Politics

Following the deployment of the impressive American armada near the Iranian coast, several military options are emerging should the White House decide to intervene. For the time being, the standoff with the mullahs' regime remains essentially verbal: communiqués, warnings, and displays of force punctuate the escalation. With each hardening of Donald Trump's tone, Tehran responds with threats of massive retaliation. On the American side, one thing seems certain: no ground intervention is planned. Several observers, however, believe that the American president will first seek a diplomatic solution before resorting to force. On the Iranian side, uncertainty remains total: how long can the regime resist new American demands? At what point might it back down? Hardened US Demands, Iranian Refusal Confirmed On Thursday evening, the US president stated that he "hopes not to have to use this military force," after having called the previous day for a "fair and equitable agreement – ​​no nuclear weapons." But since the June 2025 strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, "the price demanded of Iran for an agreement has increased considerably," according to Farzan Sabet, an Iran specialist at the Geneva Graduate Institute, interviewed by AFP. Washington is now demanding a total ban on uranium enrichment, limitations on Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, as well as "the dismantling or severe restrictions imposed on its 'Axis of Resistance,'" which includes the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, he explained. For Tehran, such an offer would amount to “a form of capitulation,” emphasizes David Khalfa, co-founder of the Atlantic Middle East Forum (AMEF). According to him, Donald Trump “will opt for the military option,” particularly to demonstrate his ability to enforce his red lines. The American military resources deployed Claiming to follow his “own morality” as his sole compass, Donald Trump warned last week that a “huge armada” was en route to the Gulf. This announcement came after his public support for Iranian protesters, whose movement has been violently repressed, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths according to NGOs. This force includes the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, its 80 aircraft, as well as an escort of three destroyers equipped with anti-missile capabilities and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The carrier strike group is generally accompanied by an attack submarine, also capable of striking land targets. The Option of Limited Strikes Donald Trump could target ships exporting Iranian oil, as he did against Venezuela, in order to cripple the country's economy and secure a deal, says Farzan Sabet. He could also conduct "either targeted strikes or a limited war with restricted objectives, allowing him to claim he has enforced his red line without engaging in another war in the Middle East, and he could then declare victory," he explains. These operations would primarily target air defense systems, missile launch sites, and drones, similar to the Israeli strikes in June. According to Eva Koulouriotis, an independent Middle East analyst, these strikes could target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militias involved in the repression. "American intelligence services, with the support of the Israeli Mossad, have a clear understanding of these forces," she states. The Hypothesis of Massive Strikes A more radical scenario would involve decapitation strikes targeting “all the pillars of the Iranian regime, starting with the top of the pyramid, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,” then the armed forces, the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard, and top political officials, according to Eva Koulouriotis. “This would also include neutralizing key military bases, the missile program, and what remains of the nuclear program,” she adds. “The American objective is to destabilize the regime. Therefore, there is a strategy aimed at paralyzing it and disrupting the chain of command,” explains David Khalfa. This approach “involves eliminating Khamenei, his close advisors, and the key figures in the Revolutionary Guard command.” He adds, however, a note of caution: “The regime is relatively solid and resilient; this will be no easy task,” especially since “the Revolutionary Guard has anticipated this scenario.” In this context, “Washington’s implicit assumption is that the ‘boots on the ground’ would be provided by Iranian society itself,” he adds. Farzan Sabet nevertheless emphasizes that nothing indicates, at this stage, that Washington explicitly favors a change of regime. Iranian Retaliation Capabilities Although significantly weakened by the strikes of autumn 2024 and June 2025, Iran's retaliatory capabilities remain. Tehran reportedly still possesses 1,500 to 2,000 medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel, according to Farzan Sabet. Iran also possesses shorter-range ballistic missiles, "much more precise," as well as cruise and anti-ship missiles capable of severely disrupting navigation in the Gulf, not to mention its missile-launching fast attack craft. The head of the Iranian army also announced that combat regiments had been equipped with "1,000 strategic drones." For Eva Koulouriotis, Tehran's decision to retaliate or not "will depend on the nature and scale of the American strike." The Key Role of US Military Bases In addition to the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, significant US military deployments are present in the region. In response to US threats, Iran has pointed out that numerous US bases are within range of its missiles. Bahrain is home to the Naval Support Activity, which houses the US Fifth Fleet and the headquarters of the US Naval Forces Central. Kuwait hosts several major facilities, including Camp Arifjan, the forward operating base for the ground component of CENTCOM. The emirate also houses pre-positioned equipment depots, as well as Ali al-Salem Air Base, home to the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing. Drones, including MQ-9 Reapers, are also deployed there. Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar houses CENTCOM's forward operating base, its air force, and its special forces. It hosts the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing and is the largest U.S. base in the region, with over 40,000 American, British, and French military personnel. Finally, Al-Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates hosts the 380th U.S. Air Expeditionary Wing, composed of ten squadrons and also incorporating MQ-9 Reaper drones.

