and significant vulnerability. In such a critical context, it is important to ask whether sufficient efforts have been made over the past thirty years to strengthen regional and multilateral cooperation frameworks to address common challenges. Next article: the Union for the Mediterranean, general assessment since 1995 and, without hiding the obstacles, will offer perspectives for 2026 Previous articles: 1/5 Mediterranean Union: what has become of the Barcelona process? 2/5 The Mediterranean idea put to the test of European balances

The notion of the “Old Continent” refers to a Europe shaped by a long history, a plurality of peoples, and a singular spiritual depth. However, this Europe is not a fixed reality: it has been conceived, reconstructed, and reinterpreted according to different eras. Two visions allow us to measure its evolution and contemporary tensions: the one elaborated in the post-World War II period by Robert Schuman and Christian democracy; and the one described today by Chantal Delsol in L’Insurrection des particularités. Between these two moments, Europe has moved from a project of civilization based on reconciliation to an identity crisis marked by fragmentation and strategic impotence. In the immediate post-war period, Robert Schuman's thought was rooted in a traumatic historical experience. Europe emerged exhausted from two world wars born on its soil. The implicit motto that then inhabited consciences was simple, radical, almost existential: “Never again.” Never again fratricidal war, never again murderous nationalisms, never again the denial of human dignity. This absolute refusal to return to barbarism constitutes the moral foundation of the European project as conceived by Schuman, Adenauer, and De Gasperi, all from the tradition of Christian democracy. For Schuman, Europe is not primarily an economic or technocratic space, but a community of destiny founded on a certain idea of man. This anthropology is inherited from Christianity, not as an imposed dogma, but as a cultural matrix that shaped the European conception of the person, law, and power. It is in this sense that he affirmed, in a famous phrase: “Democracy will be Christian or it will not be” (1). Far from signifying a confusion between faith and politics, this phrase expresses the conviction that democracy cannot survive without a moral foundation recognizing the dignity of the human person, responsibility, solidarity, and the limits of power. The Declaration of May 9, 1950, concretely translates this vision. Europe will not be built by decree, but by concrete achievements creating de facto solidarity. It is not about abolishing nations, but about inscribing them in a superior framework capable of neutralizing their destructive impulses. The “Old Continent” is then conceived as a civilization aware of its Greco-Roman, Christian, and humanist roots, and determined to transform its tragic memory into a principle of lasting peace. Christian democracy thus proposes an original synthesis: unity without uniformity, plurality without confrontation, memory without resentment. Next article: The Insurrection of Particularities: A Europe Unarmed in the Face of History (1) René Lejeune, Robert Schuman, père de l'Europe, Fayard (p 169).

After defining the geographical scope of the Mediterranean Union and explaining why adjacent seas and non-Mediterranean riparian countries were excluded, the Baltic and Nordic Councils and their objectives will be presented in order to identify what brings them closer to this Union and the differences in their respective goals. The geographical boundaries of the Mediterranean Union were precisely defined: the Mediterranean Sea, delimited by the Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles, as well as the Suez Canal. The countries concerned included those forming what may be called the European Mediterranean arc (including Portugal, by virtue of its language, history, and culture), as well as the southern and eastern riparian countries, numbering sixteen: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey; for the Adriatic: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro; and finally Mauritania, for a reason similar—though not identical—to that justifying Portugal’s inclusion. The initiator intended that the Mediterranean should not appear as a mere continuous succession of countries surrounding an empty space, but rather as a living space of production and human, commercial, and cultural exchanges, composed of the Mediterranean Sea and the countries bordering it. It was conceived as an inseparable whole: a union of countries, thus of lands, but also a union of these lands with the sea—the central space that connects them. Yet it appears that the objectives assigned are essentially land-based. None directly concern the sea. At the time, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded that this project include all twenty-seven countries of the European Union. To avoid any confrontation, French President Nicolas Sarkozy had to modify the project by integrating all EU member states and adapting its name in order to remove any ambiguity. It is nonetheless sometimes useful to revisit the different phases in the creation of a process in order to understand the reasons for its successes or failures and, consequently, the difficulties encountered by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in progressing at the desired pace. We shall see that it is not a failure, but perhaps—at least in part—a victim of the constraints inherent in its macro-structure, of the kind Europe is well known for producing. Two institutions are presented here: the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which bears a distant resemblance—through its ambitions and objectives—to the Mediterranean Union (or the UfM), and, for the record, the Nordic Council. The latter will be dealt with very briefly, as it is not centered on or around the Baltic Sea in its vocation. The Council of the Baltic Sea States This Council was established in 1992 at the initiative of Germany and Denmark to promote cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, particularly in the areas of security and the environment. It plays the role of a regional cooperation platform addressing civil, environmental, maritime, and societal issues. It is a regional forum bringing together ten states—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Sweden—of which all but Iceland and Norway are members of the European Union. Countries such as France also hold observer status at the national level. Its secretariat is based in Stockholm. