Egypt in Search of Its Role

It is impossible to discuss the future of the Middle East without considering Egypt. Not simply because it is the most populous Arab country, nor merely because of its geographical location, military strength or history, but above all because, for much of the modern era, Egypt has been one of the key centers around which the Arab regional order has been shaped. The question of Egypt’s future, therefore, goes far beyond its national borders. Ultimately, it is about the future of the Arab world’s role in the emerging Middle East.

Since the 1952 revolution, and particularly under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt evolved from a major country into a regional power with an ambitious political project. Cairo became the epicenter of Arab nationalism and a major hub of cultural, media and political influence. Egypt also led the Arab confrontation with Israel. At the time, its power rested not only on its military and economic capabilities, but also on its ability to articulate a political vision that transcended its borders and resonated with broad segments of the Arab population.

The 1967 defeat, however, marked the beginning of the unraveling of that project. Nasser’s death, followed by Anwar Sadat’s political choices, the 1973 war and the Camp David Accords, further transformed Egypt’s regional standing. The country regained the Sinai Peninsula and gradually withdrew from direct military confrontation with Israel. But this shift came at a regional cost: Egypt’s ability to exercise the kind of leadership in the Arab world that it had wielded in the 1950s and 1960s was significantly diminished.

A Shifting Regional Order, a Diminished Egypt

The problem, however, goes beyond the Camp David Accords. The Middle East itself has changed.

The Gulf states have grown in influence, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar at the forefront. Oil wealth and investment have become increasingly important sources of political power. In the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran emerged as a regional power with a clearly defined strategic vision. Turkey, meanwhile, gradually reasserted its presence in the Middle East after several decades of relative disengagement. Israel, for its part, evolved from a state primarily focused on securing its survival and security into a military and technological power seeking to reshape the regional balance of power to its own advantage.

Egypt, by contrast, has devoted much of its resources to tackling domestic challenges: population growth, poverty, unemployment, debt, low productivity and the constant pressure to mobilize the resources needed to sustain a country of more than 100 million people.

This was the most consequential shift of all: Egypt had the stature but failed to translate it into commensurate economic and technological power.

In today’s world, neither population size nor military strength alone is enough to make a country a major power. A country’s power now rests on a combination of factors: knowledge, technology, economic strength, energy, military capabilities, human capital and the ability to shape global trade and information networks.

Egypt Still Has a Role to Play

Yet it would be just as mistaken to conclude that Egypt no longer has a role to play as it would be to assume that it can simply reclaim the position it once held, as though nothing had changed.

Egypt possesses an uncommon array of strategic assets. It links the Mashreq and the Maghreb, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, Africa and the Arab world. It is home to the Suez Canal, one of the world’s most important maritime routes, both commercially and strategically. It also has a large population, a sizeable military and state institutions that are more firmly established than those of several other countries in the region. Its cultural and historical heritage, moreover, represents a form of capital that cannot be measured by economic indicators alone.

The real question, then, is not whether Egypt can once again lead the Arab world, but what role it can play in a Middle East undergoing profound change.

Al-Azhar and Egypt’s Intellectual Influence

Another dimension of Egypt’s influence, often overlooked in geopolitical analyses, is its role as the home of Al-Azhar, one of the Muslim world’s foremost religious and educational institutions.

Al-Azhar gives Egypt a form of influence that few countries in the region can claim. The conflict unfolding in the region is not limited to military and economic matters. It is also about ideas, how religion is interpreted, and its relationship with the state, society and modernity.

The evolution of religious thought has become a historical necessity. The world is entering an era shaped by artificial intelligence and biotechnology. Our understanding of human beings, work and knowledge is itself undergoing profound change. Yet much of religious discourse continues to address questions of society and the state through frameworks inherited from vastly different historical contexts.

Al-Azhar could therefore play a role that goes beyond combating extremism or promoting what is commonly referred to as moderation. It could go further by helping to renew Islamic thought itself and reopen the field of ijtihad to address the questions raised by freedom, women’s rights, human rights, the civil state, pluralism, science, artificial intelligence and the relationship between religious texts and the course of history.

If Egypt succeeds in spearheading such an intellectual movement, it will regain a significant measure of its influence. Cairo should be more than an economic and military center. It could once again become a hub of intellectual debate and scholarship for the Arab and Muslim worlds.

China and Egypt’s Strategic Choice

The second factor is the strengthening of ties between Egypt and China, a partnership whose implications extend far beyond trade and investment.