An analytical focus on the war in Sudan which, since 2023, has already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced people, with a particularly overwhelming human cost in Darfur, where mass violence, sieges, and forced displacement have taken on a dimension that many international actors now qualify as genocidal. Sudan did not collapse all at once. It unravelled in successive layers, to the rhythm of a war that aims neither at the lasting seizure of power nor the reconstruction of a political order, but the gradual exhaustion of what still remains of the state. Since April 2023, violence has established itself there as a regime in itself, transforming the country into a fragmented space where the long duration of the conflict counts more than any specific military victory. The confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), known as Hemedti, is only the visible surface of a deeper process that erupted in the political vacuum left after the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, when the alliance of convenience between the regular army and the RSF broke down over the issue of control of the military apparatus, the integration of militias, and the real sharing of power in an already deeply delegitimized state. It should be recalled in this context that the RSF have their direct origin in the Janjaweed, the Arab militias of sinister memory, mobilized by the al-Bashir regime in the early 2000s to crush rebellions in Darfur. The regime had transformed militia violence into a state tool, legitimizing the Janjaweed as auxiliaries for counter-insurgency, restructuring them from 2013 under the name of RSF, and legally integrating them into the Sudanese security apparatus, while granting them exceptional autonomy. The RSF are therefore the product of a deliberate strategy by the Bashir regime, aimed at delegating extreme violence to peripheral forces, socially and geographically detached from the center, in order to preserve the regular army from direct exposure to mass crimes. One could say, without circumlocution, that it is the dictator's last poisoned gift to his country. No structured political project It would, however, be illusory to read the current confrontation as a strictly internal mimetic duel between another « Tapioca » and another « Alcazar ». Behind the classic scheme of the two « mad generals », each of these armed apparatuses only endures and projects itself because it is part of distinct external support configurations, which condition both the conduct of the war and its entrenchment. The conflict thus pits a state military apparatus supported mainly by Egypt and Saudi Arabia – with opportunistic capacity support from Iran – against a paramilitary force largely dependent on financial, commercial, and logistical networks attributed to the United Arab Emirates. What nevertheless favors the classical reading of the mimetic duel between two megalomaniacs in camouflage is that neither side carries a structured political project. But isn't that the prerogative of the entire region? On both sides, there is no question of governing a refounded state, much less rebuilding a social contract. The stake is elsewhere. It is about holding exploitable spaces, securing flows, preserving nuisance capabilities, or preventing the other from transforming a military advantage into exclusive domination. In this context, Khartoum has lost its function as a political capital. Its conquest or reconquest has not changed the general logic of the conflict; it has simply shifted tactical balances without touching the deep architecture of the war. The RSF understood very early on that international recognition was not decisive. Therefore, their strategy relies more on duration, on integration into regional arms and funding networks, and on the use of extreme violence aimed at producing irreversible effects. Darfur, and particularly the el-Fasher region, illustrates this logic. Prolonged sieges, systematic destruction of displaced persons' camps, organized obstruction of humanitarian aid, and mass sexual violence are less a matter of uncontrolled chaos than a method aimed at permanently dislocating local societies, breaking community solidarities, and causing population displacements that are difficult to reverse. A war designed to last It should be noted in this context that reports from international organizations indicate hundreds of rapes committed against children, women, and girls in the context of raids. In this sense, the violence exercised is not only punitive but structuring, in that it redraws the human balances of the territory, modifies local power dynamics, and transforms war into a tool of demographic engineering. Darfur, for example, is not a forgotten periphery of the conflict; it is its dark heart, the place where the most radical forms of a war designed to last are experimented. Consequently, faced with such dynamics, we must not delude ourselves: the Sudanese army is far from embodying a project of state restoration. It represents nothing more than the survival of an apparatus withdrawn into its traditional strongholds in the north and east and refocused around Port Sudan, which has become the wartime capital and an indispensable facade for international recognition. The partial recapture of Khartoum in 2025 thus allowed for relative military stabilization, but it neither re-established state authority nor reversed the country's fragmentation dynamic. What we observe, in reality, is the transformation of Sudan into a space administered by war, with the transformation of the state into a disputed label, an institutional shell emptied of any capacity for sovereign projection. The war has not replaced the state; it has simply unsubstantiated it. In this context, de facto partition progresses without ever being formalized. In the west, the RSF consolidate their territorial control, while in the east and north, the army retreats to a coastal and Nilotic Sudan reduced to its minimal functions. Between the two lies a space of diffuse violence, trafficking, and trapped populations, where political affiliation offers no protection. The Sudanese conflict thus illustrates a broader mutation of contemporary wars: wars without a political horizon, without a decisive victory, where the objective is not to close the conflict but to control its rents. And as long as this predatory economy remains solvent, the war is destined to continue indefinitely. Next article: Red Sea, Gulf and Horn of Africa: the regionalization of the Sudanese conflict