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine altered certain aspects of the Council, notably with the suspension of Moscow. Its objectives are to: * promote regional identity and cooperation around the Baltic Sea; * foster sustainable and prosperous development of the region; * ensure a safe and secure region (civil security, protection of people, cross-border cooperation); * guarantee environmental protection and democratic resilience; * encourage human contacts and balanced economic growth. Its fields of action notably include maritime protection, the sustainable maritime economy, combating human trafficking and organized crime, as well as education, youth, and culture, with an enhanced role in European regional cooperation in Northeast Europe. The Nordic Council Created in 1952, the Nordic Council, along with its ministerial counterpart established in 1971, aims to strengthen cooperation among the Nordic countries across a wide range of fields (mobility, environment, culture, society). Its vision is clearly oriented toward political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation and integration. It constitutes a model of democratic regional union. The Council brings together Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, along with their autonomous territories (Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Åland). Its headquarters are in Copenhagen. Its core objectives are to promote an integrated Nordic area—free movement, equality, sustainability, and innovation—and to uphold democratic values and regional solidarity. The Nordic Council does not include Germany or the other EU member states. It is nonetheless mentioned to demonstrate that geographically constituted institutions, bringing together certain EU countries around common projects with non-EU countries within a defined geographical area, coexist and operate actively. They likely function more smoothly than the UfM, which is vast and perhaps too heavy to carry and to operate dynamically. Only the Council of the Baltic Sea States can be compared to the Mediterranean Union, as both are structured around a maritime ensemble based on riparian countries. The objectives of the Baltic Council, however, do not match the scale of those of the Mediterranean Union. Yet the latter, despite encompassing the Mediterranean Sea—along with an Adriatic component and an Atlantic opening—remains devoid of truly maritime objectives. The Mediterranean Union was short-lived. It gave way to the Union for the Mediterranean, which exists today. This is essential for Mediterranean peoples. Lebanon has its rightful place within it. Next article: The transformation of the Barcelona Process into the Union for the Mediterranean (3/5) Previous article: Mediterranean Union: what became of the Barcelona Process? (1/5)

Do not count your chickens before they are hatched. The Tehran regime has not fallen; and even if it has been weakened, it is not on the verge of collapse. While the demonstrations and riots that have erupted in Iran’s cities—led by academics, women, bazaar merchants, and other segments of society—are noteworthy, one may well ask whether they have surpassed in scale those that toppled the Shah in 1979. Yet these convulsions and protests could suddenly reach an unforeseen level of gravity, and it would not be illusory to bet on their success, as the German chancellor has openly suggested. Even in the event of an Israeli or American strike! Still, we are unlikely to witness any time soon the rout of Iran’s politico-clerical elite, nor that of its mamluks—the Pasdaran and the Basij*. These are not people who will take flight in the face of unarmed protesters. Moreover, Ayatollah Khamenei, even weakened by illness, is not Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who was easily overthrown in 1953 by a coup engineered by the American CIA and the British MI6 to restore Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Short of the regime turning against itself, the country’s future will be decided on the barricades. The regime’s heavyweights will not relinquish their hold, and the Revolutionary Guards have only one desire: to settle scores with the internal enemy. All these actors have far too much to lose from a change in power. And having been deeply implicated in corruption and repression, where could the barons and pillars of the state seek refuge? In China or the Russian Federation—Venezuela being presumably off-limits to them? That said, under external pressure the ruling class may jettison some ballast. It could even curtail the authority of the Supreme Leader, or make concessions on the nuclear issue, but it will not relinquish power. Let us be clear: a hostile cyberattack, or even an American bombing campaign without boots on the ground, is not capable of toppling the reviled regime. Once again, it will be up to the people who have taken to the streets to wrest victory by force. An initially asymmetric civil war, as was the case in Syria, therefore remains likely. In such a scenario, Russian and/or Chinese intervention should not be ruled out, if only to counterbalance Israeli and American interference. And Lebanon, then? That said, we are not out of the woods: if blood is to be spilled in the provinces of the Islamic Republic, one should expect a conflagration in Lebanon. For should it find itself threatened at its very core, the regime of the mullahs would not hesitate to set the entire Middle East ablaze. Yes, a suicidal decision cannot be excluded on the part of those who have been sliding downhill for less than two years and are living in a staggering state of denial. Hence the call to stay alert and vigilant. * If their current strength reaches 200,000 soldiers, one must not lose sight of the fact that “at least 2 million Pasdaran, and as many Basij members, have undergone the harrowing experience of the front. This brotherhood of arms explains the subsequent influence of their networks of demobilized veterans’ solidarity throughout the social body.” Jean-Paul Burdy, “Iran: A Militarization of the Regime by the Revolutionary Guards,” Middle East Magazine, January 10, 2024.

