Lebanon: Political Clans Strangled the State, Hezbollah Swallowed It

How did Lebanon reach such a state of deterioration, to the point of collapse? What prevents the state from exercising its sovereign prerogatives, including its monopoly on violence, its authority to decide on war and peace, and its right to pursue a foreign policy consistent with its interests?

Anyone who critically and impartially examines the first century of the Lebanese state’s existence will find that the ruling political class has behaved in a peculiar manner from independence to the present day. Although the founding fathers of Greater Lebanon sought to strengthen the concepts of citizenship, loyalty to the homeland, and the right to self-determination, the practices of political leaders ultimately led to the “confiscation of citizenship” and the weakening of national loyalty, to the point of its complete disappearance among some, in favor of sectarian leaders, powerful families, and foreign allegiances.

The behavior of the ruling elite, described by its opponents as a “sectarian and financial oligarchy,” has revolved around a policy designed to keep individuals dependent on political leaders in every essential aspect of their lives: employment, education, healthcare, and even dealing with a possible legal violation. Individuals must seek the leader’s intervention to obtain, as personal favors, rights that should already be guaranteed to them, thereby ensuring their continued dependence.

This policy has a name: “clientelism,” which has gradually become a standard mechanism of sociopolitical behavior.

This mechanism relies on another essential pillar that sustains it and operates alongside it: traditional political leadership. Through intermediaries and allies, traditional leaders exchange services at every level, including social, economic, administrative, and healthcare services, in return for political loyalty and the support of their followers and party members.

Since traditional leadership rests on the allegiance of members of a religious community to their leader, the sectarian community has become the obligatory intermediary between the dependent individual and the state.

The ruling political class has thus appropriated state resources and redirected them toward its own interests through “parliamentary and ministerial clientelism,” commonly known as muhasasa, or the distribution of state resources and positions among political factions, to benefit sectarian funds, councils, and patronage networks.

This system of “compulsory intermediation” consequently became institutionalized, transforming rights into acts of generosity and charity and preventing the establishment of a direct legal relationship between the individual and the state.

Weakening Institutional Competence and Losing Rights

The authorities deliberately weakened the competence and effectiveness of public administrations, government hospitals, and public schools. The purpose of this structural weakening of state institutions was to force citizens to turn to a political “leader” or sectarian party to secure a hospital bed, a public-sector job, or an educational scholarship.

Access to public employment or medical treatment was no longer regarded as a citizen’s right vis-à-vis the state to which taxes were paid. These rights became “services” that citizens had to beg for from political leaders, turning them into “clients” within the leader’s empire, supported by family and sectarian loyalties. Anyone who steps outside the protection of their family also loses the safety net it provides to those who remain loyal to the family and its political leader.

Submission to Religious Authorities in Matters of Life and Death

Paragraph (c) of the preamble to the Constitution, added in 1990 under the Taif Agreement, states:

“Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, foremost among them freedom of opinion and belief, on social justice, and on equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination or preference.”

This is followed by Article 9, which maintains the individual’s subordination to their religious community and its spiritual and denominational authorities. Although this constitutional article guarantees absolute freedom of conscience, it also stipulates that the state “shall also guarantee that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious community they belong, shall be respected.”

Citizens are thereby required to return to the fold of their religious communities in matters of personal status: marriage, birth, death, and inheritance. In other words, they are placed entirely under the authority of religious leaders. Political leaders have thus handed the entire “social body” over to the clergy of the various religious communities and denominations instead of adopting a unified civil law establishing equality among Lebanese citizens.

What, then, has become of the equality proclaimed in paragraph (c)? How can this article, which divides Lebanese citizens along sectarian and denominational lines in the most fundamental matters of their lives and existence, be reconciled with Article 7, which states: “All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights and are equally bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction”?

The principle of “equality before the law” has thus effectively been nullified.

Citizenship has become fragmented. The rights of women and children, as well as inheritance rights, change simply by crossing from one religious denomination to another. This has entrenched in individuals’ minds the belief that their fundamental protection comes from their religious community, which possesses its own legislation, rather than from a state that is absent as a unified legislative authority.

Politics as Private Property

Another dynamic has consolidated the authority of the kings and princes of the sectarian communities: hereditary succession within political families, rooted in political feudalism, which has turned politics into a profession passed down like private property.