A dark corridor, the smell of dampness emanating from it, a broken or unpowered elevator, dirty stairs, then another dark corridor, strewn with coffee cups whose grounds have splashed the floor, empty water bottles, crushed cigarette butts... There, in an office plunged into darkness, a rickety chair awaits its occupant, who settles in, waiting for the generator to deign to light up the premises. Then there was light, revealing the decrepitude. This is not the setting of a post-apocalyptic film, but indeed that of the Palace of Justice in the city that the poet Nonnus of Panopolis, in the 5th century, named guarantor of order and mother of laws: Berytus Nutrix Legum. Two kilometers from a presidential palace maintained with remarkable care (although it has seen more periods of vacancy than occupation in recent decades) stands another Palace of Justice, the nightmare of all jurists: that of Baabda, next to which the capital's palace looks like Versailles. All modern societies rest on a fundamental pillar: Justice. Order is not the absence of chaos, but the presence of efficient justice, of a true functioning third power. However, in our country, the first two powers take precedence over the third. Worse still, they weaken it knowingly, with premeditation. The proof? The 2026 budget project. While in some countries, criminals assassinate judges with car bombs or ambushes, in Lebanon, the weapon of crime is economic, legislative, and executive all at once. The 2026 budget allocates 3.37 million dollars to the judges' mutual fund, which includes nine hundred magistrates, three hundred of whom are retired, compared to 11.235 million for that of the parliamentarians. For the purchase of equipment and office supplies, 90,000 dollars are earmarked for Justice, compared to 382,000 for the Executive and 203,000 for Parliament. As for maintenance costs, Parliament receives 2.34 million dollars, the Council of Ministers and the Presidency 2.05 million… and Justice, barely 200,000 dollars. There is no error here. It should be noted that, unlike Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidential Palace, each of which has only one or two infrastructures, Justice in Lebanon is exercised through six main Palaces and about thirty premises housing courts. It is therefore hardly surprising that the buildings in which justice is supposed to be rendered are in an advanced state of disrepair. Two hundred thousand dollars per year for maintenance: this is the price of a car that some parliamentarians buy for themselves, all the more easily as they benefit, during their mandate, from tax rebates on customs duties. Judges are nevertheless asked to declare the law and to ensure it is respected, a law often drafted nonchalantly, awkwardly, or even erroneously by deputies, who sometimes blend foreign legislations, a simple «copy/paste» of standards unsuited to our society. And it is then up to the judge to find the balance and the correct application... The State is not content with depriving judges of coherent legislative means: it also deprives them of financial means. The average salary of a judge is around two thousand dollars, compared to three thousand for a parliamentarian. But the difference lies elsewhere: in retirement, the judge depends on an anemic mutual fund, unable to cover their essential needs. The deputy, on the other hand, receives between 50% and 75% of their salary for life, benefits from free medical coverage, and upon their death, their spouse inherits these benefits. A magistrate is first and foremost a human being who, by vocation, performs only one function. Conversely, parliamentarians and ministers generally have a parallel professional activity. Asking a judge to carry out their mission under such degrading conditions (unhealthy premises, lack of equipment, etc.), not to mention political pressures, and sometimes even personal threats, is simply inhumane. Themis, goddess of Justice, wears a long white robe, is blindfolded, and holds the scales in her left hand and the sword in her right. The Lebanese Themis is not only blindfolded, but also has her arms tied and her mouth gagged. In Lebanon, justice is not abolished: it is simply left without light, without budget, and without dignity, until it ceases to exist on its own. This is more discreet, cleaner, and above all, more politically economical. An administrative death sentence, decided and voted by a show of hands by those who, ironically, benefit from judicial immunity...

Although Russia and China are among Iran's major strategic partners, their support for the Islamic Republic, weakened by internal protests and under threat from Donald Trump, would remain limited in the event of an American attack. According to several experts, neither Moscow nor Beijing is willing to confront Washington militarily. Iran nevertheless holds a significant place in the geopolitical calculations of the two powers. Tehran contributes to the Russian war effort in Ukraine by supplying the famous 'Shahed' type drones that have greatly served Moscow's troops. Iran also came to Putin's rescue by re-exporting Scud-type ballistic missiles once acquired by the Islamic Republic, which produced a modernized version of them. Iran is also a key player in oil exports to China and a member of the BRICS group. Subject to a strict international embargo due to its nuclear program, Tehran manages to circumvent sanctions by selling part of its crude oil to the Chinese market. The mullahs' regime thus secures a valuable inflow of foreign currency to sustain a bleeding economy. But this cooperation does not constitute a binding strategic alliance. « Despite Tehran's efforts for decades, they have not succeeded in creating an alliance with Beijing and Moscow, » emphasizes Ellie Geranmayeh, an Iran specialist at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She recalls that during the 12-day war in June, « China and Russia did not want to oppose the United States frontally. » In the event of an American intervention, « both countries will prioritize their bilateral relationship with Washington, » she believes. « China is in a very delicate rapprochement process with Washington, and the Russians obviously want to have Trump with them on Ukraine: they each have much more important priorities than Iran. » On the Russian side, the partnership with Tehran does not include direct military engagement. « Russia and Iran are allies, but the agreements concern political, diplomatic, and economic support, without a military support component, » specifies analyst Sergei Markov. For him, « the