In this series of articles, Levant Time traces the genesis, creation, and current operation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), of which Lebanon is a member. A prospective approach on what the Land of the Cedars could undertake, and the role it can play within this Union, will conclude the series. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is the direct heir to the Barcelona Process, and then to the project launched in 2008 by French President Nicolas Sarkozy under the title of “Mediterranean Union.” This initiative, approved by a large number of actors but rejected, or even criticized, by others – notably the countries of Northern Europe, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who were wary of its outlines and implications – nevertheless presented two essential merits. The first was to allow the completion of a project, albeit under another name and in another form, but concretizing the creation of a “Union for the Mediterranean.” The second was to revive, by replacing it, a Barcelona process that was losing momentum, but by reversing its construction logic. The initial premise was based on the idea that co-development – both North-South and South-South – would create a free trade area for goods and know-how. South-South exchanges, in particular, were intended to help transform this region into a space of peace, cultural development, and social progress. It was presumed that politics would follow. This is precisely where the novelty and the attempt to revive the Barcelona Process, in another form, lay. While the latter can boast some successes in the economic field, its political and social components failed for a major reason: the difficulty of getting all the countries concerned to dialogue, due in particular to the impossibility of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to which were added underlying suspicions, especially around sensitive subjects such as immigration. President Sarkozy believed, not without reason, that the coordinated development of economies through common projects would allow dialogue to reopen at all other levels: political, social, and cultural. This approach immediately dismissed what some wished for, undoubtedly to marginalize this new idea, a proliferation of micro-projects. The impetus given to structuring projects was intended to offer a new chance to the entire region and, beyond that, to be an exemplary value. The Mediterranean Union was conceived as an association of member countries of the European Union, primarily the riparian states, and the countries bordering the Mediterranean, with the aim of designing and implementing common projects to foster the economic development of the region and the transformation of this area into a zone of peace. In 2008, the European Union had just expanded eastward with the accession of its 26th and 27th members, Bulgaria and Romania. Their integration was underway and was expected to be completed in the medium term. This enlargement, desirable in some respects, nevertheless appeared potentially excessive, at the risk of leading Europe to reconfigure itself into concentric circles, to allow a hard core to advance and to draw the other entities at a sustainable pace. In this perspective, these two countries should not be considered as belonging to the Black Sea area, but rather as the eastern marches of the European Union. The problems specific to the Black Sea were already very real, and their resolution did not depend, in the short term, on the European Union, but essentially on Russia. They depended above all on the capacity of each riparian state to resolve its internal difficulties, inherited from the implosion of the former USSR, as well as those related to the sometimes decisive presence of minorities. These issues primarily concerned the ability of these countries to establish democratic practices and to dialogue among themselves, without ignoring their geopolitical constraints and their immediate regional environment. Since the analysis of the Union for the Mediterranean will be addressed later, it is important not to integrate all the latent or proven problems into the perspective of creating a Union, whether it is first “Mediterranean,” then “for the Mediterranean.” The Mediterranean riparian countries already had enough to do with their own difficulties, without adding more distant problems, whose importance the future would show. These elements, among others, were sufficient to exclude the Black and Marmara seas from the envisaged perimeter. The Mediterranean adopted will therefore be that of geography textbooks. Next article: Birth of the Mediterranean Union, an ephemeral project that became the Union for the Mediterranean.

