The State Monopoly on Arms: Another Perspective!

Political interests often produce the strangest alignments. Some of these are so illogical that they are difficult to understand or even comprehend. Yet they are very real. There is an enormous gulf between how politics is practiced and how it is understood in theory. This perhaps explains many of the phenomena we are witnessing in Lebanon today.

Over nearly two decades, Lebanon has gone from being a country that liberated its territory from one of the region’s most powerful and bloodiest armies, without conditions, a peace treaty, or even an agreement on security arrangements, to a state where five hills were occupied, followed by some 60 villages. Their homes have been completely razed, and more than 200,000 residents have been displaced, leaving these communities almost entirely emptied, with little or no prospect of their return in the foreseeable future.

The Israeli occupier demands Hezbollah’s disarmament in the name of protecting its northern borders. Hezbollah, for its part, refuses on the grounds that as long as part of the territory remains occupied (which might not have been the case had it not become involved in wars fought in support of other fronts), resistance to occupation remains necessary (which is, of course, theoretically correct). This is where the two sides converge, despite standing at opposite ends of the spectrum!

Contrary to its claims, Israel does not genuinely want Hezbollah to be disarmed or to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state. Such a development would make its project of establishing a permanent buffer zone in southern Lebanon both impossible and unjustifiable. It would deprive Israel of the pretexts needed to pursue this objective, which it has already begun implementing on the ground through its daily operations: demolishing homes, bulldozing land, opening roads, preparing to establish military posts and positions, and, of course, refusing to withdraw or allow residents to return.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, is fully aware that all political and military circumstances have changed since its 2006 war and the “divine victory” it proclaimed at the time. Among the most significant developments are the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the assassination of senior Hezbollah leaders and high-ranking figures in Tehran, the collapse of the deterrence equation, and Israel’s intelligence superiority, illustrated by the pager operation, as well as its military superiority. Nevertheless, Hezbollah continues to insist on retaining its weapons, despite having been unable to confront Israel since the ceasefire that ended the latest war, while Israel has continued its daily violations and its attacks targeting the party’s cadres without interruption.

Caught between the two, the Lebanese state remains incapable of fulfilling its role and performing its most fundamental function: ensuring that weapons are held exclusively by official military and security institutions. It fears a confrontation with Hezbollah in order to preserve civil peace and, naturally, is in no position to confront the Israeli army, given the enormous disparity in military strength.

The continued weakness of the central state serves Israel’s interests. Israel does not seek partners in pursuing its policies, but subordinates. Its recent history offers dozens of examples in which it has insisted on weakening those advocating peace or stability. The latest is Israeli National Security Minister Ben-Gvir’s call for the Palestinian Authority to be dismantled and dissolved altogether, although the Palestinian Authority has consistently advocated peaceful solutions and ending the conflict through negotiations. This should serve as a lesson to some in Lebanon who are rushing toward normalization and “peace,” hastening to take steps in that direction and even raising the prospect of repealing the law boycotting Israel!

The establishment of a strong Lebanese central state, exercising exclusive control over weapons and securing the southern border, would deprive Israel of the arguments it uses to claim that it faces a constant threat in the north and that its settlements in those areas remain continuously exposed to danger. It is well known how much Israel continually needs wars to sustain its settler-colonial project, which it seeks to extend into Lebanon, and how measures of this kind could obstruct that project.

Conversely, the obstacles preventing the establishment of an effective state at home do not trouble Hezbollah. They make demands for the collection of weapons impossible to implement and allow the party to continue setting its own agenda in coordination with Tehran, without necessarily taking Lebanon’s national interest into account, if not acting in outright contradiction to it.

The American role in this matter must also be addressed. Washington’s interest in Lebanon could gradually diminish as the country becomes trapped in a prolonged political deadlock, with no tangible progress that US President Donald Trump could boast about before American and international public opinion. It is clear that Israel does not want official Lebanese-American relations to grow stronger. This is not because it fears losing its privileged position in American domestic and foreign policy, but because it inherently seeks to preserve its exclusive regional superiority. Lebanon, with its limited capabilities and successive collapses, cannot compete with Israel in this regard. Yet it remains the only model capable of presenting itself as something different, particularly through its pluralism and diversity.

While it is generally acknowledged that only Washington can exert pressure on Israel, albeit pressure that is by no means absolute, this does not relieve Lebanon of the responsibility to mobilize all possible international support for its cause and help build a sympathetic international public opinion that will keep that cause alive. To extinguish it would be to leave it hostage to the current impasse, while Israel continues to enjoy overwhelming superiority in bombing, bulldozing, demolishing, and forcibly displacing populations.

From this perspective, the question of the state monopoly on arms may be far more profound than some imagine. It calls for a new dialogue, one that could perhaps begin between Beirut and Tehran, with Saudi involvement and American backing.