Ukrainian crisis is existential for Moscow and much more important than the Iranian crisis. » Alexander Gabuev, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, confirms that while « Iran is important » for Moscow, and Russia will do « whatever it can to keep the regime afloat, » its room for maneuver remains very limited. « Russia cannot become a giant market for Iran (in the midst of an economic crisis) and cannot grant a giant loan, » he notes, adding that military aid would remain conditioned by Russian needs in Ukraine. Nikita Smagin, a specialist in Russian-Iranian relations, shares the same assessment: in the event of American strikes, Moscow « could do almost nothing. » « They don't want to risk a military confrontation with a great power, » he explains to AFP, mentioning at most the possibility of « sending weapons. » He specifies that this restraint is not solely linked to discussions about Ukraine, even if « using Iran as a bargaining chip would be entirely normal for Russia; it has already done so in the past. » For Beijing, whose relations with Washington structure the global balance, support for Iran would remain essentially indirect. Assistance is conceivable « on economic, technological, military, and political levels » in the face of non-armed pressures, such as trade sanctions or cyberattacks, explains Hua Po, an independent Chinese analyst. However, in the event of strikes, « it would condemn the United States diplomatically » and strengthen its economic and military ties with Tehran « to help bog down the United States in a Middle Eastern war. » For now, Beijing is exercising caution. « The Chinese are cautious as always and express themselves with restraint, » observes Théo Nencini, a specialist in Iran-China relations at Sciences Po Grenoble, recalling « two stakes for China: oil and regional stability. » « China benefits from a weak Iran, which allows it to secure low-cost oil, representing 10% to 13% of its supplies, and to have a significant geopolitical partner without excessive cost, » he analyzes. Like Hua Po, he does not anticipate an escalatory reaction in the event of American strikes: « They will condemn diplomatically, but probably not take retaliatory measures. They haven't done so on many points in the past; I find it hard to see them engaging in a standoff with the Americans for Iran.» Finally, « the current Iranian crisis will have a very limited impact on Sino-American relations, » concludes Hua Po, estimating that « the Iranian issue is not at the heart of relations between the two countries. Neither will break off its relations with the other because of Iran. »

Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's game in Iraq was not a mere clever political maneuver or a misjudgment, but a meticulously planned political conspiracy, orchestrated from within a corrupt system, to reproduce power by causing failure and profiting from it. Sudani is not external to the system that destroyed the state, nor above it, but rather at its very heart, benefiting from its mechanisms and mastering its methods. What distinguishes him from others is not integrity, but his ability to manage corruption discreetly and without fuss. Nouri al-Maliki's return to the forefront of power was neither a coincidence nor a forced compromise. It was a carefully calculated maneuver. Maliki, with his heavy legacy, unresolved files, and widespread popular rejection, was the ideal candidate to bear the burden of the imminent collapse. He was not called to succeed, but to perish. He was not recalled to lead, but to serve as a scapegoat, to bear responsibility for the failures, thereby preparing the ground for his downfall and the dismantling of the entire coordination mechanism. However, it is deliberately obscured that the one who orchestrated this game, allowed it to fester, and profited from it, is neither an impartial observer nor an opponent of corruption, but rather a full accomplice. Al-Sudani intimately knows the system from which he emerged: he masters financial flows, influence networks, conflicts of interest, and knows how corruption is managed without scandal. Therefore, corruption during his tenure was not an isolated incident, but a deliberate policy: less blatant, but deeper, more widespread, and more lasting corruption. If he allowed al-Maliki and his entourage to get bogged down in affairs and scandals, it was not out of a rejection of corruption, but because he wanted to use it as a political weapon. He allowed the coordination system to disintegrate from within, not out of a desire for reform, but as a prelude to its loss of popular legitimacy and its transformation into a political liability. In this logic, al-Maliki was not the only target, but the entire system, thus preparing the ground for al-Sudani's return, presented as the 'lesser evil.' This is where the great deception lies: presenting the situation as a struggle between corrupt individuals and a savior, when in reality it is a conflict within the corrupt establishment itself, between those who corrupt openly and those who corrupt silently. Al-Sudani does not represent a break with al-Maliki, but rather a colder evolution in his style and more dangerous in its consequences. He does not fight corruption because he is part of it, but because he understands that corruption is an instrument of governance, and he therefore redistributes it instead of dismantling it. Al-Sudani has not opened a real corruption file affecting the heart of power. He has not addressed the underground economy, nor the networks of major contracts, nor the quota system that fuels the collapse. He has merely managed the calendar: who is sacrificed now, who is spared later, and who is eliminated if necessary. A reformist rhetoric intended for public consumption, without any concrete action. In this context, the collapse itself becomes a political tool. The greater the devastation, the greater the need for a 'savior.' And the more victims there are, the more acceptable al-Sudani appears. It's a sordid game played on the ruins of the state, where failure is deliberately orchestrated and the proposed solution arises from the problem itself. The real question today is no longer: who will fall? Maliki or the regime? But rather: will Iraqis once again accept the masquerade of a 'savior' manufactured within corruption itself, or will they demand a genuine alternative, born from outside? The answer to this question will determine whether Iraq remains trapped in a cycle of collapse, or if it finally has a chance to break free.