Since the Lebanese state’s establishment, a political class composed of ruling families has become entrenched, passing power down through generations as though it were private property. The same family names repeatedly appear in political office. Before the civil war, politicians generally came from the feudal establishment. After the war and the conclusion of the Taif Agreement, power passed into the hands of warlords. Political positions in Lebanon thus became a form of “inherited family assets,” or fell under the control of armed political parties.

Exclusive Agencies and Monopolies

The dominance of powerful families is reinforced through control over prices rather than through commercial superiority. Lebanese law protects what are known as “exclusive agencies”: monopolies established by law that prohibit the importation of certain brands when they have a local agent registered with the Ministry of Economy. Likewise, bank financing remains concentrated in the hands of certain families, which are themselves partners or shareholders represented on bank boards of directors.

These powerful cartels are distributed among a limited number of families across essential sectors: oil, energy, and food; automobiles and heavy equipment; medical supplies and pharmaceuticals; major family-owned industries; and construction materials.

Each of these sectors enjoys sectarian and political protection. Whenever someone attempts to introduce competition, a sectarian veto intervenes under the pretext of defending the community’s rights. In reality, financial sharks and political leaders provide mutual protection.

This explains the hereditary transmission of parliamentary seats and ministerial portfolios from one generation to the next. The situation has not changed with the rise of certain militia-derived or sectarian parties, which have reproduced the same behavior, accompanied by an excessive personalization of power.

Lebanese citizens have consequently developed the feeling that they are governed not by a state that can be questioned and held accountable, but by “sectarian and political fiefdoms” closed to any change. The notion of subjects rather than citizens has thus reemerged, with sons and grandsons pledging allegiance to perpetuate domination and monopoly.

Any reform or transformation in Lebanon therefore requires not only placing weapons exclusively under state authority and combating political corruption, but also dismantling the monopolistic structure on which the Lebanese economy rests and allowing free economic competition.

Mobilization and Subservience to Foreign Powers

To preserve the cohesion of their popular bases and their loyalty to sectarian leadership, those who control Lebanese politics have resorted to a mobilization mechanism based on the “continuous production of fear of the other.”

This has produced a second pillar sustaining the loyalty of each community’s followers: the exploitation of a “sectarian siege mentality.”

Every leader adopts a narrative suggesting that another religious community, although a partner in the same homeland, is seeking to eliminate us, reduce our share of the benefits distributed by the state, or change Lebanon’s civilizational character.

Each community has consequently sought alliances with regional powers and blocs to confront this alleged siege. Foreign powers have been invited to intervene against domestic partners, becoming instruments of leverage wielded by sectarian communities in the struggle to maintain internal balances.

Farewell to Citizenship

“Fear” of other communities, which are constantly suspected of seeking to “take away part of our share,” has thus become the driving force behind elections.

When such fear becomes the principal motivation for voting, candidates and parties no longer need political, economic, or environmental programs. Everyone adopts the same reasoning: we vote for this side because it represents a “protective shield” against other religious communities.

All of this has obstructed the emergence of a unifying national sentiment based on loyalty to the homeland. Lebanese citizens vote according to their sectarian allegiances and, behind them, their cross-border loyalties to regional powers.

The Absence of a Common Civic Education Textbook and the Obscuring of Shared Memory

There is also the absence of a common national civic education textbook, which the authorities have failed to produce over the years. Shared historical memory has thus been deliberately obscured, while political leaders have avoided confronting their own conduct during the civil war.

They have left the teaching of history to private, religious, and sectarian schools, as well as missionary institutions. Each group glorifies its own heroes and condemns those of others, making the construction of a shared national memory, essential to genuine citizenship, almost inconceivable.

Hezbollah’s Capture of State Functions

At a certain stage, following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Syrian army’s return to its own country, a new actor entered Lebanon’s political landscape: Hezbollah.

This additional actor provided structural support to the political establishment by weaving networks of mutual interests and dependencies with it through a series of gradual steps that ultimately proved entirely successful.

What were those steps?

Beginning in 2006, a new model of governance emerged, using the “traditional sectarian oligarchy” to inherit Syrian hegemony.

It exercised a form of “dual hegemony,” combining a surplus of power, based on military weapons and calculated violence, with clientelist pragmatism rooted in exchanges of mutual interests with the elites.

