Perspective

The leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, or at least the top brass of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (the Pasdaran), likely did not read, or even try to understand, La Fontaine's fable, "The Frog Who Wished to Be as Big as an Ox," when they were at the height of their power. Had they done so, they would undoubtedly have recognized that they could not compete with powers possessing potential, in every domain, that was light-years away from their actual "divine" capabilities through ideology, empty slogans, fiery speeches, populism, demagoguery, and, above all, terrorism. If they were aware of the realities of this world, they would have been far more realistic in their expansionist and geostrategic ambitions. From the early 2000s onward, a series of indicators emerged, clearly demonstrating that not only the United States and Israel, but also the entire international community, including Russia and the main countries of the European Union, could not possibly accept that a radical Islamist regime, displaying a belligerent stance, could possess advanced nuclear weapons. It appears from official documents declassified a few days ago in Washington that, during a meeting he held in Slovenia in June 2001 with the White House chief, George W. Bush, President Vladimir Putin emphasized that he had credible evidence explicitly indicating that the Iranian regime was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, expressing his grave concerns to the American president. During another meeting held between the two heads of state at the same time at the White House, President Bush emphasized to Putin, in a clear allusion to Iran, that "we don't need religious extremists in possession of a nuclear weapon." These were the first signs of the emergence of a long diplomatic and media standoff that would pit the Islamic Republic against the international community over the Iranian nuclear program for more than two decades. In 2006, 2007, and 2008, the UN Security Council imposed UN sanctions on Iran (with the approval of Russia and China) because of its suspiciously persistent pursuit of uranium enrichment at a rate that could only lead to the acquisition of the bomb. Since then, feverish behind-the-scenes discussions, diplomatic maneuvering, and negotiations have continued, making virtually no progress, Tehran's objective clearly being simply to buy time. Even the 2015 agreement brokered by Barack Obama had flaws and made no mention, for example, of Iran's intensive production of ballistic missiles, as demanded by the then French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, who advocated a sufficiently firm stance toward the Islamic Republic. But Barack Obama was "vigilant" in order to counter any attempt to adopt too harsh a position toward the mullahs in Tehran… We know how events unfolded in this regard. Long before this diplomatic battle waged since the early 2000s, Israel did not hesitate to take action, without getting bogged down in sterile debates, and in June 1981 bombed the nuclear reactor that Iraq was working to build. And in 2007, the Israeli air force carried out a raid in Syria against a nuclear site in the Deir ez-Zor region. All of these indicators confirmed, day after day, the firm determination of Israel, the United States, European countries, and even Russia to prevent autocratic powers, and in particular a regime as radical as that of the Iranian mullahs, from completing a nuclear program whose military purpose was obvious to everyone. Despite this near-unanimity, the Islamic Republic persisted for over two decades in investing hundreds of billions of dollars in a highly strategic project whose realization was demonstrably chimerical, irrational, and even utterly suicidal given international realities. To make matters worse, and further its suicidal stance, Iran undertook, through investments of tens of billions of dollars, to establish and maintain militias completely subservient to the Revolutionary Guards in five countries and regions of the Levant (including Gaza). This resulted in an exacerbation of the age-old tension between Sunnis and Shiites, accompanied by the chronic destabilization of this part of the world, solely to satisfy the hegemonic ambitions of the Revolutionary Guard apparatus. All of this...cloaked in anti-American, anti-Western rhetoric and a belligerent attitude toward the Gulf states. In light of the sheer number of these indicators and considerations that have accumulated over more than twenty years, a troubling question arises: how could leaders who aspired to play a key, even dominant, role in the region have displayed such political blindness, allowing themselves to be convinced that they could extend their reach with impunity, everywhere, disregarding the societal, historical, political, cultural, and geopolitical realities of the Levant region? The hurricane that is currently striking the capital and numerous Iranian cities is, to a large extent, a consequence of this obstinate desire to forge an outsized power structure, completely out of proportion to the regime's actual capabilities and the extraordinary potential of the adversary the mullahs presumed to confront.

A striking confirmation of the turning point reached by the Trump Administration in foreign policy — this, in essence and succinctly, is how several observers and analysts reacted to the United States’ National Security Strategy, released a few days ago by the White House. This major document, about thirty pages long and preceded by a foreword from President Donald Trump, sets out in detailed form the orientations and objectives Washington has defined regarding current developments in the world’s sensitive regions and the vital issues playing out on the international stage. The ideas presented by the administration’s team in the federal capital are not entirely surprising. They had already been the subject of active debate in various political and diplomatic circles, but it is likely the first time they have been assembled so comprehensively and methodically — theme by theme, region by region — in a single official document emanating from the highest levels of power. The strategy outlined in this text broadly aligns with the vision defended by J.D. Vance well before the November 2024 U.S. presidential election. Vance, who would later become Trump’s running mate, had stressed in several public appearances — notably during the summer of 2024 — that the United States should no longer systematically place itself on the front lines of every struggle waged against the adversaries of the Western world. He urged, for example, that Europe take responsibility for its own defense, supported of course by the U.S., but without placing the entire burden on American military infrastructure. But it was especially Vance’s vision of the Middle East that drew attention and continues to be of great interest to Lebanon and the Levant. Trump’s running mate emphasized at the time that Israel and the Sunni states of the region should, like Europe, assume their own responsibilities in matters of defense and coordinate their efforts more specifically to counter Iran’s expansionism. This orientation — defended by Vance back then and reflected again in the White House’s newly released document — marks a fundamental break with the policy pursued by previous U.S. administrations (with the exception of Trump’s first term). One should recall that in the early 1980s, after the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988), the United States and Israel had practically rushed to the aid of Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, providing it with anti-tank missiles, military equipment, and spare parts to help it confront Saddam Hussein’s army. This crucial support — later revealed publicly in the Irangate scandal — fit into a broader context than the Iran–Iraq conflict (namely the funding of Nicaragua’s Contras), but its strategic objective was clearly to bolster the pragmatic wing of the Shia regime in Tehran in order to weaken the Sunni pole in the Middle East. Yet this calculation gravely misread the ideological mindset of the Revolutionary Guards, who, from Khomeini’s rise to power onward, had aggressively pushed their expansionist project to export the Islamic Revolution across the region. This miscalculation of the early 1980s ultimately meant that not only was the pragmatic wing of the Iranian regime not strengthened vis-à-vis the Sunni bloc, but the radical Khomeinist current, on the contrary, steadily grew in power, extending its influence into every economic, social, and institutional sector of Iran, bypassing the central state and sowing chronic instability in several Levantine countries. These hegemonic ambitions were accompanied by an accelerated development of Iran’s nuclear program, such that what had been perceived forty years ago as a pragmatic counterweight to Sunni power became, four decades later, a serious existential threat — one that should have been recognized for what it was had the ideological foundations of the Revolutionary Guards’ project been fully understood. The strategic — and likely fatal — error of the regime’s radical wing was its failure to recognize its own limits in a region as complex as the Middle East and its pursuit of excessive ambitions, both in its nuclear program and in its artificial entrenchment in the Levant. It is therefore hardly surprising that the National Security Strategy presented today by the Trump Administration reverses the equation of the 1980s by advocating cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states to confront the danger posed by a Shia power still struggling to accept that the region has undergone a profound geopolitical transformation — one paving the way for the emergence of a new Middle East built on lasting peace and broad-based economic cooperation.