Iran and the world have been focused since December 28 on the revolt movement triggered in Tehran by Bazaar merchants and thousands of young and old against the rapid deterioration of the socio-economic situation. The demonstrations, which quickly spread to numerous cities and localities, reached an unprecedented scale by January 8, openly defying the Islamic regime, before being violently repressed in blood. A national internet shutdown, which allowed, according to human rights organizations, to mask the repression, was compounded by threats to inflict heavy sanctions on protesters, labeled as "rioters acting on behalf of foreign powers". The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, speaks of "unprecedented" repression. He reported last Friday that security forces had fired "live ammunition" at protesters, deploring the deaths of "thousands" of people, including children. Iranian authorities report the deaths of over 3000 people, claiming that the majority of victims "are martyrs", meaning members of the security forces or bystanders, and not "rioters". Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), based in the United States, reports 5002 deaths, primarily protesters, and at least 26,852 arrests. For its part, the NGO Iran Human Rights (IHR), based in Norway, confirmed that 3428 protesters had died but feared that the final toll could rise to 25,000 deaths. By targeting the power led by Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, protesters are defying the Islamic Republic like never before, but is the scale of the movement sufficient to overthrow the theocratic power? Are we witnessing the end of the mullah regime? Regime change? Analysts remain very cautious about the outcome of the protest and report several dimensions to the crisis, which could have various consequences. These analysts agree that the course of events can be very strongly dictated by external action. Interviewed by Levant Time, Josef Kraus, professor at Masaryk University in Prague and Iran expert, shares his insights on the subject. Mr. Kraus begins by recalling the multidimensional nature of the Iranian crisis. He highlights internal factors – inflation, economic crisis, corruption – to which are added external problems shaking the regime: failure of the Islamic Republic's imperialist policy in the Middle East and loss of several vectors of its power, also loss of distant allies, with the fall of Maduro in Venezuela, combined Israeli-US offensive, etc. The internal, regional, and international dimensions are closely linked. They are compounded by heavy sanctions imposed by foreign powers. According to Mr. Kraus, "we are still far from the end of the regime, unless there is an unpredictable and unforeseen external element." He notes in this context that "if one focuses on internal issues and the resolution of internal problems, it is almost certain that the regime will not be overthrown." "But if one considers the regional, or even global, dynamic, the situation could be very different," he specifies. "For example, a massive intervention by the Israelis or Americans could strongly unbalance the situation in Iran". Professor Kraus, who maintains contacts in Iran due to his interventions in Iranian universities, states that a "significant part of Iranian society expects an American or Israeli intervention likely to cause the collapse of the regime." "Everyone expects a second phase of what they call the 'Twelve-Day War' between Israel and Iran". For Mr. Kraus, "if the Americans intervene in a more muscular way, the stability of the regime could be severely threatened." "Some even call for an intervention in Tehran similar to that carried out in Caracas, i.e., deploying the Delta Force, kidnapping Khamenei, etc.!", he emphasizes. Cited by AFP, Nicole Grajewski, professor at the Centre for International Research at Sciences Po., "mass demonstrations, however sustained, are unlikely to be decisive". A similar analysis from Arash Azizi, of Yale University: "It is possible that under the combined pressure of internal protests and foreign threats from the United States and Israel, members of the regime may undertake a coup-type action and modify the fundamental policies and structures of the regime". Loss of Legitimacy Mr. Kraus returns to the bitter failures of Iranian foreign policy. He affirms that the regime derives its legitimacy from ideology: Velayat el-Faqih, the Islamic Revolution, and the resulting legacy. "But frankly, hardly anyone believes in it anymore," he asserts, before adding: "I would draw a striking parallel between the current Iranian regime and, for example, the Eastern European regimes of the 1980s, like Czechoslovakia. No one believed in communism anymore. Those who participated and remained loyal to the regime did so for economic and social advantages: better jobs, apartments, privileges, etc." He adds: "The situation is very similar in Iran. However, a significant part of society still trusts the regime. They wish for its continuation. They continue to believe in the Islamic Revolution, in the guardians of the doctrine, the "fuqaha". But with the catastrophic economic situation, even those who believed in the legacy of the Islamic Revolution are greatly disturbed. They prefer to think that the system itself is not bad, but they question the leaders for their mismanagement of affairs," adds Mr. Kraus. This distrust extends beyond the economic sphere, says Mr. Kraus, and discontent also concerns security, both internal and regional. Internal security is paramount for the regime. Indeed, when the middle class realizes it has nothing to lose by risking a revolution, it will overthrow the regime. But it will not do so as long as stability and security are assured. "The regime knows this and takes advantage of it," notes Mr. Kraus. "In essence, it tells them: 'Do you want to overthrow those who guarantee your security? Look at Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria. Do you want that to happen in Iran too? If not, be loyal.'" In fact, the threat of civil war is strong in a multi-ethnic country. Any destabilization of central power could easily mobilize the