On U.S. Influence in the Middle East After the War on Iran

Much has been written about the new Middle East and the sweeping changes it has undergone over the past three years. Analysts have filled television screens with predictions about where the region is headed and how its future may be shaped by the shifting political and military balance of power. The changes are real, and they deserve a measured reading.

Some argue that the regional order established in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of unrivaled U.S. global dominance, has entered a period of decline. They point to Washington’s direct involvement in the region’s wars, including conflicts it has at times helped set in motion. The most obvious examples are the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the war against Iran, which continues intermittently and has yet to reach a definitive end.

Some observers even compare the position the United States may find itself in after the war on Iran to that of France and Britain after the 1956 Suez crisis, when two former imperial powers saw their influence begin to recede. Of course, the decline of a great power does not happen overnight, particularly when that power still possesses immense political, military and economic resources.

The United States has, in fact, failed to break the Iranian regime since the 1979 revolution, whether through decades of sanctions and isolation or through direct military confrontation. Nor has it managed to provide its Gulf allies with the security they expected, raising basic questions in those capitals about the value of the American military presence in the region. Today, these states believe they are paying the price for a war they did not choose, were not consulted about and, in some cases, openly opposed.

The war has also created new complications around maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, exposing the flow of oil exports to risks and disruptions that had not previously existed on this scale. U.S. strikes on water storage facilities in Iran, along with Israeli attacks on oil depots, also exposed Gulf states to the possibility of retaliatory strikes whose consequences could have been catastrophic.

It is therefore reasonable to ask whether this war has strengthened American influence in the region or accelerated its erosion.

The post-1991 order undoubtedly served U.S. interests. It helped secure the flow of oil, allowed Washington to exercise near-total regional influence with little Russian or Chinese resistance, generated major contracts with Gulf states, reinforced Israel’s security and supported the fight against “terrorism,” among other U.S. priorities.

Yet none of this prevented wars, instability and fragmentation across Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Libya and elsewhere. Palestine remains an even more glaring case. Washington has repeatedly endorsed the idea of a two-state solution, but without exerting meaningful pressure on Israel to move toward it. Israel, meanwhile, has continued settlement expansion in the West Bank and refused to withdraw from Gaza, which it has already devastated and where thousands have been killed.

The language of freedom, democracy and human rights that Washington once invoked so proudly has also been badly undermined by the unconditional support the Biden administration extended to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government after October 7, 2023. In truth, the contradiction is hardly new. Washington has often allied itself with authoritarian governments when doing so served its interests.

At the same time, the United States has never hesitated to abandon allies once it concluded that they had become politically expendable. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak discovered this in 2011. The episode sent a deeply troubling message to other U.S. allies, who were left to wonder whether Washington would stand by them if domestic unrest intensified.

In any event, there is now a clear convergence of interests between Iran and Israel in keeping the Middle East tense and unstable, even if each side has its own motives and justifications. It is equally clear that the United States has run short of effective tools to restrain either of them, whether its closest regional ally or one of its fiercest adversaries.

Can Washington devise a new policy for the Middle East? That seems unlikely under the current presidency of Donald Trump. But any future strategy that continues to shield allies from accountability, support them regardless of how they govern their own societies, and rely on military force as the primary response to adversaries will only deepen the erosion of American influence.

A few years from now, who will fill the space left by that retreat?

That is the question.