The Mechanism of Decisive Violence and Deterrence

The party did not adopt the model of direct military presence used by Syria. Instead, it employed different forms of targeted violence, ranging from assassinations to the occupation of public squares through sit-ins and open confrontations between 2006 and 2008.

It then escalated its offensive on May 7, a date marking a major turning point in its conduct, when it turned its weapons inward.

It subsequently imposed a constitutional veto within the Council of Ministers after obtaining the blocking third under the Doha Agreement.

Eventually, merely deploying the “black shirts” became sufficient. A subdued message of terror could impose political change in Lebanon. Elections were no longer the determining force.

Intimidation Through Assassination

This process was accompanied by a series of assassinations targeting political and security figures opposed to the party. After Rafik Hariri, army commander François al-Hajj was assassinated, as were Mohammad Chatah, Wissam Hassan, Wissam Eid, and eventually Lokman Slim.

Following attempts to obstruct the military court, the party moved to threatening the judiciary directly and publicly, notably through Wafiq Safa. It thus imposed its own “absolute criminal and security immunity,” placing itself above the Lebanese state and its laws.

The Grand Bargain: Weapons in Exchange for Political Office and Corruption

This marked the broadest and deepest entanglement with the ruling elites: an unwritten historical arrangement that came to be summed up in the following formula: you keep the political offices and benefits, while I keep the weapons, the authority to decide on war and peace, and control over the borders, including maritime border delimitation.

The 2006 Mar Mikhael Agreement and Christian Cover

The alliance with Michel Aoun constituted a fundamental pillar of Hezbollah’s strategy, providing Christian political cover for its weapons and its wars beyond Lebanon’s borders.

The overwhelming power it had acquired enabled it to impose Michel Aoun’s election after a deliberately prolonged presidential vacuum lasting more than two years.

Protecting Corruption: The Cornerstone of Political Control

The party exploited its participation in executive power to consolidate its control over essential service-providing ministries.

It also voted in favor of budgets and financial policies that led to the collapse.

It used corruption cases, which it had deliberately overlooked, to blackmail the political class, both opponents and allies. Files involving corruption, the looting of public funds, and policies that entrenched the collapse became instruments for ensuring their complete obedience and submission.

These files, kept close at hand by the party’s MP Hassan Fadlallah, became a “hangman’s noose” hanging over anyone who dared challenge the party’s weapons.

The Final Link in the Chain of Domination: Legal and Constitutional Engineering Through the 2017 Electoral Law

The imposition of an electoral law based on proportional representation, preferential voting, and a particular division of electoral districts enabled the party to establish complete control over Parliament.

Soleimani subsequently declared that he had 74 deputies in the Lebanese Parliament.

Parliament was transformed into a legislative machine designed to confer legal legitimacy on the party’s choices and, behind it, those of Iran.

The Canton and Parallel Networks

The party’s penetration of state institutions facilitated the construction of parallel infrastructure networks across Lebanese territory, stripping the state of its sovereignty.

It built a nationwide wired and wireless telecommunications network operating beyond the oversight of the Ministry of Telecommunications.

It also imposed a firm security and intelligence grip on the country’s official entry points: Beirut airport, the port, and the land border crossings with Syria.

This control enabled it to exercise authority over movements into and out of the country while providing channels for smuggling money and weapons without oversight.

Clientelism

Hezbollah succeeded in consolidating its hold over the Shia community through a powerful clientelist system that surpassed that of the traditional political class.

While the already fragile state was being plundered, leading to its collapse and the paralysis of public service institutions, the party was developing its own parallel institutions: Al-Qard al-Hassan, Jihad al-Bina, healthcare and educational establishments, and even recreational organizations, including scouting groups and religious trips, as well as food assistance and material support networks financed by Iran.

This deepened sectarian divisions and transformed the Shia community into a “closed society” dependent on the party for the necessities of daily life.

Instead of receiving services directly from the state, citizens came to receive them through the party. It should not be forgotten that Hezbollah deliberately sought to monopolize service-providing ministries.

In this way, it undermined loyalty to the state by consolidating allegiance to the party and, behind it, to Iran.

The inevitable result was Hezbollah’s transformation into a state within a state, to the point that the mini-state swallowed the state itself.

Citizenship thus became a dream for younger generations, driven to emigrate in search of safety.