Kurds, Balochs, Khuzestan Arabs, Azeris, Turkmen, etc. For now, this threat is overused by the regime and works perfectly. At the same time, it plays the external security card: "Do you want to be threatened by Israel? Do you want to be bombed by the Americans? If not, we are here to ensure security through our allies, our proxies, our powerful army, and our Revolutionary Guards". But this legitimacy has disappeared: it is true that Iran was not directly defeated by the Israeli air force, but it did not win either! The military superiority of the Hebrew state allowed its bombers to establish themselves in Iranian airspace. Now, the majority of the Iranian population is demanding accountability, due to the regime having diverted colossal sums for decades for armament, the Guardians, and the maintenance of militias in other countries. Change of leaders? Returning to the question of Khamenei's succession, Mr. Kraus recalls several elements: the Iranian Constitution stipulates that any new power must be embodied by a single person. However, so far, no one fits this profile. Some speak of the Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei: he holds political and economic power and maintains excellent relations with the armed forces. But he cannot seize power alone, because succession from father to son is a royal tradition, and the very legitimacy of the anti-royalist Islamic Revolution would therefore be shaken. A collegial leadership, a triumvirate and perhaps even five people, is therefore an idea that makes perfect sense. But who would be part of it to have the necessary legitimacy? This collegial body would need popular support. This implies the presence of diverse personalities within this body. By reconciling profiles, it could work. It would be necessary to satisfy traditionalists, the hard right, with Mojtaba on one side, reformers on the other, but also liberals and the left. For Mr. Kraus, "something very important is brewing behind the scenes". "We have absolutely no idea, because it's not just about the constitutional system, elections, or different strategies," he indicates. "It's also about families; there are the Rafsanjani, the Larijani, the Khamenei, the Khomeini... These clans are vying for access to decision-making centers and power. They could share power in some way, as the Larijani family currently shares it with the Khamenei family. Ali Larijani is becoming the most important security figure in the country, whereas five years ago, it was believed that his political career was over". Historically, Iranian politics has always been made this way. Before the Shah, political office was dependent on clans and even tribes. Nowadays, the families of great religious dignitaries are establishing themselves as new dynasties, engaging in a remake of "Game of Thrones" Sanctions, a central element If the economic situation in Iran has reached such a catastrophic state, it is not solely because of sanctions: "The country is very poorly managed," says Mr. Kraus, "to this are added corruption, nepotism, and of course, the region itself which has been very destabilized for several years. This does not help. Moreover, sanctions have been in place for four decades. This means that for more than twenty years, Iran has been experiencing a significant brain drain." "If you talk to locals, those with the skills to do business, intellectuals, academics, high-tech professionals, all want to leave the country," emphasizes Mr. Kraus. "And they do it quite well. This brain drain has been going on for 20 years, towards the West in general, Western Europe, Canada, the United States or elsewhere, it has a negative impact on the economy and productivity". Thus, the essential element of Iranian foreign policy is closely linked to the lifting of sanctions. Iranians are willing to do anything to get rid of sanctions. "They are even ready to conclude a nuclear agreement 2.0 with the United States to obtain the lifting of sanctions, because the regime only wants one thing: to survive," continues Mr. Kraus. "And it can only survive if sanctions are lifted, because that would allow the economy to recover, and the majority of the population would, in a way, be content with the regime's continuation. The lifting of sanctions is therefore the absolute priority, the number one objective of the regime, because its survival is at stake". What future for Hezbollah? What is the impact of the current situation on the fate of Hezbollah? Mr. Kraus believes that two viewpoints emerge on this subject: "Hezbollah The first is that Iran, in reality, is ready to sacrifice Hezbollah if it gets an agreement with the Americans. The idea is that the regime is so desperate and needs to survive so badly that if the Americans came and said: "Here's the nuclear deal, here's the sanctions relief," while letting Hezbollah disarm, the Iranians would accept this situation because they would have no other options. He adds: "But there is also another vision. The Iranian mentality is very close to that of Hezbollah inasmuch as it is linked to religion, ideology, and the sense of sacrifice. It is not just about calculations and power dynamics, but also emotions. But Iran is of course a pragmatic and rational actor on the international stage. It is not a fundamentalist and fanatical society. It is a perfectly rational country. However, the calculation of the Iranian leaders could be different. This calculation is based on the observation that the Islamic regime has been in power for over 40 years, almost without change, always as prestigious, according to them, surviving everything". "In contrast, if we look at Israeli policy or American policy, we see that there are cycles, as in any democratic regime," notes Mr. Kraus. "Trump has three years left, not to mention Mr. Netanyahu, who is very controversial in his own country". The current tactic of the Iranians is to freeze things and wait for better days. In the meantime, they ask Hezbollah to reduce their provocation towards Israel, not to intervene in case of Israeli aggression", which Hezbollah is currently doing, also waiting for better days. Meanwhile, Lebanon is paying the price...

