Lebanon: Lines of Fire at Home and Abroad

At a time when countries across the region are seeking mechanisms and alliances that would allow them to reduce their total security dependence on the United States, if not move entirely out from under its umbrella, with the Turkish-Saudi-Pakistani alliance offering a clear example of this trend, official Lebanon is moving in the opposite direction, toward ever greater reliance on Washington in most areas of its foreign policy. This is not limited to the issue of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, which began in Washington and are continuing in Rome, rather than Paris, for instance, and that is no coincidence.

Naturally, Lebanon cannot compare its position, presence, or role with those of the three major regional powers, nor can it adopt approaches similar to theirs, given the political, economic, and military capabilities at their disposal. Nor can anyone say with certainty whether Lebanon is even capable of distancing itself from Washington, or whether it has other options that would allow it to do so. There is also nothing to suggest that such a move is required in the first place, given the major role the United States continues to play internationally and regionally.

If some believe that it was, in practice, the direct political negotiations that brought the war to an end, and there is certainly some truth to that, Lebanon nonetheless needs to pursue a more active and effective foreign policy, one capable of mobilizing international support for its just cause and pressing consistently for a full Israeli military withdrawal to the internationally recognized borders. Those borders were acknowledged in the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel, yet they were entirely overlooked in the latest negotiations.

It is true that Washington will not accept anyone competing with its restored role in Lebanon, and that it wants to retain a monopoly over this arena in order to use it as a gateway toward some political achievement at the regional level, particularly in light of the stalemate surrounding the Iranian file, caught between bombardment and negotiation, with neither track proving capable of producing a decisive outcome. But it is equally true that relying exclusively on a single international power, however strong, does not necessarily yield the desired results. Perhaps the clearest example is the marginalization of the French role to its bare minimum, something highly unusual in the context of the “historic” Lebanese-French relationship.

While acknowledging that the American role is unavoidable under the prevailing circumstances and given the balance of power produced by the wars that have raged over the past two years, one can only hope that Washington will exert greater pressure on its favored ally in order to secure a withdrawal and curb Israel’s unabated appetite for territory in southern Lebanon, reflected in the publication of suspicious maps, the opening of roads, and the establishment of military positions in occupied areas.

Unless the United States becomes convinced that building a functioning state in Lebanon serves the interests of stability both at home and across the region, and unless that conviction is translated into concrete positions producing practical results in southern Lebanon, the situation will remain trapped in the same vicious circle: weapons before withdrawal, or withdrawal before weapons? Incidentally, this choice, namely the establishment of the state in Lebanon, does not necessarily serve Israel’s interests and most likely does not, because the absence of a strong state gives Israel room to vent its historic hostility toward Lebanon’s pluralistic character, which stands in stark contrast to its increasingly radicalized, monolithic identity.

Building the state in Lebanon, beginning with placing all weapons under the exclusive authority of the state rather than simply disarming them, is the right and only way out of the reality in which we find ourselves. It would allow the people of the South to trust that there is a state capable of protecting them, embracing them, and providing the conditions for a dignified life, away from narratives of marginalization and neglect that are reinforced by repugnant sectarian rhetoric, cloaked in unhealthy slogans and expressing a hatred that could lay the groundwork for civil conflicts that most Lebanese believed had been consigned to the past for good.

In a pluralistic and diverse society such as Lebanon, the state cannot be built on the principle of rule by the sword, although excessive weakness can itself prove fatal to the state-building project. It must instead rest on the creation of spaces of shared interest embodied by the state, which no party, however powerful, can replace. This is precisely what developments in Lebanon have demonstrated over the years, as an excess of power has passed successively from one community to another.

The Lebanese state must therefore take the necessary steps to build itself and must not rule out dialogue with anyone, at home or abroad, in pursuit of that objective, even if this requires opening channels with actors that support particular parties in Lebanon rather than the state itself. Why should the state not seek to forge regional understandings under international cover that would enable it to put its project into practice in Lebanon: the project of the state? Is this beyond the state’s capabilities? Perhaps. But the attempt should at least be made.

Finally, if calling for dialogue abroad appears necessary to break out of the current impasse, the need for dialogue at home is no less urgent. Such dialogue must not assume a merely folkloric character, producing nothing more than verbal understandings that never find their way into implementation. Rather, it must seriously seek to establish the necessary domestic red lines: no retreat from the project of building the state, beginning with placing all weapons under the exclusive authority of the state, and no fueling of feelings of marginalization and neglect among any segment of the Lebanese population.

Between these two imperatives, some common space must be created, however difficult the task may be.