The irony of history is that the American show of force in Venezuela on the night of January 3-4 marked the beginning of a new episode of “planetary destabilization” against which Pope Leo XIV had warned a few days earlier, in his Message for the 59th International Day of Peace on January 1, 2026. “In relations between citizens and rulers,” the Sovereign Pontiff affirmed, “it has come to be considered a fault not to prepare sufficiently for war, to react to attacks, to respond to violence. Far beyond the principle of legitimate self-defense, this antagonistic logic is, on a political level, the most current factor in a planetary destabilization that is becoming more dramatic and unpredictable every day.” In terms of “destabilization” and “unpredictability,” the United States couldn't have done better! Certainly, Venezuela had been “marked for so many years by drug trafficking and corruption,” according to Father Georges Engel, a missionary priest quoted by Olivier Bonnel on Vatican News. As a result, no one will truly regret Nicolas Maduro, elected on January 10, 2025, for a third term deemed illegitimate by the majority of the international community. Nevertheless, the actions of the United States are not justified. In fact, reacting to the show of force, during the Angelus on January 4, the Pope carefully avoided taking a position in the conflict, contenting himself primarily with stating that “the good of the beloved Venezuelan people must prevail over all other considerations.” This calibrated position is characteristic of Vatican diplomacy, which always places itself above the conflicting parties, to defend what it deems essential, even if it means being accused of putting the aggressor and the aggressed on the same level. The essential and the subsidiary The “essential” in question follows in the Pope's message. It is about “overcoming violence and committing to the path of justice and peace, by guaranteeing the country's sovereignty, ensuring the rule of law enshrined in the Constitution, respecting the human and civil rights of each and all, and working together to build a serene future of collaboration, stability, and concord, with particular attention to the poorest who suffer from the difficult economic situation.” This form of diplomacy, where state sovereignty, constitutional rules, and human rights nonetheless occupy their place, is that of “active neutrality”; a conduct of distancing from geopolitical “axes” similar to that which the Maronite patriarch wishes to see Lebanon adopt. This diplomatic path is also referred to in Vatican language as “diplomacy of the common good.” Its means are those of dialogue, “unarmed and disarming” means, to borrow an image from Leo XIV, which differentiates it, for example, from UN diplomacy, whose levers are of a completely different order. Active Neutrality, Not Passive “Active neutrality” means that the Holy See does not take sides with one camp against another, without, however, remaining passive or “neutral” when fundamental rights are violated. Thus, in October 2023, in a public statement, Cardinal Parolin expressed deep concern regarding the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, qualifying the ongoing actions as potentially constituting a "genocide". Having no economic or military interests, the Holy See can thus judge a situation based on ethical principles, while promoting dialogue and always proposing non-violent solutions to conflicts. Often, in parallel, the Vatican will act behind the scenes, with discretion and constancy, in the direction of non-violence. From the particular to the general This does not prevent Vatican diplomacy from rising, in its fundamental reflection, from the particular to the general. In the message on the World Day of Peace, a plea from the Vatican against arms proliferation and the armaments industry is noted to this effect. This plea takes into account, this year, the introduction of algorithms and nuclear deterrence into conflicts, to show that this new development, whose ravages are observed in the Middle East and Europe, undermines the very foundations of all civilization and leads humanity to the brink of the abyss. “We are even witnessing,” the document adds, “a process of shirking responsibility by political and military leaders, due to the increasing ‘delegation’ to machines of decisions concerning the life and death of human persons. This is an unprecedented destructive spiral of the legal and philosophical humanism on which all civilization rests and by which all civilization is protected.” Philosophical and Legal Humanism What exactly is this “legal and philosophical humanism” raised by Leo XIV? On a philosophical level, it is to affirm that human beings have an inherent dignity, which does not depend on their utility, wealth, or strength; it is also to affirm that the human person is endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore responsible for their actions; finally, it is to affirm that society, politics, and science must serve humanity, and not the other way around. These concepts, deeply rooted in Christian anthropology, correspond to the affirmation of faith that every human being is created in the image of God and that human dignity is therefore inalienable, even in situations of weakness (illness, poverty, old age, or fault). On the legal level, humanism means that law exists to protect the human person, and not merely to organize power. This implies, in particular, the rejection of laws that treat human beings as mere objects (commodities, tools, data), especially in production relations. This is a critique of purely technical or utilitarian legal systems, as well as the idea that “everything legal is just.” As we can see, the Church bases its judgments on very clear principles. Some believe that our era is "apocalyptic" and see in what is happening a sign of the "end times." But there is no need to go that far to judge. As Saint Augustine, a master of thought for Pope Leo XIV, assures us, men are free, responsible, and accountable for their actions. They will be judged by their fruits. Which does not prevent our era from being indeed unsettling.