While the 47 members of the United Nations Human Rights Council expressed alarm in a resolution at "the unprecedented scale of the violent crackdown on peaceful protests by security forces" in Iran, High Commissioner Volker Türk condemned the security forces' firing of "live ammunition" at protesters, deploring the deaths of "thousands" of people, including children. At the heart of this repression are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the ideological arm of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The 'Pasdaran' ("guardians" in Farsi) are an extremely organized armed force, accused by Westerners of orchestrating and even participating in the crackdown on the protest movement. Who are they? The "Pasdaran" were created in 1979 by the Supreme Leader shortly after the Islamic Revolution "to propagate the ideals of the Islamic Revolution," recalls Clément Therme, an associate researcher at the International Institute for Iranian Studies, quoted by AFP. A Western diplomatic source who requested anonymity suggests a number approaching 200,000 men. Beyond ideology, "it's an armed force that functions like an elite army with land, sea, and aerospace capabilities, but it is better trained, better equipped, and better paid than the regular army," this source emphasizes. The IRGC also acts as Tehran's liaison with its allies in the region, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah or the armed groups of the Hashed al-Shaabi in Iraq. Constitutionally, all its leaders are appointed by the Supreme Leader. Last June, Ali Khamenei had appointed Mohammad Pakpour as the new head to succeed Hossein Salami, who was killed in Israeli airstrikes. He is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. What are their means? "It's an empire within an empire," emphasizes David Khalfa, noting that the "Pasdaran" own or control companies in all strategic sectors of the Iranian economy. "They have a quasi-monopolistic position," whether in infrastructure (ports, transport, dams, etc.), energy (gas and oil), technology, telecommunications, or the financial and banking sectors. Their military budget is estimated at between 6 and 9 billion dollars per year, approximately 40% of Iran's official military budget, according to data collected by the researcher. "They de facto control the Iranian economy". How do they operate? The Guardians have established a vast intelligence network that is "the most extensive and efficient of the Iranian regime," explains David Khalfa, a researcher at the Jean-Jaurès Foundation, quoted by AFP. They are capable of meticulously dismantling protest networks in record time, identifying protest leaders in a matter of minutes. They rely on a paramilitary militia (the Basij), recruited primarily from among young people, which acts as an ideological organization integrated into all institutions and strata of society. They are believed to number between 600,000 and 900,000 people, according to David Khalfa, based on cross-referenced data from various American think tanks. What role do they play in the current repression? "They play a central role in the repression because today, more than ever, they are the pillar of the Iranian regime, the pillar of its longevity, of its survival," analyzes David Khalfa. "They have set a political and operational line regarding the protests which is: zero tolerance," he adds. Hence a considerable number of people killed, at least 700 in two weeks, according to NGOs. Experts believe that at the beginning of the protests, the Guardians were probably in the background, relying on local security forces and the Basij. But "from the outset, they have been directing the repressive apparatus," "they coordinate the work of systematic repression," emphasizes David Khalfa. As the protests did not wane, they sent in their ground forces and special units, explains the researcher. And in a "strategy of denial" of their responsibility, "they act in civilian clothes," adds Clément Therme, so as not to be "directly attributed responsibility for human rights violations". A terrorist organization? As early as 2019, the United States listed the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization by the State Department. European officials, including MEPs, have in recent days called on the European Union to increase pressure against Iranian authorities, demanding, among other things, that the IRGC also be included on the list of terrorist organizations. Germany, in particular, would be in favor of this, as the Quds Force, the elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards that operates abroad, is suspected of being behind an attack against a synagogue in 2021 on German soil, according to a diplomatic source.

Welcome to Tropic Thunder , a five-part short series by Levant Time designed to help you understand the different reasons behind the current U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean. This series was completed 48 hours before the American attack on Venezuela.

« Totalitarian regimes are not content to dominate bodies; they seek to enslave minds. » – George Orwell Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the United States has imposed a large-scale economic sanctions regime on Tehran, which has become over the decades one of the most multidimensional pressure tools in American diplomacy. The first measures, instituted after the hostage-taking at the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979, froze Iranian assets in the United States via Executive Order 12170, immobilizing billions of dollars and blocking numerous financial operations. In the mid-1990s, Washington strengthened its arsenal: in March 1995, all American investment in the Iranian energy sector was prohibited; a measure followed in May by a total trade embargo covering almost all exchanges and technology transfers. The « Iran and Libya Sanctions Act » of August 1996 introduced extraterritorial sanctions, threatening foreign companies investing in Iranian hydrocarbons. Escalation of Financial Sanctions With tensions related to Iran's nuclear program, sanctions took on an increased financial dimension. In July 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), aiming to isolate Iran from the global financial system by restricting access to the dollar and maritime transport for Tehran's economic actors. Between 2011 and 2012, new measures hit Iran's central bank and oil buyers, causing a significant drop in revenues, a pillar of the national economy. In parallel, sanctions targeted the regime's officials and financial networks, with asset freezes and prohibitions on operations to limit their access to international markets. Maximum Pressure and the Iranian Strategy After a temporary easing linked to the 2015 JCPOA (the Iranian nuclear deal), certain sanctions were suspended in January 2016, allowing a partial resumption of oil exports. This period ended on May 8, 2018, with the withdrawal of the agreement in question by the United States, which progressively reinstated sanctions until November 5, 2018, as part of its maximum pressure policy. According to Phillip Smythe, a Middle East expert who worked at the Washington Institute and the Atlantic Council, « economic sanctions have sent the Khamenei regime into a free fall. » « However, this has not prevented the Iranian government from pursuing its adventurous actions and acquiring weapons, » he notes. « On the other hand, US measures complicate the financing of these efforts and proxies abroad. Maximum pressure has limited access to dual-use technologies, restricted the movement of the ghost fleet transporting oil, and curbed access to international banking networks. » Smythe specifies that despite the pressure, the regime continued to finance certain militias and attempted to pursue its armament programs, notably