Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: Türkiye’s Role (4/6)

Türkiye’s strategy in the Horn of Africa, the Nile Basin and the Red Sea is part of a broader regional vision. Ankara sees the region as a vital geopolitical and economic crossroads, essential to projecting its military power along the Red Sea-Suez Canal corridor, securing the maritime routes on which its global trade depends, ensuring passage for its naval fleet to its bases in Mogadishu and Qatar, strengthening its defense partnerships and extending its diplomatic reach through mediation.

These ambitions have taken on added significance amid mounting tensions in the Red Sea, disputes over Nile waters, renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The main strands of this strategy are as follows:

– Somalia: Ankara’s Main Foothold

Somalia remains Türkiye’s closest partner in the region. The defense and economic cooperation agreement signed in 2024 further strengthened ties between the two countries and provided for maritime cooperation, particularly to help build the capabilities of the Somali navy.

Ankara also trains Somali military personnel at the TURKSOM center in Mogadishu, Türkiye’s main overseas military base. The partnership has helped deepen economic ties between the two countries and reflects Türkiye’s support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.

– Ethiopia and Somalia: Türkiye’s Precarious Position

Relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa are driven by a range of economic and political interests, including trade, Turkish investment in Ethiopia and the supply of military equipment. Türkiye, however, must balance this partnership with its support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This tension became apparent following the 2024 protocol concluded between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991. The protocol included provisions granting Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera, prompting Mogadishu to denounce it as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity. Ankara subsequently helped broker dialogue between Ethiopia and Somalia, notably through the New Ankara Process (2024), which contributed to a diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries. Türkiye sought to preserve its partnership with Mogadishu, keep channels of regional dialogue open and prevent an escalation, while avoiding damage to its ties with Addis Ababa. The mediation, however, did not definitively resolve the question of Ethiopia’s access to the sea, which remains politically sensitive.

– Egypt: A Rapprochement in Context

Relations between Türkiye and Egypt have improved significantly after several years of serious tensions triggered by the 2019 agreement on the delimitation of maritime boundaries between Ankara and Libya’s two rival governments⁽¹⁾. The resumption of high-level dialogue and the revival of bilateral cooperation point to a genuine regional rapprochement. Cairo and Ankara share common ground on certain issues, including Somalia’s stability, given that country’s close partnership with Türkiye. Their interests, however, do not coincide across the full range of issues affecting the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin.

Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, in particular, remain marked by disagreements over the management of the Nile’s waters and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which deprives Egypt of a substantial share of its water resources. Moreover, Egypt’s possible accession to the Mecca Pact (Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan) is by no means assured. One reason for this is Türkiye’s strategy in the Nile Basin.

– Sudan: A Cautious Policy Amid War

In Sudan, where the devastating conflict has been raging for more than three years, Türkiye is adopting a highly cautious stance amid an extremely fragmented political and security landscape. As of October 2026, the catastrophic humanitarian situation resulting from the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – whose attacks have struck civilian infrastructure, displacement sites and essential services indiscriminately – has led Türkiye to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality. This approach is reflected in diplomatic efforts between the warring parties, non-alignment and direct humanitarian assistance to the affected population.

– Eritrea and the Shifting Regional Balance

Relations between Ankara and Asmara are less developed than Türkiye’s partnerships with Somalia and Ethiopia. They nevertheless take shape in an unstable strategic environment, making any further rapprochement between the two sides particularly sensitive.

In Summary: Türkiye is seeking to reconcile several objectives: maintaining its privileged partnership with Somalia, safeguarding its economic interests in Ethiopia, encouraging dialogue among countries in the region and between the warring parties in Sudan, and developing its relations with Egypt. This strategy gives Ankara considerable visibility but does not make it an all-powerful arbiter. The crises in Tigray, rivalries over the Nile and disagreements over access to the Red Sea constrain its room for maneuver. Turkish diplomacy is therefore operating in an environment where alliances remain pragmatic, interests sometimes conflict and the risk of escalation is high.

Israel and the Red Sea: Security Concerns and Strategic Depth

Red Sea security remains an absolute priority for Israel and is intrinsically linked to safeguarding access to the port of Eilat and closely monitoring threats emanating from Yemen. As the regional conflict has intensified, Israel has come to view this maritime corridor not merely as a trade route, but also as a front line in its confrontation with the Houthis, who targeted Israel during the Gaza war (2023-2024), and as an area where Iranian-linked intelligence and influence networks are particularly active.

To counter what it regards as persistent threats, Tel Aviv is seeking to extend its strategic depth through pragmatic ties with various partners along the African coast of the Red Sea. The aim is to secure surveillance and intelligence capabilities, logistical footholds or maritime access arrangements that would help it monitor and counter the Houthis and Iranian networks. Recognition of Somaliland forms part of this effort to diversify its regional footholds and improve its ability to monitor hostile activity. This proactive posture reflects Israel’s determination to prevent, from a distance, any attempt by actors backed by Tehran to encircle it.

Iran, the Houthis and the Projection of Indirect Pressure

Iran continues to derive substantial strategic benefits from its support for Yemen’s Houthis, turning this partnership into a powerful instrument of influence in the heart of the Red Sea basin. It enables Tehran to exert sustained, indirect pressure from a distance on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and international shipping routes, while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. However, although Iranian support is decisive, the Houthis are not mere proxies blindly carrying out orders. They retain their decision-making autonomy and give priority to their own political calculations, their survival and their local interests. Moreover, the resumption of the war in Yemen has brought Riyadh and Abu Dhabi closer together and revived contacts between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Six Interacting Strategies

In this environment, where regional strategies – particularly those of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Türkiye, Iran and Israel – intersect, foreign powers are also present through their navies stationed in Djibouti⁽²⁾, from where they conduct sustained patrols.

Given the complexity of the situation in each country across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, no regional or international power can expect to organize the security of this corridor on its own. The risk of escalation places the region at a point of heightened tension, where strategies of indirect pressure come into conflict and the possibility of direct confrontation remains real.

(1) – In the eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye and Libya established a strategic maritime boundary in 2019, disregarding the Greek islands in order to secure access to gas deposits. This delimitation has drawn strong objections from Greece, Egypt and the United Nations.

(2) – The navies stationed in Djibouti are those of France, the United States, China, Japan and Italy.