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An Eye on the Event

Declaration toward Peace: From the Balance of Power to Global Responsibility (I)

Three Great Powers and Three Sources of Power

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(Photo by Sergei BOBYLYOV / POOL / AFP)
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Published Nov 22, 2026 - 03:49

My recent visit to China was not merely an opportunity to discover a country undergoing enormous economic, urban and technological transformations. It also allowed me to observe some of the smaller details of everyday life and to try to understand the social culture and vision of the future underlying these transformations.

At one point during my visit, I went to a panda park, where I witnessed the birth of panda triplets and observed the public interest generated by the event, as well as the way visitors responded to it. I was struck by the orderly way people moved around, their respect for the surroundings and nature, and their concern not to disrupt the order of the protected park. These were simple scenes, yet they revealed something about society’s relationship with public space and the organisation that makes collective life more harmonious.

In Shenzhen, where the trilateral conference between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin took place, I encountered another illustration of China’s transformation. This modern city, whose remarkable development began in a small border town, has become one of the world’s leading economic and technological centres in less than half a century.

Shenzhen was founded in 1979 and became China’s first special economic zone the following year. Today, its permanent population exceeds 17 million, with an average age of approximately 32 and a half. Its experience encapsulates China’s ability to transform itself from a traditional agricultural economy into a major industrial and technological power, and to build modern cities within a relatively short period.

These observations invite reflection on the meaning and sources of power. The world in which the three powers whose leaders gathered in Shenzhen operate is not governed by the military balance of power alone. Technology, economics, knowledge, natural resources and military capabilities are intertwined, as is the ability of societies to renew themselves and shape the future.

Perhaps the question we should begin with is this: What does each of these three powers possess, and what does each lack? Do the United States, China and Russia draw on equivalent sources of power, or does each have distinct strengths and face limitations that it cannot easily overcome?

The United States: Technological Superiority and Global Influence

The United States remains the world’s foremost superpower, with an integrated system bringing together technological, financial and military superiority, universities, research centres, major corporations and a network of international alliances.

It is a leader not only in defence industries but also in digital technologies, artificial intelligence and advanced chip design. It possesses an exceptional ability to transform scientific knowledge into products, markets and companies with global influence.

The dollar and the US financial system also constitute one of its principal sources of influence, alongside its naval and air power, its extensive military presence and Washington’s strategic ties with Europe, Asia and other regions of the world.

Yet this power does not mean that the country is without weaknesses. Political and social polarisation, economic inequality, crises of confidence in institutions and the decline of certain segments of the industrial base are all challenges affecting the United States’ ability to maintain its lead at the same pace.

American power continues to rest on an extensive global system, but for the first time in decades, it faces an economic and technological competitor capable of challenging essential components of that system.

China: Production, Modernisation and the Power to Shape the Future

China presents a different model of power. It has attained its international standing not through military superiority alone, but by building an enormous productive and industrial base and investing over the long term in infrastructure, education, scientific research and technology.

China has become a major centre of global manufacturing and a key player in the production of electric vehicles, batteries, solar energy equipment, high-speed rail systems, telecommunications equipment and industrial machinery. It has also acquired considerable influence over global supply chains and the processing of rare metals required by advanced technology industries.

What stands out in China’s experience is not merely the scale of its production, but its ability to combine planning, investment and implementation, and to transform cities into centres of production and innovation. Shenzhen is a prominent example. No longer simply a manufacturing and export hub, it has become an integrated ecosystem for technology companies, research and development.

Nevertheless, China has yet to achieve overall superiority over the United States. It continues to face difficulties in producing the most advanced semiconductors, as well as some of the essential equipment and software required for chip manufacturing and artificial intelligence. It is, however, working to narrow this gap and investing vast resources in achieving technological independence.

This is one of the principal areas of competition between the two countries: the United States seeks to preserve its lead in advanced technologies, while China strives to convert its productive and scientific strength into an independent capacity for innovation and leadership in the industries of the future.

Russia: Deterrence, Resources and Strategic Capabilities

The nature of Russia’s power differs from that of the United States and China. Its economy is not comparable in size to those of the United States and China, nor does it compete with them on an equal footing in most civilian technology industries. Yet it retains sources of strategic power that make its position within the international system impossible to ignore.

Foremost among these are its nuclear arsenal, which rivals that of the United States, its vast territory, its natural and energy resources, its military capabilities, its defence and space industries, and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States and Russia together possess approximately 86 per cent of the world’s nuclear warheads, while China’s arsenal remains considerably smaller, despite its rapid expansion and modernisation.

Russia’s problem, however, lies in the gap between the country’s potential and resources and its ability to harness them to build a modern, diversified economy capable of competing in civilian technologies, advanced industries and large-scale innovation.

Russia possesses significant scientific and engineering traditions, as well as considerable nuclear, space and military capabilities. However, it has not succeeded in building an economic and technological system comparable to that established by the United States or the one China is striving to develop. Its heavy reliance on exports of oil, gas and raw materials, as well as on its military and nuclear power, remains one of the clearest manifestations of the imbalance between its potential and its economic and technological standing.

Three Different Sources of Power

A comparison of the three countries reveals three distinct models, with different elements of power and unequal limitations.

The United States enjoys technological, financial and military superiority, together with extensive global influence. China possesses growing productive and industrial strength and an exceptional capacity for modernisation and technological expansion, while Russia relies on nuclear deterrence, natural resources, military capabilities and its geopolitical position.

This distinction does not mean that each country has a monopoly over a particular field or is incapable of competing in other areas. China is a rising nuclear and military power, the United States is a major industrial and scientific power, and Russia retains significant technological and scientific capabilities. Nevertheless, the differences in their respective levels of performance remain evident and influence the nature of the role each country can play in the world.

This helps explain why competition among the three powers is asymmetrical. China competes with the United States in economics, industry and technology, yet it continues to lag far behind both the United States and Russia in the size of its nuclear arsenal. Russia can assert its presence in international strategic and security calculations, but lacks the economic and technological base that would enable it to compete with the other two powers across the various sectors that will shape the future.

This disparity is one of the essential keys to understanding the trilateral meeting and the declaration toward peace issued in Shenzhen.

The three leaders did not meet because their countries are equal in power, but because each possesses assets that make sidelining it or disregarding its interests extremely costly for the others. The United States cannot ignore China’s rise, China cannot build its future in isolation from the global economic and technological system, and Russia cannot be excluded from international security arrangements given its nuclear, military and strategic capabilities.

Yet understanding the sources and limitations of power alone is insufficient to explain the transformation under discussion. The more important question is this: Why are these powers moving towards dialogue and mutual understanding despite their continuing rivalry and conflicting interests?

Is this a matter of redistributing influence, or of a shared recognition that policies of deterrence, pressure and sanctions are no longer capable, on their own, of achieving the desired balances of power?

This is what we will seek to unravel in the second part, by examining shifts in US strategy towards China, efforts to end the war in Ukraine and the limits of the use of force in the Middle East, ultimately considering the declaration toward peace as a possible avenue for managing international rivalry rather than sliding into confrontation.

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