long-range missiles. Its ghost fleet continued to export oil, and in this regard, China remained a key partner, allowing the regime to maintain its resources and power. New Targets and Unprecedented Measures In January 2026, facing the repression of massive protests, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, for his role in the crackdown. Asset freezes and prohibition of any operations with American entities also apply to other high-ranking officials and financial networks of the regime. On January 12, 2026, a historic measure imposed a 25% tariff on any country that continues to trade with Iran, thus illustrating the regime's dependence on its foreign partners and the structural weaknesses of its economy. Future Levers Against the Regime According to Phillip Smythe, « the United States has many tools » to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic. « They could tackle the more secret banking apparatuses operated by the Islamic Republic, » he indicates. « These measures could thus include sanctions directly targeting the leaders and the foundations of their power » (taking into account that the regime's economy largely relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, and bases controlled by the mullahs). « Among other potentially viable tools is also targeting how the regime uses cryptocurrencies to continue financing itself, » adds Phillip Smythe. « Attacking other 'ghost' economies, such as banking, maritime transport, and money transfer, could also be other useful ways to limit the aggressive actions of the Islamic Republic. » A Regime Focused on Armament Mr. Smythe also emphasizes that for the ruling power in Tehran, « the people often come last. » The regime's priority remains military programs and regional ambitions, to the detriment of the population. Despite sanctions and international pressure, the Iranian government continues its military adventures and support for its militias, thereby highlighting the persistence of a totalitarian system determined to impose its strategic objectives. From 1979 to 2026, US sanctions – sectoral, extraterritorial, or targeting individuals – have evolved from a simple asset freeze to a global and multidimensional system, combining embargo, financial restrictions, sanctions against elites, and tariff measures affecting commercial partners, thus revealing the flaws and contradictions of the Iranian regime. A Paper Tiger Despite the image of power it seeks to project internationally, the Iranian regime has proven to be a veritable paper tiger. Its military and political structures, presented as solid and omnipotent, rely on fragile networks and an economy dependent on foreign partners. Successive sanctions have highlighted the financial vulnerabilities of the power and its difficulty in financing its regional and military ambitions. Its apparent resistance hides a much more precarious reality: costly programs, ultra-funded proxies at the expense of an increasingly suffering population. This mix of façade and structural fragility shows that, behind the rhetoric of strength, Iran struggles to maintain its influence without the support or tolerance of other powers, confirming the fact that it is in reality a paper tiger.

The latest article in our analysis of the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership of Barcelona (Euromed), then of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), draws an unvarnished assessment of the achievements and shortcomings that have marked, for Lebanon, the two phases 1995-2008 and 2008-2025 of this dual European strategic initiative. The Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona Process (Euromed), then the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), have brought political, economic, and institutional achievements to Lebanon. However, these remain limited due to the chronic instability that has plagued the country since 1995, and more particularly since 2008. The benefits of the Barcelona Process for Lebanon in various areas can be outlined as follows: – On the political front, the recognition of the legitimacy of the central power after a long period of constitutional vacuum, support for the sovereignty and stability of the State, the establishment of a regular dialogue with the European Union on issues of governance, human rights, and regional stability. – On the economic front, the signing in 2002 of the Lebanon-EU Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2006, the granting of preferential access for certain products to the European market, financial and technical aid for the modernization of the economy, support for SMEs, as well as infrastructure development. – On the institutional and social front, support for institutional and administrative reforms, education, training, and cultural cooperation, strengthening of state capacities in public services and environmental protection. However, political instability, regional conflicts, and internal Lebanese crises have had an inhibitory effect, preventing Lebanon from benefiting from the desired trade exchanges. Structural reforms have progressed slowly. The benefits of the UfM Since 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has provided Lebanon with primarily sectoral, technical, and diplomatic contributions, through the implementation of various concrete projects: – On the political front, Lebanon remains integrated into regional dialogues within a Euro-Mediterranean multilateral framework. It gains access to a platform for North-South and South-South dialogues, allowing it to defend its interests despite its precarious political and security situation, while maintaining its cooperation with the European Union. – On the economic and development front, achievements have focused on participation in regional projects in the areas of sustainable urban development, transport, energy, and environment, as well as support for inclusive growth, job creation for youth and women, entrepreneurship, and SMEs. – In terms of education and training, Lebanon has benefited from UfM programs in the areas of higher education, vocational training, academic mobility, and youth employment. – On the social front, support has been provided for initiatives promoting gender equality and social inclusion. – On the environmental and sustainable development front, support has been granted to projects related to water management, waste treatment, the fight against climate change, and the development of renewable energies. All these are important areas, considering the demographics and successive crises. However, political instability in Lebanon since 2008, the 2019 economic crisis, regional tensions, as well as the limited financial resources of the Union and the restricted role of EU aid (as well as international institutions) have curtailed the anticipated results. Mixed assessment Nevertheless, the Barcelona Process has brought Lebanon closer to the European Union and integrated it into Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, while providing aid in economic and institutional sectors. However, the economic impact of these measures remains limited. Regarding the Union for the Mediterranean, Lebanon has benefited from support for education, the environment, and civil society, which has resulted in concrete projects within a framework of regional cooperation. These achievements have allowed it to maintain its place in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, but they have not been sufficient to overcome the successive crises the country has faced. Previous articles Mediterranean Union: What became of the Barcelona Process? (1/5) The Mediterranean Idea: Tested by European Balances (2/5) A Cooperation Rich in Promises: The Barcelona Process (3/5) Union for the Mediterranean: An Unfinished Revival of the Barcelona Dream (4/5)