Egypt occupies a strategic position at the heart of one of the world’s most important trade corridors, thanks to the Suez Canal. China, meanwhile, ranks among the world’s leading economic and technological powers. A stronger partnership between the two countries could give Egypt greater room for maneuver in an international system that is gradually moving towards a more multipolar order.

Closer ties with China should not, however, be viewed as a simple substitute for Egypt’s longstanding relationships with the United States and the West. Replacing one dependency with another is no strategy. The real value of the partnership between Cairo and Beijing lies in its potential to expand Egypt’s range of options on the international stage.

If Cairo can turn its cooperation with Beijing into a vehicle for transferring knowledge and technology, developing industry and infrastructure, advancing the energy sector and expanding the digital economy, while connecting these efforts to projects linked to the Suez Canal and to African and Arab markets, Egypt will be able to make full use of its geographical position. It will no longer be merely a transit corridor for trade, but could become a hub for production, services and logistics.

This opens up a more ambitious prospect: Egypt could become a crossroads linking China, Africa, the Arab world and Europe.

But such a strategy can succeed only if Egypt avoids becoming merely a market for Chinese goods or a host for foreign investment. The true measure of success will be the country’s ability to acquire knowledge and technology and develop its own productive capabilities.

The Limits of a Return to the Past

Egypt will not regain the position it held in the 1950s and 1960s, because the Middle East of that era no longer exists.

No Arab country can now claim regional leadership based on a centralized nationalist discourse. The centers of power within the Arab world have multiplied. Saudi Arabia today is very different from the Saudi Arabia of the Nasser era. The Gulf states have emerged as economic, financial and political powers, each with its own vision, interests and projects.

Egypt should therefore not seek to become the “leader of the Arab world” once again. Instead, it should work to build a new Arab partnership based on strength.

Relations between Egypt and the Gulf states are particularly important in this respect. The Arab world commands immense resources, but they are unevenly distributed. The Gulf states have capital, energy and the means to invest rapidly in emerging technologies. Egypt, for its part, has a large population, a vast domestic market, a strategic geographical position, universities, skilled human resources, industrial capabilities and military strength.

If relations between Egypt and the Gulf states were to move beyond a model based partly on aid and one-off investments towards a long-term project of strategic integration, the regional balance of power could be transformed.

Egypt’s Real Battle Is Economic and Intellectual

Egypt cannot secure a lasting regional role without rebuilding its economic strength.

The next economic revolution will be driven increasingly by artificial intelligence, robotics, energy, semiconductors, data, advanced industries and space research. If Egypt remains merely a consumer of these technologies, its political weight will continue to decline, regardless of the size of its army or population.

But if Egypt succeeds in turning its demographic potential into a source of knowledge and expertise, what is now seen as a demographic burden could become one of its greatest assets.

Education must therefore be at the heart of Egypt’s strategy to reclaim its place on the regional stage. The real battle is not simply about acquiring more weapons; it is also about educating and training engineers, scientists, programmers, researchers and entrepreneurs.

Egypt and the Three Regional Powers

Egypt’s importance also stems from the fact that it is the only Arab country whose size, geographical position, history and resources give it the potential to counterbalance the region’s major powers: Israel, Türkiye and Iran.

But Egypt does not need to build a fourth empire to compete with these three imperial powers. What the region needs instead is an Arab center of power that would prevent it from becoming a battleground for rivalries among outside powers.

A partnership between Egypt and the Gulf states could form the foundation of such a center, with strategic ties extending to China, Africa, Europe and the United States, without becoming wholly dependent on any one of them.

The Egypt the New Middle East Needs

Egypt’s future strength could rest on a combination of closely interconnected assets: its population, geographical position, the Suez Canal, its military, its economy, its knowledge and technological capabilities, Al-Azhar and its intellectual and religious influence, its partnership with the Gulf states, a balanced strategic relationship with China and the West, and its reach into Africa.

This changes the original question.

Egypt does not need to reclaim the role it played under Nasser, because history cannot simply be restarted at the press of a button, however much political leaders may like to think otherwise.

It must forge a new model of power: that of an Arab, African and Mediterranean state, an economic and technological hub, a country whose intellectual influence can help renew Islamic thought, and an international partner capable of engaging with Washington, Beijing and Europe thanks to its geographical position, which allows it to diversify its options.

The Middle East that Cairo could once lead with a single voice belongs to the past.

But the new Middle East has yet to find its balance.

If Egypt can bring together Al-Azhar and the Suez Canal, knowledge and industry, the Gulf and Africa, China and the West, it will not need to reclaim its former role.

It will be able to build a new one.