Do We Win if Netanyahu Loses… and Lose if He Wins?

In Lebanon, the noise of Israel’s election campaign drowns out every other voice. Each side follows its developments according to its own calculations, circumstances and interests, hoping to strengthen its position.

Some, convinced that bringing about change within Lebanon is difficult, pin their hopes on political change in Israel. They believe it would spare them a direct confrontation with Hezbollah and offer a way out of their predicament, allowing them to regain the ability to pursue their objectives and achieve results in negotiations without obstacles.

Hezbollah, for its part, calculates that it could restore its influence, regain control of the state and impose the Iranian agenda. In its eyes, Netanyahu’s defeat would amount to another divine victory, adding to its previous triumphs, since it would supposedly be the fruit of its "sacred jihad." The party awaits this outcome, already proclaims it and prepares to sell it to its constituency in an attempt to win back a support base that is beginning to slip away.

It matters little to Hezbollah that such a supposed victory would do nothing to change the displacement of southern Lebanon’s residents, the destruction of their homes or the impossibility of returning to their villages without a settlement that the Iranian axis refuses to accept for fear of losing its presence and influence in Lebanon.

Nor does it matter that the fire of whoever succeeds Netanyahu will not turn into coolness and peace for Palestinians and Lebanese. The foundations of Israeli policy remain unchanged, whether in matters of security, settlement expansion, foreign policy or the Jewish character of the state, as embodied in its institutions and structures. In other words, the contest among the candidates is primarily about Israel’s domestic affairs and does nothing to alter the sweeping offensive Israel has waged since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood against anyone it considers a threat.

Nor does it matter what is happening across the Arab fronts, where conflicts are giving Israel greater strength and an enhanced ability to exploit the policy of divide and rule, just as Iran does. Syria pitted against Jordan, Saudi Arabia against Yemen, and why not open still more fronts, as long as they serve the plans and ambitions of those behind them? All it takes is a little skill to move the pieces across the chessboard of an Arab world that has lost its central role in shaping the region’s destiny, having fragmented into mutually hostile and competing worlds.

Yet this is sheer stupidity, the pretence of drawing strength from something that serves no purpose, intended solely to raise the morale of the defeated, who continue to sink deeper into denial. There is also the haste to anticipate developments which, should they fail to meet expectations, will bring bitter disappointment and another setback to those rushing to sell illusions.

Premature celebrations of Netanyahu’s possible defeat would therefore make the disappointment all the more painful if he were to win the election, form another government and continue his campaign of aggression, which stops neither at the Yellow Line nor at Ali al-Taher Hill. The disillusionment would be just as bitter if Netanyahu’s successor sought to make Beirut’s southern suburbs the price to be paid for the security of Israel’s northern settlements.

Where, then, would Hezbollah look for its victories? How would it rally its support base? And what could it possibly gain by continuing to oppose the establishment of a state with exclusive authority over decisions of war and peace and a monopoly on weapons, one capable of negotiating with the Israeli enemy with sufficient leverage to reach a satisfactory agreement that would guarantee an end to the occupation and the beginning of reconstruction, allowing the people of southern Lebanon to return to their villages?

In short, do we win if Netanyahu loses… or lose if he wins?

These are difficult questions when one treats this man’s victory or defeat as the measure of what lies ahead in the war against Lebanon.

Lebanon’s national interest cannot depend on the calculations of those who seek to exploit developments in Israel to strengthen their positions and improve their bargaining power. It lies in ending the state of neither war nor peace that undermines every hope of escaping the country’s economic decline and restoring the health of the state, its institutions and its sovereignty over the entirety of its territory.

The arrogant obstinacy that dominates the rhetoric of Iran’s faction in Lebanon will do nothing to alter the war of extermination being waged by the Israeli enemy. Nor will the continued hesitation over decisive action, which prevents the Lebanese state from taking steps capable of changing the equation.

What needs to be done is clear.