International Conference in Support of the Lebanese Army: Multiple Challenges (1/3)

As the date of the international conference in support of the Lebanese army, scheduled for March 2026 in Paris, approaches, Lebanon finds itself at a critical juncture. This meeting, intended to mobilize the international community in favor of the regular forces, comes at an extremely complex political and regional time. Every decision or lack thereof by the Lebanese state regarding the monopoly of weapons, in particular, will have a direct impact on the effectiveness of international aid to the troops and, more broadly, on the very future of the army and national sovereignty.

The chosen date, March 5, 2026, remains conditional, however. According to General Maroun Hitti, the conference could be postponed if a crucial step is not taken by Lebanon by then. This step consists either of a unanimous political decision within the Lebanese government, including Hezbollah and Nabih Berri’s ministers, for the State to take charge of the weapons issue and for Hezbollah to submit to its authority, or of a major regional event. This could be a cataclysm or an armed conflict that would force Iran to comply with the demands of the international community, thus altering the balance of power in the region.

The Paris conference is thus not limited to a simple technical or diplomatic meeting. It is intimately linked to regional geopolitical balances and the strategic agenda of external powers.

DDR as a central objective

For General Hitti, the strategic objectives of the conference are clear: to discuss border control, which is a less contentious issue, and above all to advance on DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Hezbollah). This is not merely a military endeavor but a major political and social challenge: How to reintegrate an ideological party like Hezbollah into Lebanese society so that it ceases to be aligned with foreign interests and becomes a fully national actor?

General Hitti emphasizes that the objective is not to help the army wage war on Israel or to turn Lebanon into a theater of confrontation, but to rebuild the Lebanese state, affirm its sovereignty, and integrate all actors into a legitimate national framework.

Prior Defeat

He insists on a fundamental point: reintegration can only be achieved after a tangible and undeniable defeat. As he explains, just as happened with the Nazis in Germany after 1945, no armed ideological organization can be reintegrated into a society until it has accepted its defeat.

General Hitti also specifies that a distinction must be made between Hezbollah's vain official discourse and the reality on the ground. According to him, Hezbollah is in distress even if this does not appear in its public communication. This dimension also shows that the Paris conference is not a meeting for the distribution of resources or the planning of aid to the army, but a strategic step aimed at creating the political and social conditions necessary for national realignment.

The human factor: an underpaid soldier

The Lebanese army plays a fundamental role in this context, hence the attention paid to its development.

At the center of any discussion about regular forces, General Hitti places the man on the ground. Lebanese soldiers, often poorly paid, are nonetheless the true pillar of any envisaged operation.

He insists on their salary frustration and considers it absurd to ask an underpaid man or woman to perform tasks that do not allow them to remain active and support their families.

For General Hitti, the human factor must precede any consideration of equipment or technical and military capabilities, inasmuch as, according to him, a demotivated or absent soldier weakens the entire institution. The challenge is therefore twofold: to guarantee a decent income for military personnel and structural support for the Troops.

According to General Hitti, the first pressing question donor countries should ask themselves is whether it is not a priority to start by ensuring that the Lebanese soldier receives a salary that allows him to leave his family with peace of mind because he has provided them with the means to live honorably. Or, is it possible for him to spend more time at home, at the expense of his presence at work and at the risk of a drop in operational readiness, and for the commanders on the ground to continue striving to alleviate a perpetual and cruel shortage of men?

International aid: stabilization or real strengthening?

For years, the army has benefited from various international aids: training, equipment, logistical support, even indirect salary assistance, notably from France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other partners, following capacity development plans developed by the Troops.

However, despite this support, the balance of power between the army and Hezbollah remains uncertain. General Hitti explains that the Lebanese army is multi-confessional and reflects the diversity of a liberal society, while Hezbollah is mono-confessional, ideologically indoctrinated, and benefits from strong internal cohesion and an extra-Lebanese doctrine.

However, what may be considered an apparent weakness of the army can be transformed into a potentially considerable strength, provided that the State asserts its authority and makes unanimous decisions that will benefit from the support of Parliament. According to General Hitti, international aid will remain strategically sterile in this context as long as the question of the monopoly of force and the authority of the State is not settled. The resources provided remain useful and serve operational missions but will only become effective if the State assumes its responsibilities by granting a clear mandate to the army.

Symbolism or concrete actions?

General Hitti emphasizes that previous international conferences in favor of the army, initiated by Paris and Rome and approved by Washington, were truly effective tactically and operationally, while waiting for the Lebanese state to take control of strategic and political decisions.

The March 2026 conference could reproduce the same pattern if it does not influence internal political blockages. Donors provide means and resources, the Lebanese state remains hesitant and ambiguous in its directives, and skeptical citizens and soldiers will continue to doubt the real effectiveness of any conference.

General Hitti adds that no international aid, however generous, can replace political courage. Without a clear mandate, he says, and without a national vision (a national security and defense policy), the regular forces remain exposed, and the sovereignty of the Lebanese state will remain an empty slogan.

General Hitti also insists on the need for a clear political appropriation of the army's missions. The State, he notes, must assume its decisions, even in the face of internal pressures and the risks posed by Hezbollah. This condition is essential to transform announcements of support into concrete and measurable results and to prevent the March 2026 conference from becoming another diplomatic ritual.

A tipping point

The Paris conference appears more than ever as a real potential tipping point for a Lebanon facing political, social, and strategic challenges.

Its success will depend less on the material means promised by the international community than on the capacity of the Lebanese state to assert its authority, to demand the surrender of armed actors ideologically subservient to an external power, to unite its political bodies around a common objective, and to clarify the army's role on national territory, while providing it with the means to fulfill it.

Without structural reforms and without recognizing the value of those who serve on the ground, even the best-organized conference risks remaining symbolic.

Ultimately, the Paris conference will be a test of political and institutional maturity for the Lebanese State. It will measure the government's ability to translate its international commitments into concrete actions on the ground, to stabilize its armed forces, and to consolidate its sovereignty.