"Yemen Dawn": A Turning Point with Lasting Consequences (2)

II - Where Next?

The transformation represented by Operation “Yemen Dawn” cannot be understood solely through its immediate military results, nor is it enough to examine the declared positions of the parties involved in the war. The issue extends beyond the battlefield to the reshaping of regional balances, the future of Yemen, and its place in Arab security arrangements and international maritime routes.

A comparison between “Yemen Dawn” and Operation “Decisive Storm” in 2015 perhaps reveals the extent of the changes that have occurred in the nature and objectives of the war. At the time, Saudi Arabia entered the conflict with the stated aim of restoring legitimacy and preventing the Houthis from taking control of the Yemeni state, relying on overwhelming military superiority and a regional coalition. Yet years of warfare have demonstrated that military superiority is insufficient to settle a conflict in which internal divisions are intertwined with regional calculations, and where geography becomes a source of power no less important than weapons.

Today, the calculations appear more complex. Riyadh is no longer confronting a local adversary with limited capabilities, but a force that has gained combat experience, acquired military technologies, and succeeded in exploiting Yemen’s geographical position to exert pressure on its opponents. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become more aware of the cost of an open-ended war and the risks posed by continuing threats to its borders, vital facilities, and the security of navigation in the Red Sea.

The question, therefore, concerns not only what the operation might achieve militarily, but whether it will lay the foundations for a different phase that brings the logic of attrition to an end, or instead trigger another round of warfare involving more dangerous means.

Saudi Arabia: Between a Decisive Outcome and a Reordering of Regional Balances

Saudi Arabia faces a test that goes beyond regaining the military initiative. The success of any initiative is measured not only by its ability to inflict losses on the Houthis, but also by its ability to prevent them from rebuilding their strength and deprive them of the use of Yemeni territory as a platform from which to threaten the kingdom and maritime routes.

Achieving this, however, requires more than military pressure. The fundamental question concerns the political alternative capable of filling the vacuum, and whether the Yemeni forces opposed to the Houthis can overcome their differences and put forward a state-building project that transcends local and factional interests.

Here lies one of the problems of the previous experience: objectives multiplied, allies differed in their priorities, while the establishment of a Yemeni authority capable of unifying the country remained a goal repeatedly postponed. If this pattern is repeated, battlefield gains may be achieved without producing lasting stability.

Iran and the Houthis: The Limits of Influence and Decision-Making Autonomy

The position of the Houthis cannot be separated from their relationship with Iran. Yet reducing the Yemeni movement to an Iranian instrument overlooks its local roots, its own interests, and its ability to make decisions shaped by its internal calculations.

Tehran benefits from the presence of an allied force near Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, enabling it to extend its regional leverage and raise the cost of confrontation for its opponents. This influence, however, does not necessarily mean that Iran controls every Houthi decision or that it can guarantee the outcome of any escalation.

Tehran may regard continued confrontation as a means of increasing its negotiating leverage, but it may also find itself facing the risks of a wider war, particularly if the operations turn into a direct threat to international shipping or American interests.

For their part, the Houthis face an equally complex equation: escalation may give them the ability to secure a place in any settlement, but it simultaneously increases the cost of war for Yemeni society and raises the likelihood of their capabilities and the territories under their control being targeted. Between local considerations and Iranian calculations, the question of how independently the Houthis make their decisions remains an essential factor in determining the course of the next phase.

The United Arab Emirates and the South: Conflicting Objectives

Any reading of the Yemeni situation would be incomplete without examining the Emirati role, particularly in the south, along the coast, and in the ports. Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates share interests in confronting the Houthis, they do not necessarily share the same vision of Yemen’s future and its political structure.

Emirati calculations are tied to the security of maritime routes and ports, as well as to Abu Dhabi’s relations with southern forces whose political projects differ from that of a unified Yemeni state. This reveals a fundamental contradiction: will military operations unify the anti-Houthi front, or will they revive the divisions among its components?

Weakening the Houthis, if not accompanied by a Saudi-Emirati understanding on the structure of the future government, could open the door to new struggles over influence, resources, and ports. The problem would then lie not in a lack of military power, but in the absence of a political project capable of turning that power into stability.

Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea: The International Dimension of the War

Yemen’s geographical position gives the conflict dimensions extending far beyond its borders. Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a maritime passage, but a vital link in the movement of trade and energy between Asia and Europe. Any sustained threat to shipping through the strait confronts international powers with direct security and economic concerns.

In this context, an expansion of the confrontation could lead to greater foreign intervention, but it could also push the parties toward a settlement driven by international interests in safeguarding freedom of navigation and preventing the Red Sea from becoming an open-ended arena of conflict.

This is where Oman’s importance comes into focus, given its communication channels and experience in mediation, alongside the American role, which may fluctuate between supporting military pressure and seeking to contain escalation. International interests, however, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Yemeni people. Major powers may content themselves with securing maritime routes without addressing the causes of the war or the country’s internal divisions.

What Lies Ahead: Between a Political Settlement and Attrition

Three main paths can be envisaged for the next phase.

The first would see military operations succeed in altering the balance of power, opening the way to more serious negotiations that would compel the Houthis to abandon the use of force to impose their choices and allow state institutions to be rebuilt on the basis of national partnership.

The second would involve a reduction in the intensity of military operations without a decisive outcome, returning the war to a pattern of mutual attrition, with Yemen’s divisions and its multiple centers of influence remaining in place. This possibility cannot be ruled out, given the experience of previous years and the parties’ ability to adapt to losses.

The third would be a regional expansion of the confrontation, carrying risks for Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea, and international interests, and turning Yemen into another arena for settling regional scores. Such a course could lead to broader interventions without guaranteeing a more stable political solution.

There is, however, another possibility, dependent on the parties’ ability to learn the lessons of the previous experience: that military pressure becomes a means of reaching a political settlement rather than an end in itself. This would require a regional consensus capable of preventing the war from being perpetuated, along with understandings among Yemenis that address the southern question, restore the role of state institutions, and put an end to the proliferation of armies and centers of decision-making.

Ultimately, the Yemeni people must not be absent from the calculations shaping their country’s future. Yemeni society has paid an enormous price in resources, stability, and unity, while the state has remained unable to provide even the minimum standards of security, services, and rights.

“Yemen Dawn” may represent a turning point with lasting consequences, but it will not become one merely because the front lines shift. The real test lies in the ability to move from managing the war to ending it, and from temporary balances of power to building a state capable of protecting its sovereignty and unifying its society.

For the ultimate measure is not who prevails in a military confrontation, but who can end the war, rebuild the state, and restore the Yemenis’ right to determine their own future.